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Abstract 
The Republic of Lebanon came into existence in 1920. Prior to this Lebanon 
was traditionally referred to Mount Lebanon. The geographic boundaries of Mount 
Lebanon included that part of the present Lebanese territory which extends roughly 
from the Lebanon mountain ranges to the sea excluding Beirut and the regions of 
Tripoli and Sidon. Mount Lebanon was in the main happened to be the ancestral home 
of two important religious sects - the Maronites and the Druzes. 
Lebanese multi-sectarian character under Ottoman rule (1516-1916) was 
well established as powerful Druze, Muslim,, and Maronite feudal lords 
controlling authority over certain tracts of land in Mount Lebanon. They enjoyed 
a high degree of autonomy as long as taxes were paid to the Ottoman authorities. 
After World War I and the defeat of the Ottomans by the Allied Powers, 
the League of Nations granted to France, mandatory authority over Greater 
Syria, an area that included present-day Lebanon. As a result of Lebanon's years 
under the French Mandate (1920-1943), the Constitution enacted in 1926 was 
fashioned after that of the French Third Republic. Article 95 of this constitution, 
however, was unique in that it provided for "balanced" confessional 
representation in government. In 1943 the provisions of this article were spelled 
out more clearly by unwritten agreements between Maronite and Sunni leaders. 
These agreements came to be known as the National Pact. 
Since the emergence of the post-1943 state, Lebanon's national policy has 
been determined largely by a relatively restricted group of traditional, regional 
and sectarian leaders. The 1943 National Pact allocated political power on an 
essentially confessional system, based on the 1932 census. The confessional 
(sectarian) representation was subsequently adopted not only in the house of 
deputies (parliament), but also in the distribution of key political offices. This 
confessional political system though worked relatively well for several decades 
on the surface, is also characterized by significant weaknesses in the system. In 
this system distribution of political offices was based upon the census of 1932, 
whose validity was questioned by many. As such, the system was overtly rigid, 
and did not adjust the demographic change, because the communities' leaders at 
the time of the National Pact could only agree on a system for 1943 (Lebanon's 
independent), and not for the future. Under the situation where on Sunnis were 
prepared to reject the possibility that Lebanon and Syria would eventually unite 
and Christians were not prepared to establish a system that might eventually 
subordinate the Christian community in a Muslim state, the seats in parliament 
were divided on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims. 
The 1943 National Pact as adopted laid down four principles. 
1. Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. The Christian 
communities were to cease identifying with the West; in return, the 
Muslim communities were to protect the independence of Lebanon 
and prevent its merger with any Arab state. 
2. Although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its official 
language, it could not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with 
the West, which had helped it attain such a notable degree of 
progress. 
3. Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate 
with the other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, it 
should not side with one state against another. 
4. Public offices should be distributed proportionally among the 
recognized religious groups, but in technical positions preference 
should be given to competence without regard to confessional 
considerations. 
Moreover, according to this accord the top government positions should be 
distributed as follows: the President of Republic should be a Maronite; the Prime 
Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shiite 
Muslim; the Deputy Speaker, Greek Orthodox; the Defense Minister, Druze; and the 
Commander of the Military, Maronite Christian. 
The confessional system as outlined in the National Pact was a matter of 
expediency, an interim measure to overcome philosophical divisions between 
Christian and Muslim leaders at independence. It was hoped that once the 
business of governance got under way, and as national spirit grew, the 
importance of confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. Over 
the years, however, the frequent political disputes - the most notable of which 
were manifested in Arab-Israeli War, the 1958 Civil War, the Palestinian 
controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1975 Civil War - bear stark 
testimony to the repeated failures of the National Pact as a means toward 
societal integration. 
Although the National Pact embodied a domestic understanding that 
allowed Lebanon to proceed to independence, pro-West versus pro-Arab 
orientations continued to divide the Lebanese on the question of their state's 
identity and, by extension, its foreign policy. These domestic differences, 
containable in 1943, became increasingly explosive as various conflicts erupted 
across the West Asia (i.e., the Arab-Israeli conflict [1948 and after], the various 
inter-Arab cold war, and the US-USSR Cold War [with its posturing by proxy 
in the West Asia]). 
Part of Lebanon's internal rift, therefore, was fashioned by different 
perceptions of Lebanon's security needs and its foreign policy directions -
especially its obligations to Arab causes. This cleavage was overlaid by another 
contentious debate concerning political representation and power sharing. 
Throughout the 1970s, therefore, Lebanon's governing elite faced two 
mounting challenges: rising political, social, and economic discontent and 
increasing disruptions caused by external actors (especially the Palestinians and 
Israel). These proved more than Lebanon's fragile political system could 
manage. The rigidity of Lebanon's political organization - its sectarian quotas 
and its inability to allow for peaceful change - rendered it unstable and 
contributed to both the war's eruption and continuation. 
Moreover, the sectarian system contributed more to the state's weakness 
than to its strength. Rather than bolstering Lebanese citizens' allegiance to the 
state, the sectarian system encouraged the Lebanese to identify with their sects, 
or alienated them altogether. This tendency, in combination with high levels of 
internal dissatisfaction and the historical ties linking Lebanon's communal 
groups with outside powers, prompted many sectarian and political groups to 
look to foreign sponsors for backing in domestic power struggles. 
Concomitantly, foreign patrons pursuing their own regional or international 
agendas were eager to sponsor Lebanese clients. In brief, this perilous patron-
client symbiosis resulted in a proliferation of sub-state foreign policies that 
embroiled outside powers in Lebanon's domestic turmoil and entangled 
Lebanon in wider regional conflicts. Lebanon's vulnerability to regional 
influences, as Lebanese clients and their foreign patrons joined (often very 
briefly) to pursue their own shifting agendas, contributed substantially to the 
war's complexity and intractability. 
This overview provides some sense of the issues that coalesced into 
uncontainable conflict in the 1970s, issues that must be addressed if Lebanon is 
to secure lasting stability in the twenty first century. Although Lebanon after 
Taif is no longer at war, it is not yet at peace. Lebanon's future remains hostage 
to myriad interconnected political socioeconomic, psychological, and regional 
challenges. The need to surmount these challenges - despite Lebanon's 
•'peace" - is the reason why the present study is undertaken. It is in this context 
that the study is aimed at exploring the views expressed by Lebanese people from six 
communities (Maronite, Catholic, Orthodox, Druze, Sunni, and Shiite) regarding 
important political issues in their country, notably in the context of local and 
regional level which includes the role of neighbouring countries such as Syria, Israel, 
Iran and the all other related issues such as influx of Palestinians into Lebanon etc. 
and its fall out on the internal politics of the country. The study also discusses the 
concern of Lebanese people as far the role of external powers specially the US 
affecting the institutions of their country. 
The literature on contemporary Lebanon is rich. However, it is interesting to 
note that the historians, the comparative social scientists, the orientalists and those 
who have most systematically studied Lebanon for the most part have had different 
concerns. The answer to the fundamental question i.e. Lebanon's unity and integrity, 
however, requires more than a generalized account of recent Lebanese history but a 
more focused study of Lebanon's traditional confessional culture, power sharing and 
the task of adjusting it to modem world. 
Hence, this study is important in the sense that it attempts to provide an 
integrative and analytical description to understand the nature of contemporary 
Lebanon - which is an update on politics and society from the point of view of 
institution building. The study also attempts to explore the nature of Lebanese 
polity and briefly discusses the course of political evolution since its inception. 
While attempting to these issues the study will try to answer the 
following questions: 
1. How far confessional political model is successful in Lebanon? 
helpful 
2. To what extent civil society organizations are;^  towards the 
institution building in Lebanon? 
3. Whether the emergences of different political parties are in line 
to the plural democratic system in Lebanon? 
4. Whether the pluralist confessional constitutional model as 
envisaged in 1943 is appropriate in achieving domestic peace 
and inter-communal trust? 
5. To what extent regional or international actors are responsible for the 
present state of affaiijin Lebanon? 
6. How to consider Lebanon's modem history in light of the war and 
what likely way out may be possible to this end? 
The concern is to find answers to these basic questions with an attempt 
to identify the main causes of civil strife in Lebanon. The intention is to provide 
forward looking analysis i.e. Lebanon's current conditions, but also its future 
needs. 
In so doing, this study is concentrated on describing and analyzing four 
distinct areas, in the form of study chapters: (1) Lebanon: Genesis and 
Development, (2) The Foundations of Parliamentary Politics in Post-
Independence Lebanon, (3) Conflict in Lebanon: the Israel, Syria, and 
Palestinian Factor, and (4) 1989 Taif Accord and Conflict Resolution - leading 
to significant conclusions about the over-all phenomenon of contemporary 
confessional system as ingrained in the Lebanese political culture and power 
sharing which is influenced and affected by the recent years of turmoil. 
The methodology followed in this study is inductive, analytical and 
descriptive. To get reliable and objective information, the study relied both on 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included documents published 
by governments and other international organizations. The secondary sources 
included newspapers, electronic media, books, periodicals, journals and research 
reports related to the area of the study. 
The first chapter deals with the historical background to the formation of 
State of Lebanon. It traces the evolution of the Maronite ideas to create the Christian 
state among the Arab countries. It is in this context that the French mandatory policy 
and the events leading for the struggle of independence, the characteristics of National 
Pact are also discussed and examined in detail. 
The second chapter discusses the confessional system in terms of the power 
sharing, distribution of offices, as practiced in Lebanon. The characteristics and 
unique features of the religious and sectarian communities (nation's diverse ethnic-
religious groups) are also discussed in detail. The chapter also examines the 
development and evolution of the Lebanese political parties and forces - operating in 
the Christian camp (Right), Muslim camp (Left), including minority parties in detail. 
The last section of this chapter tries to analyse the ideas of nationalism and Lebanese 
identity which continue to influence Lebanese society even today. 
The third chapter focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on 
Lebanon as a continual battlefield of both internal forces and foreign powers. It is in 
this context that the role of external powers including the UN in Lebanon's internal 
affairs is also discussed. The chapter also examines the causes that led to the Civil 
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War of 1958 and of 1975-76 in Lebanon which claimed many lives and destroyed the 
social and political fabric of the country. The last section of this chapter discusses the 
Riyadh - Cairo Arab Summit Conferences 1976 and subsequent major events until 
1988 and its fall out on the Lebanese polity. 
The fourth chapter deals the Taif Accord in detail and its impact to end the 
second Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). The chapter highlights the attempts of Rafiq 
Hariri in rebuilding the Lebanese economy after the Civil War. The chapter also 
discusses the various peace initiations (Madrid Conference, Oslo Accord and Beirut 
Summit) in which Lebanon participated for a meaningful dialogue. The last section of 
this chapter analyses the contemporary political situation in Lebanon. 
The last of the concluding chapter brings together the distinctive aspects 
of Lebanese political culture of confessionalism, its varied dimensions resulting 
to Civil War. This section also attempts to investigate and analyse the Lebanese 
polity in the post-Taif Accord 1989 and its future. This chapter also attempts to 
discuss and to propose some seemingly appropriate ideas and the ways of 
settling conflict in Lebanon. 
But in an important sense this study remains preliminary. It is an attempt to 
understand the Lebanon's contemporary political culture in right perspective and 
possibly to provide the meaningful suggestions for its rejuvenation. 
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Dr. Ghulam Mursaleen for their critical and timely suggestions towards the 
completion of this study. I am also grateful to the Library staff of the Centre of West 
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Panjab University Library, Panjab, for providing literature on the research subject. 
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Preface 
Lebanon is a small country in the West Asia with 3,925,502 inhabitants. It was 
once recognized as an example of Muslim-Christian coexistence. The institutions with 
which the country endowed itself permitted Lebanon to deal with its religious 
diversity rather successfully (17 different communities with Shiite, Sunni, Druze, 
Catholic, Orthodox, and Maronite being the largest). 
The confessional system is the term used to designate the political system that 
has been in force in Lebanon since 1926. The roots of confessionalism go back to the 
millet system formed in the Ottoman Empire as early as the sixteenth century. The 
Confessionalism is a system of government that proportionally distributes political 
and institutional power among religious and ethnic communities. At the time of 
Lebanon's independence from France in 1943, the National Pact, a gentlemen's 
agreement between the country's Maronite Christian President Bishara al-Khouri and 
his Suimi Muslim Prime Minister Reyad al-Sulh, consecrated this confessional 
formula. Religious communities were allocated specific political posts. Thus, it was 
agreed that the President of the Republic was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime 
Minister a Surmi Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shiite Muslim. Other lower 
political posts were also assigned according to this formula. Representation in 
parhament was set according to a ratio of 6:5 in favour of the Christians. The Taif 
Agreement of 1989, which officially ended the iong-ruiming civil war, reasserted the 
confessional formula for the governance but amended parliamentary representation to 
a 50:50 Christian/Muslim ratio. 
While the original confessional formula was good for civic peace and gradual 
democratic development, it created other problems. Having all kinds of religious 
communities meant an eventual extension of regional politics into domestic affairs. 
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While the Muslims in general wanted close relations with their Arab, mostly Muslim, 
neighbours, the Christians wanted to maintain close relations with the West despite 
their Arab identity. 
However, in the early 1970s, the changing demographics of the country 
(Muslims began to out-number Christians), the intensification of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict (over 300,000 Palestinians living in refugee camps in Lebanon were 
demanding the right to fight Israel across Lebanese borders), and economic crises, 
which polarized the country's population more than ever between haves and have-
nots, coalesced to severely test the formula. Ultimately, the pressure became so great 
that civil war broke out 
The war was a manifestation of regional conflicts. These antagonisms-some of 
them between Arabs, other between Arabs and Israelis-played out in Lebanon because 
the absence of strong central government there facilitated external interference and 
the flow of weapons, both of which fed a bloodbath lasting nearly two decades. 
The Taif Accord, signed in 1990, stopped the war between Lebanese-Muslims 
and Lebanese-Christians. This Accord placed some constitutional reforms, and 
implicitly justified and endorsed the Syrian and Palestinian presence in the country. 
The Accord caused divisions among Christians and a new war, this time between 
Christian factions, setting those who accepted part of the accords and those who 
rejected it completely against each other. Although, the war was stopped, some 
observers contend it continues even today albeit in a non-military manner. On the 
surface, the war appeared to be an internal conflict, but it was far more than that. 
Today, confessional politics is again at the centre of the country's political and 
economic problems that could threaten the civic peace prevailing since the end of 
Lebanon's civil war. While Lebanon has always had democratic politics and 
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practices, it has never really had full democracy. Its sectarian politics allows 
interference from outside actors, specifically Iran, Israel, Syria, and the United States. 
Thus, Lebanese government v^ as blamed for inviting outsiders to interfere and settle 
scores on Lebanese soil. 
While attempting to these issues the study will try to answer the 
following questions: 
1. How far confessional political model is successful in Lebanon? 
helpful 
2. To what extent civil society organizations are^ towards the 
institution building in Lebanon? 
3. Whether the emergences of different political parties are in line 
to the plural democratic system in Lebanon? 
4. Whether the pluralist confessional constitutional model as 
envisaged in 1943 is appropriate in achieving domestic peace 
and inter-commxmal trust? 
5. To what extent regional or international actors are responsible for the 
present state of affaiijin Lebanon? 
6. How to consider Lebanon's modem history in light of the war and 
what likely way out may be possible to this end? 
The concern is to find answers to these basic questions with an attempt 
to identify the main causes of civil strife in Lebanon. The intention is to provide 
forward looking analysis i.e. Lebanon's current conditions, but also its future 
needs. 
It is on the basis of the above the proposed study intends to test the 
following hypotheses: 
1. Civil society plays a crucial role in institutional building in Lebanon. 
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2. The political structure which is based on the 1943 National Pact is rigid 
and lacks the capability to adapt itself to the changing political ground 
realities. 
3. Different political parties and their ideologies exert a centrifiigal force on 
the political system resulting in creation of extra-constitutional centres of 
power. 
4. Lebanon is also caught up in the vortex of the Arab-Israeli conflict with 
the result that external actors have come to have a defining role in 
Lebanese domestic politics which is detrimental to a building of national 
consensus. 
In so doing, this study is concentrated on describing and analyzing four 
distinct areas, in the form of study chapters: (1) Lebanon: Genesis and 
Development, (2) The Foundations of Parliamentary Politics in Post-
Independence Lebanon, (3) Conflict in Lebanon: the Israel, Syria, and 
Palestinian Factor, and (4) 1989 Taif Accord and Conflict Resolution - leading 
to significant conclusions about the over-all phenomenon of contemporary 
confessional system as ingrained in the Lebanese political culture and power 
sharing which is influenced and affected by the recent years of turmoil. 
The methodology followed in this study is inductive, analytical and 
descriptive. To get reliable and objective information, the study relied both on 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included documents published 
by governments and other international organizations. The secondary sources 
included newspapers, electronic media, books, periodicals, journals and research 
reports related to the area of the study. 
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The first chapter deals with the historical background to the formation of State 
of Lebanon. It traces the evolution of the Maronite ideas to create the Christian state 
among the Arab countries. It is in this context that the French mandatory policy and 
the events leading for the struggle of independence, the characteristics of National 
Pact are also discussed and examined in detail. 
The second chapter discusses the confessional system in terms of the power 
sharing, distribution of offices, as practiced in Lebanon. The characteristics and 
unique features of the religious and sectarian communities (nation's diverse ethnic-
religious groups) are also discussed in detail. The chapter also examines the 
development and evolution of the Lebanese political parties and forces - operating in 
the Christian camp (Right), Muslim camp (Left), including minority parties in detail. 
The last section of this chapter tries to analyse the ideas of nationalism and Lebanese 
identity which continue to influence Lebanese society even today. 
The third chapter focuses on the Arab-Israeli conflict and its impact on 
Lebanon as a continual battlefield of both internal forces and foreign powers. It is in 
this context that the role of external powers including the UN in Lebanon's internal 
affairs is also discussed. The chapter also examines the causes that led to the Civil 
War of 1958 and of 1975-76 in Lebanon which claimed many lives and destroyed the 
social and political fabric of the country. The last section of this chapter discusses the 
Riyadh - Cairo Arab Summit Conferences 1976 and subsequent major events until 
1988 and its fall out on the Lebanese polity. 
The fourth chapter deals the Taif Accord in detail and its impact to end the 
second Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). The chapter highlights the attempts of Rafiq 
Hariri in rebuilding the Lebanese economy after the Civil War. The chapter also 
discusses the various peace initiations (Madrid Conference, Oslo Accord and Beirut 
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Summit) in which Lebanon participated for a meaningful dialogue. The last section of 
this chapter analyses the contemporary political situation in Lebanon. 
The last of the concluding chapter brings together the distinctive aspects 
of Lebanese political culture of confessionalism, its varied dimensions resuhing 
to Civil War. This section also attempts to investigate and analyse the Lebanese 
polity in the post-Taif Accord 1989 and its future. This chapter also attempts to 
discuss and to propose some seemingly appropriate ideas and the ways of 
settling conflict in Lebanon. 
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CHAPTER - I 
CHAPTER-I 
LEBANON: GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Republic of Lebanon, with an area of 10,452 square kilometers (4,036 
square miles), lies on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, with a population of 
just 3,925,502 (the United Nations estimates at July 2007).' The country has a 
moderate Mediterranean climate which makes its coastal plains ideal for citrus fruit 
growing. In between two mountain chains. Mount Lebanon, which is adjacent to the 
coastal plains, and Anti-Lebanon, lies the Biqa Valley, which is noted for its grain. 
Lebanon is also rich in water resources, which includes two major rivers, the Litani in 
the south and the Orantes in the north.^  
Historically, culturally and economically, Lebanon has been an integral part of 
the Arab world. The population is predominantly Arab Muslim and Christian. The 
Sunnis, Shiites and Druze comprise the Muslim sects, while the Maronites, Catholics 
and Eastern Orthodox comprise the major Christian sects, with the Maronites being in 
the majority among them.^  
Culturally, it has been one of the most highly developed countries in the West 
Asia. It is also the most multi-sectarian state in the region. Once called the 
Switzerland of the West Asia, Lebanon as a result of inter-confessional tensions 
resulting to Civil War in 1975 was fragmented, a nation in jeopardy, and a nation in 
the process of collapse. However, despite periodic setbacks, Lebanon is making 
' Derek O'Brien, ed. Penguin Yearbook 2008 (New Delhi: Penguin Boolcs, 2007) pp.503-504. 
^ Stephen H. Longrigg and James Jankowsici, The Middle East: A Social Geography (London: Gerald 
Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1970) pp. 127-130. 
' Jacob E. Safra, Encyclopedia Britannica Almanac 2003 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 2002) 
pp.536-537. 
steady progress along the road to recovery, and the ongoing peace process brings 
some hope for stability.'' 
1. The Ancient Lebanon 
The agony of conflict which characterizes present-day Lebanon is consistent 
with the entire history of the country from ancient times to the present. The history of 
Lebanon is a long chronicle of war and destruction and of continuous domination by 
foreign powers. Each new conquest of the land brought Lebanon within a new sphere 
of influence, and each conquest devastated its people and cities. 
Perhaps the primary reason for Lebanon's particular role in world history is its 
geographical location. Lebanon is situated at the centre of a land mass which joins 
three continents: Asia, Africa, and Europe. At various times in history each region has 
been the incubator and springboard for hordes of conquering peoples. From the west 
came the Greeks, Romans, and Crusaders; from the north, the Hyksos, Hittites, and 
Ottoman tribes; from the east, the Assyrians, Persians, and Mongols; and from the 
south, the Egyptians, Amorites, Arabs, and Mamluks. Smaller powers originating in 
these regions were the Aramaens, Philistines, Hebrews, and Seleucids. It must be 
appreciated that each of these peoples influenced, whether for good or for bad, 
Lebanese history to varying degrees. Most of the invaders coveted Lebanon's fine 
natural harbors and outlets to the Mediterranean, her fertile soil emd large forests, and 
especially her strategic geographic location as a gateway between major regions of the 
world.^  
'' Colbert C. Held, Middle East Pattern: Places, Peoples, and Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000) p. 261. 
* Philip Louis Gabriel, In the Ashes: A Story of Lebanon (Pennsylvania: Whitmore Publishing 
Company, 1978) pp. 3-4. 
1.1 Ancient Phoenicia: The People and Their Origins 
The area now known as Lebanon first appeared in recorded history around 
3000 B.C. as a group of coastal cities and a heavily forested hinterland. It was 
inhabited by the Canaanites, a Semitic people, whom the Greeks called "Phoenicians" 
because of the purple (phoinikies) dye, then the land that produces and sells purple. 
Nothing is known of their original homeland, though some traditions place it in the 
region of the Arabian Peninsula or the Persian Gulf Phoenicia lay at the eastern end 
of the Mediterranean and extended from the Nahr-el-Kabir to Mountain Camel. It 
included the maritime plain and the adjacent portions of Jabal Nusariyeh, Mountain 
Lebanon, and highlands of Galilee.^ 
Being on the trade route between the Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, 
Phoenicia became an important center of commerce. By 1200 B.C. with the decline of 
Egyptian dominance, Phoenicians led the Mediterranean world in trading and 
seafaring. They colonized many Mediterranean areas that later became independent 
states, such as Carthage and Utica. These colonies and trade routes flourished until the 
invasion of the coastal areas by the Assyrians.^  
1.2 Religion and Language of Phoenician 
The religion of Phoenicians was inspired by the powers and processes of 
nature. Many of the Gods they worshipped, however, were localized and are now 
known only under their local names. A pantheon was presided over by the father of 
* James Hastings, ed.. Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, v.9 (New York: T.&T. Clark, 1956) p. 
887. 
Galilee, in ancient Roman times, hilly region of northern Palestine between the Sea of Galilee and the 
Jordan River (now part of Israel). It was the homeland of Jesus Christ, who was sometimes referred to 
as the Galilean, and a centre for Jewish learning after the Roman destruction of the temple in Jerusalem 
in A.D. 70. 
' Michael D. Harkavy, ed.. The New Webster's international Encyclopedia (Florida: Tridend Press 
International, 1998) p.842. 
Gods, El; Asherah of the Sea was his wife and their mother. Of his family, the 
goddess Astarte (Ashtart) was the principal figure.' 
Although the Phoenicians used cuneiform (Mesopotamian writing), they also 
produced a script of their own. The Phoenician traders carried their alphabet wherever 
they ventured. The Phoenician alphabetic script of 22 letters was used at Byblos as 
dearly up to the 15* century. This method of writing, later adopted by the Greeks, is 
the ancestor of the modem Western alphabet. It was the Phoenicians' most 
remarkable and distinctive contribution to arts and civilization. 
Phoenician language - Semitic language of the Northern Central (often called 
Northwestern) group, spoken in ancient times on the coast of Syria and Palestine in 
Tyre, Sidon, Byblos, and neighbouring town, and in other areas of the Mediterranean 
colonized by Phoenicians. Phoenician is very close to Hebrew and Moabite, with 
which it forms a Canaanite sub-group of the Northern Central Semitic languages. The 
earliest Phoenician inscription deciphered dates probably from the 11* century B.C.; 
El (Semitic: "god"), the chief deity of the West Semites. In the ancient texts from Ras Shama (ancient 
Ugarit) in Syria, El (El the Bull) was described as the titular head of the pantheon husband of Asherah, 
and father of all the other gods (except for Baal). Although a venerable deity, he was not active in the 
myths, which primarily concerned his daughters and sons. He was usually represented as an old man 
with a long beard and, often, two wings. He was the equivalent of the Hurrian god Kumarbi and the 
Greek god Cronus. In the Old Testament, El was used both as a general term for "deity" and as a 
synonym for Yahweh. 
Asherah, ancient West Semitic goddess, consort of the supreme god. Her full name was probably "She 
who walks in the Sea," but she was also called "holiness," and, occasionally, Elath, "the goddess." 
According to the texts from Ugarit (modem Ras Shamra), Asherah's consort was El, and by him she 
was the mother of 70 gods. As mother goddess she was widely worshipped throughout Syria and 
Palestine, although she was frequently paired with Baal, who often took the place of El in practical 
cult; as Baal's consort, Asherah was usually given the name Baalat. The Old Testament was used not 
only in reference to the goddess herself but also to indicate a wooden cult object associated with her 
worship. 
' G. T. Bettany, The World's Religions (London: Bracken, 1988) pp.496-499. 
Astarte is the name of a Phoenician goddess of love and fertility as known from Northwestern Semitic 
regions, cognate in name, origin and functions with the goddess Ishtar in Mesopotamian texts. In 
Syrian art Astarte is frequently represented with two curled ram's horns on her head. According to 
scholar Mark S Smith, Astarte may be the Iron Age (after 1200 BC) incarnation of the Bronze Age (to 
1200 BC) Asherah. 
the latest inscription from Phoenicia proper is from the 1*' century B.C., when the 
language was already being superseded by Aramaic."' 
Aramaic replaced Phoenician as the main language and by the 4* century 
Christianity was firmly established. During the early years of the Christian era, when 
theological differences bred numerous break-away sects, Lebanon became a refuge 
for religious minorities fleeing persecution." 
1.3 Foreign Conquerors of Phoenicia-Lebanon 
Beginning with the Egyptians, from 1900 to 1600 B.C., Phoenician-Lebanese 
history became - and remains - a long chronicle of conquering army one after another. 
The following list summarizes the major eras of foreign rule over Phoenicia-Lebanon. 
Egyptian rule 
Hyksos rule 
Egyptian rule 
Assyrian rule 
Babylonian rule 
Persian rule 
Greek and Seleucid rule 
Roman and Byzantine rule 
Arab rule 
Crusader rule 
Egyptian Mamluk rule 
Ottoman Turkish rule 
French mandate 
1900-1600 B.C. 
1600-1570 B.C. 
1530-1400 B.C. 
9* - 6* B.C. 
6* B.C. 
6* - 4* B.C. 
4*^  - l^B.C. 
64 B.C.-A.D.636 
A.D. 636-1099. 
A.D. 1099-1291 
A.D. 1291-1516 
A.D. 1516-1918 
A.D. 1918-1941'^ 
10 Philip W. Goetz, ed.. The New Encyclopedia Britannica, v.9 (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica 
Inc., 1987) p.392. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, Encyclopedia of Muslim World, v.l5 (New Delhi: Anmal Publications PVT. 
Ltd., 2003) p.46. 
'^  Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, pp.6-7. 
To be more precise, as listed above, Assyrian rule (875-608 B.C.) in particular 
deprived the Phoenician cities of their independence and prosperity and brought 
repeated, unsuccessful rebellions. By the end of the seventh century B.C., however, 
the Assyrian Empire was weakened by the successive revolts and ultimately destroyed 
by Babylonia, a new Mesopotamian power. The Achaemenids ended Babylonian rule 
when Cyrus, founder of the Persian Empire, captured Babylon in 539-38 B.C. and 
Phoenicia and its neighbours passed into Persian hands. The Phoenician navy 
supported Persia during the Greco-Persian War (490-49 B.C.). But when the 
Phoenicians were overburdened with heavy tributes imposed by the successors of 
Darius I (521-485 B.C.), revolts and rebellions resumed in the Lebanese coastal cities. 
The Persian Empire eventually fell to Alexander the Great, king of Macedonia. 
He attacked Asia Minor, defeated the Persian troops in 333 B.C., and advanced 
toward the Lebanese coast. Despite his early death in 323 B.C., Alexander's conquest 
of the eastern Mediterranean basin left a Greek imprint on the area. The Phoenicians, 
being a cosmopolitan people amenable to outside influences, adopted aspects of 
Greek civilization with ease. After Alexander's death, his empire was divided among 
his Macedonian generals. The eastern part-Phoenicia, Asia Minor, northern Syria, and 
Mesopotamia-fell to Seleucus I, founder of the Seleucid dynasty. 
The last century of Seleucid rule was marked by disorder and dynastic struggles. 
These ended in 64 B.C., when the Roman general Pompey added Syria and Lebanon 
to the Roman Empire. The inhabitants of the principal Phoenician cities of Byblos, 
Sidon, and Tyre were granted Roman citizenship. Upon the death of Theodosius I in 
A.D. 395, the empire was divided into two: the eastern or Byzantine part with its 
capital at Constantinople, and the western part with its capital at Rome.'^ 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N. 11, pp.48-49. 
Phoenicia was to remain in Roman and Byzantine hands for approximately 700 
years. Under Roman rule, all of the Phoenician commercial cities, including Beirut, 
Tyre, and Sidon, enjoyed increased prosperity and an expanded world trade. Greco-
Roman culture became widespread throughout the Empire, and Phoenicia was not 
immune. Canaanite, the indigenous language, became virtually extinct. It had been 
supplanted mostly by Aramaic and Greek in a transformation which began during the 
earlier Hellenist ijeriod and was completed during the Roman period. Phoenicia cities 
enjoyed a great degree of self-rule during the first years of Roman dominance, but 
their rights were considerably eroded in later years. 
The most significant change to take place in Phoenicia during the Roman years 
was the Christian conversion. Christianity, originally a Semitic religion, made inroads 
into Phoenicia, early and rather easily. Historians record that Tyre was the home of 
the first Christian community in Lebanon. The Christian of Egypt, Palestine, Syria, 
Phoenicia, and elsewhere managed to survive years of repression by Roman 
authorities. Christianity existed during these difficult and oppressive times until the 
fourth century and became the official religion of the Byzantine Empire under 
Constantine the Great.'* 
However, in the sixth century a series of earthquakes demolished temples, 
famous law schools, destroyed the city of Beirut and killing nearly 30,000 inhabitants. 
Heavy tributes and religious dissension produced disorder and confiision. This 
turbulent period weakened the empire and made it easy prey to the newly converted 
Muslim Arabs of Arabian Peninsula.'^ 
'" Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, pp. 16-17. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, p.49. 
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1.4 Lebanon in the Arab-Islamic Period 
By the end of the sixth century, the Byzantine dynasty was at war with Persia, 
and Persia resumed and held control of the Levant for more than a decade. Byzantium 
managed to re-establish its authority briefly and to strengthen its grip on Phoenicia, 
which by then was seething with political unrest. Subsequently, in the seventh century 
the Arabians invaded the Fertile Crescent.'^ It took the Arab Muslim a mere seven 
years, from 633 to 640, to defeat a Byzantine army.'' Thus, the Prophet's successor, 
Caliph Abu Bakr (632-4) brought Islam to the area surrounding Lebanon.'* Most of 
the Phoenician cities were captured by the Arabs; Beirut was capitulated in 635, Tyre 
in 636, and Sidon in 636. They offered little resistance to the Arabian conquerors. The 
463 years of official Muslim political rule in Lebanon can be divided into three major 
periods: the Umayyad, from 661 to 750; the Abbasid, from 750 to 969; and the 
Fatimid, from 969 to 1099." 
'* Fertile Crescent: Crescent shaped area between the Anatolian Mountains and the Arabia Desert. 
The Fertile Crescent covers ancient Elam (south-western Iran), Mesopotamia (Iraq), Assyria (Syria), 
Phoenicia (Lebanon) and Palestine (Israel and the Palestinian entity). Sometimes the Nile valley of 
Egypt is included to emphasise the crescent shape. It was the cradle of ancient civilization, with 
irrigated agriculture going back to ca 8000 BC, and the region provided the base for the Greek and 
Roman civilizations. 
" Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, p. 17. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N. 11, p.50. 
" Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, pp.17-19. 
Umayyad: A Damascus-based dynasty, founded by the Muslim general Muawiya ibn Abi-Sufyan 
(c.605-680), which ruled until 750, also the dynasty's continued rule in Spain until 1030. It replaced 
the era of the four Medina-based Caliphs, of whom the last, Ali was murdered in 661. 
Abbasid: Dynasty of Arab Caliphs (749-1258) descended from Abbas (d.653), uncle of Prophet 
Muhammad. The early years of Abbasid rule were marked by prosperity and strong government; they 
reached their high-water mark with the reign of the fifth Caliph Harun ar-Rashid (764-809). The 
dynasty was finally overthrown by Hulagu Khan, grandson of Genghis Khan, who sacked Baghdad in 
1258. 
Fatimid: (Fatimite) A dynasty of Caliph who reigned over Egypt and North Africa from A.D. 908 to 
A.D. 1171. They obtained the name fh)m the pretensions of the founder of their dynasty abu 
Muhammad "Ubaidu Mlah, who asserted that he was a Sayyed, descended from Fatimah, the daughter 
of the Prophet and Ali. There were in all fourteen Caliphs in dynasty and was overthrown in 1171 by 
Salahuddin. His opponents declared he was the grandson of a Jew of Magian religion. 
In time, Arab influence permeated the religious, linguistic, and cultural spheres 
of the conquered territories, which became increasingly Islamized and Arabicized. In 
14"' century, Arabic had become the language of the region with only small and 
fragmented minorities resisting?" 
To this day, the lands of North Africa and the West Asia remain 
overwhelmingly Arabic and Islamic. The penetration of Islam in Lebanon was a 
slower process than in most other parts of the Arab empire. Christians in Syria and 
Palestine were converted to Islam, and they adopted Arabic much earlier than the 
Christians of Lebanon, who did not convert until much later. Large numbers of 
Christians in Lebanon never converted to Islam. In fact, it was during this period in 
Lebanese history that Mount Lebanon became a heaven for loyal Christians and 
Muslim dissidents. Perhaps the most important reason that the mountain people were 
able to resist Muslim rule was that the terrain and cold climate of the mountains were 
completely unsuited to the desert-oriented Bedouin invaders from Arabia.^' 
During this period of Arab rule Mount Lebanon was the main ancestral home of 
two important religious sects - the Maronites and the Druze. 
The Maronite was a sect of Christianity, who first appeared in northern Mount 
Lebanon in the seventh century A.D. The term 'Maronite' was used as early as the 
eighth century A.D. by John the Damascene and was derived from the reference to 
either the Syrian hermit Saint Maroun or Jean Maroun, the first Maronite Patriarch, 
who started a religious movement in Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. Whatever its origin, 
the term clearly referred to a Syriac group of Aramean origin that embraced the 
^° Joanne Maher, ed.. Middle East and North Africa, 2003, (London: Europa Publications, 2003) 
p.682. 
'^ Wal 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) pp.11-12. 
lid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance, 
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Monothelite heresy (i.e., holding that Christ has one will but two natures) and 
consequently was persecuted under Emperor Justinian II. As a reaction to this 
persecution and also due to incursions from Muslim Arabs, between the seventh and 
twelfth century A.D., the Maronites increasingly retreated into Mount Lebanon. 
Towards the end of the twelfth century A.D., the Maronite Church abandoned its 
Monotheist doctrine and entered into partial communion with Rome.^ ^ 
The Druze on the other hand represented a heretical sect of Islam. An offshoot 
of Ismailism (which itself is splinter of Shiitism, which in turn is a major sect of 
Islam) the Druze or Druzes first appeared in Wadi al-Tayn in Southern Mount 
Lebanon. This religion sprang from the belief in the divinity of the sixth Fatimid 
Caliph of Egypt, Hakim (996-1020 A.D.) who declared himself to be the last 
incarnation of the deity. Two of his followers Hamza and Darazi (after whose name 
Druze are known) spread Hakim's doctrine, embellished with Ismaili philosophy, in 
Southern Mount Lebanon.^ ^ 
The first Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban II in 1095 at the Council of 
Clermont-Ferrand in France.^ '* During the Crusades, Mardites were brought from the 
22 
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Robin Fedden, Syria and Lebanon (London: John Murray, 1965) pp.211-213. 
Malise Ruthven,/s/am in the World Q^sw York: Oxford University Press, 1984) pp.213-215. 
^* Masudul Hassan, History of Islam v.l (Delhi: Adam Publishers & Distributors, 1995) p. 734. 
Crusades, under papal authority, wars waged in the Middle Age (ll^-n"" centuries) by European 
Christians against the Muslims to recover the Holy Land, particularly Jerusalem. The initial impetus for 
the Crusades was a revival of religious fervour, as urged by Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont 
(1095); however, conquest of territory, attraction of riches, and the possibility of expanded trade with 
the Eat were also vital elements. At the end of the First Crusade (1095-1099) Jerusalem was retaken 
and the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem was established, as were the orders of the Knights Templars and 
the Knights Hospitalers. The Second Crusade (1147-49), a response to the loss of Edessa (1144) to the 
Turks, ended in failure. The Third Crusade was an attempt to recapture Jerusalem, lost to Saladin in 
1187. Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I, Richard I of England, and Philip II of France led this crusade, 
but were only able to achieve a 3-year truce that gave Christians access to the holy city. During the 
Fourth Crusade (1202-1204) the Crusaders seized Constantinople. In 1212 the tragic Children's 
Crusade was waged. Thousands of children died of hunger or disease or were sold into slavery as they 
headed toward the Holy Land. The goal of the Fifth Crusade, another failure, was Egypt. There was a 
Sixth Crusade (1228-1229) in which another short-lived truce was arranged with the Muslims, and 
then 3 additional Crusades, but Muslim gain held steady. The last Christian stronghold, Akka (Acre), 
fell in 1291. 
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Amanus and Taurus mountains (in southern Turkey) to protect coastal towns from 
Muslim Arab attack. At the end of the Crusade period, Muslim Arabs forced these 
Mardites to resettle in the Mountain, where they intermingled with the Maronites.^ ^ 
The Maronite community began developing from an amalgamation of Mardite 
and Maronite Christian refugees from areas in northern Syrian and along the Lebanese 
coast. These Christians were able to create for themselves a permanent sanctuary in 
the mountains and to resist Islam to such a degree that centuries passed before Arabic 
replaced Aramaic as the language of the Lebanese Christians of Mount Lebanon. To 
this day in Lebanon, the Christian population exerts a powerful political force, even 
though it is now out-numbered by its Muslim brethren. From their first appearance in 
Lebanon, the Maronites were destined to play an important role in the history of their 
country.^ ^ 
Their support of the Crusaders and of Catholic and Protestant missionaries and 
their general identification with Western Christianity account for much of their 
history of conflict in Lebanon with the Druzes, and with the Lebanese Muslims.^ ^ 
Under the influence of the Crusaders, Maronite relations with the Rome began 
to take form in the 12* century. Rome's influence also touched upon Maronite 
religious doctrines. It was not until 1439, however, that partial union with Rome was 
achieved at the Council of Florence. Full union was effected only in 1736 at the 
Synod of Al-Luwzayah.^ ^ 
^' Fahim I. Qubain, Crisis in Lebanon (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1961) p.lO. 
*^ Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus 
(London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988) p.261. 
"" Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (London: l.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1988) pp.95-96. 
*^ Fahim I. Qubain, N.25, p.lO. 
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While the Second Crusade was still in progress, an army of Mamluks was 
seizing power in Cairo.^' The Mamluks were destined to gain control first of Egypt 
and then of most of the land of the eastern Mediterranean, which they were to rule 
from 1250 until 1516. The same period in Lebanese history was also the time of the 
Mongol invasions from Central Asia, which brought widespread destruction to most 
of Syria and Lebanon. These were the historic conquests led by Genghis khan.^ ° The 
Mongols were finally stopped by the Mamluks in Palestine and were driven from 
Lebanon and Syria by 1260. 
For Lebanon, the Crusader and Tarrar-Mongol invasions and the Mamluks-
Muslim reconquests proved devastating. It was during the Mamluk period, however, 
that peace once again reigned and that Beirut emerged as the center of trade and 
commerce in Lebanon. ' 
^ Mamluk: meaning "A slave", the military body of slaves who for a long time ruled Egypt. These 
military slaves were first organized by Malik as-Salih, who purchased many thousands of slaves from 
Asia, and brought them to Egypt in the 13* century. They were by him embodies into a corps of 12,000 
men, but in A.D. 1254, they revolted, and killed Turan Shah, the last prince of the Aiyub dynasty. They 
then raised to the throne of Egypt al-Mu'izz, who was himself a Turko-man slave. The Mamluks 
continued the ruling power in Egypt till A.D. 1517, when Salim I defeated them and put to death 
Tumaun Bey, the last of the Mamluk dynasty. They were, however, maintained in Egypt as a military 
aristocracy, and were a powerful body at the time of the French invasion. Muhammad Ali Pasha of 
Egypt destroyed their power and influence by murdering many of them in A.D. 1811. 
'" Genghis Khan (pronounced Chinggis Khaan, c. 1162-1227), bom Temujin (meaning 
"ironworker"), was the Mongol founder. Khan (ruler) and posthumously declared Khagan (emperor) of 
the Mongol Empire, the largest contiguous empire in history. He came to power by uniting many of the 
nomadic tribes of northeast Asia. After founding the Mongol Empire and being proclaimed "Genghis 
Khan", he started the Mongol invasions and raids of Kara-Khitan Khanate, Caucasus, Khwarezmid 
Empire, Western Xia and Jin Dynasty. During his life, the Mongol Empire eventually occupied a 
substantial portion of Central Asia. Before Genghis Khan died, he assigned Ogedei Khan as his 
successor and split his empire into khanates among his sons and grandsons. He died in 1227 after 
defeating the Tanguts. He was buried in an unmarked grave somewhere in Mongolia at a location 
unknown. His descendants went on to stretch the Mongol Empire across most of Eurasia by conquering 
and/or creating vassals out of all of modem-day China, Korea, the Caucasus, the Central Asian 
countries, and substantial portions of modem Eastern Europe and the West Asia. "The greatest 
happiness is to vanquish your enemies, to chase them before you, to rob them of their wealth, to see 
those dear to them bathed in tears, to clasp to your bosom their wives and daughters"- Genghis Khan 
' ' Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, pp.23-24. 
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2. Lebanon under the Ottoman Empire 
During Mamluk rule (1291-1516), there witnessed repeated local uprisings, 
which were suppressed by the Mamluks: for example, the great insurrections of the 
Druzes and Shiites in Lebanon at the thirteenth century. The period was one of 
economic decline, partly because of war and unrest, and partly because of the 
geographical discoveries of the fifteenth century, which changed the course of the 
world's great trade routes; but there was still a certain trade with Europe, carried on 
by Italian merchants. To the economic weakness of the country, Syria and Lebanon, 
was added the decay of Mamluk rule; and when the Ottoman Turks attacked Syria in 
1516 they conquered it without difficulty.^ ^ From 1516 until 1918, Syria remained 
under Ottoman rule which included much of central Europe, Asia Minor, 
Mesopotamia, part of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. The country was 
divided into several Pashaliks, those of Damascus, Aleppo and Tripoli, and later of 
Saida; but often the authority of the Pashas was only effective in and around the great 
towns in which garrisons were stationed. Men gave formal reverence to the Sultan, 
who had also arrogated to himself the title of Caliph or head of the Islamic 
community; but the limits of his Government's action were narrow. In practice 
customary law was supreme, and social power was in the hands of the feudal lords, on 
^^  Ottoman Empire, vast empire of the Ottoman Turks that at its height, during the reign of Sultan 
Suleyman I, stretched from the far shore of the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf in the east to Budapest 
in the north and Algiers in the west. The Ottoman Turks, led by Osman 1, entered Asia Minor in the 
late 1200s and, expanding rapidly, made Busra their capital in 1326. They crossed to the Balkan 
Peninsula (1345), and in 1453 Constantinople fell to Muhammad II. The empire continued to expand in 
the le* century under Selim I, the Terrible (1512-1520), and reached its zenith under Suleyman I. 
however, Suleyman failed to capture Vienna (1529) and was driven back to Malta (1565). Directly 
after his death, the Ottoman fleet was annihilated at the naval battle of Lepanto (1571). During the 
1700s and 1800s the decaying empire fought against Russia, and Greece won its independence. The 
reformist Young Turk movement led the empire into Worid War I on the German side, with disastrous 
results. The nationalists, led by Mustafa Kamal Ataturk, deposed and exiled the last Sultan, 
Muhammad, and proclaimed the Turkish Republic in 1922. 
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whom the Ottoman rulers, like their predecessors, mainly relied for the maintenance 
of local order and the collection of taxes. 
2.1 The Maans (1120-1697) 
When Ottoman sultan Selim-I defeated the Mamluks (rulers of Syria and 
Egypt) in Syria in 1516, Lebanon came under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire, 
which established its capital at Istanbul.^ "* By this time. Feudalism was firmly 
established in the Mountain and the political policy of the Turks in Lebanon was 
similar to that of the Mamluks in that it gave a certain degree of autonomy to the local 
emirs, or lords i.e. Fakhr al Din-I from the Maan family.''^  (See Map No.l) 
The power of the Maan reached its zenith under Fakhr al Din-II (ruled 1586-
1635), the grandson of emir Fakhr al Din-I, who controlled all of Lebanon and parts 
of northern Palestine and northwestern Syria around the end of the sixteenth century. 
Fakhr al Din-II was able to unite the Mountain with the Chouf (south-east of Beirut, 
comprises a narrow coastal strip, the valleys and mountains of the western slopes) into 
the 'Emirate of Mount Lebanon'. During his reign the Ottomans did not interfere 
much in the internal affairs of the emirate, since they regarded it as a 'tax farm'. Fakhr 
al Din-II is famous for his unsuccessful attempt to break away from Ottoman rule by 
signing treaties with European powers and attempting to create a greater Lebanon. He 
and his son were, however, ultimately defeated and executed in Constantinople by the 
Turks in February 1635. Because of his deeds he is considered to be the first hero of 
" A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1954) 
pp.23-24. 
" Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, p.25. 
" B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (A Modern Political History) (London: Zed Booics Ltd., 
1985) p28. 
The Maan family, under orders from the governor of Damascus, came to Lebanon in 1120 to defend it 
against the invading Crusaders. They settled on the southwestern slopes of the Lebanon Mountains and 
soon adopted the religion. Their authority began to raise with Fakhr al Din 1, who was permitted by 
Ottoman authorities to organize his own army, and reached its peak with Fakhr al Din 11 (1570-1635). 
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the modem Lebanese independent movement and is usually thought of as the "Father 
of modem Lebanon." 
During Fakhr al Din-II's rule, the influence of the West in Lebanon expanded 
considerably, particularly throughout the Maronite community. Catholic missionary 
schools were established in Lebanon by France during the period as part of France's 
now infamous "civilizing mission." The Maronites were also drawing closer to Rome. 
The ties between the Maronites and the Christian West were based primarily on 
religion; the Lebanese Christian communities on doubt viewed themselves as small 
enclaves in a vast world of Islam. To a lesser extent, Maronite contacts with the West 
were also of a commercial nature since it was they who controlled Lebanon's 
lucrative silk industry and, therefore, the large silk trade with Europe.^ ^ 
Although Fakhr al Din-II failed to keep it, his expression of independence for 
Lebanon lived on.''^  The independent Greater Lebanon which he envisaged and for 
which he labored was attempted again by another emir, Bashir Shihab-II (1788-1840), 
but was not fully realized until 1943.^ * 
The departure of Fakhr al Din-II from Lebanon did not end the Maanid line. 
The emir who followed was Mulhim Maan, a nephew of Fakhr al Din-II, gained 
control of the Chouf and, by 1658, had added the districts of Batrun and Safad to his 
domain. Ahmad Maan, the emir Mulhim's son, succeeded his father in 1667. During 
his last years, Ahmad Maan, the emir was virtually a prisoner in his own palace and 
died in 1697, without leaving a male descendant.^' 
*^ Robin Fedden, N.22, pp. 215-216. 
" Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996) 
p.l8. 
" Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (New York: St Martin's Press, 1970) p.731. 
^' Charles Winslow, N.37, p.l8. 
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2.2 The Shihabs (1697-1842) 
The Shihabs, who in 1697 succeeded the Maans, trace their pedigree to one of 
the noblest Arabian tribes, the Quraysh.''° They originally lived in the Hawran region 
of southwestern Syria and settled in Wadi at Taim in southern Lebanon."' Bashir 
Shihab-I was elected governor in 1697 by the council of emirs, (landlords) after the 
last of the Maans died childless. 
The house of Shihab achieved the apex of its power under Bashir Shihab-II 
(1788-1840), who was a baptized Maronite. The destruction of feudal privileges 
reached its climax under the forceful and ambitious emir Bashir Shihab-II, who 
succeeded in establishing a firm control over and expanded Shihab realm and ruled it 
in the manner of an enlightened despot."^ 
In 1810 he helped the Ottomans to repel an invasion by the Wahhabi power of 
Arabia; but in 1831, he sided openly with Muhammad AH of Egypt, when that ruler 
invaded Syria."^ Bashir-II was interested in getting rid of Ottoman influence over the 
'^ Philip K.Hitti,N.38,p.731. 
*' Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.ll, p.54. 
*^ Michael Curtis, ed., Religion and Politics in the Middle East (Colorado: Westview Press, 1981) 
p.218. 
"^  Joanne Maher, ed., N.20, p. 683. 
The Wahhabite movement is both religious and political. The founder of the Wahhabite sect was 
Mohammad Abd al-Wahhab (1703-87), who after his religious and legal studies at Baghdad returned to 
Arabia to preach a Muslim Puritanism and a revival of the simplicity of early Islam. Abd al-Wahhab 
insisted that the Koran was the only source of authority; he preached against the adoration of Muslim 
saints and against the decoration of their tombs by the pilgrims to Mecca and Medina; he assailed the 
superstitions and miracles which had, like barnacles, attached themselves to Islamic monotheism; and 
he insisted on a return to the simple and penurious life of the early Muslim leaders. Among Wahhab's 
early converts was Emir Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, one of the important local princes of central Arabia. 
Wahhabism supported by the political power of Ibn Saud and under the inspired leadership of Wahhab 
spread between 1770 and 1800 from the Nejd in central Arabia to a considerable portion of the 
peninsula. With armed forces composed of Wahhabite peasants and nomads Ibn Saud in the first 
decade of the new century raided the Ottoman vilayats of Syria and Baghdad, captured the Holy Cities 
of the Hejaz and interrupted the annual Haj (Muslim pilgrimage) to Mecca and Medina.In 1811 
Mohammad Ali, Pasha of Egypt, decided to give heed to the Sultan's commands and began to prepare 
an expedition to Arabia in 1812. by 1818, Mohammad All's son, Ibrahim Pasha, captured Daraiya, Ibn 
Saud's capital in the Nejd, and destroyed the political power of the Wahhabis in Arabia. A little more 
than hundred years later Ibn Saud as leader of the Wahhabis captured Mecca and Medina, created the 
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emirate, which he thought Ibrahim Pasha would aid him in doing. The Church also 
found it propitious to ally with Egypt to get rid of the Ottomans and their allies, the 
Druze lords."" 
Holding Lebanon as the vassal of Egypt, he was compelled, however, to apply 
to the 'Mountain' the unpopular policy imposed by Ibrahim Pasha, the son of 
Muhammad Ali with the result that a revolt broke out, which, after the Egyptian 
withdrawal of 1840.^ *^  The involvement of Bashir-II in the struggle between 
Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt (backed by the French), and the Ottomans (backed by 
the British), brought about his downfall in 1840."*^  
The Ottoman wanted to centralize the political machine in the emirate so that 
they could control it. To this end, they agreed with the European powers to oust 
Bashir-II and appoint Bashir Qasim Shihab (Bashir-III) as ruler of the emirate. To 
further their interests in the emirate, the Europeans recognized the Maronite patriarch 
as the representative of his people and began to deal with him accordingly.''^  
Unlike the Christians, the Druses did not prosper during the Egyptian 
occupation, and this was also a cause for resentment towards Christians on the part of 
Druses. As tension built between them, the Maronites began to actively seek the 
support of France, while the Druses began looking to British and the Ottoman 
authorities for assistance. In the meantime, the Turkish, or Ottoman authorities were 
busy provoking religious strife among the mountain people in order that they might 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and conquered a large part of the Arabia peninsula. He thus became the 
dominant power there and an important factor in the affairs of the West Asian. (William Yale, The 
Near East: A Modem History (New York: The University of Michigan Press, 1968) pp.63-64). 
*^ B. J. Odeh, N.35, p.33. 
"^  Joanne Maher, ed., N.20, p.683. 
^ Michael Curtis, ed., N.42, p.218. 
"' B. J. Odeh, N.35, p.34. 
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strengthen their control over the area by weakening the ability of the mountain 
population to govern itself. Civil strife was an inevitable result of all these factors. 
The initial outbreak of violence between Maronites and Druzes occurred on October 
25, 1841. After the first clash, France, England, Austria, Prussia and Russia pressured 
the Turks into intervening in the growing crisis.''^  
23 Double Qaimaqamate 1842-58 
In 1842, the Ottoman replaced Bashir-III with an Ottoman ruler. Displeased 
with this alternative, the European powers intervened and called for a new 
arrangement within which they could exert more influence in Lebanon. In 1843, they 
initiated the two-govemorate system, then known as Mount Lebanon. This comprised 
a northern govemorate which was predominantly Maronite and a southern 
govemorate with Druze lords but mostly Christian peasantry.'*' This arrangement 
came to be known as the Double Qaimaqamate. (See Map No.2) Both officials were 
to be responsible to the governor of Sidon, who resided in Beirut. The rest of 
Lebanon, such as the coast and the Biqa Valley, was placed under the direct control of 
the Ottoman authorities. The Beirut-Damascus highway was the dividing line between 
the two districts.^" 
This partition of Lebanon proved to be a mistake. Animosities between the 
religious sects increased and nurtured by outside powers. The French, for example, 
supported the Christians, while the British supported the Druzes, and the Ottomans 
fomented strife to increase their control. Not surprisingly, these tensions led to 
•" Jawaid Iqbal, "Sectarian Conflict and the Evolution of the Lebanese Political System" Journal of 
West Asian Studies, n.20,2006, p.92. 
Sami A. Ofeish, "Lebanon's Second Republic: Secular Talk, Sectarian Application", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, v.21, n.l, winter, 1999, p. 101. 
^ Malise Ruthven, N.23, p.216. 
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conflict between Christians and Druzes as early as May 1845. Consequently, the 
European powers requested that the Ottoman sultan may establish order in Lebanon, 
and he attempted to do so by establishing a Majlis (council) in each of the districts. 
Each Majlis was composed of members who represented the different religious 
communities and was intended to assist the deputy governor. '^ 
2.4 Government of Mount Lebanon (Mutassarrifiyya) 1860-1915 
The 1840s witnessed the end of the principality, the cantonization of Mount 
Lebanon and the establishment of the first confessional-based councils as governing 
bodies. And by 1858, a revolt by Maronite peasants against their Druze lords was 
spreading throughout northern Lebanon.^ ^ 
This era of sectarian and class struggle, two decades of intermittent civil war 
between peasants and feudal chiefs and between Maronites and Druses, culminated 
with the massacres of Lebanese and Syrian Christians in 1860. Better armed, better 
organized, more disciplined, and with significantly more competent leaders than the 
Christians, the Druzes were able to wreak havoc on their foes for four bloody 
months.^ ^ 
At this point of time, which witnessed the death of around 15,000-30,000 
Christians and many were homeless in Levant in 1860 that Britain, France, and other 
powers agreed to send 12,000 troops to bring an end to the conflict, which had also 
spread to Damascus. When, however, 7,000 French troops landed in Lebanon, the 
Ottoman ruler Fuad Pasha was already in fiill control of the situation. He had already 
clamped down on those directly responsible for the massacres. 
' ' Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, p.55. 
" Hussein Sirriyeh, Adelphi Papers 243, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict (Lx)ndon: Brassey's for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, autumn, 1989) p.3. 
" Philip Louis Gabriel, N.5, p.32. 
20 
As a subsequent development in the autumn of 1860, an international 
commission met to negotiate an agreement for the political reorganization of 
Lebanon. The commission represented Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia (later 
Germany) and Sardinia (later Italy), and was presided over by Fuad Pasha, who 
represented Ottoman interests. Eight months after its first meeting on 5 October 1860, 
on 9 June 1861, the commission reached an agreement, 'the Reglement Organique', 
comprising 17 articles, and amended on September 6, 1864.^ '* This accord established 
the Mutassarrifiyya (govemorate) system that unite Lebanon (the two govemorates) 
under an Ottoman ruler and abolished feudalism in the Mountain. (See Map No.3) 
Under the new Ottoman administration, which lasted until 1915, Lebanon was 
divided into six (later seven) districts according to the distribution of different 
religions in the population.^ ^ The appointment of Mutassarrif (governor) by the 
Ottoman Sultan was subject to the approval of the European powers. The designate 
Ottoman governor (the Mutassarrif) was always a non-Lebanese Christian and an 
Ottoman subject. He used to receive support by a central administrative council of 
twelve and locally recruited police force, civil service and gendarmerie. The whole 
arrangement was to be under European power protection. This council was to be made 
up of four Maronites, three Druses, two Greek Orthodox, one Shiite, one Sunni (both 
^ 'The Reglement Orgaique' Agreement: 
(1) provided the Mountain with a distinctive and separate status within the Ottoman system; 
(2) specified that the jurisdiction would have a Christian governor (mutassarif) whose authority 
was largely independent of the Ottoman; 
(3) created an Administrative Council to apportion taxation and supervise in spending the revenue 
that was raised; 
(4) give the Council a consultative role in the Governor's employment of Ottoman troops; 
(5) divided the country into six districts, each with its own mudir (director) and council, 
appointed by the Governor in consultation with local leaders; 
(6) and (where possible) further divided each district into smaller sectarian cantons which were, 
in turn, further subdivided by an elected into village communes of approximately 500 persons, 
each headed by an elected sheikh. In the mixed areas, this official represented only those from 
his own sect. 
(Charles Winslow, N.37, p.41). 
" Jawaid Iqbal, N.48, pp.93-95. 
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Muslim sects) and one Greek Catholic.^ ^ The Mutassarrifiyya (govemorate) used to 
comprise Mount Lebanon with the exclusion of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon and the 
valley of the Biqa (the fertile alluvial plain between the Lebanon and the Anti-
Lebanon).^ '' 
The government of the mountain maintained its own judiciary and preserved 
order by a local militia. 
Da'ud Effendi Pasha, an Armenian by birth, Roman Catholic by persuasion, 
director of the telegraph at Constantinople and author of a French work on Anglo-
Saxon laws, was appointed as the first governor.^ * In a speech to the notables of 
Lebanon, he used the following illustration: 
A doctor fell sick, and called in a fellow physician and said to him "We 
are three, you, I, and the disease. If you help me, we will conquer the 
disease. If you help the disease you will conquer me." So we in Lebanon 
are three; you, the people, I, the ruler, and the traditional animosity of 
races in Lebanon. Help me and we shall conquer it. Help it, and you will 
ruin me and yourselves together. 
However, a number of Mutassarrifs (governors) ruled the country efficiently 
and conscientiously until Ohannes Koyoumjian Pasha (1912-5), the last in the series 
and like the first an Armenian, was replaced in August 1915 by a Turkish. Direct 
Turkish rule continued till the end of the World War I.^' 
^ Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of 
the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) p.20. 
" Michael Curtis, ed., N.42, p.219. 
'* List of Governors (Mutasarrifates) of the Mount Lebanon (1861-1915): 
1. Da'ud Effendi Pasha 
2. Nasri Franco 
3. Rustem 
4. Wasah Pasha 
5. Na'um Pasha 
6. Muzaffar Pasha 
7. Yusuf Franco 
1861-1868 
1868-1873 
1873-1883 
1883-1892 
1892-1902 
1902-1907 
1907-1912 
59 
8. Ohannes Koyoumjian Pasha 1912-1915 
Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History: from the Earliest Times to the Present (London: Macmillan & 
Co Ltd, 1957) pp. 443-447. 
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3. Lebanon after World War I 
The end of World War I witnessed major changes in West Asian geopolitical 
configuration. Having been the recipient of series of agreements and treaties such as 
the Sykes-Picot agreement, Balfour Declaration, and Sherif Hussein-McMahon 
correspondence, the region underwent many changes. In effect, the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire opened the opportunity to the nations of the West Asia, and more 
precisely to its nationalist movements, to attempt to achieve their historical goals.^ 
3.1 World War I 
The outbreak of World War I in August 1914 brought for Lebanon further 
problems, when Turkey entered the War as an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary 
(Central Powers) and found themselves at war with Britain, which had been their 
major prop throughout most of the nineteenth century.*' Ottoman authorities used the 
opportunity to occupy Lebanon and Syria and to exercise direct rule over them and 
appointed Jamal Pasha, the minister of the navy, as the commander in chief of the 
Turkish forces in Syria, with discretionary powers.*^ The next year, they suspended 
the Mutassarrifiyya, the privileges which Lebanon had enjoyed since 1861, and 
recalled the Armenian Mutassarrif, Ohannes Pasha, to Istanbul, annulling the 
Reglement and abolishing the Administrative Council. Jamal Pasha then subsequently 
**'WalidPhares,N.21,p.65. 
*' World War I, also called First World War, or Great War an international conflict that in 1914-18 
embroiled most of the nations of Europe along with Russia, the United States, the Middle East, and 
other regions. The war pitted the Central Powers—mainly Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey— 
against the Allies—mainly France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Japan, and, from 1917, the United 
States. It ended with the defeat of the Central Powers. The war was virtually unprecedented in the 
slaughter, carnage, and destruction it caused. World War I was one of the great watersheds of 20th-
century geopolitical history. It led to the fall of four great imperial dynasties (in Germany, Russia, 
Austria-Hungary, and Turkey), resulted in the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and, in its 
destabilization of European society, laid the groundwork for World War II. 
*^  Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957) p.46. 
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appointed Muslim Governors for Lebanese: Ali Munif Paslia (1915-17), Isma'il 
Haqqi Pasha (1917-18), and Mumtaz Pasha (July-September 1918)." 
In February 1915, frustrated by his unsuccessful attack on the British forces 
protecting the Suez Canal, Jamal Pasha initiated a blockade of the entire eastern 
Mediterranean coast to prevent supplies from reaching his enemies and indirectly 
caused thousands of deaths from widespread famine and plagues. Lebanon suffered as 
much as, or more than, any other Ottoman province.^ The blockage deprived the 
country of its tourists and summer visitors, and remittances from relatives and friends 
were lost or delayed for months. The Turkish army cut down trees for wood to fuel 
trains or for military purposes.^ ^ 
In 1916, Turkish authorities publicly executed twenty-one Syrians and 
Lebanese in Damascus and Beirut, respectively, for their alleged anti-Turkish 
activities, in other words, 'Arab Nationalism'.^ The date, i.e. May 6, is 
commemorated annually in both countries as 'Martyrs' Day,' and the site in Beirut 
has come to be known as Martyrs' Square.^ ^ 
" Charles Winslow, N.37, p.54. 
^ Francesco Gabrieli, The Arab Revival (London: Thames and Hudson, 1961) p.66. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.ll, p.57-58. 
66 Arab Nationalist: Thus, in Arab nationalist historical theory, Arab history came to be depicted as 
passing through four difTerent phases: 
(1) A pre-Islamic phase when the history of the Arabs was still parochial, although their potential 
for subsequent greatness was already discernible. 
(2) A phase of unity, power and glory, which began with the rise and expansion of Islam under 
Arab leadership, and ended with the extinction of the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad. 
(3) An age of degeneration when the Arabs fell under Turkish or Persian rule and were politically 
and culturally dormant. 
(4) An age of national reawakening (called 'asr al-nahdah) which began in the nineteenth century 
and continued into the twentieth, pointing the way to the future. 
(Kamal S. Salibi,N.27, pp.211-212). 
*' Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, p.58. 
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Relief came, however, by September 1918 after the Allied powers defeated the 
Turkish army in the Middle East (henceforth will be referred as West Asia) and 
occupied all the Arab provinces formerly under Ottoman rule. Emir Faisal-I, the son 
of Sherif Hussein,** helped the British army, led by General Edmund Allenby, in 
defeating the Turks in Palestine and Syria. The British subsequently permitted the 
establishment of an Arab government in Damascus under Faisal.*^ 
Between 1918 and 1920 the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, 
which by then were a large, well-established community, feared that in the political 
restructuring that would take place, Lebanon would be incorporated into a Pan-Arab 
Islamic state in which they would lose their autonomy which they enjoyed under the 
Ottomans. Moreover, the Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronites, demanded 
an independent state in Lebanon and they were supported by France, whose colonial 
ambitions were seriously threatened by Arab national aims.™ During 1919, therefore, 
various Maronite delegations, including one led by the Maronite Patriarch Elias 
Botrus al-Howeik, himself traveled to Paris and Versailles to plead for the creation of 
a separate state for themselves under French supervision. '^ 
Daud Ammun, the president of the Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon, 
appeared on 13 February 1919 before the Supreme Council of the Allies to demand 
the independence of Lebanon and the extension of its territories to its 'historical' and 
'natural' frontiers. As Ammun puts it, 
** Hussein had four sons: Ali, Abdullah, Faisal, and Zayd. Ali succeeded his father in 1924 as second 
king of Hejaz, but he abdicated the following year. Abdullah became king of Transjordan 
(subsequently Jordan), and Faisal became king of Iraq as Faisal I. 
*' Joel Carmichael, The Shaping of the Arabs: A Study in Ethnic Identity (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1967)p.317. 
™ Meir Zamir, The Formation of Modern Lebanon (London: Croom Helm, 1985) p.3. 
" Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and Political Development in Lebanon, 1842-1972 (Durban: Duke 
University Press 1976) p.61. 
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"The territories within the said frontiers are necessary to our existence. 
Without them, neither commerce nor agricuUure is possible for us and our 
population is bound to migrate. The mere closing of our frontiers by 
administrative measures would drive us, as has happened during the War, 
to actual starvation." 
The Muslims of Syria at whose expense Mount Lebanon was sought to be 
enlarged, however, were resolutely opposed to the Christian demand. Nationalist 
sentiments among them were running high. However, Emir Faisal, son of Sherif 
Hussein of Mecca who was also the Britain's war time ally, attempted to extend his 
authority over Mount Lebanon and over the Lebanese coast as well, by setting up an 
Arab government in Damascus. Syrian nationalists wanted complete independence of 
geographical Syria, on the basis of British war time pledges to Sherif Hussein 
contained in the Sherif Hussein-McMahan correspondence in 1915 and 1916." 
But the British had concurrently concluded secret Sykes-Picot Agreement with 
France for dividing geographical Syria among themselves after the culmination of 
war.^ "* Very soon, therefore. General Henry H. Allenby along with the French forces 
'^  Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., N.26, p.l50. 
'^  The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence, the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War 1 on 
the side of the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary), the British Government and its allies 
encouraged the Arabs revolt against the Turks. To this end, they gave them several pledges to 
recognize their independence from Ottoman at the end of the war. The correspondence exchanged in 
1915 and 1916 between the British High Commissioner in Cairo, McMahon, and the Sherif of Mecca, 
Hussein (published in full in 1938 and in the official English version in 1939). From these letters 
Hussein appeared to believe that he had reached a precise understanding with Great Britain on the 
formation of a unified Arab state comprising the whole zone of the Fertile Crescent and the Arabian 
Peninsula, that is in all the Arab lands of the dissolving Ottoman Empire. His original demands were 
even wider: he wanted to include such areas of somewhat doubtful 'Arabness' as the Turkish provinces 
of Mersin and Adana, but McMahon induced him to drop this idea. He also made special conditions 
with regard to the coastal zone of Syria (that is, the Lebanon) as being of particular interest to France, 
and on Iraq (provinces of Baghdad and Basrah) where British interests were involved; while rejecting 
all Anglo-French claims in principle, Hussein consented to discuss these conditions later. 
'^ Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 9, 1916), secret convention made during World War I between Great 
Britain and France, with the assent of imperial Russia, for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. 
The agreement led to the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various 
French- and British-administered areas. The agreement took its name from its negotiators. Sir Mark 
Sykes of Britain and Georges Picot of France. 
Its provisions were as follows: 
1. Russia should acquire the Armenian provinces of Erzurum, Trebizond (Trabzon), Van, and 
BitUs, with some Kurdish territory to the southeast; 
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moved into Lebanon, replaced the Arab administration in Beirut and set up a 
temporary military administration over the region. Syrian nationalists vigorously 
protested this division of Syria and the imposition of British and French control/^ 
3.2 The French Mandate 1920 
After war, two trips to London and Paris with respect to the peace settlement, 
Emir Faisal belatedly discerned his naivet6 in accepting wartime commitments at face 
value. Learning at first hand, the unreliability of Western diplomats, he became the 
personal victim of slippery French diplomacy and astute British imperialism. The 
Arabs desired independence, and the Allied Powers would not grant it as League of 
Nations imposed mandate.'^ 
On March 8, 1920 'General Syrian Congress' of nationalists had proclaimed 
an independent kingdom of Greater Syria, including Lebanon and Palestine, with 
2. France should acquire Lebanon and the Syrian littoral, Adana, Cilicia, and the hinterland 
adjacent to Russia's share, that hinterland including Aintab, Urfa, Mardin, Diyarbakir, and 
Mosul; 
3. Great Britain should acquire southern Mesopotamia, including Baghdad, and also the 
Mediterranean ports of Haifa and Akka (Acre); 
4. between the French and the British acquisitions there should be a confederation of Arab states 
or a single independent Arab state, divided into French and British spheres of influence; 
5. Alexandretta (Iskenderun) should be a free port; and (6) Palestine, because of the holy places, 
should be under an international regime. 
This secret arrangement conflicted in the first place with pledges already given by the British to the 
Hashimite dynast Husayn ibn Ali, sharif of Mecca, who was about to bring the Arabs of the Hejaz into 
revolt against the Turks on the understanding that the Arabs would eventually receive a much more 
important share of the fruits of victory. It also excited the ambitions of Italy, to whom it was 
communicated in August 1916, after the Italian declaration of war against Germany, with the result that 
it had to be supplemented, in April 1917, by the Agreement of Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, whereby 
Great Britain and France promised southern and southwestern Anatolia to Italy. The defection of 
Russia from the war canceled the Russian aspect of the Sykes-Picot Agreement; and the Turkish 
Nationalists' victories after the military collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to the gradual abandonment 
of its projects for Anatolia. The Arabs, however, who had learned of the Sykes-Picot Agreement 
throii^ the publication of it, together with other secret treaties of imperial Russia, by the Soviet 
Russian government late in 1917, were scandalized by it; and their resentment persisted despite the 
modification of its arrangements for the Arab countries by the Allies' Conference of San Remo in April 
1920. 
" Michael Curtis, ed., N.42, p.220. 
'* Redhey Shyam Chaurasia, History of Middle East (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 
2005) p. 225. 
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Faisal as king7^ The prominent members of the Christian community swore 
allegiance to him; and even the Muslims on Lebanon's Administrative Council came 
to Damascus to pay him homage.'^ 
One month later, the granting of the mandate over Syria and Lebanon to 
France at the San Remo Conference in April 24, 1920 was an official recognition of 
France's long-standing ties with the Levant." The French now had legal authority to 
deal with the unfriendly Arab administration in the interior, whose troops had 
unofficially attacked French military positions near the demarcations-line between the 
two zones, while the Arab authorities carried anti-French propaganda, and obstructed 
French commerce; the French in their turn were not quilt less of counter-
80 
provocation. 
In July 1920, General Henri Joseph Eugene Gouraud sent Faisal an ultimatum 
for the unqualified acceptance of the French mandate for the whole country. While 
Faisal was attempting to negotiate, there were armed clashes between his troops and 
the French.*' 
However, Emir Faisal's negotiation with French failed. On July 24, a small 
band of Faisal's forces met the French army at Maysalun Pass and, after a six-hour 
battle, were thrown back in disarray. In August 7, General Henri Joseph Eugene 
Gouraud entered Damascus and raised the French Tricolor. After a few additional 
^' George E. Kirk, A Short History of Middle East: from the Rise of Islam to Modern Times 
(Northampton: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1964) p.l63. 
" Charles Winslow, N.37, p.58. 
"MeirZamir,N.70,p.38. 
Levant: (French: derivative of lever, to rise, as applied to, say, sunrise). Historically, the term was 
applied to the lands along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean. Subsequent to the French mandate 
of Syria and Lebanon in 1920, these countries were called the Levant State. Today the term Levant 
applies to the independent states of Syria and Lebanon. 
*" George E. Kirk, N.77, p. 163. 
" Redhey Shyam Chaurasia, N.76, pp.226-227. 
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attempts to reach an accord with the French, Emir left Syria for Italy and, finally, 
moved on to Baghdad where, in 1921, the British installed him as King of Iraq. 
Evoking the historical memory of the Crusades, General Henri Gouraud 
dramatically enacted the role of faithful protector in 1920 when he visited the famous 
tomb of Saladin outside the Umayyad Mosque soon after arriving in Damascus. On 
reaching the tomb he is supposed to have knocked on the door and said to its inmate, 
"Listen, Saladin, we have returned!" The French saw themselves as the political 
midwife for the creation of a Maronite-dominated state and its ultimate guarantor. 
Despite, the position of France in Syria and Lebanon was not a happy one. 
Although, the Supreme Allied Council in April 1920 at the Conference of San Remo 
had awarded the mandate for Syria and Lebanon to France, the French were obliged 
to secure control of Syria by military operations against the Syrians. After the capture 
of Aleppo and Damascus in July 1920, the French ruled Syria and Lebanon quite 
arbitrarily for more than three years before the mandate of the League of Nations 
became effective legally on September 29, 1923.*"* (See Map No.4) 
3.3 The Greater Lebanon 
The World War I (1914-18) led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the 
military occupation of its Syrian provinces by British and French troop. After the end 
of the war, the League of Nations (fore-runner of the United Nations) decreed that 
'^ Charles Winslow, N.37, p.38. 
" Michael Humphrey, Islam, MuMculturalism and Transnationalism: From the Lebanese Diaspora 
(London: The Centre for Lebanese Studies and LB. Tauris Publishers, 1998) p.65. 
" William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (New York: The University of Michigan Press, 
1968) p.339. 
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Greater Syrian was to be partitioned into two French mandate, Lebanon and Syria, in 
order to prepare them for self-government and eventual independence. 
General Henri Joseph Eugene Gouraud, now the French High Commissioner 
in Lebanon (who was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Syria and 
Lebanon), proclaimed on September 1, 1920, for the establishment of state of Greater 
Lebanon (Le Grand Liban) with Beirut as its capital. 
The boundaries of this new state which coincide with those of contemporary 
Lebanon, diverged considerably from the portion of the Ottoman Empire that had 
constituted the area previously referred to as Lebanon.** The annexed areas to the 
Mount Lebanon consisted of the former autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire 
largely consisting of the Christian population, constituting in the districts of Akkar in 
the north, the fertile Biqa Valley in the east, the country areas of Jabal Amel in the 
south up to the Palestine border, as well as the coastal towns and city-ports of Tripoli, 
" B. V. Rao, History of Asia: From Early Times to A.D. 2000 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Pvt 
Ltd., 2001) p.419-420. 
Britain, France's chief European rival and the world's leading industrial power, was not idle in the race 
to extend its commercial and political influence abroad. By the end of the nineteenth century, British 
foreign policy led to direct intervention in and control of vast territories inhabited wholly or by 
significantly large populations of Muslims in West and East Africa, Egypt and Sudan, Aden and the 
Trucial States of Arab/Persian Gulf, India, and north Borneo and Malaya in southeast Asia. Anglo-
French rivalry was extended in the immediate aftermath of the Worid War I to the two counties 
dividing the remnants of the now defunct Ottoman Empire between them. The League of Nations 
(forerunner of the United Nations), founded and dominated by the Western nations which had emerged 
victorious from the war against Germany and its Ottoman ally, granted France a mandate over Syria 
and Lebanon, while Palestine and Iraq were mandated to Britain. 
Although Britain and France were the major beneficiaries of this global political politico-economic 
carve-up, especially as it affected Muslim areas, other Europeans, for example the Dutch, Belgians, 
Germans, Italians, Spanish, and Portuguese were actively involved as well. By the beginning of the 
twentieth century, the only significant Muslim territories to have escaped direct European political 
domination were Turkey (the core of the old Ottoman Empire), Iran, Afghanistan, the Yemen, and the 
holy cities of Mecca and Medina in Arabia. (David Waines, An Introduction to Islam (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp.215-216). 
** In 1914 the Ottoman Arab East had been divided into three provinces (Aleppo, Suriyya and Beirut) 
and three special districts (Lebanon, Dair az-Zur and Jerusalem). 
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Sidon (Saida), Tyre and Beirut. Precisely, the area that constitute to the present-day 
Lebanon.*^ (See Map No.5) 
France's decision in 1920 tripled Lebanon's land area and increased its 
population by half from 400,000 to 600,000. More critical still, the residents of the 
annexed areas differed significantly, particularly in terms of religion, from those of 
the core area.** The former state, consisting principally of the area of Mount Lebanon, 
was composed primarily of Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians and Druze, 
while most of the residents of the annexed areas were Shiite and Sunni Muslims. (See 
Map No.6) Given the social, economic, and political significance of religious identity 
in the area, this new configuration had enormous import for the viability of the 
enlarged state. *^  
In the new republic, the French ensured that the Maronite Christians, who had 
sought French protection against their Ottoman rulers as early as the 17* century, 
formed the largest religious community and would therefore; dominate the new state 
politically and economically. Yet the enlargement of the Lebanon incorporated into 
the large numbers of Muslims and Christians who would have preferred to remain 
part of Syria and who were deeply attached to the Arab world.^ 
Many of these people had little allegiance to their new country and, like their 
Syrian neighbours, deeply resent what the French had done. Muslim opinion was 
divided between those who wished to see Lebanon reunited with the Arab world and 
" Hussein Sirriyeh, N.52, p.3. 
'* Robin Fedden, N.22, pp.250-251. 
" Trevor Mostyn, ed.. The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) pp.368-369. 
'" Lois A. Aroian, and Richard P. Mitciiell, The Modern Middle East and North Africa (New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984) p.201. 
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those who wished to build a new Lebanon in partnership with their Christian 
compatriots. 
The Maronites were also divided between those who felt that Lebanon should 
not turn its back on Arab world, and those who regarded Lebanon as a Christian 
homeland belonging to the same Mediterranean world as France. The latter regarded 
the Muslims as potential danger to what they believed to be the 'Christian' state of 
Lebanon. '^ 
3.4 The Pre-Constitutional Period: 1920-1926 
The period between 1920 and 1926 witnessed a clear difference between 
Muslim and Christian attitudes toward the establishment of the new entity. 
Ideologically, the debate was essentially between the supporters of Arab nationalism 
and the promoters of modem Lebanese nationalism. The question at hand was double 
fold; whether or not Lebanon should be an independent state, separate from the 
Syrian-Arab hinterland, and what should be its relations with the French under the 
mandate.'^ 
The Greek Catholics concurred with the Maronites and consequently were 
pro-French and favored the creation of Greater Lebanon. In contrast, the Greek 
Orthodox held diverse views and were less sure of their stand. Compared to the other 
Christian communities, the Greek Orthodox were more pan-Arab in orientation and 
many of them supported the Sunni position. The anti-French and anti-Maronite 
sentiments of most Greek Orthodox reinforced this predilection. Yet, many Greek 
Orthodox were not anxious to be swallowed up in an overwhelmingly Sunni state. 
The Druze tended to share the ambivalence of the Greek Orthodox although, like the 
" Lucy Dean, ed.. Middle East and North Africa 2006 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Frances Group, 
2005)p.694. 
'^WalidPhares,N.21,p.77. 
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Greek Orthodox, they inclined towards the Sunni point of view. Lilcewise, the Shiites 
tended to be pro-Syrian, anti-Greater Lebanon, and anti-French, but not so uniformly 
or emotionally as the Sunnis.'^ 
Since the annexation by the French of four provinces (Beirut, Biqa, Akkar, 
and Jabal-Amel) to Mount Lebanon, the Muslim population of these areas resisted 
integration to the new state. Despite, the Declaration of Greater Lebanon on 
September 1, 1920, and the establishment of a local Lebanese administration under 
the auspices of the French mandate, most of the Muslim leadership boycotted the 
French-backed bureaucracy. Kamal Salibi wrote: 
When in 1920, the Lebanese territory was enlarged in order to include the 
regions of the littoral and the inland adjacent to Mount Lebanon, the 
Muslim majority of the annexed regions opposed this annexation and 
refused to accept it as a final arrangement. '^' 
The traditional Sunni political families, however, remained attached to the 
mainstream Syrian movement, fundamentally opposed to French rule and the 
Christians who they felt were their "local Christian surrogates." By opposing the new 
realities, the Muslim political forces did not contribute to the internationally 
recognized entity and remained excluded from the buildup of the new state. ^ 
Faced with this new State, into which they had been thrust against their will, 
Islamic Communities at first reacted with an attitude of total refusal: this rejection of 
the new entity took on three main forms. Firstly, boycott: many Muslims refused to 
have the word "Lebanese" stamped on their identity cards and the mandatory 
authority was obliged to leave their nationality blank. Many boycotted the 1921 
'^  David C. Gordon, Lebanon: the Fragment Nation (London: Croom Helm, 1980) p.39. 
** Kamal S. Salibi, Tarikh Lubnan al-Hadith (Modern History of Lebanon) (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 
1976)pp.212-213. 
' ' Walid Phares, N.21, pp.77-78. 
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census and the 1922 and 1925 elections which were designed to ensure representation 
of the communities at the legislative council of the Greater Lebanon. They also 
refused, using religious and civil notables as their spokesmen, particularly in Beirut, 
Tripoli, Saida and Baalbeck, to take part in the preparatory consultations in 1926 for 
the organic statute (constitution) of the new State. Finally many notables and learned 
young Muslims refused the positions offered to them in the new administration, so as 
not to collaborate with a State which they saw as predominantly Christian linked to 
France, and embodying their enforced separation from the Syrian homeland.^ * 
The rejection of the Lebanese State also took the more active form of political 
protest: in 1923, 1926, 1928 and on many other occasions, meetings (often called 
"conferences") were held, usually at the home of one of the notables, which always 
finished with communique or petition addressed to the French authorities or 
sometimes to international opinion. These petitions ceaselessly reaffirmed the 
following leitmotivs: the annexation to Lebanon had been carried out against their 
wishes and without consultation of the Islamic community, who in fact reject the new 
State and its institutions; they demanded, on the basis of the rights of nations 
(Wilson's precepts), their reattachment to Syria on decentralized lines. Qadis, Muftis, 
wealthy merchants, notables, presidents of municipalities and even elected members 
of the representative Council signed these petitions, which would seen to indicate a 
certain unanimity (ijma) among the community or at least a strong popular pressure in 
this direction. Close examination of these texts shows greater intransigence and a 
more violent tone in the petitions coming from Tripoli and Saida. In fact, these two 
towns, with a large Sunni majority, had lost, to Beirut's gain, the greater part of their 
** Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965) 
pp.169-170. 
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commercial exchanges with the Syria hinterland; felt their marginalization as a direct 
effect of the new political entity.^ ^ 
Some of Lebanon's Muslim communities, moreover, associated their struggle 
with that of the Arab nationalist movement in Syria. Muslim elements from Lebanon 
supported Arab uprisings in the Syrian mainland, and Arab nationalists from Syria 
often infiltrated Lebanon to wage guerrilla warfare with locals against the mandate 
(and the Christians). The peak of Lebanon's Muslim communities' involvement in 
anti-French, anti-Greater Lebanon activities was during the great Syrian revolt in 
1925, known as al-Thawra as-Suriya al-Kubra. Extending a large military uprising 
launch in various Syrian provinces, mainly in the Jabal al-Duruz, Druze and other 
nationalist forces crossed the borders into the Biqa and southern Lebanon, participated 
in ambushed against French units, and raided many Christian villages in the area. This 
controversy encouraged armed Shiite factions in South Lebanon, for both political and 
commercial purposes, to attack, massacre, expel, and loot the Christian towns. 
By March, the following year, the French troops with the help of Christian 
auxiliaries had been largely successful in putting down the revolt.^ * 
The major revindication of the Muslims in Lebanon was the reunion with 
Syria. They called for a detachment of the four districts from Mount Lebanon and 
their merger with the hinterland. The Muslims' fears were based on the threat that a 
Christian-dominated Lebanon would compel its Muslim population to serve its 
natural ties with the Arab-Muslim world and make them second-class citizens.^ 
^ Olivier Carre, ed., Islam and the State in the World (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1987) 
pp.21-22. 
^ Meir Zamir, N.70, pp.207-209. 
^ George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 
1961)p.ll6. 
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The Christian political establishment followed mainly a pro-French line. The 
Christian mainstream current attempted to reach the following objectives: 
1. First was to secure a separate entity of Greater Lebanon from any type of 
unification with Syria. During the first years of the mandate, the majority 
of the Christian leadership opposed any attempt by the French that could 
jeopardize the status of a separate Lebanon with its extended borders. On 
many occasions, the Christian establishment, under the umbrella of the 
Maronite patriarchate, strongly resisted French plans to create a Syrian 
federation, even with the pledged Christian upper hand. Thus, the 
Maronite preference was to protect and consecrate the territorial gains 
obtained in September 1920. In the twenties, Lebanese nationalism among 
the Christians meant the inclusion of all the territory the borders 
establishing in 1920. The Christians sought to insure a hasty domination of 
the Lebanese inland. 
2. The second trend of Christian policies immediately after the creation of 
Greater Lebanon was to guarantee full control of governmental 
institutions. Profiting from the Muslim boycott of the administration, 
prominent Christian families sent their members to occupy the different 
echelons of the ministries. Since this period, Lebanon's governmental 
apparatus was mostly controlled by the political establishment as a way to 
give additional support to the Lebanese identity of the state. 
3. The third trend was to consolidate an alliance with the French, in order to 
ensure the above-mentioned objective; that is, a separate Lebanese entity 
and Christian domination. In the early twenties, France was considered a 
world power. For the Lebanese Christians in particular, France was 
viewed as a protector and promoter of their interests. Therefore, the 
Lebanese Christians maintained constant pressure on French authorities 
both in Beirut and in Paris. Yet relations between the two ameliorate their 
relations with the Muslim of Lebanon and Syria, proposing to fulfill some 
of their demands at the expense of the Lebanese Christians. Constantly 
alert to these attempts, the latter organized a network of contacts with the 
French cabinet, the legislative branch, and even with the opposition. The 
"Lebanese Lobby" in Paris operated efficiently, and Christian spiritual and 
political leaders in Lebanon repeatedly asserted these claims as extension 
of the Lebanese-French historical relations. 
In fact, the Lebanese Christian circles were looking forward to consecrating 
their objectives through legal, constitutional, and diplomatic documents. The first 
battle concerned the establishment of a constitution.'"*' 
"^ Walid Phares, N.21, pp.80-81. 
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3.5 French Mandatory Policy and Administration 
The League of Nations assigned Syria and Lebanon both to France in 1922 in 
a single mandate with the condition that they be governed as separate parts of one 
political entity."" Instead, France subdivided the area into several autonomous states. 
Lebanon was not created along the lines of the autonomous Ottoman province 
established in 1861, however.'"^ Thus, any French Government which wished to 
preserve the essential interests of France felt bound to pursue a policy in Syria and 
Lebanon which would serve: 
1. To protect the Catholic and other Christian communities, in accordance 
with the French tradition in the Levant, and also the other minorities; 
2. To safeguard the work of the missions and the position of French culture 
in Syria and Lebanon; 
3. To assure her control over at least one naval and one air base, and perhaps 
over other strategic points as well; 
4. To conform with her general policy in the other Arab and Muslim 
territories which she controlled; 
5. To conform with British policy in the surrounding Arab countries; and 
6. To safeguard her investments, her commercial interests, and her access to 
the oil of Iraq, by means of the pipeline to Tripoli, and also to the oil of 
Syria itself if it should prove to be worth exploiting. 
One other political interest of France must be mentioned. She was the 
dominant power in North West Africa, of which the majority of the inhabitants are 
Arabic-speaking Muslims. One of the motives for occupying Syria was her desire to 
control so important a centre of Arab and Muslim opinion; and in framing her policy 
in Syria and Lebanon, she had always to take into account the repercussions it was 
likely to have in Morocco, Algeria and Tunis. To repress nationalism in the Levant 
might have caused unrest in North Africa; but to concede everything to nationalism in 
"" George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1971) p.309. 
"•^  Don Peretz, The Middle East Today (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1971) p.321. 
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the Levant might have strengthened the demand for similar concessions in North 
Africa, where it would have been more difficult for France to grant them. 
Yet France did not want to create a really independent state. Lebanon was 
therefore enlarged to include enough Christians to justify setting up a separate 
government, but also a sufficient number of Muslims to assure the need for continued 
French protection of their political hegemony. The heartland was Mount Lebanon 
where some 340,000 Maronites lived. It included the area of the former autonomous 
Ottoman province created in 1861. This area was tripled in size in 1920 by adding the 
predominantly Muslim city of Beirut; Muslim Tripoli in the north; Sidon in the south; 
southern up to the Palestine border, with a predominantly Shiite population; and the 
fertile Biqa Valley, occupied by a mixture of Muslim and Greek Orthodox residents. 
Maronites, who had constituted the majority of the Ottoman province, became the 
largest minority in the new French-controlled Lebanon. They and other Christian 
groups constituted just a little more than half the population. Sunni, Shiite, and other 
Muslim sects and the Druzes made up the rest. Emigration was at first forbidden lest 
the Christian-Muslim balance be disturbed. 
A number of native governments were also established in Syria and one in 
Lebanon, each with its own constitution."^ The native government was staffed by 
Lebanese, while the high commissioner's organization was manned by French 
colonial officials responsible for both Syria and Lebanon. At his Beirut headquarters, 
the High Commissioner was assisted by a French political and military cabinet who 
' " A. H. Hourani, N.33, pp.156-157. 
"^ Ibid., p. 169. 
Dual government was theoretically a provisional system designed to enabled peoples who "politically 
speaking, are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. 
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took charge of departments of security, education, public works, and antiquities and 
an organization for Bedouin affairs.'"^ 
In Lebanon, where the High Commissioner was always close at hand, the 
country experienced a succession of four French Governors leading to the 
establishment of French constitution for the new Sate: 
1. Georges Trabaud 1920 - 1923 
2. M. Privat-Aubouard 1923 - 1924 
3. General Vanderberg 1924 - 1925 
4. LeonCayla 1925-1926 
Between the High Commissioner and the Governor was a Secretary General in 
charge of designing and implementing the French strategy of political and economic 
development for the Mandate. The man who, more than anyone else, drew up the 
programme of reform that the French hoped would modernize Syria was Secretary 
General Robert De Caix. From 1919 to 1923, he put through his ideas of organization 
which "laid the foundations of a new Lebanese administration" and enlisted the 
talents of a new class of native Lebanese, mostly Christian, who had recently 
graduated from the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionary schools. Due to the 
efforts of De Caix, the first two High Commissioners, Gouraud and Weygand, not 
only developed a Lebanese civil service but also established a new electoral law, a 
new currency, new laws regulating land tenure, and a reorganized police and local 
militia.'°* 
Because of their favoured position, French businessmen easily acquired 
financial control of the railroads, public utilities, and banks. Since the language of the 
government administration was French, that language became much more useful in 
'"' Don Peretz, N.102, p.322. 
"* Charles Winslow, N.37, pp.62-63. 
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official and intellectual circles than Arabic. At this juncture economic policy also 
favoured France. On the one hand, tariffs were inadequate to protect local enterprise 
from cheap imports. On the other, French companies received the most important 
economic concessions. Currency instability resulted from linking the Lebanese pound 
to the fluctuating French franc. 
However, during the mandatory period law and order was effectively 
enforced, especially in the mountainous hinterland that in the past had managed to 
remain free from Ottoman control. Roads were built to link urban areas with the 
countryside and to help develop it. Better communications also facilitated the 
suppression of Bedouin incursions. Expansion of the school system raised the already 
high literacy rate. Development of health services and easier access to medical care 
considerably improved health standards. During this period, Beirut expanded into a 
metropolis and became a leading Mediterranean port. As a consequence of French 
material improvements, the availability of food and clothing became more plentiful 
and desire for emigration declined.'°^ 
Mandatory officials were often corrupt, avaricious, and arbitrary. Local 
employees were not chosen wisely, properly trained, or given an appropriate measure 
of responsibility. Too often, the Lebanese charged, they were treated like an African 
colony and regarded by colonial officials with contempt. Basic civil rights were 
violated and political suspects were frequently imprisoned without trial. Security 
agents even instigated disorder in their attempts to discredit native governments. 
During the period, the Syrian and Lebanese native governments also had little 
opportunity to develop the powers they did have, however, whenever a native 
"" Philip K. Hitti, N.59, pp.487-488. 
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government threatened to exercise too much independence, the High Commissioner 
merely suspended its constitution and took over its administration. 
French policy originally satisfied the Maronites, although some Christians and 
most Muslims objected to being cut off from the Syrian hinterland. Because of the 
favored Maronite position, French control was considerably milder in Lebanon than in 
neighbouring Syria, where several uprisings were harshly suppressed. 
Material progress without more rapid development of local government only 
created the inevitable colonial dilemma. The more sophisticated and familiar with 
Western ways the population became, as a result of its higher living standards, the 
greater its dissatisfaction with the slow attainment of self-determination. Even many 
formerly pro-French Maronites became impatient with the delays in developing self-
govertmient. Thus, Lebanese Christians also began to demand full independence and 
to identify with neighbouring Arab nationalist movements.'"* 
3.6 The Constitution 1926 
In 1922, two years after the League of Nations had given the French a 
mandate over the newly created state of Lebanon, it allowed the election of a 
Representative Council (RC) with thirty members. This Representative Council did 
not turn out to be the compliant body that the French had anticipated. In 1925, it 
moved to exercise its constitutional right to choose the chief executive. Despite 
French objections, the Representative Council was determined to elect Bishara al 
Khouri, a Maronite who enjoyed the support of many Muslim leaders and was 
opposed to the French presence.'"^ The French high commissioner. General Maurice 
"* Don Peretz, N.102, pp.321-324. 
109 Bishara al Khouri (1890 - 1 January 1964) was the first post-independence President of Lebanon, 
holding office from 21 September 1943 to 18 September 1952, apart fix)m an 11-day interruption (11-
22 November) in 1943. He had previously served two brief terms as Prime Minister, from 5 May 1927 
to 10 August 1928 and from 9 May to 11 October 1929. A lawyer by training, Khouri founded the Ad-
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Sarrail, repeatedly applied pressure on the Representative Council to change its mind 
and choose France's preferred candidate, Emile Edde."° But the Representative 
Council could not be swayed. In desperation, Sarrail dissolved the assembly, and 
elections for a second Representative Council were conducted.'" 
From the rebellion of 1925-27 came one benefit, the start of a constitutional 
process in the mandated territory which, while inconclusive for Syria, did result in a 
constitution for Lebanon. In early 1926, Henri De Jouvenal was sent to Beirut as High 
Commissioner, replacing General Serail, whose inept and rigid policies had done 
much to expand and prolong the hostilities. He immediately gave permission to the 
Dustour Party (Constitutional Bloc Party) and served as a Cabinet minister prior to his election as 
President on 21 September 1943. He was a strong nationalist who opposed the French Mandate, and on 
11 November 1943, he was arrested by Free French troops and imprisoned in the Rashaya Tower for 
eleven days, along with Reyad El-Solh (the Prime Minister), Pierre Gemayel, Camille Chamoun, and 
numerous other personalities who were to dominate politics in the generation following independence. 
Massive demonstrations forced the Free French forces to release the prisoners, including Khouri, on 22 
November 1943, a date now celebrated as Lebanon's national independence day. Khouri is remembered 
for his part in drawing up the National Pact, an agreement between Lebanon's Christian and Muslim 
leaders which forms the basis of the country's constitutional structure today, although it was not 
codified in the Constitution until the Taif Agreement of 1989. Khouri's years in office were marked by 
great economic growth, but the 1948 Israeli War of Independence (in which Lebanon fought on the 
Arab side) strained the Lebanese economy with its financial cost and with the influx of some 100,000 
Palestinian refugees. These factors, along with suspicions of corruption in Khouri's administration, 
provoked massive demonstrations which forced him to resign on 18 September 1952. He was 
succeeded by Camille Chamoun, although technically Fuad Shihab succeeded him temporarily as 
acting president. 
Constitutional Bloc Party (Hizb Al-Kitla Al-Doostooriya): The Constitutional Bloc Party was formed 
in 1936 to call for the restoration of the constitution in Lebanon after its suspension by French mandate 
authorities. It was headed by Bishara al-Khouri, who championed the cause of Lebanon's 
independence. Although the Bloc cannot be considered a political party, it did not differ from other 
political organizations in Lebanon in terms of its personality-oriented structure. Its members were 
drawn from the commercial and political elite, who did not agree with the views of Emile Edde, a 
supporter of French policies in Lebanon. It was most active in Mount Lebanon and Beirut, among 
Maronites and Druze. After 1941, the bloc became identified with British policy in the West Asia The 
cohesiveness of the bloc, which was based on the shared goal of independence, quickly splintered after 
al-Khouri was elected president in 1943. He continued to use the Bloc as a tool against his well-
organized enemies. It continued to strengthen it as a political force, with limited influence and appeal, 
into the 1960s. After al-Khouri retired, his son Khalil al-Khouri assumed leadership of the bloc. With 
the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the Bloc ceased to exist, and Khalil retired to France. 
'"* Emile Eddd (1886 - 1949) was a Maronite Lebanese political figure. He served as Prime Minister 
of Lebanon fixjm 11 October 1929 to 25 March 1930. He served as the President of Lebanon from 1936 
to 1941. He also founded the Lebanese National Bloc party. 
' " Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: 
The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) pp. 80-81. 
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Representative Council to act as a Constituent Assembly and draft a constitution, 
which would be subject to restrictions that protected the Mandatory's privileges. 
De Jouvenal, though a liberal who was also determined to protect French 
interests, did not hesitate to suppress resistance to the Council's work from all 
quarters. Petitions were organized by the Unionists, and after many weeks of 
discussion and consultation with the High Commissioner's officer, a draft was 
accepted, and Lebanon, on May 23, 1926, was proclaimed as Constitutional 
Republic."^ Drawn up by a French committee which sat in Paris, mostly in private, 
with little consultation with the Lebanese, it was presented to the Representative 
Council with the understanding that it was to adopt it. On 23 May 1926, the 
constitution was promulgated; on the 24'*' the Council became the Chamber of 
Deputies; on the 25* members of the Senate (Higher Chamber) were appointed by the 
High Commissioner; on the 26* both Chambers met and elected the first President of 
the Lebanese Republic (Charles Dabbas); and on the 31'' the first Cabinet was formed. 
Religious confession was the basis for the distribution of seats in the Chambers and 
the Cabinet. Thus, by 31^' May a parliamentary republic was established in 
Lebanon."^ 
The legislature was initially divided into two houses, a Senate and a Chamber 
of Deputies. However, a constitutional amendment adopted in 1927 abolished the 
Senate. The constitution was amended in 1929 at the initiative of the French, who 
wanted to strengthen the presidency at the expense of the legislature, extended the 
President's term from three years to six years but made it non-renewable."'* 
"^ Charles Winslow, N.37, p.65. 
' " Nicola A. Ziadeh, N.62, p.51. 
"^ Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, N.l 11, p.81. 
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It adopted for its national flag - the tricolour with the cedar in green imposed 
in the white, later modified into one with three horizontal bars, red-white-red, with the 
cedar in the centre. 
Though amended several times and suspended more than once by French 
authorities, the constitution remained substantially in force. More liberal than all 
neighbouring constitutions, the Lebanese had no provision for any state religion or the 
head of state religion; it made freedom of worship a reality. The time-honoured 
tradition giving the corporate religious communities (sing, millah) the right of 
jurisdiction over matters relating to the personal status of their members - be they 
Christians or Muslims - was retained. Gradually, a new tradition developed making a 
Maronite President of the Republic, a Sunni Prime Minister, a Shiite Chairman of the 
Chamber of Deputies and a Druze Minister of Defence, thus, keeping a balance 
among the major elements in the population."^ 
At the end of Charles Dabbas's first term in 1932, Bishara al Khouri and 
Emile Edde competed for the office of president, thus, dividing the Chamber of 
Deputies. To break the deadlock, some deputies suggested Sheikh Muhammad al Jisr, 
who was chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Muslim leader of Tripoli, as a 
compromise candidate."* However, as a result of nationalist agitation and 
demonstrations against Paris in 1932, the French High Commissioner, Henri Ponsot, 
suspended the 1926 Constitution."^ On May 9, 1932, he extended the term of Dabbas 
for two years: in this way, Henri Ponsot prevented the election of a Muslim as 
president. Dissatisfied with Ponsot's conduct, the French authorities replaced him 
' " Philip K. Hitti, N.59, p.490. 
"* Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, p.58. 
' " Don Peretz, N.102, p.324. 
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with Comte Damien De Martel."^ A new, revised constitution was promulgated in 
1934 by the High Commissioner, restricting the power of the Chamber of Deputies 
and ignoring the religious proportionment that had characterized elections and 
parliamentary representation. An uneasy truce prevailed between the nationalists and 
France until 1932, when outbreaks in Damascus forced Paris to reopen negotiations 
with both Syria and Lebanon. 
On January, 30, 1934, Habib al Sa'd (1934-36) was nominated as the first 
Maronite President by Comte Damien De Martel, the French High Commissioner. 
The first one elected president by the Chamber was Emile Edde (1936-41).'^° In fact 
he was the first Lebanese to hold the presidency by election. French control became 
' " Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, pp.58-59. 
' " Don Peretz, N.102, p.324. 
'^ ^ List of Presidents of Lebanon 
Before Independence 
Charles Dabbas 
Antoine Privat-Aubouard (acting) 
Habib Pacha Es-Saad 
Emile Edde 
Pierre-Georges Arlabosse (acting) 
Alfred Naqqache 
Ayub Thabit (acting) 
Petro Trad 
After Independence 
Bishara al Khouri 
Emile Edde 
Bishara al Khouri 
Fuad Shihab (acting) 
Camitle Chamoun 
Fuad Shihab 
Charles Helou 
Suleiman Frangieh 
Elias Sarkis 
Bashir Gemayel 
Amine Gemayel 
Ren6 Moawad 
Elias Hrawi 
Emile Lahoud 
Michel Suleiman 
1 September 1926-2 January 1934 
2 January - 30 January 1934 
30 January 1934 - 20 January 1936 
20 January 1936-4 April 1941 
4 - 9 April 1941 
9 April 1941-18 March 1943 
19 March-21 July 1943 
22 July - 30 September 1943 
21 September- 11 November 1943 
11-22 November 1943 
22 November 1943 - 18 September 1952 
18-22 September 1952 
23 September 1952-22 September 1958 
23 September 1958-22 September 1964 
23 September 1964 - 22 September 1970 
23 September 1970 - 22 September 1976 
23 September 1976-22 September 1982 
23 August 1982 - 14 September 1982 (Assasinated 10 
days prior to the beginning of his office term). 
23 September 1982-22 September 1988 
5 November - 22 November 1989 
24 November 1989 - 24 November 1998 
24 November 1998 - 23 November 2007 
25 May 2008 - present 
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indirect, operating through "advisers" .However, the services speciata, comprising a 
host of intelligence agents, were maintained. 
Emile Edde was elected president on January 30, 1936 defeating his rival 
Bishara al Khouri with a margin of one vote. A year later, he partially reestablished 
the Constitution of 1926 and proceeded to hold elections for the Chamber of Deputies. 
However, Gabriel Puaux, who succeeded De Martel as High Commissioner in 
January 1939, dissolved the Lebanese Chamber on 21 September, by suspending the 
Constitution for a second time, and confirmed Emile Edde as President and Head of 
State, at the outbreak of World War II. He hoped that the situation world stabilize in 
Lebanon, as well as in Syria for the duration of the war.'^ ^ 
3.7 The Census 1932 
From 1861 to 1914, the Lebanon Mountains comprised an autonomous 
territory within the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently in 1920, the French formed Grand 
Liban ("Greater Lebanon") by adding to Mount Lebanon - including the 
predominantly Muslim population cities resultant in a mixture of Muslim and Greek 
Orthodox residents.'^ ^ 
Therefore, the Lebanese population is comprised of different religious 
communities, some Christian (mainly Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Greek 
Catholic), others Islamic (Sunni Muslim, Shiite Muslim and Druze). Consequently, in 
the old Mount Lebanon there had been an overwhelming Christian majority, but in the 
new Greater Lebanon there was a closer balance between Christians and Muslims. 
Apart from the Armenians of Lebanon, who are relative newcomers to the country, all 
'^' Philip K. Hitti, N.59, p.492. 
'^ ^ Kamal S. Salibi, N.96, pp. 179-184. 
'^' Redhey Shyam Chaurasia, N.76, p.227. 
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the Lebanese communities - Christian and Muslim - have historically spoken Arabic, 
and shared at the traditional level in what may be described in common language as 
an Arab way of life.'^ ^ 
Religious communities are all-important in Lebanon, yet little solid 
information is available on the size of any, since the subject is politically sensitive. 
The country has operated on the political fiction that the 1932 census, taken by the 
French, accurately reflected the distribution of the sects.'^^ Of fundamental 
importance to an understanding of Lebanon's various religious communities is a 
recognition that there are many such groups and that no one sect constitutes more than 
30 percent of the country's total population: the Lebanese Government officially 
recognize seventeen different sects.'^ * Lebanon's religious sect can be thought of in 
terms of two broad grouping, Muslim and Christian, but the subdivision within these 
grouping are several and significant.'^ ^ 
The Maronites who were absolute majority in Mount Lebanon were now 
reduced to the status of largest single sect in Greater Lebanon. According to the 
census of 1932, the Maronite constituted approximately 29 percent of the population 
and all the Christian sects together constituted only 51.7 percent of the population. 
Even this majority was largely attained by including the Armenians who had settled in 
Lebanon after the World War L In contrast, the Sunnis who had constituted only 3.5 
'^ ^ Kamal S. Salibi, N.27, p.4. 
' " Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1980) p.l23. 
'^ ^ List of the sectarian composition of Lebanon, according to tlie census of 1932: (1) Sunnis, (2) 
Shiites, (3) Druzes,(4) Alawis, (5) Ismailis, (6) Maronites, (7) Roman Catholics of the Latin rite, (8) 
Greek Orthodox, (9) Greek Catholics, (10) Syrian Orthodox (Jacobites), (11) Syrian Catholics, (12) 
Armenian Orthodox (Gregorians), (13) Armenian Catholics, (14) Assyrians and Chaldaean Catholics, 
(15) Protestants, (16) Jews, (17) Miscellaneous. (A. H. Hourani, N.33, p.l21). 
™ David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of 
Lebanon and Ghana (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1975) pp.75-76. 
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percent of the population of Mount Lebanon now became the second largest sect in 
Greater Lebanon comprising 22 percent while the Shiites increased from 5.6 to 19.4 
percent. (See Map No.7) More important than this loss of overwhelming Christian 
majority was the fact that the inhabitants of the incorporated territories, who were 
predominantly Muslim, resented their inclusion in Greater Lebanon.'^ * 
On this basis (the number of Christians slightly exceeded the number of 
Muslims) political and administrative positions were divided between Christians and 
Muslims on a 6:5 ratio. Seats in the unicameral parliament, positions in the civil 
service, and posts in the cabinet have been apportioned according to this ratio.'^' 
Leaders of the Christian-rightist alliance in the civil war defended this system 
and had been willing to modify it only slightly. They had consented to change the 
ratio from 6:5 to 5:5, with seats in the parliament and cabinet distributed on the basis 
of this new formula. They also agreed to abolish the sectarian distribution of positions 
in the civil service except at the highest level, and to have persons selected for such 
jobs solely on merit. Leaders of the Muslim-leftist alliance argued that the sectarian 
ratio should be abolished altogether, and that religious community should cease to be 
the foundation of which the Lebanese political system is structured.'^° 
The widespread reluctance in Lebanon to organize another census reflects 
uncertainty regarding the precise nature of the demographic shifts among the sects 
since 1932. Some sources have portrayed the Lebanese population as now being about 
equally divided between Christians and Muslims. It is quite likely, however, that the 
Muslims outnumbered the Christians in Lebanon, both because Christians tend to 
'^' Ibid., p.76. 
'^' Bruce Borthwick, N.125, p.l23. 
"''Ibid.,pp.l23-124. 
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have a higher rate of permanent emigration and because they (Christians) tend to have 
a lower birthrate.'^' But since 1932, successive Lebanese government have refused to 
conduct another census due to opposition from the Christians. This political 
arrangement was not adjusted, in the absence of a new census, until 1990, even 
though there has been an obvious Muslim majority for years.'''^ 
3.8 The Franco - Lebanese Treaty 1936-39 
By 1936, French policy in the Levant was also influenced by Socialist Premier 
Leon Blum's Popular Front government.'^ '' Socialist ideology opposed colonialism 
and Blum's government was sympathetic to nationalist aspirations. Hence, Syria was 
first to obtain greater self-determination in 1936.'^ " 
Meanwhile, on 9 September 1936, the Franco-Syrian Treaty was signed in 
Paris. The French also negotiated in the same year in Beirut for a similar Treaty with 
Lebanon. Subsequently in November 1936, a twenty-five-year Treaty between French 
and Lebanon was signed. The treaty was negotiated between President Edde and High 
Commissioner Damien De Martel.'''' By the terms of these Treaties, Syria and 
Lebanon were recognized as independent and sovereign states, to be recommended 
" ' David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, N.127, p.76. 
"^ Colbert C. Held, N.4, p.263. 
' " Leon Blum (1872-1950), creator of the modem French Socialist party, and the first socialist and 
first Jewish person to become premier of France. As premier in 1936-37, he led the Popular Front, a 
coalition of Socialist and Radicals opposed to fascism. Blum was imprisoned by the Germans, 1940-45. 
He became premier again in 1946-47. (Michael D. Harkavy, ed., N.7, p. 142) 
Popular Front, an alliance of lift-wing parties (Communists, Socialists, Liberals, Radicals, etc.) 
against a reactionary government or the threat from powerful DICTATORS abroad. The idea of an 
anti-FASCIST Popular Front was proposed by the Communist International in 1935; such a 
government was set up in Madrid in 1935, but was unable to avert the SPANICH CIVIL WAR. France 
did enjoyed a Popular Front government from 1936 to 1938 under Leon Blum, but apart from enabling 
the French Communist Party to strengthen its power base it could not achieve long-term unity on the 
Left or pose on effective counterweight to Fascism and NAZISM in neighbouring states. (Nicholas 
Comfort, Brewer's Politics: A Phrase and Fable Dictionary, (London, Cassell pic, 1995) p.471). 
''*DonPeretz,N.102,p.324. 
" ' Philip K. Hitti, N.59, p.492. 
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for admission to the League of Nations after a preparatory period of not more than 
three years. The two states were to be allies of France in peace and war, providing her 
specific land, air, and sea facilities for military purposes. France was moreover 
supposed to have a privileged position in the two states. The Syrian and Lebanese 
armies were to be recognized under French supervision; the Syrian and Lebanese 
governments were to seek all technical help and advice from France; the French 
diplomatic service was to protect the rights of Syrian and Lebanese subjects abroad; 
and the French ambassador in Damascus and Beirut was to have precedence over all 
others.'^ ^ In addition, there were detailed provisions regarding currency, the rights of 
foreigners, the privileges of foreign institutions, and other technical matters. In the 
case of the Lebanese Treaty, an exchange of notes between President Edde and High 
Commissioner De Martel, added as an annex, specified among other things that the 
Lebanese Republic should guarantee the fair representation of all the country's sects 
in the government and high administration. This item, known after its code number in 
the correspondence as '6-6 bis', was to outlive the Treaty and its annex and continue 
to be the fundamental principle of Lebanese political life. 
The text of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty was unanimously passed by the 
Lebanese Chamber on 13 November, by the Muslim deputies joining the Christians in 
its approval. Outside the Legislature, however, Muslim opinion took the Treaty to be 
a final confirmation of Lebanon's territorial composition and independent status, and 
consequently opposed it with vigour.'^ ^ 
The reaction in Lebanon was varied. In general, it was felt that there was a 
need for a Treaty which would guarantee Lebanon's independence. On the other hand, 
''* Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary (California: ABC-Clio Information 
Services, 1984) p.223. 
' " Kama! S. Salibi, N.96, pp.181-182. 
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it was feared by some sections of the Lebanese population that such a Treaty would 
destroy any hope of possible union with Syria. Although this was, generally speaking, 
the feeling of the people of Tripoli, Sidon and the Maronites living in parts of Beirut. 
Some important spokesman at least, felt that the Treaty did not give them any special 
guarantees and it was finally abandoned in 1939.'^ * 
Once the Treaty was approved, trouble broke out in all Muslim districts. There 
were violent demonstrations and a strike in Tripoli, and anti-Christian rioting in 
several religiously mixed districts. In Beirut, on 15 November! 936, a particularly 
serious clash between Christians and Muslims resulted in a number of casualties. It 
was indeed this last incident which immediately led to the formation of the Kataeb 
organization as a counterpoise to the Muslim street forces in the capital. In the 
Lebanese Legislature, however, the mood remained unchanged. 
By the terms of the Franco-Lebanese Treaty, Lebanon, like Syria, was to be 
admitted to the League of Nations as a fully independent state before the end of 1939. 
By the late summer of that year, however, the Treaty was still unratified by France. 
The outbreak of the World War II on 3 September 1939 indefinitely delayed the 
implementation of the Treaty. Meanwhile, between 1936 and 1939, Lebanon had been 
allowed to enjoy three years of constitutional government in which considerable 
political progress was made. De Martel proclaimed the fiill restoration of Lebanese 
constitutional life on 4 January 1937. On the same day, in keeping with the spirit of 
the Franco-Lebanese Treaty, President Edde called upon a Muslim deputy, Khayr al-
Din al-Ahdab, to form a government.'^' 
'^ * Nicola A. Ziadeh, N.62, p.56. 
"* Kamal S. Salibi, N.96, p.l82. 
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The changed circumstances in Lebanon this justified the decision to appoint a 
Muslim premier. A Constitution, a Treaty, and the passage of sixteen years had given 
ample guarantee to the integrity of Greater Lebanon as the events of November 1936 
had brought into relief the difference in political attitude between those Muslims who 
were associated with the government and those who were not.''*° 
As a consequence, the movement of discontent with sectarianism was greatly 
strengthened, and many Lebanese, especially among the young, began to look for an 
alternative. At one extreme the 'Phalanges libanaises', the party of the Lebanese 
nationalism, received much support. So did the 'Syrian National Party', with its 
doctrine of the total separation of Church and State; while the Arab Nationalists 
pointed to the failure of the constitutional system as a proof, if one were needed, that 
an independent Lebanon was too divided, artificial and unstable to exist by itself''*' 
4. World War II and Independence 
The World War II had severely weakened the traditional European colonial 
powers and made it very difficult for them to control the revolutions for national 
independence that were accelerating throughout their colonies.''*^ Ultimately many of 
these colonies achieved independence in the late 1940s. Lebanon's and Syria's 
"^ Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., N.26, p. 149. 
' " A. H. Hourani, N.33, pp.182-183. 
'^ ^ Worid War II. second global conflict lasting from 1939 to 1945 that involved civilian populations 
in an unprecedented scale. Military deaths probably amounted to some 17 million, but civilian deaths 
were undoubtedly much higher because of mass bombing of cities, starvation, epidemics, massacres, 
and other war-related causes. The parties to the conflict involved nearly every major power in the 
world, divided into 2 groups: the Allies (principally France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and china) and the Axis Powers (principally Germany, Italy, and Japan). A war whose origins 
lay in three different conflicts which merged after 1941: Germany's desire for European expansion; 
Japan's struggle against china; and a resulting conflict between Japanese ambitions and US interests in 
the Pacific. The development - and use - of the atomic bomb late in the war ushered in the nuclear age. 
Along with World War I, World War II was one of the great watersheds of 20th-century geopolitical 
history. It resulted in the extension of the Soviet Union's power to nations of Eastern Europe, enabled a 
Communist movement eventually to achieve power in China, and marked the decisive shift of power in 
the world away from the states of Western Europe and toward the United States and the Soviet Union. 
52 
independence was part of this process that continued through the 1950s and 60s in 
Asia and Africa."*^ 
4.1 World War II 
On the eve of the World War II, the situation in Lebanon, because of the 
presence of the French army headquarters and because of the French proclivities for 
the Maronites, was not as volatile as in Syria. There were nationalists in Lebanon-
Christians, Muslims, and Druzes-who were members of the Syrian National Party and 
wanted union and independence. On the whole, however, the initiative for nationalist 
agitation was very active in Syria. In 1936, however, a treaty similar to the Franco-
Syrian one was arranged by the French administration with Lebanon. But the French 
did not deal any better with the Lebanese than they had with the Syrians. They simply 
were not able to let their mandates go free and let the "civilizing mission" of France 
take its own course. 
The approach of World War II ended the short-lived semi-independence of 
both Syria and Lebanon. After the fall of France in 1940, the puppet Vichy 
government that Germans had created in France claimed suzerainty over the French 
colonial empire.''*^ Before the Vichy government sent General Dentz to Syria-
Lebanon as High Commissioner in November 1940, a number of French officers and 
soldiers had escaped to Palestine to join the Free French forces. With the arrival of 
General Dentz, Syria-Lebanon became an open field for Axis espionage against the 
British. 
'"' B. J. Odeh, N.35, p.3. 
'** Vichy Government: In World War II, the right-wing government of unoccupied France after the 
country's defeat by the Germans in June 1940, named after the spa town of Vichy, France, where the 
national assembly was based under Prime Minister P t^ain until the liberation in 1944. Vichy France 
was that part of France not occupied by German troops until November 1942. Authoritarian and 
collaborationist, the Vichy regime cooperated with the Germans even after they had moved to the 
unoccupied zone in November 1942. It imprisoned some 135,000 people, interned another 70,000, 
deporteid some 76,000 Jews, and sent 650,000 French workers to Germany. 
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Syrians and Lebanese considered the fall of France as an opportunity to press 
for their immediate independence. The collapse of the French franc, and economic 
hardship that resulted, gave the Syrians and the Lebanese occasion to carry on strikes, 
organize political demonstrations, and demand independence. The measures that 
General Dentz took to satisfy the nationalists were not effective.'''^ 
Although in his effort to stabilize the situation General Dentz appointed Alfred 
Naccache, a Maronite judge of known integrity, to take over as Chief of State. A 
board of four under-secretaries, under the chairmanship of the Sunni engineer Ahmad 
Da'uq, was put in charge of the country's administration.''*^ 
The new arrangement established by Dentz lasted only for a short time. 
However, on 8 June 1940, for reasons connected with their general war strategy, 
British and Free French forces began the invasion of Syria and Lebanon from 
Palestine. On the same day, in an attempt to secure local goodwill. Allied aircraft 
dropped thousands of leaflets over the two countries, proclaiming their sovereignty 
and independence in the name of Free France. The leaflets were signed by General 
Georges Catroux, de Gaulle's representative in Cairo. Consequently, when the Allies 
finally occupied Syria and Lebanon towards mid-July, the Lebanese, like the Syrians, 
looked forward to a rapid termination of French tutelage.''*^ 
4.2 Independence and National Pact 
After signing the Acre Armistice, General Charles de Gaulle visited Lebanon, 
officially ending Vichy control, and the French subsequently replaced the High 
Commissioner by a Delegate-General. Lebanese national leaders took the opportunity 
'^' Yahya Armajani and Thomas M- Ricks, Middle East: Past and Present (New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Inc., 1986) p.274. 
146, 
147 
' Kamal S. Salibi, N.96, p.184. 
Yahya Armajani and Thomas M. Ricks, N.145, p.274. 
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to ask de Gaulle to end the French Mandate and unconditionally recognize Lebanon's 
independence. As a result of national and international pressure, on November 26, 
1941, General Georges Catroux, Delegate-General under de Gaulle, proclaimed the 
independence of Lebanon in the name of his government. The United State, British, 
the Soviet Union, the Arab States, and certain Asian countries recognized this 
independence, and some of them exchanged ambassadors with Beirut. However, even 
though the French technically recognized Lebanon's independence, French, continued 
to exercise authority.''** The new arrangement provided for the appointment of a 
Cabinet representing Lebanon regionally and confessionally. Under this new 
arrangement, the security forces and organizations were to be subjected to war needs; 
that France s' privileged position resulting from centuries of association and the 
holding of the mandate was to be maintained; and that the treaty of 1936 was to be the 
basis for future Franco-Lebanese relations.''*^ 
General elections were held, and on September 21, 1943, the new Chamber of 
Deputies elected Bishara al Khouri as president. He appointed Reyad as Sulh (also 
cited a Solh) as prime minister and asked him to form the first government of 
independent Lebanon.'^" On November 8, 1943, the Chamber of Deputies amended 
"" Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.l 1, p.59. 
However, Syrian and Lebanon independence was soon recognised by the Powers. Britain did so in 
February 1942, and Spears, who had been the head of a Britain political mission, became the first 
British Minister. Belgium and Czechoslovakia announced the recognition in March, the United States 
sent her notice of recognition in August 1942, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia in October 1943, and the 
U.S.S.R. recognised Syria in July and Lebanon in August 1944. 
"" Nicola A. Ziadeh, N.62, pp.68-69. 
' ^ Reyad as-Sulh (1894 - July 17, 1951) was the first Prime Minister of Lebanon (1943-1945), after 
the country's independence. Like all of his successors as prime minister of Lebanon, he was a Sunni 
Muslim. He later served as prime minister of Lebanon again from December 14, 1946 to February 14, 
1951. Several months after leaving office, he was assassinated in Amman, Jordan. He was known as 
one of the most important personalities in Lebanon's struggle for independence and as a person able to 
unify Lebanon's various religious groups in the struggle for independence. He was married to Fayza 
Al-Jabiri and had five daughters. His eldest daughter, Aliya bom in 1935, continued in her father's path 
in the struggle for a fi-ee and secure Lebanon. Aliya propagated the rich cultural heritage of Lebanon 
abroad until her death in Paris on April 26,2007. 
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the Constitution, abolishing the articles that referred to the Mandate and modifying 
those that specified the powers of the high commissioner, thus, unilaterally ending the 
Mandate in 1943. This day has been celebrated as Independence Day in Lebanon. 
The foundations the new Lebanese state were established in 1943 by an 
unwritten agreement between the two most prominent Christian and Muslim leaders, 
Khouri and Sulh. The contents of this agreement, later known as the National Pact or 
National Covenant (al-Mithaq al-Watani), were approved and supported by their 
followers.'^' The National Pact laid down four principles. ^ \ ^ ^ " i ^ T ^ ^ ' ^ v ^ ^ 
1. Lebanon was to be a completely independent state. Their Chinstian ' • ' 
communities were to cease identifying with the West;,fin-(e\fifn,'''ithe . 
Muslim communities were to protect the independence oMjeianon and > 
prevent its merger with any Arab state. ^ ^ 7s.. ^^ 
2. Although Lebanon is an Arab country with Arabic as its offici^^n&U%g^^'^<;\ 
it could not cut off its spiritual and intellectual ties with the West, 
had helped it attain such a notable degree of progress. 
3. Lebanon, as a member of the family of Arab states, should cooperate with 
the other Arab states, and in case of conflict among them, it should not 
side with one state against another. 
4. Public offices should be distributed proportionally among the recognized 
religious groups, but in technical positions preference should be given to 
competence without regard to confessional considerations.'^ ^ 
Moreover, according to this accord the three top government positions should 
be distributed as follows: the President of Republic should be a Maronite; the Prime 
Minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, a Shiite 
Muslim; the Deputy Speaker, Greek Orthodox; the Defense Minister, Druze; and the 
Commander of the Military, Maronite Christian. The ratio of deputies was to be six 
" ' Edward E. Azar, The Emergence of A New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984) p.45. 
George E. Delury, World Encyclopedia of Political System, v. 1 (Essex: Longman Group Limited, 
1983)p.61L 
After 1934, the President was always a Maronite Christian; after 1937 the Prime Minister were Sunni 
Muslims (except for brief periods in 1943 and 1952); and after 1947 the Speaker of Legislative 
Assembly or Parliament was always a Shiite Muslim. 
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Christians to five Muslims.'" Post in the civil service, the judiciary, the military, and 
seats in the parliament itself were allocated according to the sectarian distributions 
reported in the 1932 census. On that basis, the ninety-nine-members Chamber of 
Deputies allocated fifty-four seats to Christians and forty-five to non-Christians 
(Muslim and Druze). Since neither the Christian nor non-Christian sides were 
doctrinally homogeneous, each major sect was also jealous of its proper 
representation. 
Table - 1 
Allocation of Seats in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 
According to Religious Sect 1943 
Christians (54) 
Maronites 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 
20 
11 
6 
Non-Christians (45) 
Sunni Muslims 20 
Shiite Muslims 19 
Druze 6 
Armenian Orthodox 4 
Minorities 3 
Source: Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political 
Modernization in Lebanon (New York: Random House, 1968) p.23. 
In addition, the Lebanese constitution guaranteed freedom of religion and 
respect for the religious interests of each community.'^ '* 
From the beginning, however, the balance provided for in the National Pact 
was fi^ile. Many observers believed that any serious internal or external pressure 
' " George E. Kirk, N.99, p.l 17. 
General Edward Spears, the British representative in Beirut, mediated between feuding Muslims and 
Christians about the apportioning of parliamentary sects. Using the 1932 census, showing Christians to 
be 52 per cent of the population. Spears recommended a ratio of six Christian seats to five Muslim. 
(Later the 6:5 ratio was also applied to posts in the civil service, judiciary and military). 
"" Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1977) p.286. 
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might threaten the stability of the Lebanese political system, as was to happen in 
1975. 
Lebanon subsequently became a member of the League of Arab States (Arab 
League) on March 22, 1945.'" It also participated in the San Francisco Conference 
of the United Nations (UN) and became a member in 1945. On December 31, 1946, 
French troops were completely withdrawn from the country, with the signing of the 
Franco-Lebanese Treaty. 
'" The Arab League, officially called the League of Arab States, is a regional organization of Arab 
states in Southwest Asia, and North and Northeast Africa. It was formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945 
with six members: Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan (renamed Jordan after 1946), Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and 
Syria Yemen joined as a member on May 5, 1945. The Arab League currently has 22 members. The 
main goal of the league is to: "draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate 
collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a 
general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries." The Arab League is involved in political, 
economic, cultural, and social programmes designed to promote the interests of its member states. It 
has served as a forum for the member states to coordinate their policy positions, to deliberate on 
matters of common concern, to settle some Arab disputes, and to limit conflicts such as the 1958 
Lebanon crisis. The league has served as a platform for the drafting and conclusion of many landmark 
documents promoting economic integration. One example is the Joint Arab Economic Action Charter 
which sets out the principles for economic activities in the region. Each member state has one vote in 
the League Council, while decisions are binding only for those states that have voted for them. The 
aims of the league in 1945 were to strengthen and coordinate the political, cultural, economic, and 
social programs of its members, and to mediate disputes among them or between them and third 
parties. Furthermore, the signing of an agreement on Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation on 13 
April 1950 committed the signatories to coordination of military defense measures. The Arab league 
has played an important role in shaping school curricula; advancing the role of women in the Arab 
societies; promoting child welfare; encouraging youth and sports programmes; preserving Arab cultural 
heritage and fostering cultural exchanges between the member states. Literacy campaigns have been 
launched, intellectual works reproduced, and modem technical terminology is translated for the use 
within member states. The league encourages measures against crime and drug abuse, and deals with 
labor issues—particularly among the emigrant Arab workforce. 
' ^ Mohammad Iqbal Ansari, Arab League 1945-1955 (Aligarh, U.P.: Institute of Islamic Studies 
Publications, 1968) pp.47-50. 
CHAPTER - II 
58 
CHAPTER-II 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS IN POST-
INDEPENTDENCE LEBANON 
1. Patterns of Confessional Politics (National Pact 1943) 
1.1 Confessional System and Lebanon 
The confessional system is a term used to designate the political system that 
has been in force in Lebanon since 1926.* The roots of confessionalism go back to the 
millet system formed in the Ottoman Empire as early as the sixteenth century. Under 
this system, different lateral 'nationalities' (Christian, Jewish) were recognised 
alongside Islam and were governed, often by their religious leaders, according to their 
own laws. It was, however, the direct intervention of the European powers that 
accelerated the genesis of confessionalism.^  
After the civil conflicts of 1860 and the French intervention, the Lebanese 
question became a European one. A 'comprehensive settlement' was imposed on 
Mount Lebanon (4500 sq. km, less than half the present coimtry), which henceforth 
was directly answerable to the Ottoman state. An administrative council was formed, 
comprising representatives of the six principal religious groups: Maronites, Druze, 
Suimi, Shiite, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic.'* Mount Lebanon, v^ t^h its large 
Maronite majority, was divided into seven mudiriyyat or administrations: four 
' David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, The Politics of Pluralism: A Comparative Study of Lebanon 
and Ghana (New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company Inc., 1975) p.44. 
^ Millet system: Under the Ottomans, self-admmistered non-Muslim religious community (e.g., Jews, 
Christians), a logical extension of the early Muslim concept of "people of the book." 
' Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, 
(London, The Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988) p.312. 
* Nazih Richani, Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Parties in Sectarian Societies: The Case of 
the Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon 1949-1996 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) p.20. 
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Maronites, one Druze, one Greek Orthodox and one Greek Catholic.^  The 
sectarianism established in this way was in subsequent years reinforced by European 
powers taking it upon themselves to defend a particular community: France 
championed the Maronites, British the Druze, and Russia the Greek Orthodox.^  In 
1920, France was given Mandate over the region and separated Greater Lebanon 
(with its present borders) from what was to become Syria/ 
Three factors helped confessionalism to take root: 
1. Within the new frontiers, the Christians were just in the majority, but 
the fear of being submerged by Islam revived their sense of imity and 
made them determined to maintain their power. 
2. At the beginning of 1926, the status of political community was 
accorded to the Shiite, who until then had been part of the Simni legal 
sphere. 
3. Finally, article 95 of the Constitution of 1926 stipulated, 'As a 
temporary measure, and with the intention of establishing justice and 
harmony, communities will have equal representation in public office, 
and in the composition of ministries'.^ 
This temporary measure is still in force to till date. In the meantime, 17 
religious persuasions or 'confessions' have been officially recognised, each of which 
operates along essentially tribal or ethnic lines. In matters of personal status 
(marriage, divorce, inheritance), each community has its own rules. Civil marriage, 
therefore, does not exist. In the field of politics, the rules were laid down by a pact 
concluded between conmiunity leaders in 1943.' 
* A. Nizar Hamzeh, "Clientalism, Lebanon: Roots and Trends", Middle Eastern Studies, v.37, n.3, July 
2001, p. 170. 
* Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, ed.. Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years 
(London; LB. Tauris Publishers, 2006) p.28. 
' Kaleem Ahmed, "Role of Maronite Church in the Creation of Greater Lebanon", Journal of West 
Asian Studies, 2004, n.I8 p.89. 
' Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, The New A-Z of the Middle East (London, LB. Tauris, 2004) 
p.62. 
' David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, N.l, pp.75-77. 
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1.2 National Pact: Power Sharing and Confessional Distribution of Offices. 
The modem Lebanese system evolved out of a unique historical experience. 
Fully aware of this background, two Lebanese leaders, Bishara al-Khouri (a Maronite 
Christian) and Reyad al-Sulh (a Sunni Muslim) drafted the National Pact of 1943 with 
the British help. The Pact formally addressed two thorny problems that the new state 
faced: internal distribution of power, and national character with respect to external 
relations.'" 
The National Pact institutionalized a distribution of political power along 
confessional lines, based on each group's proportional size in the census of 1932 
which found Christians to be a majority and Muslims a minority. Thus, the President 
would always be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Suimi Muslim, the 
Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies a Shiite Muslim, and the Deputy Speaker a 
Greek Orthodox Christian. Similarly the position of Ministry of Foreign Affairs went 
to a Greek Orthodox, the Ministry of Defense to a Druze and the Conmiander of the 
Military to Maronite Christian.'' The representation in the Parliament and in the 
Cabinet was also allocated along confessional lines - six Christians for every five 
Muslims. The system was designed, in large part, to alleviate Christian fears that their 
regional minority status would somehow impinge on their historical national majority 
status in Lebanon. In return for some advantages in internal affairs, the Christians 
agreed to membership in the Arab community with special reservations.'^ 
10 Reinhard Schuhe, A Modem of the Islamic World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000) p. 153. 
" Edward E. Azar, The Emergence of New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984) p.45. 
'^  William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (New York: The University of Michigan Press, 
1968)pp.460-461. 
This formula had positive and negative repercussions. On the domestic side, the parliamentary and 
presidential elections tended to produce very able politicians who had cross-communal appeal. While 
the President has ample constitutional powers available to him, his success had to be measured by his 
ability to work with the Sunni prime minister (the head of the cabinet) and the highly independent 
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Theoretically, confessionalism, if administered well, institutionalizes channels 
of cooperation, places high national value on accommodation and unity, and promotes 
moderation rather than extremism. Because Lebanese confessionalism recognizes the 
religious identity of communities and guarantees multiple channels of access to the 
national leadership, it can be a stabilizing and integrative force. But, political, 
ideological, and strategic polarization in the West Asia produced turbulence in the 
area which found its way, in one form or another, into Lebanon and consequently 
made a mockery of confessionalism and breached the sprit of the National Pact 
repeatedly.'^  The distribution of seats on the confessional lines between 1947 through 
1972 is as follows: 
Table-2 
Distribution of Electoral Seats and Districts by Region (1947-1972) 
Region 
Beirut 
Mount Lebanon 
North Lebanon 
South Lebanon 
Biqa 
TOTAL 
194-/ 
S 
9 
17 
12 
10 
7 
55 
r 
D 
5 
1951 
S 
13 
23 
16 
14 
11 
77 
D 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
9 
] 
S 
7 
14 
9 
8 
6 
44 
953 
D 
5 
9 
8 
7 
4 
33 
1957 
S 
11 
20 
17 
11 
20 
66 
D 
2 
6 
7 
7 
3 
25 
1960-72* 
S D 
16 3 
30 6 
20 7 
18 7 
15 3 
99 26 
S = Seats 
D = Districts 
* = The number of electoral districts in 1964, 1968 and 1972 remained the same as in 1960. 
Source: Jawaid Iqbal, The Lebanese Civil War: Issues, Actors and Outcome (Aligarh U.P., India: 
Aligarii Muslim University Press, 1998) p.35. 
parliament and its Shiite speaker. Certain laws require a two-thirds majority approval, and their passage 
requires legislative compromise. The country's electoral districts encompass multicommunal 
electorates, so each candidate had to campaign among Lebanese from all groups in order to win a 
parliamentary seat, and needed to be responsive to the demands of his district's residents and not only 
to members of his own sect or community. This in turn created a natural mechanism that promoted the 
election of able leaders (often well-tested ones) possessing special competence in the art of 
compromise and consensus-building. (Edward E. Azar, N.l 1, pp.45-46). 
" Michael Humphrey, Islam, Multicuituralism and Transnationalism: From the Lebanese Diaspora, 
(London, The Centre for Lebanese Studies and LB. Tauris Publishers, 1998) pp.64-65. 
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Tab le -3 
Distribution of Pariiamentary Seats by Sects (1947-1972) 
Sect 
Christians 
Maronite 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 
Armenian Orthodox 
Minorities 
Muslims 
Sunni 
Shiite 
Druze 
TOTAL 
1947 
18 
6 
3 
2 
1 
11 
10 
4 
55 
1951 
23 
8 
5 
3 
3 
16 
14 
5 
77 
1953 
13 
5 
3 
2 
1 
9 
8 
3 
44 
1957 
29 
7 
4 
3 
2 
14 
12 
4 
66 
1960-72* 
30 
11 
6 
4 
3 
20 
19 
16 
99 
*= Since I960, there have been three elections-in 1964, 1968 and 1972. The sectarian distribution 
remained the same as in 1960. 
Source: Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the 
Arab World: The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions, (Colorado, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999) p.87. 
1.3 Working of the Confessional System 
The confessional system outlined in the National Pact was a matter of 
expediency, an interim measure to overcome philosophical divisions between 
Cliristian and Muslim leaders at independence.'* It was hoped that once the business 
of government got under way, and as national spirit grew, the importance of 
confessionalism in the political structure would diminish. Over the years, the frequent 
political disputes - the most notable of which were manifested in the 1958 Civil War, 
the Palestinian controversy of the 1960s and 1970s, and the 1975 Civil War - bear 
stark testimony to the failure of the National Pact as a means toward societal 
'" Jawaid Iqbal, "Sectarian Conflict and the Evolution of the Lebanese Political System" Journal of 
West Asian Studies, n.20, 2006, pp.98-99. 
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integration.'^ In this regard, John Entelis, a prominent "Lebanologist," wrote about 
the Pact: 
The Mithaq al-Watani, National Pact, managed to resolve only part of 
the identity dilemma. It was, in fact, a pragmatic arrangement which, 
by establishing coexistence rather than conflict as the basis of relations 
between the religious commimities, discouraged the rise of "irrational" 
confessionalism and, consequently, prevented the possible dissolution 
of the state. Nevertheless, the Mithaq (Pact) was not meant as a long-
term formula for national unity; rather it was a temporary 
accommodative measure by which conflict could be minimized.' 
Thus, the National Pact merely perpetuated the power of the privileged. The 
Pact, combined with the system of zu'ama clientelism, guaranteed the maintenance of 
the status quo and the continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites. 
1.4 The Za'ama Clientelism and Confessional System 
For decades and even centuries, persons from the same political families have 
controlled Lebanese national politics. They have been constantly in the public eye, 
continually involved in political debates, appearing and reappearing in parliaments 
and cabinets. Most have inherited their political position, and they work frenetically 
to promote their sons in politics so that the family tradition will be carried out through 
the system of za'im.'* 
'^  Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, Encyclopedia of Muslim World, v. 15 (New Delhi: Anmal Publications PVT. 
Ltd., 2003) p. 117. 
" Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) p.90. 
Even more seriously, Elizabeth Picard points out that 'the territorial distribution of Lebanese groups 
has under gone radical changes leading to the homogenization of each region'. The Christians have left 
Tripoli and now number less than 50,000 in West Beirut - as against 500,000 ten years ago. The Jbeil 
Mountain, Kisrawan and ahnost all of Metn are now exclusively Christian. The Chouf became Druze 
following the flight of the Christians between 1983 and 1985. The country has thus been divided into 
virtually homogeneous cantons, each one nervously withdrawn into its own communal solidarity. 
Moreover, some observers claim that the National Pact merely perpetuated the power of the privileged. 
The Pact, combined with the system of zu'ama clientelism, guaranteed the maintenance of the status 
quo and the continuation of privilege for the sectarian elites. 
'^  Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.l 17. 
'* Rodger Shanahan, ne Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (London: Tauris Academic 
Studies, 2005) p.37. 
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Za'ims (the Arabic plural is zu'ama'), in the Lebanese version means political 
boss. Its support comes from a town, region, or sect, the interests which the leaders 
advance, and their national power results front having a local political base. They are 
the heads of the Lebanese political parties, the commanders of the militias, the leaders 
of the parliamentary blocs, and generally they are also prominent in the professions 
and business.'^ 
Za'ims comprise the overwhelming majority of the deputies in Parliament, 
and they determine the election of presidents, the formation of cabinets, and the 
adoption of politics. The compromises reached among them are those basic to 
Lebanese politics, and their quarrels reflect the fissures in Lebanese society. 
In pluralistic societies, patronage is often a common feature of the political process; the promotion of 
the interests of a particular sect is frequently widespread. Although patronage is prevalent in developed 
and lesser developed countries alike, clientelism may be more entrenched in Lebanon than in most 
other nations. The pervasiveness of this system in Lebanon is easily traced to feudal times, wherein the 
overlord allowed peasants and their families the use of land in exchange for unquestioned loyalty. In 
more recent times, this social system has been translated into a political system; the overlord has 
become a political leader, or za 'im, the peasants have become his constituents, and, instead of land, 
favours are exchanged for electoral loyalty. And although clientelism has its roots in the rural areas, it 
now pervades towns and large cities down to the neighborhood level. 
" James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, The Middle East Politics and Power (Boston: Allyn and Bacon Inc., 
1974) p.67. 
Sulaiman Franjieh, President of Lebanon from 1970 to 1976, is the za'im of the Maronite town of 
Zghorta, near Tripoli. Kamal Jumblat, who was assassinated in 1977, was a member of the Chamber of 
Deputies from 1943 to 1977, a participant in many cabinets, the head of the Progressive Socialist 
Party, and leader of the Muslim-leftist alliance in the civil war. He was the za'im of the Druze in Shouf 
area of the southeast of Beirut. Three well-known Maronite za'im involved in an intense personal 
rivahy were Pierre Jumayyil, leader of the Kata'ib Party, who hails from the town of Bikfayya in the 
Matn area immediately northeast of Beirut; Raymond Edde, leader of the National Bloc, whose father 
was president of Lebanon from 1936 to 1941 and who comes from the district of Jubayl between 
Beirut and Tripoli; and Kamil Shamoun, president of Lebanon from 1958, leader of tiie Liberal 
National Party, who prior to the civil war came from the area around the town of Damour, a short 
distance south of Beirut. Private wealth and high political office are indispensable to the maintenance 
of the position of za'im. Wealth enables them to provide to their constituents loans, small monetary 
gifts, and jobs. Most za'ims have a number of businesses. They use their political position to speed up 
in the granting of a license, get someone out of jail, or improve a road in a particular area. Ideology 
and party affiliation are largely irrelevant to his followers, who supports them because of their 
established position and past services. The za'im system survives since Lebanese would rather 
associate with a small local group than with a wider one. 
°^ Bruce Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East: An Introduction (New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall, Inc, 1980) p. 142. 
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2. Religious and Sectarian Communities 
The Lebanese estimated population in July 2007 of approximately 3.92 
million contains more Muslims than Christians, with Lebanese Muslims divided 
almost equally between the Sunni and Shiite sects. The majority of Lebanese 
Christians are Maronites, who recognize the authority of the Pope while also 
upholding many Eastern rites.^' Other Christians belong either to the Greek Catholic 
church or various branches of the Orthodox Eastern church. Lebanon is also an 
unwilling host to approximately 404,170 Palestinian refugees, creating numerous 
imresolved problems regarding their absorption into society. The Palestinians are 
mostly Suimi Muslim, but there is also a Christian minority of over 10 percent 
(primarily Greek Orthodox).^ ^ This mix of population is further complicated due to 
Arab-Christian and Arab-Jev^sh conflicts, whereby each group often expresses 
different opinions concerning internal Lebanese affairs, and this has resulted in 
Muslims opposing Muslims and Christians opposing Christians.^ '* 
2.1 Christians 
There are several Christian sects in Lebanon of which a few are non-Arab. 
Each Christian sect has its own cultxu-al distinctiveness and many claim patriarchs. 
'^ The Pope (from Latin: "papa" or "father" from Greek "papa", Papa in Italian) is the Bishop of 
Rome, the leader of the Roman Catholic Church and head of state of Vatican City. The current (265th) 
pope is Pope Benedict XVI, who was elected April 19,2005 in papal conclave. The office of the pope 
is called the Papacy; his ecclesiastical jurisdiction is called the "Holy See" (Sancta Sedes in Latin) or 
"Apostolic See" (the latter on the basis that both St. Peter and St. Paul were martyred at Rome). In 
iiddition to his spiritual role, the pope is Head of State of the independent sovereign state of the Vatican 
City, a city-state entirely enclaved by the city of Rome. 
^^  Derek O'Brien, ed. Penguin Yearbook 2008 Qvlew Delhi: Penguin Books, 2007) pp.503-504. 
^^  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Lebanon 
^* Carl L. Bankston III, World Conflicts: .45/fl and the Middle East, v.2 (California: Salem Press, 2003) 
p.336. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.29. 
66 
1. Maronites 
Comprising about 30 percent of the population according to the 1932 census, 
the Maronites are the single largest community in Lebanon, and the one with which 
the state is most closely identified. 
They trace their origins back to a fifth-century Christian monk. Saint Maron, 
who started a religious movement in the Homs, Hama, and Aleppo regions of Syria. 
After the Muslim-Arab conquest of the seventh century, the Maronites left this fertile 
area for the harsh and inhospitable mountains of Lebanon, where they were able to 
fend off Muslim attempts at conquest and could develop a nearly independent society 
and state.^* During the period of Crusader rule, from about 1098 to 1291, they 
9Q 
established close contact with the French. 
The Maronites have been small mountain farmers, yet today a large number 
are businessmen and professional. Prior to the 1860s they were ruled by a feudal 
aristocracy and by the clergy. Today, many prominent families play an active role in 
*^ Jawaid Iqbal, Israeli Intervention in Lebanon: Strategic Imperatives and Security Interests 
(Bhubaneswar: Mahavir Prakashan, 1999) p.9. 
^' S t Maroun also known as Saint Maron, was a 5th century Syriac Christian monk who founded the 
Maronite spiritual movement. The Church that grew from this movement is the Maronite Church. St. 
Maroun was known for his missionary work, healing and miracles, and teachings of a monastic 
devotion to God. St. Maroxm, bom in the middle of the 4th century in Syria, was a priest who later 
became a hermit, retiring to a mountain of Taurus in the region of Cyrrhus, near Antioch. His holiness 
and miracles attracted many followers, and drew attention throughout the empire. St. John Chrysostom 
sent him a letter around AD 405 expressing his great love and respect, and asking St. Maron to pray for 
him. 
^ In Mount Lebanon itself Maronites established themselves first of all in the Batrun district, where the 
Patriarch, Yuhanna Maron (d.c. 707) established his seat at Kafarhayy, and along the Qadisha (Abou 
Ali) valley, near which the earliest known Maronite church was built at Ehden in AD 749. Settlement 
spread in this core area, now regarded as something of a Maronite holy land, because it contained only 
a small indigenous population and, despite its defensibility, because it possessed cultivable soils and 
numerous springs. (Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, J. Malcohn Wagstaflf, The Middle East: A 
Geographical Study (New York: John Wiley&Sons, 1978) p.374). 
^ Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, J. Malcohn Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study 
(New York: John Wiley&Sons, 1978) pp.368-369. 
They entered into commimion with Rome, a relationship that was broken but then reestablished in the 
sbcteenth century, when the Maronites became one of the Eastern Rites, which recognize the Pope as 
the Supreme Head of the Church but maintain their own non-Latin liturgy. 
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politics, and the Maronites patriarch is one of the most important persons in Lebanon. 
The Maronites are one of the most literate communities in the country, with an 
educated elite that has received a thorough French education, knows French better 
than Arabic, and has highly assimilated French culture. The Maronites community has 
emigrated more than any other in Lebanon and it has a world-wide network of 
ecclesiastical and social relations with the centre in Lebanon.'"' Today the Maronites 
are believed to comprise nearly 20 percent of the population. 
2. Greek Orthodoxs 
With 10 percent of the population, according to the 1932 census, the Greek 
Orthodox is the second largest Christian sect in Lebanon and the fourth largest of any 
in the country.^ ' Living throughout the eastern Mediterranean and Russia, the Greek 
Orthodox have formed separate but related national churches, each with its own 
patriarch and autonomous religious jurisdiction. Those who live in Lebanon are under 
the Patriarch of Antioch, who now resides in Damascus. They are not concentrated in 
Lebanon alone and have no special or historic attachment to the Lebanese state. 
In Syria and Lebanon, the clergy are all Arab, and the liturgical language is 
Arabic; "Greek" is merely a historical designation. When the Muslim Arabs 
conquered the West Asia, Greek Orthodox believers did not flee to the mountains, but 
'° Bruce Borthwick, N.20, pp. 133-134. 
''Ibid., p. 134. 
'^  Gabriel Baer, Population and Society oftlteArab East (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975) p.84. 
The Greek Orthodox Church has long considered itself the true inheritor and preserver of Christianity, 
and has taken pride in its Eastern traditions. The Greek Orthodox adhere to the Orthodox Eastern 
Church, which is actually a group of autocephalous churches using the Byzantine rite. Historically, 
these churches grew out of the four Eastern Patriarchates (Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and 
Constantinople) which, from the fifth century diverged from the Western Pafriarchate of Rome over the 
nature of Christ. The final split took place after the fall of Constantinople in 1096. From that time, with 
the exception of a brief period of reunion in the fifteenth century, the Eastern Church has continued to 
reject the claim of die Roman patriarchate to universal supremacy, and has also reject the concept of 
papal infallibility. Doctrinally, the main point at issue between the Eastern and Western Churches is 
that of the procession of the Holy Spirit. There are also divergences in ritual and discipline. 
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became the largest Christian community in the Islamic Empires and the one which 
had the best relations with the Caliph or Sultan. They are one of the world's major 
faiths, not a schismatic and persecuted sect, and are Arab and Eastem.^^ Among the 
Christian communities of Lebanon, they are most favorable to Pan-Arabism and the 
best able to cooperate with the Sunnis.^'' Frequently they act as mediator between 
them and the Maronites. They are unhappy with Maronites domination of the 
Lebanese political system. Many have sided with the Muslims in the civil war. 
The Greek Orthodox are virbanized and well educated, and in Beirut many are 
rich bankers.''^ In the past there has been a wide gulf between the rich and the poor, 
but a middle class is now developing. Since the seat of the Patriarch is in Damascus, 
and because of a long tradition of influential lay councils in dioceses and parishes, 
leadership of the Greek Orthodox community has been more in the hands of upper-
class laymen of the clergy.^^ Today, they constitute about 5 percent of total 
population, not counting the Palestinian Greek Orthodox community. 
" Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 134. 
^* Pan-Arabism is a movement for unification among the peoples and countries of the Arab World, 
from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea. It is closely connected to Arab nationalism which asserts 
that the Arabs constitute a single nation. Pan-Arabism has tended to be secular and often socialist, and 
has strongly opposed colonialism and Western political involvement in the Arab world. Pan-Arabism is 
a form of cultural nationalism. 
" David R. Smock and Audrey C. Smock, N.l, p.43. 
*^ Nadim Shehadi and Dana Haffar Mills, eds., N.3, p.68. 
" Bruce Borthwick, N.20, pp. 134-135. 
The Greek Orthodox have contributed important ideological and political leaders to the Arab world. 
Kustantin Zurayq has been one of the seminal leaders of liberal Pan-Arabism; Autun Sa'ada was the 
father of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party; Michel Aflaq was one of the founders of the Ba'th Party 
and its leading ideologist, and Dr. George Habash was a founder of the Arab Nationalist Movement 
and later of the radical Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. (David C. Gordon, Lebanon: the 
Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Hehn, 1980) p.39). 
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3. Greek Catholics (Melkites) 
Greek Catholics are the second largest Uniate commxmity in Lebanon. They 
emerged as a distinct group in the early eighteenth century when they split from the 
Greek Orthodox Church.^ * Although they fully accept Catholic doctrine as defined by 
the Vatican, they have generally remained close to the Greek Orthodox Church, 
retaining more of the ancient rituals and customs than have the Maronites. They use 
an 
Arabic and follow the Byzantine rite. Greek Catholics live in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, 
and Egypt, and their Patriarch alternates residence between Cairo and Damascus.'*" In 
Lebanon, when one speaks of Catholics, one is referring to this group, not to Roman 
Catholics or the Maronites. 
The highest official of the church since 1930 has been the Patriarch of 
Antioch, who resides at Ayn Traz, about twenty-four kilometers southeast of Beirut. 
The patriarch is elected by bishops in a synod and confirmed by the Pope in Rome, 
who sends him a pallium (a circular band of white wool worn by archbishops) in 
recognition of their communion. Greek Catholic churches, like those of the Greek 
Orthodox, contain icons but not statues."*' The leadership of their community thus 
remains in the hands of lay people rather than clergy."*^  The Greek Catholics live 
primarily in the central and eastern parts of the country, dispersed in many villages. 
Members of this sect are concentrated in Beuiit, Zahle, and the suburbs of Sidon. 
They have a relatively higher level of education than other sects. Proud of their Arab 
*^ Harald Voche, The Lebanese War: lis Origins and Political Dimensions (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, 1978) p.5. 
' ' Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered, (London,I.B. 
Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 1988) p.41. 
*" Harald Voche, N.3 8, p.6. 
'^ Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.30. 
*^ Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 135. 
70 
heritage, Greek Catholics have been able to strike a balance between their openness to 
the Arab world and their identification with the West, especially the US.'*^  
4. Armenians 
Except for the Palestinians, the Armenians are the most recent arrivals in 
Lebanon, and are the only group that has not assimilated itself into the Arabic 
culture.''^  At the end of the nineteenth and in the early part of the twentieth century 
they suffered a great deal in domains ruled by the Turks (Ataturk), so they fled them 
and settled all over the world."*^  Those who came to Lebanon were given citizenship 
by the French mandatory government in 1924."^  In the present they form about 4 
percent of the population and live mostly in Beirut, its suburbs, and in one town in the 
Biqa Valley. They are mostly an urban middle class consisting of crafts people, 
merchants, lawyers, and doctors. They are still cultural foreigners temporarily resident 
in Lebanon, maintaining their own school system in which Armenian history, culture. 
"^  Gabriel Baer,N.32, p. 116. 
** The Armenians (Armenian: Hayer) are a nation and ethnic group originating in the Caucasus and in 
the Armenian Highlands. A large concentration of them has remained there, especially in Armenia, but 
many of them are also scattered elsewhere throughout the world. The Armenians have had a significant 
presence in countries such as Georgia, Iran, Russia, and Ukraine due to their proximity to Armenia. 
After the Armenian Genocide, a large influx of survivors fled to France, the US, Argentina, the Levant 
and other countries that welcomed the Armenians. There are an estimated 10 million Armenians around 
the world. Christianized in the early 4th century, Arsacid Armenia became the first Christian nation, 
although Christianity had begun to spread in Armenia soon after Christ's death, due to the efforts of 
two of his apostles, St. Jude and St. Bartholomew, thus most Armenians adhere to the Armenian 
Apostolic Church, a Monophysite church. They speak two different, but mutually intelligible dialects 
of their language: Eastern Armenian, spoken mainly in Armenia, Iran and the former Soviet republics, 
and Western Armenian, spoken primarily in the Armenian diaspora. 
*^ Ataturk: Mustafa Kamal (1881-1938) Turkish army officer, politician, and President of turkey 
(1923-38), bom in Salonika. Following a nationalist rebellion, he became vutual dictator, and launched 
a social and political revolution introducing Western fashions, educational reform, and the replacement 
of Arabic script with the Latin alphabet. In 1935 he assumed the surname Ataturk ("Father of Turkey"). 
^ Peter Mansfield, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980) p.52. 
The Turkish atrocities are still very much alive ui their minds, and have the same effect on their 
outlook as does the Holocaust on Jews. They share with Lebanese Christians a religious bond that 
transcends national differences, and for this reason they have been welcomed into the country, given 
citizenship, and are fiill participants in the political process. 
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and language are given primary emphasis. Armenians always speak their own 
language among themselves, and most have a limited knowledge of Arabic. 
The Armenians are divided into three religious denominations: Gregorian 
(Orthodox) Armenians, Armenian Catholic, and Armenian Protestant, with the first 
comprising the overwhelming majority."*^  They are well organized into two political 
parties: Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Hunchak Party), which is Marxist and 
was sympathetic to the Soviet Union; and Armenian Revolutionary Federation 
(Tashnak or Dashnak), which is nationalist, anti-Communist, and anti-Russian. The 
infighting between the two is fierce, weakening the political power of the community 
as a whole. The Armenians are important in Lebanese politics because they have a 
common interest v^ dth the Maronites in maintaining the independence of Lebanon and 
its political and economic systems. This gives both communities the freedom to 
preserve their distinct national and religious identities and dominant economic 
• • 49 
positions. 
5. Roman Catholics (Latins) 
Catholics who accept the full primacy of the Holy See and follow the Latin 
rite comprised less than 1 percent of the population today. ^ ° The Lebanese refer to 
*^ Edmund Herzig and Marina Kurkchiyan, eds., The Armenians: Past and Present in the Making of 
National Identity (London: RoutledgeCurzen, 2005) pp. 134-135. 
*' Harald Voche, N.38, p.6. 
*' Bruce Borthwick, N.20, pp. 135-136. 
'*'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Lebanon 
The Holy See is the episcopal jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome, commonly known as the Pope, and 
is the preeminent episcopal see of the Roman Catholic Church. It is also the sovereign entity, headed 
by the Pope, which governs the Vatican and represents the Catholic Church in temporal affairs. The 
Holy See should not be confiised with the Vatican City State, which came into existence only in 1929, 
while the Holy See dates back to early Christian times. Ambassadors are officially accredited not to the 
Vatican City State but to "the Holy See", and papal representatives to states and international 
organizations are recognized as representing the Holy See, not the Vatican City State. While all 
episcopal sees can be referred to as holy, the expression "the Holy See" (without further specification) 
is normally used in international relations (as well as in the canon law of the Catholic Church) to refer 
to the central government of the Catholic Church. 
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them as Latins to distinguish them from Uniate groups. The Latin conmiunity is 
extremely variegated, since both laity and clergy, including large numbers of 
foreigners, are mainly Europeans. As Roman Catholics, they acknowledge the 
supreme authority of the Pope in Rome, venerate the Virgin Mary, the saints, 
recognize the 7 sacraments of baptism, i.e. confirmation, the Eucharist (the sacrament 
of the Lord's Supper), confession, penance, ordination, matrimony and extreme 
xmction (given when facing the danger of death). Members of the clergy are celibate.^' 
6. Jacobites (Old Syrians) 
The Jacobites or Syrian Monophysites, often referred to as the Syrian 
Orthodox Church, take their name from Jacob Baradaeus who spread the teaching of 
the church throughout Syria in the sixth century. The doctrinal position of the 
Jacobites is that after the incarnation, Christ had only one divine nature. This is 
contrary to the orthodox Christian position that states, "Christ had both a human and 
divine nature". As today there are only a few thousand Jacobites in Lebanon. 
7. Assyrian or Nestorian Church 
The Assyrians are the remnants of the Nestorian Church that emerged with the 
Christological controversies in the fifth century.^ ^ The Nestorians, who have a Syriac 
liturgy, stressed that Jesus Christ consisted of two separate persons, one human and 
one divine, as opposed to having two natures in one person. '^* Their doctrine was 
condemned by the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D. Subsequently, those Nestorians 
' ' Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.31. 
" Ibid., p.32. 
The church follows the Syriac liturgy of St. James and has an independent hierarchy under the 
Patriarch of Antioch, whose seat was formerly at Mardin in Turkish Kurdistan and is now at Homs, 
Syria. 
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Gabriel Baer, N.32, p.84. 
Peter Mansfield, N.46, p.58. 
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who accepted this doctrine formed an independent church, which has only a few 
thousand members in Lebanon/^ 
8. Protestants 
The Protestants in Lebanon were converted by missionaries, primarily English 
and American, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.^ ^ They are divided into a 
number of denominations, the most important being Presbyterian, Congregational, 
and Anglican. Typically, Lebanese Protestants are educated and belong to the 
professional middle class.^ ^ They constitute less than 1 percent of the population and 
live primarily in Beirut. 
2.2 Muslims 
1. Sunni Muslims 
The Sunni Muslims are named after the Sunna, the transmitted words and 
CO 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammad. Religious leadership of the Sunni community m 
Lebanon is based on principles and institutions deriving partly fi"om traditional Islam 
and partly from French influence. Under the Mandate, the French established a 
Supreme Islamic Council at the national level, headed by a Grand Mufti and a 
national Directorate of Waqfs; these institutions continued to exist in the mid-1980s.^ ^ 
*^  Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996) 
p.299. 
^ Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, J. Malcolm Wagstaff, N.29, p.373. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, pp.32-33. 
*^ Orthodox Sunni Muslims are those who regard the Holy Qur'an, supplemented by the traditions of 
the Prophet, as the sole and sufficient embodiment of the Muslim faith. They do not recognize the need 
for a priesthood to mediate the faith to the community of believers. Thus, Sunnis have no "church" and 
no liturgy. The Sunnis, especially the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, stand for the original simplicity of 
Islam and its practices against later innovations. 
' ' Waqf: "Standing, stoping, halting. A term which in the language of the law signifies the 
appropriation or dedication of property to charitable uses and the service of God. An endowment. The 
object of such an endowment or appropriation must be of a perpetual nature, and such property or land 
cannot be sold or transferred. If a person build a mosque his ri^t of property is extinguished as soon as 
prayers have been recited in the building. 
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The French also established local departments of Waqfs, which staffed and 
maintained hospitals, schools, cemeteries, and mosques. In addition, the Waqfs 
managed the funds that supported these operations. The funds were obtained partly 
from direct donations and partly from income derived from real property given to the 
community as an endowment.^ '' 
They occupy all professions and trades. There is a large stratum of peasants 
and workers, a small middle class of merchants and professionals, and a small upper 
class composed of the owners of large tracts of agricultural land and of urban real 
estate and business. Simnis are not as well educated as Christians. They are more 
resistant to change and more zealous in defending Arab culture and civilization 
against Western inroads. '^ 
In 1987, the majority of Lebanese Sunnis resided in urban centres. It is 
estimated that more than two-thirds of them lived in Beirut, Sidon, and Baalbek. The 
few rural Simnis lived in the Akkar region, the western Biqa Valley, aroxmd Baalbek, 
and in the Chouf Mountains. Their typical occupations were in the realms of trade, 
industry, and real estate.^ ^ Large Suimi families enjoyed political and social 
significance. The most prominent of them were the Sulh (also cited a Solh), Bayhum, 
Dauq, Salam, and Ghandur in Beirut; the Karami, Muqaddam, and Jisr in Tripoli; and 
60 Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.25. 
*' Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 136. 
Sheikh is an honorary title given to any Muslim religious man in Lebanon. As a result of the 1975 Civil 
War and the intensification in sectarian mobilization and identification, the religious leaders of the 
Sunni community assumed a more political role, especially with the advent of Islamic fimdamentalism 
in Lebanon. As of 1987, the Sunni Mufti, Sheikh Hasan Khalid, was the most powerful Sunni leader; 
he headed what was called the Islamic Grouping, which was composed of all Sunni traditional leaders. 
The Sunni Ulama (learned religious men) of Lebanon emulated the Shiite practice of combining 
temporal and religious power in the person of the Imam. 
" Michael Humphrey, N.13, p.64. 
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the Bizri in Sidon. Today in Lebanon, they may constitute 25 percent of the total 
population. 
The Kurds^ are non-Arab Sunnis of whom there are only a few in Lebanon, 
concentrated mainly in Beirut.^ ^ They originated in the Taurus and Zagros Mountains 
of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The Kurds of Lebanon tended to settle there 
permanently because of Lebanon's pluralistic society. Although, they are Simni 
Muslims, Kurds speak their own language.^ ^ 
63 Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.26. 
^ The Kurds are an Iranian-speaking ethnolinguistic group mostly inhabiting a region that includes 
adjacent parts of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey and which is known as Kurdistan. Substantial Kurdish 
communities also exist in the cities of western Turkey, and they can also be found in Lebanon, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and, in recent decades, some European countries and the US. They speak 
Kurdish, an Indo-European language of the Iranian branch. The origins of the group and its 
relationships with historical entities and names are complex and disputed. The Kurdish language 
belongs to the north-western sub-group of the Iranian languages, which in turn belongs to the Indo-
Iranian branch of the Indo-European femily. The older Hurrian language of the people inhabiting the 
Kurdish areas was replaced by Indo-European around 850 BCE, with the arrival of the Medes to 
Western Iran. Most Kurds are bilingual or polylingual, speaking the languages of the surrounding 
peoples such as Arabic, Turkish and Persian as a second languj^e. Kurdish Jews and some Kurdish 
Christians (not be confused with ethnic Assyrians of Kurdistan) usually speak Aramaic (for example: 
Lishana Deni) as their first language. Aramaic is a Semitic language related to Hebrew and Arabic 
rather than Kurdish. The exact number of Kurdish people living in the Southwest Asia is unknown, due 
to both an absence of recent census analysis and the reluctance of the various governments in Kurdish-
inhabited regions to give accurate figures. According to the CIA World Factbook, Kurds comprise 5% 
of the population in Turkey, 15-20% in Iraq, perhaps 8% in Syria, 7% in Iran and 1.3% in Armenia. In 
all of these countries except Iran, Kurds form the second largest ethnic group. Roughly 55% of the 
world's Kurds live in Turkey, about 20% each in Iran and Iraq, and a bit over 5% in Syria. These 
estimates place the total number of Kurds at somewhere between 27 and 36 million. 
" David C. Gordon, Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation (London: Croom Helm, 1980) p.40. 
In Beirut, however, Kurds are the lowest of the low. A large Kurdish community has been in Lebanon 
since the beginning of the twentieth century, but on the identity card that Kurdish immigrants must 
cany, the words "domicile under review" appear in the spear for citizenship. This puts the Kurds into a 
category of seasonal or migrant workers. In Lebanon the Kurd is almost always a menial, depicted by 
Lebanese novelist Elias Khouri as a faceless toiler and random victim. (Christopher Hitchens, 
"Struggle of the Kvoids", National Geographic Magazine, Vol: 182, no.2, 1992, p.49). 
^ David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: LB. Tauris Publishers, 2000) p.485-
488. 
In 1961 Kamal Jumblat, then Interior Minister, sought a solution by granting Kurds 'non-specified' 
citizenship whereby the children bom in Lebanon of such parents would acquire Lebanese citizenship. 
The measure was soon abandoned following opposition, presumably from Christian politicians 
concerned about the changing confessional balance. Since 1996 it is believed that approximately 60 
percent of Lebanon's Kurds hold Lebanese citizenship. 
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2. Shiite Muslims (Mutawalis) 
In the mid-1980s the Shiites generally occupied the lowest stratvim of 
Lebanese society; they were peasants or workers except for a small Shiite 
bourgeoisie. The Shiites were concentrated chiefly in the poor districts of southern 
Lebanon and the Biqa. From these rural areas, stricken by poverty and neglected by 
the central government, many Shiites migrated to the suburbs of Beirut. Some Shiites 
emigrated to West Africa in search of better opportunities.^^ Shiite Muslims of the 
Twelver Sect are the single largest religious group in Lebanon today. They are 
generally believed to be between 30 and 40 percent of the total population, although 
estimates vary wildly. 
A. Twelver or Imami Shiites 
Shiites of Lebanon, most of whom were Twelver or Imami Shiites, lacked 
their own state-recognized religious institutions, until 1968 when Imam Musa as-Sadr, 
an Iranian-bom cleric, created the Higher Shiite Islamic Coimcil. Sadr was elected 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.25. 
*' Charles Winslow, N.55, p. 197. 
Musa as-Sadr, (1928-78): Lebanese/Iranian Islamic leader. Bom into a religions family of Lebanese 
origin in Qom Sadr was educated in secular and Islamic traditions before being sent to Tehran 
University, where he acquired a post-graduate degree in Islamic studies in 1956. Three years later the 
Shiite establishment in Qom sent to him to Lebanon as its representative to provide religious guidance 
to Lebanese Shiites. Following Sadr's condemnation of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi for suppressing 
the countrywide protest in Iran led by AyatoUah Ruhollad Khomeini in June 1963, he was deprived of 
his Iranian nationality. Sadr then acquired Lebanese citizenship, and in 1967 formed the Higher Shiite 
Communal Council (HSCC), the first of its kind in the country, becoming a leading spokesman of 
Shiites. Five years later the HSCC presented social, administrative and economic demands to the 
govermnent to ameliorate the living and working conditions of Shiites. This charter became the 
manifesto of the multiconfessional Movement of the Disinherited that Sadr founded in February 1973. 
It proved popular with Shiites, who were dissatisfied with their traditional leaders. Through rallies, 
demonstrations and strikes Sadr made Shiite, the single largest sect, aware of their strength. When the 
Lebanese civil war erupted in April 1975, Sadr realised that unlike most other important religious sects, 
Shiites did not have their own militia. He setup a militia adjimct to the Movement of the Disinherited in 
June 1975, and called it the Lebanese Resistence Detachment, which became popularly known by its 
Arabic acronym Amal. It fought the Phalange militia. While opposed to the traditional Shiite 
leadership, Sadr remained friendly with the Sunni establishment, with whom he shared the demand for 
political parity between Muslims and Christians. During a trip to Libya in August 1978, Sadr 
'disappeared.' Libya insisted that Sadr had left by plane for italy, but his followers alleged that he had 
been detained or assassinated by his Libyan hosts. Lebanese Shiites, routinely calling Sadr 'Imam', 
regard him as a martyr, worthy of their veneration. 
chairman of the council, which was supposed to represent Lebai%i^ i^hiites 
political and religious levels. ^ The council included as members 
well as deputies, state employees, ministers, writers, professionals, and most noted 
Shiites residing in Lebanon.'" Sadr, as chairman for life, continued to head the council 
until 1978, when he "disappeared" in Libya while on a state visit. He reportedly was 
kidnapped and killed by Libyan authorities for imknown reasons. Shiite leaders in 
Lebanon as of 1987 still refused to acknowledge Sadr's death.'' While the 
chairmanship of the coimcil was preserved for Sadr's awaited "return," in 1987 
Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad Din (also seen as Chamseddine) was the vice 
chairman of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council. Moreover, a new Shiite leader and 
spiritual guide of Hezbollah (Party of God), Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah 
emerged in the early 1980s as the most important religious and political leader among 
Lebanon's Shiites.'^ However, in the present the community is headed by Sheikh 
Hasan Nasrallah, who has become one of the most popular leaders in Lebanon and in 
the large Arab world.'^ 
*' M.S. Agwani, Contemporary West Asia (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995) p.35. 
Leadership of the Shiite conununity is held by the Imam, a lineal male descendant of Ali. A son usually 
inherited the office from his &ther. In the eighth century, however, succession became confused when 
the Imam, Jafar as Sadiq, first named his eldest son, Ismail, his successor, then changed his mind and 
named a younger son, Musa al Kazim. Ismail died before his father and thus never had an opportunity 
to assert his claim. When Jafar died in 765, the imamate devolved on Musa. Those Shiite who followed 
Musa are known to Western scholars as the Imami or Twelver Shiites. The part of the community that 
refused to acknowledge Musa's legitimacy and insisted on Ismail's son's ri^t to rule as imam became 
known as Ismailis. The appellation "Twelve" derives from the disappearance of the twelfth imam, 
Muhammad al Muntazar, in about 874. He was a child, and after his disappearance he became known 
as a messianic figure, Ali Mahdi, who never died but remains to this day hidden from view. The 
Twelver Shiites believe his return will usher in a golden era. 
™ Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) pp.281-282. 
' ' Yaacov Shimoni, Biographical Dictionary of the Middle East (New York: Facts On File, 1991) 
p.202. 
'^  Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.27. 
" David Hirst, "The First Real Setback for Israel's Deterrent Power", Young Muslim Digest, v.28, 
September 2006, issue 8, p.36. 
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B. Dnizes (Muwahiddun) 
The Druze are an eleventh century offshoot of Shiitism, and their beliefs are 
kept a secret from outsiders.^'* They live almost exclusively in tv^o areas: the Chouf 
region, which forms the southern part of Mount Lebanon and is to the southeast of 
Beirut and its suburbs in confessionally marked neighbourhoods, and Jabal Druze (the 
"Mountain of the Druze") in southwestern Syria near Mount Herman/^ In Lebanon 
Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah (b. August 30, 1960, Bourj Hammoud, Beirut, Lebanon) is the current 
Secretary General of the Lebanese Islamist party Hezbollah. In 1975, the civil war in Lebanon forced 
his family to move to his ancestral home in Bassouriyeh, where Hasan Nasrallah completed his 
secondary education at the public school of Sour (Tyre). Here he joined the Amal Movement, a 
political group representing Shiites in Lebanon. Nasrallah joined Hezbollah after the Israeli invasion in 
1982. His fiery sermons drew the admiration of Shiite followers who joined Nasrallah in organizing 
Hezbollah. In 1987, Nasrallah traveled to a seminary in Qom, Iran for religious studies. He returned to 
the war in Lebanon in 1989 and later that year, went back to Iran to represent Hezbollah. In 1991, 
Musawi became secretary general of Hezbollah and Nasrallah returned to Lebanon. Nasrallah replaced 
Musawi as Hezbollah's leader after the latter was killed with his wife and child by Israeli forces in 
1992. Hezbollah's military campaigns of the late 1990s were believed to be one of the main factors that 
led to the Israeli decision to withdraw from Southern Lebanon in 2000, thus ending 18 years of 
occupation. Consequently, Nasrallah is widely credited in Lebanon and the Arab world for ending flie 
Israeli occupation in Southern Lebanon, something which has greatly bolstered the party's political 
standing within Lebanon. Nasrallah also played a major role in a complex prisoner exchange deal 
between Israel and Hezbollah in 2004, resuUing in hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners 
being freed and the dead body of his son with many more returning to Lebanon. The agreement was 
described across the Arab world as a great victory for Hezbollah with Nasrallah being personally 
praised for achieving these gains. 
'* Peter Mansfield, N.46, p.47. 
The religion of the Druzes may be regarded as an offshoot of Ismaili Islam. Historically it springs from 
the Fatimid caliph of Egypt, Hakim (996-1021 A.D.), who considered himself the final incarnation of 
God. His close associates and followers Hamza and Darazi (hence the name Druze) spread the new 
doctrine among the inhabitants of southern Lebanon, and founded among them a sect which non-
Druzes called "Druze" and Druzes called "Unitarian." The Druzes believe that Hakim is not dead but 
absent and will return to his people. Like the Ismailis, they also believe in emanations of the deity, in 
supernatural hierarchies, and in the transmigration of souls. 
" Collert C. Held, Middle East Pattern: Places, Peoples, and Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000) p.265. 
Chouf (also spelled Shouf, Shuf or Chuf, in Arabic Jebel ash-Shouf) is a historical region of Lebanon, 
and also an administrative district in the govemorate (mohafazat) of Mount Lebanon. Located in Ae 
south-east of Beirut, the historical region comprises a narrow coastal strip with notably the Christian 
town of Damour and the valleys and mountains of the western slopes of Jabal Barouk, the name of the 
local Mount Lebanon massif Chouf is the heartland of Lebanese Druze community, and Druze leader 
Walid Jumblatt resides in the Jumblatt palace in the town of Moukhtara. The Emirs of Lebanon used to 
have their residence in Chouf. Most notably, Bachir Chehab II built the magnificent palace of 
Beiteddine during the first half of the 19th century. Another historical town, just below Beiteddine, is 
Deir al Qamar (the monastery of the Moon). Anotiier large town in Chouf is called Baakline.lt used to 
be the capital of old Mountain of Lebanon, where Amir Fakher El-Deen was bom. He was well liked 
by both Christians and Druze. He switched his residence to Deir al Qamar symbolizing his neutrality. 
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they act as a buffer between the Maronites in the north and the Shiites in the south. 
They are organized into tightly-knit villages and clans, and have several leading 
families. Two of the most famous leadership of the Druze communities in Lebanon 
are Jumblat (also seen as Junblatt) and Arslan, both of which have been prominent in 
Lebanese politics for a century or more.^ ^ There are Druzes in every parliament and 
cabinet, where they occupy a crucial middle position between the Maronites and 
Simnis, making alliances with one side or the other and extracting concessions 
favourable to their interests.'^ More than half of Lebanese Druzes resided in the rural 
areas. Most of the Druzes are small farmers. The Druze elite consisted of large 
landowning families. Their literacy rate is about the same as the Surmis, and a 
moderately large number of them are engineers, doctors, and lawyers. The situation 
of the Druze community in Lebanon has been complicated, since they have no natural 
allies, and though originally a powerful sect, their numbers have today declined to just 
over 5 percent of the population. 
C. Ismailis 
In the mid-1980s, there were only a few hundred Ismailis in various parts of 
Lebanon. The Ismailis are Shiites known as Seveners because they believe Ismail was 
the seventh Imam. Ismaili beliefs are complex and syncretic, combining elements 
*^ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997)p.l22. 
" Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 137. 
™ Kamal S. Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965) 
pp. 169-170. 
' ' Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 137. 
*° Paul Grieve, A Brief Guide to Islam: History, Faith, and Politics: the Complete Introduction 
(London: Constable & Robinson, 2006) p.283. 
The followers of the Ismailis movement afFmn that the seventh imam was not Musa, but his older 
brother Ismail. Reportedly Jafer, the sixth imam, intended to designate Ismail as his successor but 
changed his mind on learning that Ismail drank wine. Because the Ismailis recognise Ismail as the 
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from the philosophies of Plotinus, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Gnosticism, and the 
Manichaeans, as well as components of Judaism, Christianity, and Eastern religions. 
Ismaili tenets are unique among Muslims.*' Ismailis place particular emphasis to 
taqiyya, the practice of dissimulation about one's beliefs to protect oneself from 
harassment or persecution. Ismaili beliefs about the creation of the world are 
idiosyncratic, as is their historical ecumenism, toleration of religious differences, and 
religious hierarchy. Furthermore, the secrecy with which they veil their religious 
beliefs and practices (together with the practice of taqiyya) makes it extremely 
difficult to establish what their actual religious beliefs are. Their conceptions of the 
imamate also differ greatly from those of other Muslims. Today, the Ismailis 
constitute less than 1 percent of Lebanon's population. 
D. Alawis (Nusayris) 
For several centuries, the Alawis enjoyed autonomy within the Ottoman 
Empire, but, in the mid-nineteenth century, the Ottomans imposed direct rule. 
Regarding the Alawis as infidels, the Ottomans consistently persecuted them and 
imposed heavy taxation. During the French Mandate, the Alawis briefly gained 
territorial autonomy, but direct rule was reimposed in 1936.*'* Several thousand 
founder of their sect, they acknowledge only seven imams and for this reason are known as the 
Seveners. 
" Niels C. Nielsen, Religions of the World Q^ew York: St. Martin's Press, 1983) pp.656-657. 
*^  Malise Ruthven, Islam in the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) p.205. 
The Ismaili sect is divided into two branches: the Mustalian branch is found primarily in North Yemen, 
and the Nizari branch is found is found in the Iranian district of Salamiya, Afghanistan, soviet Central 
Asia, India, the hitral and Gilgit areas of Pakistan, and East Africa. The Ismailis split into two branches 
over a succession dispute. The current Nizari Imam is a revealed ruler and is well know, even in the 
West, as the Agha Khan. 
^ The Alawis or Alawites take their name from Ali ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the 
Prophet Muhammad, also the 4* and last "Rightly Guided Caliph" of Islam. 
" Tara Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.28. 
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Alawis were scattered throughout northern Lebanon in 1987.^ ^ Lebanese Alawis have 
assumed more significance since the rise to power of the Alawis faction in Syria in 
1966, and especially since the Syrian established a military presence in Lebanon in 
1976.*^ 
Alawis claim they are Muslims, but conservative Suimis do not recognize 
them as such. In the early 1970s, however. Imam Musa as-Sadr declared the Alawis 
sect a branch of Shiite Islam.*^ Like Ismaili Shiites, Alawis believe in a system of 
divine incarnation. Unlike Ismailis, Alawis regard AH as the incarnation of God. 
Because many of the tenets of the faith are secret, Alawis have refused to discuss their 
faith with outsiders. Only an elect few learn the religion after a lengthy initiation 
process; youths are initiated into the secrets of the faith in stages. Alawis study the 
Quran and recognize the five pillars of Islam. 
Alawis do not set aside a particular building for worship. In the past, Sunni 
government officials forced them to build mosques, but these were invariably 
abandoned. Only the men take part in worship. Today, the Alawis constitute less 
than 1 percent of Lebanon's population. 
" Charles Winslow, N.55, p.298. 
** David C. Gordon, N.65, p.40. 
"DilipHiro,N.70,p.lO. 
The Alawis are also known as "Nusayris" because of their concentration in the Nusayriyah Mountains 
in western Syria. They appear to be descendants of people who lived in this region at the time of 
Alexander the Great. When Christianity flourished in the Fertile Crescent, the Alawis, isolated in their 
little communities, clung to their own pre-Islamic religion. After hundreds of years of Ismaili influence, 
however, the Alawis moved closer to Islam. Furthermore, contacts with the Byzantines and the 
Crusaders added Christian elements to the Alawis' new creeds and practices. For example, Alawis 
celebrate Christmas, Easter, and the Epiphany, and use sacramental wine in some ceremonies. 
** Peter Mansfield, N.46, p.47. 
89 Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.28. 
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2.3 Jews 
Lebanese Jews historically have been an integral part of the Lebanese fabric of 
confessional communities, hi 1947, they were estimated to number 5,950. After the 
creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Lebanese Jews did not feel compelled to 
emigrate because they enjoyed a prosperous status in Lebanese society and had been 
granted equal rights by law with other citizens. Moreover, they suffered no harm 
during the anti-Zionist demonstrations of 1947 and 1948. However, the intensification 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the past has politicized attitudes of local Jews, who 
were often seen associated with the policies of Israel.^^ 
Nevertheless, the rise of Muslim fimdamentalists, especially in the aftermath 
of the Israeli invasion of 1982, constituted a real threat to Lebanese Jews." As today, 
there remains a very small Jewish population, traditionally centred in Beirut, and in 
the eastern sector of the city. 
2.4 Others 
Other religions account for only an estimated 1.3 percent of the total 
population. In addition to the above-mentioned sects, there are a number of small 
religious and ethnic communities that numbered only in the hundreds. Such groups 
comprised Chaldean Catholic, Bahais, Armenian Catholics, Copts, Turkomans, and 
Circassians. New immigrants from South East Asia have recently brought in larger 
^ Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics (London: Yale University Press, 1977) p.67. 
In the early 1950s their synagogue in Beirut was bombed, and the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies 
witnessed heated debates on the status of Lebanese Jewish army officers. The discussions culminated 
in a unanimous resolution to expel and exclude them from the Lebanese Army. During the June 1967 
War, Lebanese authorities stationed guards in Jewish districts, when hostility toward Lebanese Jews 
became overt Several hundred chose to leave the country; until 1972 Jews were free to leave the 
country with their money and possessions. Organizations such as the Khaybar Brigades and the 
Organisation of the Oppressed of the Earth claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing several 
Lebanese Jews between 1984 and 1987. 
' ' Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.33. 
'^ Ibid. 
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numbers of Buddhists and Hindus, and small populations of other immigrant religions 
are also present.^ ^ 
It is not that the Lebanese community is divided only on the basis of sect and 
religion, this difference is also reflected in their political affiliations as they are 
divided among many political parties representing their interests. A brief narration of 
the main political parties and pressure groups as represented by various community 
religious sects and those who left an impact on the national scene by their active 
presence are as follows: 
3. The Lebanese Political Parties and Forces 
There are a large nimiber of political parties operating in Lebanon and most of 
them are based on a clear cut division between Christians and Muslims. Parties in 
Lebanon also fimction as pressure groups for their respective religious constituencies. 
Some of the prominent parties/political forces which play a vital role in the Lebanese 
political arena are as follows: 
3.1 Parties and Pressure Groups (Right Wing and Christian Group) 
1. Phalange Party or Kataeb (al Kataeb al lubnaniya, Hizb ijtimai dimokrati) 
The Kataeb Social Democratic Party, better known as the Phalange (Kataeb) 
party^ '* was founded in 1936 as a Maronite Catholic paramilitary youth organisation 
by Pierre Gemayel.'^  It is an authoritarian and centralized party with a strong 
93 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Lebanon 
^ The Arab word Kataeb, is a plural form and can be translated as 'battalions', 'regiments' or 
'squadrons', also by the plural of the term 'phalanx' which is taken from the military vocabulary of 
antiquity. Leftist opponents of Kataeb use tiie misleading translation 'Falange', which is aimed at 
recalling the fascist unity party of General Franco. However, this word does not accurately represent 
the party name in Arabic. 
'^ Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary (California: ABC-CLIO Information 
Services, 1984) pp. 222-223. 
Sheikh Pierre Gemayel (Nov 6, 1905 - Aug 29, 1984) (last name also spelt Jmayyel, Jemayyel or al-
Jumayyil, Sheikh is an honorific title in Arab countries), was a Lebanese political leader. He is 
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leadership. Soon after its inception the party became a major political force in Mount 
Lebanon. Phalange from the beginning adopted a very topsy-turvy attitude. For 
example after allying itself with the French Mandate authorities, the Phalange later -
just before Lebanese independence - sided with those calling for independence. As a 
result, the party was dissolved in 1942 by the French high commissioner (it was 
restored after the French left Lebanon).'^ Despite this dispute, over the years the 
Phalange has been closely associated with France in particular and the West in 
general.'^ 
Consistent with its authoritarian beginnings, Phalangist ideology has been on 
the right of the political spectrum. Although it has embraced the need to modernize, it 
has always favoured the preservation of the status quo. The Phalange party motto is 
"God, the Fatherland, and the Family," and its doctrine emphasizes a free economy 
and private initiative. It focuses on the primacy of preserving the Lebanese nation, but 
with a "Phoenician" identity distinct from its Islamic Arab neighbours. Party policies 
have been uniformly anti-communist and anti-Palestinian, with no place for pan-Arab 
ideals.^^ 
remembered as the founder of the Kataeb Party (Phalangist Party), as a parliamentary powerbroker, and 
as the father of Bashir Gemayel and Amine Gemayel, both of whom were elected to the Presidency of 
the Republic in his lifetime. He opposed the French Mandate over Lebanon in the late 1930s and early 
1940s, and advocated an independent state, free from foreign control. He was known for his deft 
political maneuvering, which led him to take positions which were seen by supporters as pragmatic, but 
by opponents as contradictory, or even hypocritical. Although publicly sympathetic to the Palestinian 
cause, he later changed his position due to Palestinian support of the Lebanese National Movement and 
its calls to end the National Pact and establish non-sectarian democracy. A controversial politician, he 
survived several assassination attempts. Several of his descendants were less fortunate. His son, Bashir 
Gemayel was assassinated on 14 Sep 1982 after being elected to the Presidency. His grandson Pierre 
Amine Gemayel, a Cabinet Minister, was similarly assassinated on Nov 21, 2006. Several other 
descendants of Pierre Gemayel have also been murdered. 
^ Michael W. Suleiman, Political Parties in Lebanon: The Challenge of a Fragmental Political 
Culture (Ithaca, New Yoric: Cornell University Press, 1967) pp. 232-234. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.l27. 
** Philip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, v.3 (Maine: 
Thomson Gale, 2004) pp. 1830-1831. 
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Unlike many zu'ama, political bosses or leaders, who achieved their status by 
virtue of inheriting wealth, Gemayel ascended his authority because of his ability to 
instill discipline in his organization and, by the mid-1950s, through the accumulation 
of military might. However, by the out break of the 1958 Civil War, the Phalange 
party was able to further its growing power by means of its militia. In that year, when 
President Camille Chamoun^ was unable to convince the army commander, Fuad 
Shihab, to use the armed forces against Muslim demonstrators, the Phalange militia 
came to his aid.'°° Encouraged by its efforts during this conflict, later that year. 
" Camille Nimr Chamoun (KamJl Sham'm) (b. April 3, 1900 - d. August 7, 1987) was President of 
Lebanon from 1952 to 1958, and one of the country's main Christian leaders during most of the 
Lebanese Civil War (1975 - 1990). Camille Nimr Chamoun was bom at Deu- el-Qamar on 3 April 
1900, into a prominent Maronite Christian family. He was educated in France and became a lawyer. He 
was first elected to the Lebanese parliament in 1934, and was reelected in 1937 and 1943. Chamoun 
was reelected to parliament, now called the National Assembly, in 1947 and 1951. He was frequently 
absent, however, as he served as ambassador to the UK from 1944 to 1946, and as ambassor to the UN 
thereafter. When President Bishara el-Khoury was forced to resign amid corruption allegations in 1952, 
Chamoun was elected to replace him. Near the end of his term, Pan-Arabists and other groups backed 
by Nasser, with considerable support in Lebanon's politically disadvantaged Muslim community, 
attempted to overthrow Charaotm's government in June 1958 after Chamoun tried to illegally seek 
anodier term as president. Chamoim appealed to the US for help under the new Eisenhower Doctrine, 
and American marines landed in Beirut. The revolt was squashed, but to appease Muslim anger, Gen. 
Fuad Shihab who although Christian enjoyed considerable popularity in the Muslim community, was 
elected to succeed Chamoun. On his retirement from the presidency, Chamoun founded the National 
Liberal Party (al-Ahrar). In the 1970s and 1980s, Chamoun served in a variety of portfolios in the 
Cabinet. This was during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-90), in w i^ch Chamoun and the NLP 
participated through the party's militia, the "Tigers" (in Arabic, nimr means tiger). In 1984, Chamoun 
agreed to join the National Unity government as Deputy Prime Minister, a post he held until his death 
in Beirut on 7 August 1987, at the age of 87. He is remembered as one of the main Christian nationalist 
leaders, and one of the last significant figures of Lebanon's pre-war generation of politicians, whose 
political influence was eclipsed during the war by that of younger militia commanders and warlords. 
Camille Chamoun was survived by his two sons, Dany and Dory, both of whom followed in his 
footsteps as NLP leaders and politicians in their own right. 
'"" Fuad Shihab, (1902-1973): Lebanese military leader and politician; president, 1958-64 bora into 
Maronite family, Shihab joined the army during the French mandate and rose to the rank of colonel. 
After the independence of Lebanon in 1946 he was promoted to general and appointed commander of 
the army. He modernized the force and maintained its neutrality during political crises. When the 
opposition mounted street demonstrations against the corrupt government of President Bishara Khouri 
in September 1952, Shihab kept the army in the barracks. Unable to withstand rising popular pressure, 
Khouri resigned. Under the new president, Camille Chamoun, Shihab served briefly as prime minister 
as well as defence and interior minister. In the May 1958 civil war between pro-Western forces, led by 
President Chamoun, and nationalist-leftist forces, headed by Kamal Jumblat, Chehab; commanding an 
8000-strong army, remained neutral. His impartiality paved the way for his election to presidency, and 
an end to the civil strife. Reflecting the bipartisan backing he had received, Shihab maintained stability 
by aligning his external policies with those of the Arab hinterland, and by co-opting the leaders of 
urban Muslims in ruling the country. At home, supported by military officers and technocrats, he tried 
to modernize the Lebanese political-administrative machine, which was steeped in feudal values and 
sectarian cleavages. His public works programme, including road building, in the rural north and south, 
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principally through violence and the success of general strikes in Beirut, the Phalange 
achieved what journalists dubbed the "counterrevolution." By their actions the 
Phalangists brought down the government of Prime Minister Karami and secured for 
their leader, Gemayel, a position in the four-man cabinet that was subsequently 
formed.'°' 
The Lebanese Civil War of 1958 and the intensification of sectarian conflict 
benefited the party; its membership increased from 300 in 1936 to 40,000 in 1958. 
The power of the party was reflected in parliament; from 1959 through 1968, 61 
percent of its candidates were elected, hi the 1972 parliament, the Phalange had seven 
deputies, including Pierre Gemayel and his son Amine Gemayel. By the start of the 
Lebanese Civil War that began in 1975, the party's membership had increased to 
65,000, including a militia of nearly 10,000. 
Throughout the Civil War, the Phalange party was most formidable Christian 
force, and its militia bore the brunt of the fighting on the Christian side. Because the 
party was part of the mostly 'Christian, right-wing coalition' known as Lebanese 
Front, the power of the Gemayel family increased considerably. Ironically, however, 
as Pierre Gemayel's son Bashir Gemayel was consolidating his power through the 
integration of all right-wing militias into his Lebanese Forces, the role of the Phalange 
party diminished.'°^ Bashir, a member of the party, marginalized its traditional 
leadership, which people felt was too moderate. "^ ^ 
accelerated migration into cities from the countryside, thus setting in train the radicalization of 
Lebanese politics. After stepping down in 1964 he continued to wield influence through the 
parliamentarians and military and intelligence officers who remained loyal to him. But he resisted their 
pressure to stand for the presidency again in 1970. 
"" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.l27. 
^°^ Bashir Gemayel (10 November 1947-14 September 1982) was a Lebanese militia commander, 
politician, and president-elect. In 1962, Gemayel joined the Kataeb party. In 1971, Gemayel was 
appointed inspector in the para-military branch of the Kataeb party, the Kataeb Regulatory Forces. In 
1975, Gemayel was accused by the Lebanese National Movement of being responsible of the Black 
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During the 1980s, the Phalange lost much of its credibility and political 
stature. In 1982, under military pressure from Israel, which occupied a good deal of 
Lebanon, Bashir Gemayel was elected president but was assassinated before assuming 
office, and his brother Amine Gemayel took his place.'°^ The corrupt and partisan rule 
of Amine further harmed the image of the party, and the death of Pierre Gemayel in 
1984 inaugurated a struggle for power within the party. Mr. Elie Karameh, 
subsequently, became the president of the party. The party was even attacked by the 
Lebanese Forces, the erstwhile political child of the Phalange, in 1985. The new party 
Saturday massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims. In 1976, Gemayel became president of the 
Kataeb Military Council and the head of the unified command of the Lebanese Forces (LF), a coalition 
of the Christian militias of the Kataeb Party, National Liberal Party, Al-Tanzim and the Guardians of 
the Cedars. Gemayel became a member of the Lebanese Front in 1980. On 7 July 1980, Bashir 
extirpated the Tigers Militia. The life of the Tiger's commander, Dany Chamoun, was spared this time 
and sought refuge in West Beirut. Bashir subsequently became the sole leader of Lebanese right. Israeli 
forces invaded Lebanon in 1982. Although Gemayel did not cooperate with the Israelis publicly, his 
long history of alleged tactical collaboration with Israel counted against him in the eyes of many 
Lebanese Muslims. On 23 August 1982, being the only announced candidate for the presidency of the 
republic, the National Assembly elected Gemayel by the second narrowest margin in Lebanese history 
(57 votes out of 92); many Muslim members of the Assembly boycotted the vote. On 1 September 
1982, two weeks before his assassination, Bashir met the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in 
Nahariya and agreed to start the process of establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and 
Lebanon as soon as he assumes office. An explosion of anger took place after his death, which led to 
Christian militiamen fi-om the LF carrying out the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Bashir Gemayel's older 
brother Amine Gemayel became president in Bashir's place, serving from 1982 to 1988. Rather 
different in temperament. Amine Gemayel was widely regarded as more moderate than his brother, and 
many of the latter's followers were dissatisfied. Bashir Gemayel remains a divisive figure in Lebanese 
politics. Many Christians remember him nostalgically as a hero, seeing him as the embodiment of what 
Lebanon could and should have been. Others disagree, seeing him as responsible of prolonging the 
Lebanese Civil War and one of tiie main factors of inducing the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 
103 Philip Mattar, ed., N.98, p. 1831. 
'°* Amine Pierre Gemayel (bom 22 January 1942) was President of Lebanon from 1982 to 1988 and 
is the leader of Kataeb Party. Bom in the Lebanese village of Bikfaya, Amine Gemayel is the son of 
Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Kataeb Party. Gemayel was elected to the presidency by the National 
Assembly on 21 September 1982, in place of his brother Bashu- Gemayel who had been elected the 
previous month but had been assassinated before taking office. After obtaining a law degree, Amine 
Gemayel concentrated on building up his family's newspaper business. In a 1969 by-election, he was 
elected to succeed his deceased uncle, Maurice Gemayel, as a member of the National Assembly; he 
defeated Fuad Lahoud by a margin of 54% to 41%. In 1972, in the last election to be held for 20 years, 
he was reelected by a large margin. While his younger brother Bashir was regarded as a political 
radical, espousing the expulsion of Palestinian guerrillas from Lebanese soil and a radical overhaul of 
the political system, and hinting at a possible peace settlement with Israel, Amine Gemayel was 
considered more moderate. Always a consensus politician, he avoided, at least in his pre-presidential 
years, alienating Muslim politicians as his brother had done. When Bashir Gemayel was assassinated, 
therefore. Amine was regarded as a natural choice to bring together both the supporters of his slain 
brother, and his Muslim opponents. 
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president (1987) George Saade, tried to rejuvenate the organization with the help of 
Syria, but the changing political sentiment in the country in favour of Syria did not 
help him to win the cause. The Phalange was briefly led by the pro-Syrian Munir al-
Hajj after Saade's death in 1998. The race to replace al-Hajj was a rivalry between 
Amine Gemayel, who returned to Lebanon in July 2000, and Karim Pakradouni (who 
was not Maronite, but Armenian). In early 2002, Karim Pakradouni became president 
of the party with the help of Syria. Later in 2005, as the situation turned out, Amine 
Gemayel, however, was invited to become the supreme president of the party. Within 
the Lebanese coalition government, however, in the present Elie Karameh leads the 
Phalange Opposition and Fouad Abou Nader, Bashir's right hand, leads the Lebanese 
Forces. They have rejected the Syrian occupation, and claim to have the support of the 
Phalange popular base.'°^ 
2. National Liberal Party (NLP) (Hizb al-Wataniyyin al-Ahrar) 
The National Liberal Party (NLP) is a political party in Lebanon, established 
by President Camille Chamoun in 1958. It is now under the leadership of Dory 
Chamoun, who also happens to be the son of Camille Chamoun. The party has 
adopted a hard line for the preservation of Lebanese independence, and to the 
safeguard of the distinctive liberal practices in Lebanon with respect to freedom of 
expression and opinion and religious freedoms. Like most Lebanese political 
organization, it has a sectarian basis; the NLP is mainly supported by Christians.'"^ 
'°^ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kataeb_Party 
'°* George E. Delury, ed., World Encyclopedia of Political System, v.l (Essex: Longman Group 
Limited, 1983)p.617. 
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In 1968, the party joined the Helf Alliance'°^ formed with the two other big -
mainly Christian parties in Lebanon: the Kataeb Party of Pierre Gemayel, and 
National Bloc of Raymond Edde.'°^ During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-90, the 
NLP was aligned mainly with Maronite Christian alliance who fought the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM). It had its own armed militia, the Tigers.'°^ In 1977, the 
NLP joined with the Kataeb Party and the Guardians of the Cedars (GoC) to form the 
'"^  Helf Alliance, Tripartite Alliance (al-hilf ath-thulathi): The Helf Alliance or Tripartite Alliance is 
a right-wing coalition formed in 1968 by the big three mainly Christian parties in Lebanon: The Pierre 
Gemayel's Phalange, the National Liberal Party (NLP) of former President Camille Chamoun, and 
National Bloc of Raymond Edde. The coalition called for a Lebanese Nationalism as Regional and 
internal tensions rise, and as relations with PLO spoils. It was also seen as a counter-force against 
Arabist line incarnated during his mandate by President Fuad Shihab. The alliance well-performed in 
1968 Parliamentary elections winning 30 seats in the 99 member National Assembly - the best result to 
date for any organized electoral force in Lebanon's notoriously fractured legislature. In 1969, the 
National Bloc left the alliance over disagreement about the Cairo Agreement. The Kataeb and the NLP 
were still closely allied, in search of an alliance with other right forces the Lebanese Front in 1977. 
•"^  Charles Winslow, N.55, p. 158. 
National Bloc, Lebanese National Bloc (NB) (Hizb al-kitla al-watantya): National Bloc (NB) is a 
Lebanese political party founded in 1936. His founder Emile Edde became president the same year 
under French protectorate. His son, Raymond (1913-2000), succeeded him as head of the party. In 
1968, the NB joined the Helf Alliance, a grouping which included former President Camille 
Chamoun's National Liberal Party and Pierre Gemayel's Kataeb Party. The alliance well-performed in 
Parliamentary elections held the same year winning 30 seats (on 99). Nevertheless in 1969, the NB 
leaved the alliance after the Cairo Agreement. During the Lebanese Civil War, and although mainly 
Christian the party refiised to rejoin the Lebanese Front, formed by his former allies. During the war 
years, he reftised to arm a militia and kept a moderate line consisting mainly in defending the 
independence and unity of Lebanon aligning his self with the positions of the Sunni bourgeoisie, 
represented by Rashid Karami and Saeb Salam. The exile in Paris (in 1976) and the death (in 2000) of 
his leader, combined with the rise of the LF and Aounist current, contributed to the decline of the party. 
He is now part of anti-President Lahoud coalition, 'Alliance of 14 March.' His current leader is Carlos 
Edde, Raymond's nephew and a businessman who had spent most of his life abroad. The NB is no 
longer a major player on the Lebanese political scene. The president of the party is traditionally called 
dean. 
"*' Marius Deep, ne Lebanese Cml War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) p.64. 
Tigers Militia (numur) was the military wing of the NLP during the Lebanese Civil War. The Tigers 
formed in Saadiyat in 1968, under the leadership of Camille Chamoun. Trained by Nairn Berdkan, the 
unit was led by Chamoun's son Dany Chamoun. After the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, the 
Tigers, strong of 3500 militiamen fought the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and its Palestinian 
allies, which from late 1976 included the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The group was 
active in a number of battles in Lebanon, allied with the Phalange (Kataeb) and the Guardians of the 
Cedars (GoC); it was involved in the Karantina and Tel al-Zaatar Massacres of Palestinian refiigees. In 
1977, these militias combined to form the Lebanese Forces (LF) as a military wing of the Lebanese 
Front. Power in the LF was soon apprehended by the dominant faction, the Phalange militia under 
Bashir Gemayel. In 1980, the Tigers suffered hundreds of casuahies and were desfroyed as a fighting 
force by the Gemayel's LF. Gemayel was mtent on establishing the LF, under his command, as the sole 
Christian militia. Dany Chamoun fled to Syria, and later resettled in West Beirut. He eventually 
returned to East Beirut, where he was assassinated in 1990. 
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Lebanese Front. This was paralleled by the joining of the militias under a central 
command, the Lebanese Forces (LF), headed by Phalange leader Bashir Gemayel. 
In 1980, Gemayel turned on the Tigers, and in a surprise attack in Sajfra eliminated the 
militia. The NLP has survived as a party, however.'" Nevertheless, with the death of 
Camille Chamoun in 1987 and the assassination of his successor and son Dany in 
1990, combined v^ ith the rise of the LF as political party, it seems that the NLP's 
political influence has considerably declined comparing to the 60s and 70s. In 
2005, the NLP was part of the Qomet Shehwan Gathering, opposed to the Syrian 
presence in Lebanon, but later left the same because of what it alleged was 
"corruption" in this gathering."^ 
3. Guardians of the Cedars (GoC) (Hizb Horras Al-Arz) 
The Guardians of the Cedars (GoC) are a right-wing Lebanese Nationalist 
Party and former militia in Lebanon. It was formed by Etienne Saqr (Abu Arz) and 
others along with the Lebanese Renewal Party in the early 1970s. They were inspired 
by the writings of Said Aql who believed that Lebanese identity was rooted in its 
distant Phoenician past and had little to do with Pan-Arabism or Islam."'* Cedar trees 
""DilipHiro.N.TO.p.lSl. 
' " Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (New York: Palcrave 
Macmillan, 2003) p.55. 
"^DilipHiro, N.70,pp.219-220. 
' " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Liberal_Party_%28Lebanon%29 
The Qomet Shehwan Gathering is a Lebanese political organization, comprising politicians, 
intellectuals, and businessmen, mostly Christian and ranging in ideology from the centre-right to the 
center-left. The organization is not a political party in the classical sense: its members belong to, and in 
some cases lead, a variety of political parties. It is more of a loose coalition, although whether it intends 
to organize electorally is imclear. The coalition adheres to seven principles and pursues five objectives. 
""* Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) 
p.90. 
Said Aql (1912- ): Lebanese writer. Bom into a Maronite family in Zahle, Aql soon established 
himself as an outstanding poet with extraordinary lyrical powers. His use of symbols set a new trend in 
Arabic poetry, as did his (later) practice of using colloquial language instead of classical Arabic, a 
traditional practice in the Arab world. An intellectual, Aql believed that Lebanese identity was rooted 
in its distant Phoenician past and had little to do with Islam or Arabism. He went on to develop a 
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are the symbol of the Lebanese state, and a green cedar has been incorporated into the 
national flag. But the cedar is also a symbol of Christian traditions of the country. It 
operated in the Lebanese Civil War imder the slogan: "Lebanon, at your service." The 
group is self-described as secular, although this fact is disputed. Policies and 
allegiances during Lebanon's civil war would indicate that the group has a strong 
Maronite Christian influence. 
The GoC started to form a militia m its formative years leading up to the 
Lebanese Civil War and commenced military operations in April 1975.'^ ^ The party 
spread its messages by means of graffiti in East Beirut, including such slogans as: 
"No to Syria, no to the Palestinian Resistance, no to Arabism; Lebanon will be the 
graveyard of the Palestinian Terrorists."''^ The GoC joined with other mainly-
Christian militias in 1976 to form the Lebanese Front.''^ The GoC was able to filed 
about 500-1000 fighters during the Lebanese Civil War. It claimed that they were 
protecting Lebanon "with the word and the sword", indicating a Maronite Christian 
theological backing. Yet, some supporters maintain that the group played a non-
version of the Latin alphabet that he clauned was more suitable to the 'Lebanese' language. Aql's ideas 
appealed to Maronite intellectuals who, during the period between the two world wars, were intent on 
giving shape to a Lebanese identity distinct from Syria and the Muslim-dominated Arab hinterland. 
With the tide of the Arab nationalism rising after the Second World, Aql's particularist thesis lost 
ground. But the later arrival of a large number of Palestinians in Lebanon revived Aql's ideology 
among Maronites, especially the untranationalist militia, the Guardian of the Cedars. 
l i s Harald Voche, N.38, p.72. 
"* In September 1975, Communique No. 1 was issued to denounce advocates of the partition of 
Lebanon. The second communique contained a bitter attack on the Palestinians. The third articulated 
the party's attitude on the issued of Lebanese identity: Lebanon should dissociate itself from Arabism. 
" ' Kirsten E. Schulze, N.l 14, p.l53. 
Etienne Saqr summed the Guardians of the Cedars attitude to Palestinians in an interview with the 
Jerusalem Post on July 23, 1982:- "It is the Palestinians we have to deal with. Ten years ago there were 
84,000; now there are between 600,000 and 700,000. In six years there will be two million. We can't 
let it come to that. "His solution: "very simple. We shall drive them to the borders of 'brotherly' Syria 
... anyone who looks back, stops or returns will be shot on the spot. We have the moral right, 
reinforced by well-organized public relations plans and political preparations." 
118 George E. Delury, ed., N.l06, p.615. 
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sectarian or non-religious role. Despite their relatively small number (around 6,000 at 
their peak), the GoC were involved in some of the heaviest engagements of the war. 
After heavy Palestinian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, the GoC 
cultivated ties with the Israeli military, receiving weapons and support. Some 
followers maintain that this was a collaboration of necessity, and not an ideological 
agreement with the Israelis. Many of them joined the Israeli-sponsored South 
Lebanon Army (SLA), formed after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 
March 1978."' In the fi-actured Maronite community of the late 1980s they were one 
of the eight political or military factions. When the Civil War ended in favour of their 
adversaries in October 1990, their influence declined. Their backing of the electoral 
boycott by the Maronites of the parliamentary poll of 1992 fiirther marginalised 
them.'^ ° From the end of the Civil War in 1990 until the Israeli withdrawal fi-om 
Lebanon in 2000, the GoC formed an element of the now-defimct South Lebanon 
Army. Since that date their military operations have ceased and they operate solely 
" ' South Lebanon Army (SLA) (Jaysh Lubnan aJ-Janubi): Renegade Lebanese Army Major Saad 
Hadad (1936-1984) founded the Free Lebanon Militia (FLM) to combat the PLO in southern Lebanon 
during Lebanon's Civil War (1975-1990) and made common cause with Israel when it invaded 
Lebanon in March 1978 to drive PLO guerrillas away from the Israeli border. Israel withdrew from 
Lebanon in June 1978 and turned over to Hadad a buffer zone 3 to 6 miles (5 to 10 km) wide along the 
Lebanese side of the border. Israel fimded and trained Hadad's re-named South Lebanon Army (SLA) 
m return for SLA efforts to prevent the return of elements hostile to Israel to the area. Israel's 1982 
invasion of Lebanon to route the PLO deepened the relationship between the Israel Defense Force 
(IDF) and the SLA. Headquartered in Marjayoun Lebanon, the SLA's 2500 fighters were Maronite 
Christians (40 percent) and Shiite Muslims (60 percent), although Christians predominated among the 
officers. Hadad died in January 1984 and Gen. Antoine Lahad replaced him. In 1985 Israel withdrew 
from Lebanon, leaving behind a small force to advise the SLA. TTie rise of Hezbollah, a Shiite militia 
created to liberate southern Lebanon from Israel and its SLA client, provoked SLA-Hezbollah battles 
and drew IDF froops back into Lebanon. By the late 1990s IDF fatalities in Lebanon led to an Israeli 
grass-roots campaign for a unilateral withdrawal. AVhen the IDF withdrew from Lebanon suddenly on 
24 March 2000, the SLA disintegrated, and its members either surrendered to Hezbollah or to the 
Lebanese army, returned quietly to their villages or sought emergency refuge, along with their families, 
in Israel. Military courts in Beirut sentenced hundreds of SLA members to prison terms ranging from 
months to years for collaborating with the enemy, which SLA commanders tried in absentia received 
death sentences. SLA families struggled to adjust to Israeli society; most of them, however, returned to 
Lebanon or moved to other countries within several years of the SLA's collapse. 
'^ '* Dilip Hiro, N.70, pp.94-95. 
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politically, campaigning to remove the Syrian presence in Lebanon.'^' Today, the 
newly-reorganized GoC is a legal and fully-functional political party. 
4. Lebanese Front 
The Lebanese Front was formed in September 1976 as a confederation of the 
following Maronite Christian political parties: the Phalange Party (Kataeb), National 
Liberal Party, the Guardians of the Cedars (GoC) and Maronite League.'^ ^ It was 
headed by the Camille Chamoun.'^ '' The Front's constituents stressed their 
distinctness fi-om the Arab world by emphasizing that Maronite history, centring 
around the church and Mount Lebanon, stood apart from mainstream Muslim Arabs 
and even non-Maronite Christians, hi December 1980, the Front issued a manifesto 
calling for the replacement of the 1943 National Pact for some sort of federation or 
confederation within a unified Lebanon.'^ '' 
Though Chamoun was the nominal leader, Bashir Gemayel and his father, 
Pierre, mattered more. Since Christians played a special role in Lebanon, they argued, 
they were entitled to a special position, irrespective of their being a minority. The 
Front tightened its links with Israel, which found it convenient to deal with a single 
Maronite political entity than with several. However, vdth Bashir Gemayel's 
121 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guardians_of_the_Cedars 
Maronite League of the attorney Shakir Abu Suleiman, a movement which dose not control a 
militia. The Movement stands for the political interests of the Maronite religious community in 
Lebanon. 
'^ Deirdre Collings, Peace for Lebanon?: from War to Reconstruction (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1994) p.l3. 
'^ * Edward E. Azar, N.l 1, p.33. 
'^ Ze'ev Schiffand Ehud Ya'ari, Israel's Lebanon War (London: George Allen&Unwin, 1984) pp.28-
30. 
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murder in September 1982 and Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985, the 
Front moderated its stance. 
With the rise of Gen. Michel Aoun'^ ^ as a pretender to the presidency in 
September 1988, the Front became one of the three power centres in the Christian 
enclave, the remaining one being the Lebanese Forces.'^ ^ The internecine Christian 
fighting in early 1990, however, weakened the Front. With the end of the Civil War in 
October, the Front, a creature of the conflict, lost its relevance-
'^*DilipHiro,N.70,p.l82. 
'^ ^ Michel Nairn Aoun (bom 17 February 1935 in Beirut) is a Lebanese military commander and 
politician. From 22 September 1988 to 13 October 1990, he served as Prime Minister and acting 
President of one of two rival governments that contended for power. He was defeated by Syrian and 
allied Lebanese forces and forced into exile. He returned to Lebanon on May 7, 2005, eleven days after 
the withdrawal of Syrian troops. Known as "The General," Aoun is currently a Parliament Member. He 
leads the "Free Patriotic Movement" party. 
'^ * Kail C. Ellis, "Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, v.21, n. 1, winter 1999, p. 15. 
Lebanese Forces (LF) (al-Quwat al-Lubnaniyya): In January 1976, Lebanese militia along with the 
Maronite militias of the Phalange (Kataeb), the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Guardians of the 
Cedars (GoC) and Al-Tanzim formed the Lebanese Forces (LF). Its unified military command was 
headed by Bashir Gemayel. After his assassination in 1982 the new commander, Fadi Afi-am, adopted 
an openly pro-Israeli line, calling for talks between Lebanon and Israel. Following the abrogation of the 
draft Lebanese-Israeli Peace Treaty in March 1984, LF leadership passed to Fuad Abu Nadr. 
Subsequently, after a bloodless coup in March 1985, Samir Ja'ja (also called Geagea) assumed 
command of the LF. In December 1989, Ja'ja's backing for the Taif Accord led to fighting between the 
LF and Gen. Michel Aoun commanding the (Christian) Lebanese army based in the Christian enclave. 
At the time of Aoun's fall in October 1990, marking the end of the Civil War, the LF was left with 
10,000 men, down fi-om its peak of 20,000 under Bashir Gemayel, with 25,000 reserves. Ja'ja was 
included in the national unity cabinet formed in December. The next year, in line with the official 
policy of integrating the members of all militias under the age of 25 into the regular armed forces, the 
government absorbed 6,500 LF men into the military. The LF then transformed itself into a political 
party. It boycotted the 1992 general election. In May 1994, following the bombing of a Maronite 
church in Jonieh earlier that year, the Ja'ja was arrested on charges of attempting to undermine 
government authority by "maintaining a militia in the guise of a political party," of instigating acts of 
violence, and of committing assassinations during the Lebanese Civil War. The Lebanese government 
ultimately issued a decree dissolving the LF in 1994. Supporters of the LF were, however, active 
participants in the Cedar Revolution of 2005. In the subsequent parliament election held in May and 
June 2005, the LF joined a coalition led by Saad Hariri, which gained a majority in the Lebanese 
Parliament. Samir Ja'ja was pardoned on 18 July 2005, and subsequently on October 2005 became 
president of the Executive Committee of the Lebanese Forces. The LF in June 2005 held 5 of the 128 
seats available in the Lebanese Parliament, and participated in the Siniora government, formed in July 
2005, by the minister of Tourism Joseph Sarkis. 
'^'DilipHiro,N.70,p.l82. 
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5. Marada Brigade or Zghrta Liberation Army (MM) (Tayyar Al-Marada) 
The Marada Brigade (MM) was a Maronite Christian faction in the Lebanese 
Civil War and it was named after the legendary Marada warriors of the early Middle 
Ages.'''" At its height it had about 5,000 members. The Marada Brigade was the 
personal militia of Suleunan Franjieh, president of Lebanon at the outbreak of the 
war.'^' It was also known as the "Zghrta Liberation Army" after Franjieh's home 
town of Zgharta. During the Lebanese civil war, Marada Brigade militia successfiiUy 
repulsed and responded with attacks on Muslim and PLO militias from neighboring 
Tripoli.'^^ 
They were initially allied with the Kataeb but m 1978 (the year when 
Suleiman Franjieh's son Tony Franjieh, 'the Marada commander,' was killed), 
Franjieh became firmly pro-Syrian and stopped attending meetings with the Lebanese 
Front.'^^ The murder of Tony Franjieh was one of the factors which many 
''" David C. Gordon, N.65, p.38. 
" ' Suleiman Kabalan Frangieh, last name also spelled Frangie, Franjieh, or Franjiyeh, (15 June 
1910 - 23 July 1992) was President of Lebanon from 1970 to 1976. His presidency saw the beginning 
of the Lebanese Civil War, which raged from 1975 to 1990, as well as the start of the Syrian military 
presence in Lebanon, which continued until 2005. The scion of one of the leading Maronite families of 
Zgharta, near Tripoli, Frangieh was the second son of Kabalan Suleiman Frangieh, who was to become 
a member of Parliament and his wife Lamia Raffoul. His grandfather, Kabalan Frangieh, had been a 
District Governor. Frangieh had five children with his Egyptian-bom wife, Iris Handaly. Suleiman 
Frangieh took over the Parlimnent seat in 1958 from his brother Hamid, after his brother Hamid 
became ill. His grandson, Suleiman Frangieh, Jr. was Minister of the Interior from 2004 to 2005. 
132 
133 
Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, N.8, p. 191. 
Ze'ev Schiffand Ehud Ya'ari, N.125, p.25. 
When a local Phalange commander was murdered, and on June 13 the showdown came: hundreds of 
armed Phalangists surrotmded Tony Franjieh's home, in Ehden, where the killer was purportedly 
hiding, and demanded his surrender. When Franjieh refiised to surrender anyone, the Phalangists 
assaulted the house and slaughtered everyone within: Franjieh, his wife, his daughter, his bodyguards, 
and the entire domestic staff. About 10 Kataeb members were killed in the attack. Samir Ja'ja was 
seriously wounded in the attack. Kataeb members Elie Hobeika and Samir Ja'ja denied taking part in 
the killing. Bashir Gemayel was believed to have ordered the attack, he also denied being responsible 
for the killing. Many class their actions as "backstabbing". The attack in Ehden began the break up of 
the united Maronite militias known as the Lebanese Front. Suleiman Frangieh swore revenge for the 
death of his son and his family. In 1979 Bashir Gemayel's daughter and bodyguards were killed in a 
car bomb and later in 1982 Bashir himself was killed in a huge explosion. The degree of involvement 
by Marada operatives is unclear. These actions taken against the Marada still haunt Samir Ja'ja and his 
followers to this day. 
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commentators blame for the longevity of Lebanon's war and was the start of strong 
division between Christians. Recently, there has been great popular support for 
renewed Maronite solidarity which existed before 1978. After the assassination of 
Tony Franjieh, the LF failed to absorb the Marada Brigade and it remained intact.'^ "* 
Although not a formal militia, it has many supporters even to this day and Suleiman 
Franjieh is a close personal friend of Syrian President Bashar Asad and a strong 
advocate of Syria.'^ ^ He was serving as Interior Minister, one of the most powerful 
positions in the Lebanese government, when Rafiq Hariri was assassinated on 14 
February, 2005.'^ ^ 
' ^ Trevor Mostyn, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.374. 
'^ * Dr. Bashar al-Assad (Bassar al-Asad) (bom 11 September 1965) is the President of the Syrian 
Arab Republic, Regional Secretary of the Baath Party, and the son of former President Hafez al-Assad. 
The Baath Party remains in control of the parliament, and is constitutionally the "leading party" of the 
state. Until he became President, Bashar al-Assad was not greatly involved in Syrian politics; his only 
political role was as head of the Syrian Computer Society, which was mainly in charge of introducing 
the Internet to Syria in 2001. Al-Assad was confirmed as President by an unopposed referendum in 
2001. He was expected to bring a more liberal approach to the leadership tiian his father. In an 
interview he stated that he saw democracy in Syria as 'a tool to a better life' but then argued that it 
would take time for democracy to come about and that it could not be rushed. Although al-Assad rules 
with a softer touch than his father, political freedoms are still extremely curtailed. He resembles his 
father in many ways but is more subtle in reducing opposition. The Assad family are members of the 
minority Alawite sect, and members of that group have been prominent in the governmental hierarchy 
and army since 1963 when the Baath Party first came to power. Their origins are to be found in the 
Latakia region of north-west Syria. Bashar's fiimily is originally from Qardaha, just east of Latakia. "Al 
Assad (or Asad)" means "the lion" in Arabic. Officially a Republic, Syria is under Emergency Law 
since 1963 and governed by the Baath Party; the head of state since 1970 has been a member of the 
Assad family. Family connections are presently an important part of Syrian politics. Several close 
family members of Hafez al-Assad have held positions within the government since his rise to power. 
Most of the al-Assad and Makhlouf families have also grown tremendously wealthy, and parts of that 
fortune have reached their Alawite tribe in Qardaha and its surroundings. 
^* Rafiq Bahaa El Deen Al-Hariri — (Nov 1, 1944 - Feb 14, 2005), a self-made billionaire and 
business tycoon, was Prime Minister of Lebanon from 1992 to 1998 and agam from 2000 until his 
resignation, 20 October 2004. He headed five cabinets during his tenure. Hariri dominated the country's 
post-war political and business life and is widely credited with reconstructing Beirut after the 15-year 
civil war. Hariri was assassinated on 14 February 2005 when explosives equivalent to around 1000 kg 
of TNT were detonated as his motorcade drove past the St. George Hotel in the Lebanese capital, 
Beirut. The investigation into his assassination is still ongoing and it is conducted under the supervision 
of the UN and led by the independent investigator Daniel Bellemare. Some have speculated that the 
Syrian government is linked to the assassination. Hariri's killing led to massive political change in 
Lebanon, includmg the Cedar Revolution and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. 
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3.2 Parties and Pressure Group (Left Wing and Muslim Group) 
The parties and pressure groups of the Left wing and Muslim group in 
Lebanon, are more numerous and perhaps more mercurial than those of the Right, 
Christian Camp. Their genesis and establishment can be understood as foUows:-
1. Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) (al-hizb al-taqadummi al-ishtiraki) 
The Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) is a political party in Lebanon. Its 
cvmtent leader is Wa\id Jvonblat.'^ ^ It is ideologically sec\ilai and officially non-
sectarian, but in practice is supported mostly by followers of the Druze faith. The 
party was founded on 5 January 1949, and registered on 17 March the same year. The 
founders comprised six individuals, all of different backgrounds. The most notable of 
these was Kamal Jumblat (Walid Jumblat's father).'^^ From 1951 through 1972 the 
party had between three and six deputies in parliament.'^' 
The PSP imder Kamal Jumblat was a major element in the Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM) which supported Lebanon's Arab identity and sympathised with 
the Palestinians. Despite Jumblat's initial reluctance to engage in paramilitarism, it 
built a powerful private army, which proved to be one of the strongest in the Lebanese 
Civil War 1975-1990. It conquered much of Mount Lebanon and the Chouf 
' " Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies (London: 
Routledge, 1990)p.l57. 
Walid Jumblatt (bom August 7, 1949) is the current leader of the Progressive Socialist Party "PSP" of 
Lebanon, and the most prominent leader of the Druze community. He is currently one of the most 
outspoken anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon and is allied with the March 14 Alliance, which includes 
the Future Movement, the Lebanese Forces and the Qomet Chehwan Gathering. 
" ' Kamal Jumblatt (December 6, 1917 - March 16, 1977) was an important Lebanese politician. He 
was the main leader of the anti-government forces in the Lebanese Civil War until his assassination in 
1977. He is the father of the present Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. 
" ' FloTente ElUott, A Dkiionary of PoMcs (Middlesex*. Penguin Books, 1915) p.28\. 
The others were Farid Joubran, Albert Adeeb, Abdallah Alayli, Fouad Rizk, and Georges Hanna. The 
PSP held in Beirut the first conference for the Socialist Arab Parties in Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq 
in 1951. 
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District.'""^  Its main adversaries were the Maronite Christian Phalangist militia, and 
later the Lebanese Forces militia (which absorbed the Phalangists). The PSP suffered 
a major setback in 1977, when Kamal Jumblat was assassinated.'''^  His son Walid 
succeeded him as leader of the party.'""^  From the Israeli withdrawal from the Chouf 
in 1983 to the end of the Civil War, the PSP administered a highly effective civil 
administration in Chouf- an area under its control.'''^  
Since the restoration of constitutional rule in 1989, PSP leader Walid Jumblat 
participated in a number of governments, but later joined the opposition and took up a 
position opposed to the role of Syria in Lebanon's politics.''*^ Unlike some opponents 
140 George E. Delury, ed., N.106, p.620. 
" ' B. V. Rao, History of Asia: From Early Times to A.D. 2000, (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers Pvt 
Ltd., 2001) pp.423-424. 
This is a list of assassinated Lebanese political figures: 
• Kamal Jumblatt - founder of Progressive Socialist Party. Assassinated on March 16, 1977 
• Tony Frangieh - Son of President Suleiman Frangieh. assassinated on June 13, 1978. 
• Bashir Gemayel - former President-Elect, founder of Lebanese Forces, son of Pierre Gemayel. 
Assassinated on Sept. 14, 1982 
• Rashid Karami - Former Prime Minister (1987) 
• Hassan Khaled - Former Grand Mufti of Lebanon's Sunni Muslim community. Assassinated on 
May 16, 1989. 
• Ren6 Moawad - President (1989) 
• Dany Chamoun - leader of National Liberal Party, son of Camille Chamoun, assassinated on 
Oct. 21, 1990 
• Abbas al-Musawi - Leader of Hezbollah (1992) 
• Elie Hobeika - militia commander, politician. January 24, 2002 
• Ramzi Irani - Lebanese Forces student representative at Lebanese University. Assassinated May 
7, 2002 
• Rafiq Hariri - Ex-Mme Minister. Assassmated on February 14,2005 
• Samir Kassir - University professor, journalist and historian. Assassinated June 2,2005 
• George Hawi - Former secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP). Assassinated 
June 21,2005. 
• Gebran Tueni - Politician and newspaper editor. Assassinated on December 12,2005 
• Pierre Amine Gemayel - legislator, son of Amine Gemayel, Minister of Industry and leader of 
Kataeb. Assassinated November 21,2006. 
• Walid Eido - Parliament Member. Assassinated June, 2007. 
• Antoine Ghanem - Parliament Member. Assassinated September 19,2007. 
• Fran9ois al-Hajj - Brigadier General of the Lebanese Army. Assassinated December 12, 2007. 
'••^  B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (A Modern Political History), (London, Zed Books 
Ltd., 1985) p. 189. 
'••^  Charles Winslow, N.55, p.241. 
"" Nazih Richani, N.4, pp. 103-104. 
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of the Syrian presence, he did not oppose the presence of the Syrian army per se, but 
contended that the Syrian intelligence services were exerting undue influence. 
Following the passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in 2005, calling for a 
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, Jumblat was particularly prominent in the 
opposition.''*^ He is currently one of the most outspoken anti-Syrian politicians in 
Lebanon and is allied with the March 14 Alliance.''** 
2. Amal Movement (Afwaj al-Mouqawtna Al-Lubnaniyya) 
In 1974, the Movement of the Disinherited was formed by the Shiite leader 
Imam Musa as-Sadr and Member of Parliament Hussein El-Husseini. ' On 20 
January 1975 the Lebanese Resistance Detachments were formed as a military vnng 
of The Movement of the Disinherited, and came to be popularly known as Amal 
(from the acronym Afwaj al-Mouqawma Al-Lubnaniyya). Amal became one of the 
most important Shiite Muslim militias during the Lebanese Civil War.''*^ After Imam 
Musa as-Sadr disappeared while on a mission in Libya in August 1978, Nabih Berri 
had emerged as leader of Amal in 1981.''*' Amal grew strong through its close ties 
'*^  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Progressive_Socialist_Party 
'^ The March 14 Alliance or M14, named after the date of the Cedar Revolution, is a coalition of 
anti-Syrian political parties and independents in Lebanon, led by Saad Hariri, younger son of Rafik 
Hariri, the assassinated former prime minister of Lebanon, Samir Ja'ja president of the Lebanese 
Forces, former President Sheik Amine Gemayel and Walid Jumblatt of Progressive Socialist Party. At 
the last legislative elections. May and June 2005, the alliance became the dominant group in parliament 
with 72 MP:s out of 128. Currently the Alliance has 68 of 127 MP:s because of assassinations, a 
defection and a natural death. 
'*' Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.134, p.378. 
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Avraham Sela, ed.. Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 1999) p.33. 
Nabih Berri (bom January 28, 1938) is the Speaker of the Parliament of Lebanon. He heads the 
mostly Shiite Amal Movement. He was bom in Bo, Sierra Leone to Lebanese parents. He went to 
school in Tebnine and Ain Ebel in southern Lebanon and later studied at the Makassed and the Ecole 
de la Sagesse in Beimt. He obtained a law degree in 1963 from the Lebanese University, where he had 
served as the student body president. During the 1960s, he joined the Arab Nationalist Movement. In 
the early 1970s, he worked in Beirut as a lawyer for General Motors. He also lived in the Detroit area 
from 1976 to 1978. He held a series of positions in the Amal movement during the late 1970s, after the 
disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric who disappeared under mysterious circumstances 
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with the Islamic regime of Iran, and due to the presence of the 300,000 Shiite internal 
refugees from southern Lebanon after the Israeli bombings in the early 1980s. At its 
peak, the militia had 14,000 troops. Amal is also an Arabic noun, meaning "hope." 
Amal's historical objectives are to achieve greater respect for Lebanon's Shiite 
population and to get a larger percentage of resources allocated to the Shiite-
dominated southern part of the country.'^° 
Amal fought along campaign against Palestinian refugees in the Lebanese 
Civil War called the "War of the Camp." After the War of the Camps, Amal fought a 
bloody battle against its fellow Shiite group Hezbollah for Beirut and to control the 
Shiite community. This battle ended with massive Syrian intervention.'^' Amal 
accepted the Taif Agreement of 1989 (mainly architected by Husseini) in order to end 
the Civil War.'^^ In the changed scenario with the Syrian controlled end of the 
1 S3 
Lebanese Civil War (October 1990), 2,800 Amal troops joined the Lebanese army. 
while on a trip to Libya in 1978, and who is thought to have been killed on the orders of Muammar al-
Gaddafi. The resignation of Hussein el-Husseini from his post as leader of Amal resulted in Berri's 
assumption of full control in April 1980, and consequently the resignation of most of Amal's earliest 
members. He led the Amal movement during the fierce fighting of the Lebanese Civil War. In 1984, he 
joined the National Unity government as Minister for Southern Reconstruction, and later, he served as 
Minister of Justice and of Electrical and Hydraulic Resources, under Prime Minister Rashid Karami. 
Berri again served as a Cabinet minister from 1989 to 1992, when he was elected speaker of the 
National Assembly on November 20. It is widely believed that Berri has benefited from tiie large sums 
of money - over $3 billion - fliat were invested in the Council of the South, whose head was appointed 
by Berri. The money was supposed to go to the reconstruction of the Southern province. Berri's sister-
in-law, Samira Assi, has made a fortune by getting a contract from Libyan leader Muammar al-
Gaddafi, who was responsible for Musa al-Sadr's disappearance, to print one million copies of his 
Green Book. He, as well as Rafiq Hariri and Walid Jumblatt, are viewed by many as having been 
puppets of the Syrian government during its 30-year military presence, as well as corrupt politicians. 
'*'' Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, N.76, p. 119. 
'*' Simon Chapman, The Middle East and North Africa 1992 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 
1991)p.646. 
"^ Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition (London: Hurst & Company, 2001) p. 140. 
'"DilipHiro,N.70,p.l3. 
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Amal was a strong supporter of Syria after 1990 and endorsed Syria's military 
presence in Lebanon. ^ "^^  Since 1990, the party has been continuously represented in 
the Lebanese parliament and the government. Nabih Berri was, subsequently, elected 
speaker of parliament in 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2005 (the next election are due in 
2009) . ' " After Rafiq Hariri's assassination in 2005, Amal opposed the Syrian 
withdrawal and did not take part in the Cedar Revolution.'^^ Ciurently, Amal has 14 
Tepresentatives in tiae 12S-seat Lebsovese parliament. 
3. Hezbollah (HA) (Party of God) 
Hezbollah (HA) (Party of God) was established in 1982 at the initiative of a 
group of Shiite clerics and former Amal movement supporters, some of whom were 
adherents of Sheikh Hussein Fadlallh.'" By 1987 the party was the second most 
important Shiite organisation in Lebanon, after Amal. It was a reaction to the 
perceived moderation of the Amal movement imder the leadership of Nabih Berri, and 
partly a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It has consistently 
'^ Avraham Sela, ed., N.148, p.34. 
155 Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, N.8, p. 196. 
'^ The Cedar Revolution {thawrat al-arz) or Independence Revolution {intifadat al-istiqlal) was a 
chain of demonstrations in Lebanon (especially in the capital Beirut) triggered by die assassination of 
former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14, 2005. The primary goals of the original 
activists were tiie withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and to replace the Syrian influence with a 
patriotic Lebanese government, (he establishment of an international commission to investigate the 
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri, the resignation of security officials to ensure the success of the 
plan, and the organization of free parliamentary elections. The demonstrators requested the end of the 
Syrian influence in Lebanese politics. At the start of the demonstrations, Syria had been maintaining a 
force of roughly 14,000 soldiers and intelligence agents in Lebanon. Following the demonstrations, the 
Syrian troops completely withdrew from Lebanon on April 27, 2005. The Pro-Syrian government was 
also disbanded, accomplishing the main goal of the revolution. The opposition has taken, as its symbol, 
the white and red scarf, and the pro-Hariri blue ribbon. Popular mottos of the movement were 
Hurriyya, Siyada, Istiqlal (Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence), and Haqiqa, Hurriyya, Wahda 
wataniyya (Truth, Freedom, National unity). The main goal of the Cedar Revolution was the ending of 
the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon which had lasted about 30 years (since 1976). In addition, 
many Lebanese called for the return of former Prime Minister Michel Aoun, in exile since 1989, and 
the release of the imprisoned Lebanese Forces leadei: Samii 3a'ja' as a goal of the tevolution. 
157 
158 
Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.143, p.378. 
Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'Uah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002) p.69. 
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followed the political and theological lines of the government of Iran and called for 
the creation of Islamic republic of Lebanon.'^^ In pursuit of this goal, Hezbollah has 
coordinated its activities closely with the government of Iran and its representatives in 
the region.'^ *' For years the party rejected any compromise with the Christians of 
Lebanon, Israel, and the US. This hard-line approach of the party appealed to many 
Shiite, who abandoned the Amal movement to join Hezbollah. Those who left Amal 
tended to be young, radical, and poor.'^' 
Hezbollah is headed by the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura), which 
consists of the highest-ranking party officials, some of whom are clerics. Its members 
responsibility include financial, military, judicial, social, and political affairs.'^^ The 
party's operations were geographically organized, with branches in the Biqa Valley, 
the South, and the southern suburbs of Beirut. In the late 1980s, its politburo was 
created to handle day-to-day operations.'^^ 
Hezbollah gained international attention in 1983 when press reports linked it 
to attacks against U.S., French, and Israeli targets in Lebanon, and to the abduction of 
Western hostages in Lebanon. The party continues to deny responsibility for some of 
those acts.'^ Syria let Hezbollah keep its arms because it considered the party to be 
pursuing a legitimate struggle against Israel's occupation of south Lebanon. The 
party's armed opposition to Israel's presence resulted in significant confrontations, 
' ' ' Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, eds., Religious Fundamentalism and Political Extremism 
(London: Frank Cass Publishers) p.84. 
'*** Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 22 December 2006. 
'*' Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004) 
pp.22-26. 
' " Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, N.158, p.43. 
' " Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p.l31. 
'** Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, ed., N.6, p.221. 
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and Israeli's forces killed the party's leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in 1992.'^ ^ In the 1992 
election, Hezbollah won 8 seats in the parliament; it now participates in the legitimate 
political arena after years of underground existence. The party has been trying to 
change its image since 1992 and has entered into dialogue with many of its former 
enemies, both Leftists and Christians.'^ * It is now headed by Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah, 
who has become one of the most popular leaders in Lebanon and in the large Arab 
world.**' The party's standing was dramatically boosted after the withdrawal of Israeli 
troops from most of south Lebanon in 2000, for the party had led the resistance 
movement against the IsraeH occupation. The party insists that although it supports 
armed struggle against Israeli occupation, it opposes the struggles of Osama bin 
Ladin.'** 
4. Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) (al-Hizb as-Suri al-Qawmi al-Ijtima i) 
The Syrian Social National Party (SSNP) emerged in 1947 out of the Syrian 
National Party, founded in 1932 by Autun Saada with the aim of creating a Greater 
Syria that could accommodate all the people forming the Syrian nation. In its 
'"EyalZisser,N.152,p.l41. 
'**DilipHiro,N.70,p.ll3. 
'*' David Hirst, N.73, p.36. 
'** Philip Mattar, ed.. Encyclopedia of the Modem Middle East and North Africa, v.2 (Maine: 
Thomson Gale, 2004) p. 1037-1038. 
Usamab bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin (bom 10 March 1957, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), most 
often identified as Osama bin Laden or Usama bin Laden, is the founder of the Jihadist organization 
Al-Qaeda. He has been designated a terrorist by numerous scholars, journalists, and law enforcement 
agencies. In conjunction with several other Islamic militant leaders, bin Laden issued two fatwa in 
1996 and then again in 1998 that Muslims should force the US and its allies to withdraw their military 
forces from the Arabian peninsula, by attacking American military and civilian targets. He has been 
indicted in US federal court for his alleged involvement in the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya, and is on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation's Ten Most 
Wanted Fugitives list. Although bin Laden has not been indicted for the September 11,2001 attacks, he 
has been reported to have orally claimed responsibility for them, in a Conservative leaning English 
language newspaper and in videos released to the public. 
'** Charles Winslow, N.55, p.318. 
The Syrian nation which Saada described as an ethnic fusion of Canaanites, Akkadians, Chaldeans, 
Assyrians, Arameans, Hittites and Metannis 
104 
formation years, the SSNP combined its opposition to the French mandate with 
secularism - including separation of church and state and removal of barriers between 
various sects and religions - and a state-directed programme for modernising society. 
The French banned the party in 1935, but it continued to function secretly.''° 
The outbreak of the Second World War found Autun Saada in Latin America 
on a mission to forge links with Syrian settlers there. On his return to Lebanon in 
1947 he re-established control over the party. Now renamed as the Syrian Social 
National Party, it derives the majority of its support from the non-Maronite section of 
the Christian conmiunity. Due to his views on an all-embracing Syrian nationalism, 
Saada remained in opposition with the Lebanese government. He went underground 
but was allowed to resurface after he had affirmed his acceptance of Lebanon as a 
sovereign state.''' hi 1949, the party declared a revolution in Lebanon and after the 
revolt failed, Saada traveled to Syria to meet the president. When he arrived to the 
palace, he was instantly apprehended and handed over to the Lebanese authorities 
who trialed and executed hun within 8 hours.'^ ^ 
Though much weakened in the absence of Saada, the party continued to 
fimction semi-clandestinely imtil the lifting of the ban on transnational parties in 
1970.'" When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in April 1975, it allied with the 
Movement of the Disinherited, led by Musa as-Sadr, to form the Pro-Syrian 
Nationalist Front. The SSNP participated in the 1992 general election.''"* 
'™ Peter Mansfield, ed., N.46, p.59. 
171 DiIipHiro,N.70,p.311. 
'^ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_Social_Nationalist_Party 
' " Yaacov Shimomni, ed., N.71, p. 197. 
"''DilipHiro,N.70,p.312. 
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The party remained active in the Lebanese resistance against Israeli 
occupation until Israel's withdrawal from the remaining occupied territories in 2000. 
In the present, as part of the pro-Syrian bloc, along with Amal and Hezbollah, it has 
only limited popular support in Lebanon. The SSNP took a pro-Syrian position in the 
ongoing debate about Syria's role in Lebanon. Its popular support in Lebanon is now 
rather limited. 
5. Lebanese National Movement (LNM) (Al-Harakat al-Wataniyya) 
Formed on the eve of the Lebanese Civil War (April 1975-October 1990), the 
Lebanese National Movement (LNM) was a confederation of various nationalist and 
progressive Muslim-dominated parties. Prominent participants in the LNM include: 
Lebanese Communist Party,'^ ^ the Organisation of Conmiunist Action,''^ the 
'" The Lebanese Communist Party (LCP; Hizbu-sh-shuy'uT-l-lubnanT) is a Left-wing, Marxist, and 
democratic socialist political party in Lebanon, founded in 1924 by the Lebanese intellectual, writer 
and reporter Youssef Ibrahim Yazbek, and Fou'ad al-shmeli a tobacco worker from Bikfaya. Declared 
illegal in when the French ruled Lebanon 1939, the ban was relaxed during World War II. For about 
twenty years, the LCP controlled communist political activity in both Lebanon and Syria, but in 1944 
the party was split into the Lebanese Communist Party and the Syrian Communist Party. During the 
first two decades of Lebanon's independence, the LCP enjoyed little success. During the 1950s, the 
party's inconsistent policies on Pan-Arabism and the Nasserite movement cost it support and 
eventually isolated it. The party was active on the anti-government side during the 1958 uprising. 
Surviving underground, the LCP in 1965 decided to end its isolation and became a member of the 
Front for Progressive Parties and National Forces, which later evolved into the Lebanese National 
Movement (LNM) under Druze leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt. During the early 1970s, the LCP 
established a well-trained militia, the Popular Guard, which participated actively in the fighting of 1975 
and 1976 at the start of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). The LCP was aligned with the mostly-
Muslim LNM-Palestinian coalition, despite its mainly Christian membership (in particular, Greek 
Orthodox and Armenian). Throughout the 1980s, the LCP generally declined in influence. 
Nevertheless, between 1984 and 1987 many party leaders and members were assassinated, reportedly 
by Islamic ftindamentallsts. The party participated in the parliamentary elections in 2005 in many 
regions, and got a considerable niunber of votes especially in the south of Lebanon. But due to the 
Lebanese winner-takes-all system, no one of those candidates succeeded against the coalitions of 
March 14 and March 8, the biggest political coalitions in Lebanon. The party has now an estimated 
membership of around 5000 members. 
" ' Organization of Communist Action (OCA): The Organization of Communist Action (OCA), 
munazzamatu-l- 'amali-sh-shuyu 7 fi lubnan, was formed through the merger of the Organization of 
Socialist Lebanon and the Movement of Lebanese Socialists in 1970. These groups included veterans 
of the Lebanese branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), a radical Pan-Arab group which 
had splintered into national Actions in the late 1960s. The OCA was involved in the Lebanese Civil 
War, on the side of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), of which Muhsen Ibrahim was Executive 
Secretary. However, the LNM dissolved after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the expulsion of tiie 
PLO from Beirut in 1982. As Syria strengthened its hold on Lebanon, the OCA was forced to abandon 
its activities, since it refiised to give up its alliance with the PLO of Yasser Arafat, who was opposed 
the Syrian President Hafez Asad. The OCA had strong relations with the Marxist Palestinian faction of 
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Progressive Socialist Party, Syrian Social Nationalist Party, the two Lebanese Ba'th 
Party'^ ^ (the pro-Syrian and pro-Iraqi factions) as well as the Murabitun militia of the 
Independent Nasserist Organisation, the mainly Amal and several other minor 
Nasserist groups.'^ ^ Led by Kamal Jumblat, it demanded the abolition of the 
Naif Hawatmeh i.e. Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and was involved with 
the group's party newspaper al-Hurriya (Liberty). During 1982-2000, the OCA allied to the Hezbollah 
in its campaign of guerrilla warfare against Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. 
^^ The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (also spelled Baath or Ba'ath) was founded in Damascus in the 
1940s as the original secular Arab nationalist movement, to combat Western colonial rule. In Arabic, 
baath means renaissance or resurrection. It functioned as a pan-Arab party with branches in different 
Arab countries, but was strongest in Syria and Iraq, coming to power in both countries in 1963. In 1966 
the Syrian and Iraqi parties split into rival organizations mainly for ideological reasons - the Qotri (or 
Regionalist) Syria-based party being aligned with the Soviet Union while the Qawmi (or Nationalist) 
Iraq-based party adopted a generally more centrist stance. Both Ba'th parties retained the same name 
and maintain parallel structures in the Arab world. The Ba'th Party came to power in Syria on 8 March 
1963 and has held a monopoly on political power since. Later that same year, the Ba'thists gained 
control of Iraq and ran the coimtry on two separate occasions, briefly in 1963 and then for a longer 
period lasting from July 1968 until 2003. After the de facto deposition of President Saddam Hussein's 
Ba'thist regime in the course of the 2003 Iraq War, the invading US army banned the Iraqi Ba'th Party 
in June 2003. The Arabic word Baath means "renaissance" or "resurrection" as in the party's founder 
Novy Batth's published works "On The Way Of Resurrection". Ba'thist beliefs combine Arab 
Socialism, nationalism, and Pan-Arabism. The mostly secular ideology often contrasts with that of 
otiier Arab governments in the Arab world, which sometimes tend to have leanings towards Islamism 
and theocracy. In Lebanon, the party is led by former Sunni MP for Tripoli Abdul-Majeed Al-Rafei 
and Nicola Y. Firzli, Beirut-based real estate entrepreneur and scion of a prominent Greek Orthodox 
Christian family that fought against Ottoman Turkish rule. 
'•" Nazih Richani, N.4, pp.55-56. 
Murabitun (Faithful of the Sermon) is Lebanese militia. Formed in the early 1970s by Ibrahim 
Qulaylat, the Murabitun was the armed wing of the Independent Nasserite Movement (fNM). Opposed 
to the traditional Suimi leadership, the Beirut-based fNM had its following among poor Sunnis. It 
backed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Part of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) 
in the Civil War of 1975-90, it was bitterly opposed to the Phalangists. With its peak strength not 
exceeding 3,000, it was the smallest militia. Due to its closeness to the PLO, it was expelled from 
Beirut along with the PLO by the Israelis in August 1982. Its attempt to return to West Beirut in 
February 1984 was frustrated by Amal and the Druze militia and pro-Syrian organizations, after Syria 
launched an all-out offensive on the PLO and its supporters in 1985. Later, as PLO constituents began 
to rebuild their military strength in West Beirut, it did the same. Following the end of the Civil War in 
October 1990, it was dissolved along with other militias. 
Independent Nasserite Movement (INM) (Harakat al-Nasiriyy'm al-Mustaqillin):The Independent 
Nasserite Movement (INM) was the oldest of several organizations in Lebanon that embraced the ideas 
of the late Egyptian president, Gamal Abdul Nasser. Despite its claims of non-sectarianism, the 
membership of tiie INM has been overwhelmingly Muslim; 1987 reports estimated it to be about 45 
percent Sunni, 45 percent Shiite, and 10 percent Druze. Its ideology was reflected by its motto: 
"Liberty, Socialism, and Unity." The INM came to prominence in the 1958 Civil War and remained a 
strong force throughout the 1970s. At the height of the 1958 conflict, its militia, the Murabitun, clashed 
with the forces of pro-Western president Chamoun. Consistent with its Pan-Arab ideals (Pan-Arabism), 
the INM was the firm supporter of the Palestinian movement in Lebanon in the late 1960s. During this 
time, it reinforced the Murabitun. When the 1975 Civil War began, it was well positioned to play an 
active part. The Murabitun engaged Phalangist fighters in the most severe combat during the early 
stages of the war, and absorbed many casualties. In the 1980s, the INM weathered difficult times. It 
fought with the Palestinians against the Israelis during the invasion of 1982 and with the Progressive 
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confessional system, amendment of the constitution to redefine the prerogative of the 
various branches of the executive, and reorganisation of the army.''^ 
It formed an alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in its 
fight with the Maronite Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces. When the LNM-
PLO alliance gained the upper hand in the fighting, Syria intervened in June 1976 on 
the side of the Christians. Its troops expelled LNM-PLO forces fi'om the Christian 
areas they had captured. This, and the subsequent Syrian plan to legitimise its 
occupation of eastern and northern Lebanon, turned Jumblat into a vocal adversary of 
the then Syrian President Hafez Asad.**° 
Kamal Jumblat's assassination in March 1977 deprived the LNM of a 
charismatic figure. The mantle passed on to his son, Walid, who lacked experience 
and leadership qualities. He made his peace with Syria. Indeed, as the leader of both 
the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) and the LNM, he coordmated his policies and 
actions with Damascus. While the Lebanese Front insisted on resolving the problem 
of Syrian and Palestinian military presence before tackling the issue of political 
reform, the LNM wanted innmediate reform while its Syrian and Palestinian allies 
were still able to lend it their support.'^' 
Israeli's siege of Beirut in August 1982 resulted in the departure of both PLO 
and LNM fighters fi:om West Beirut. This enfeebled the LNM. A year later, in July 
Socialist Party (PSP) against the Lebanese Army in the Chouf Mountains in 1983. Its alliance with the 
PSP was short lived, however. In 1985 a joint PSP-Amal campaign virtually eliminated the Murabitun 
as an important actor in Lebanon and forced INM leader, Ibrahim Kulaylat, into exile. 
'™ Hussein Sirriyeh, Adelphi Papers 243, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict (London: Brassey's for 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, autumn, 1989) p. 16. 
"" Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.134, p.373. 
Hafez Asad (October 6, 1930 - June 10, 2000) was president of Syria, for three decades. Asad's rule 
stabilized and consolidated the power of the country's central government after decades of coups and 
counter-coups. He was succeeded by his son and current president Bashar Asad in 2000. 
181 Yaacov Shimoni, N.71, pp. 130-131. 
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1983, the constituents of the LNM gathered again (in Tripoli) to consult all other 
groups opposing the draft Lebanese-Israeli peace treaty that were taken two months 
earlier. Following its success in destroying the treaty, the LNM ceased to function as a 
coherent body. However, its erstwhile constituents even after it ceased to fiinction 
participated in the civil strife through their respective militias. They come together 
again briefly as the Lebanese National Front in August 1989 to overthrow General 
Michel Aoun.'^^ 
3.3 The Minority Parties 
1. Armenian Parties 
A. Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), (Dashnak or Tashnak) 
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) or Tashnak is the leading 
party of Armenian Orthodox Christians in Lebanon, founded in Tiflis (Tbilisi in 
modem day Georgia) in 1890.'^ ^ ARF is considered Right-wing, nationalist, anti-
Communist, anti-Soviet, pro-Western and describes itself as Social-Democratic in 
orientation. Ethnic Armenians are allocated 6 seats in Lebanon's 128-member 
National Assembly.'^ The Lebanese branch of the ARF has usually controlled a 
majority of the Armenian vote and won most of the ethnic Armenian seats in the 
National Assembly. It has generally avoided entanglement in sensitive domestic 
"^  Dilip Hiro, N.70, pp.182-183. 
"^  Edmund Herzing and Marina Kurkchiyan, N.42, pp.78-79. 
The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) founded by Christapor Mikaelian, Stepan Zorian, and 
Simon Zavarian. The party operates among Armenian communities internationally, especially in 
Armenia and Lebanon, and in the ethnic Armenian-dominated Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The 
ARF advocates socialism and is a member of the Socialist International, although the implementation 
of Socialist poUcies have not been consistent. The ARF is the largest political party amongst 
Armenians in the Diaspora. 
•" Avraham Sela, ed., N.148, p. 146. 
"' George E. Delury, ed., N.106, p.621. 
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issues, usually supporting whatever government has happened to be in power. Pnor 
to the Lebanese Civil War of 1975 to 1990, the party was closely allied to the 
Phalangist Party of Pierre Gemayel, and generally fought election on joint tickets with 
the Phalangists, especially in Beirut constituencies with large Armenian populations. 
The refusal of the ARF, along with most Armenian groups, to play an active role in 
the Civil War, however, soured relations between the two parties, and the Lebanese 
Forces (a militia dominated by Phalangists and commanded by Bashir Gemayel, 
Pierre Gemayel's son) responded by attacking the Armenian quarters in many 
Lebanese towns. 
A major policy shift, however, occurred in the party leading to the 
parliamentary election of 2000. Negotiations to form a joint ticket between the ARF 
and the Dignity Party of Rafiq Hariri broke down over Hariri's insistence that all 
candidates elected on his list, including ARF candidates, would have to form a unified 
• parliamentary block - a rarity in Lebanese politics. The ARF decided to go it alone, 
although other Armenian parties joined Hariri's list. This decision at this juncture did 
not benefit the ARF. In an unprecedented sweep. Dignity and its allies captured 13 of 
Beirut's 19 seats, and the ARF was left with only one parliamentary seat, its worst 
result in many decades.'^' On August 5, 2007, a by-election took place in the Metn 
district, which includes the predominantly Armenian area of Bouij Hammond, to 
replace the slain anti-Syrian minister. The ARF, subsequently, won the seat. 
B. Social Democrat Hunchakian Party (Hunchak Party) 
Its name, taken from its newspaper Hunchak, means "Bell" in English, and is 
taken by party members to represent "awakening, enlightenment, and fi-eedom." It 
"* Bruce Borthwick, N.20, p. 136. 
'*'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_Revolutionary_Federation 
no 
was founded in 1887 in Geneva.'^ ^ The Hunchak Party is Marxist and in its initial 
formative years v^ as sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The party subscribes to a 
socialist ideology and advocates a planned economy for Lebanon.'^' In 2000, the 
Hunchak Party joined forces with Rafiq Hariri's Dignity List, which swept the pools 
in the city of Beirut. The party is also active in Lebanon, where it competes for the six 
National Assembly seats reserved for ethnic Armenians. 
C. Ramgavar Party (Ramgavar Azadakan - Democratic Liberals) 
The Ramgavar is an Armenian political party in Lebanon. Founded by 
Armenian exiles in 1921, it has long been the smallest of the ethnic Armenian parties 
in Lebanon.''^ It won its first-ever parliamentary seat in 2000, as Rafiq Hariri's 
Dignity party, currently known as Future Movement.''' The MP and party's leader in 
Lebanon Hagop Kassaijian was re-elected in 2005 elections as part of March 14 
Alliance. The Ramgavar party advocates liberalism, unlike the other two major 
Lebanese-Armenian political parties, the Dashnaktsutyun and the Hunchakians, who 
follow left-wing politics. 
'** George E. Delury, ed., N.106, p.621. 
The Social Democrat Hunchakian Party, also known as the Hentchak, is one of the oldest political 
parties in Armenia. It was founded in 1887 by Avetis Nazarbekian, Mariam Vardanian, Gevorg 
Gharadjian, Ruben Khan-Azat, Christopher Ohanian, Gabriel Kafian and Manuel Manuelian, a group 
of college students in Geneva, Switzerland, with the goal was to gain Armenia's independence from the 
Ottoman Empire. 
189 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Democrat_Hunchakian_Party 
"° Peter Mansfield, N.46, p.53. 
" ' http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramgavar_Party 
Future Movement (Jayyar Al Mustaqbal) (FM) is a political movement in Lebanon, led by Saad 
Hariri, younger son of the assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri. The movement 
is the largest member of the March 14 Alliance, which won a majority of the seats in the May 2005 
parliamentary elections. The current leader, Saad Hariri, has vowed to transform it into a political party 
when the country becomes stable and the regime without religious references. Most of its support 
comes from Suimi Muslims and it is allied to the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Druze Party, and 
Maronites who are associated with the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties (main 3 allies of FM). The 
main opponent of Future Movement is the March 8 Alliance, most important parts being Free Patriotic 
Movement(FPM) led by General Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. 
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2. Kurdish Parties 
Kurdish parties have exerted little influence on Lebanese politics. In general, 
Kurds have been more concerned with international Kurdish matters than with 
internal Lebanese issues. In addition, Kurdish groups in Lebanon have been 
characterized by a high degree of factionalism. 
Jamil Mihhu established the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Hizb Al-Kurdi 
Al-Democraty, in 1960, but it was not licensed until 1970. Mihhu, however, supported 
the Iraqi government against Kurdish rebels fighting in that country, and he was 
captured and imprisoned by the Kurdish resistance in Iraq. Consequently, the 
leadership of the party passed to Jamil's son, Riyad. Another son, Muhammad, 
disagreed with his family's position on several issues and therefore in 1977 started his 
own movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party.'^ ^ 
Yet another Kurdish group dissatisfied with the leadership of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party established a new party, Razkari Party {Hizb Al-Razkari), led by Riz 
Kari. Established in 1975 by Faysal Fakhu, Riz Kari supported the Kurdish forces 
fighting against the Iraqi regime. For a brief period during the 1975 Civil War, 
however, Riz Kari joined forces with the Kurdish Democratic Party to form the 
Progressive Kurdish Front in an effort to eliminate differences in the ranks of 
Lebanese Kurds. The position of Riz Kari by the mid 1970s, however, was weakened 
due to the defection in the party. The new organisation; led by Abdi Ibrahim, a 
staunch ally of Syria, subsequently rejected the formation of the Progressive Kurdish 
Front. The party in the present has minimal impact in the national politics of the 
county. 
"^ David McDowall, N.66, p.487. 
"^ Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.15, p. 136. 
112 
However, the narration of religious and sectarian political parties as discussed 
above shown that religious sects have become a major focus of loyalty, self-definition 
and self-identification for the Lebanese citizen. It is because of this reason that a 
broad national consensus could never emerge even on fundamental issues like a 
constitution, political order for the country and national identity of Lebanon. Thus, 
Lebanon remained fragmented on the basis of primordial loyalties.'^ '* As a result of 
the weakening of the state institutions, many ideological and sectarian parties and 
religious sects began to establish paramilitary group (militants) of their own, to be the 
coercive arm of the party or sect-often against state authority, hi the early seventies, 
therefore, it was becoming apparent that Lebanon was heading towards an inevitable 
breakdown of order. However, the rapidity with which it was facilitated was a 
function of the presence of Palestinians and Israeli - armed and organised, in 
Lebanon. 
4. Nationalism and Lebanese Identity 
The question of Lebanese identity has always been problematic due to the 
presence of numerous sectarian groups in the country. 
Lebanon was declared Balad Thu Wajh Arabi, a country with an "Arab face." 
To the Muslims, it was as a half-victory. Instead of being called a full Arab country, 
Lebanon was said to be in the process of Arabization. To the Christians, however, 
only the "face" was considered Arabic, as they saw the concession as superficial. 
Thus, this ideological limbo of Lebanon's identity would generate most of the 
country's crises in the next decades. In the case of Lebanon's Mithaq al-Watani, 
National Pact 1943, the concept of "Arab face" didn't resolve the historical identity 
problem; words alone could not do so. The Musluns sought fulfilment of the 
"'• Jawaid Iqbal, The Lebanese Civil War: Issues, Actors and Outcome (Aligarh U.P., India: Aligarii 
Muslim University Press, 1998) p.93. 
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Arabization plans while the Christians resisted further losses in their Lebanese 
nationalist ideology. In 1943, nonetheless, the anti-French coalition was in a position 
to strongly agree on Al-Wajh al-Arabi.^^^ 
While the Muslims were demanding Lebanon's unity with Syria, Maronite and 
other Catholic Christians' busied themselves with developing historical, cultural and 
even geographical argimients aimed at demonstrating the 'special nature' of Lebanon 
and justifying its existence as an entity separate from the rest of the Arab world. 
Phoenecianism and Mediterreanism were two important intellectual movements 
which emerged in the mid-1920s v^ dth the specific aim of distinguishing Lebanon 
from its Arab milieu. Phoenecianism was the attempt to trace the ancestry of 
Lebanese to the Phoenician civilization which existed some five thousand years ago. 
Its chief proponent was a Maronite intellectual Charles Corm whose main aim was to 
show that the Lebanese have very little in common with the Arabs. Mediterreanism 
whose prophet was a Greek Catholic Michel Chiha did not sfress the historical origins 
of Lebanon but sought to link Lebanon's physical and cultural origins to the 
Mediterranean basin.'^* Its intent, therefore, was very similar to Phoenecianism.'^^ 
However, in the Christian milieux, the principal debate before the war cenfred 
on the concept of "Libanisme," or Lebanonism. Not imlike the debates found among 
their Semitic neighbours to the south, the Lebanese asked themselves, "What is 
Lebanon, who is a Lebanese, and what are the 'real' historical foundations of 
Lebanon?" This self-examination prevailed because of the ideological challenge that 
195 WalidPhares,N.16,p.88. 
"* Michel Chiha (1891 - 1954) is a Lebanese thinker. He was a banker, a politician, writer and 
journalist. Along with Petro Trad and Omar Daouk, he is considered one of the fathers of the Lebanese 
Constitution. His ideas and actions have had an important influence on the shaping of the modem 
Lebanon. 
" ' Jawaid Iqbal, N.26, pp. 13-14. 
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was brought about by the Christian minority of the Arabist left. In fact, the hardliners 
among the Christian Arabists and leftists denied the existence of a Lebanese entity 
and rejected the idea of a "Lebanese Nation." This attitude was largely publicized in 
Lebanon by Christian-leftist writers, activists and many other. The identification of 
the leftist-Christians with the leftist-Muslim agenda and the broad Arab-nationalist 
movement in the region, however, has tiimed moved the centre of gravity in the 
Christian traditional debate fi-om the notion of a totally independent Lebanon to the 
search for a compromise between "Lebanonism" and "Arabism". 
For Muslim Arabs in Lebanon, Islam was the backbone of the Muslim 
population. It not only safeguard their belief, identity, culture and civilization, but 
gave them strong political clout and military direction. But the Palestinian Muslims in 
Lebanon were different from the Lebanese Muslims: the Palestinian leadership had 
not yet raised the baimer of Islam but was nationalist in orientation. Often their 
ideology was left-wing as thek nationalism was secular. It was because of this reason 
that the Lebanese Muslims, although sympathetic to the cause of the Palestinians, felt 
alienated from their nationalistic ideology. 
Despite confessional differences over several political issues, there is a shared 
experience of loss and suffering that cuts across all lines. The common suffering of 
the war - physical, emotional, and economic - the common hostility to local militias 
and outside armies, the common yearning for an end to the war, the common wish for 
a return of the state and law and order, provide a deep reservoir of common 
sentiments and attitudes forged nationwide. It is the first experience of this magnitude 
and intensity that all Lebanese have experienced similarly as victims. It is a common 
sorrow that links all Lebanese and defines their socio-political world over and above 
198 Walid Phares, N.16, pp.119-120. 
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the narrower political orientations of their communities. No doubt, it will play a 
considerable role in defining the tone and content of Lebanese nationalism in the 
future. 
CHAPTER - III 
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CHAPTER-III 
CONFLICT IN LEBANON: THE ISRAEL, SYRIA 
AND PALESTINIAN FACTOR 
1 - Roots and Trends 
Lebanon is composed of diverse cultural and religious minorities, allowing 
only minimal social and political integration at the national level. Social relations 
across some religious communities are very rare. While economic exchange and 
transactions are widespread, there appears to be no proportional spillover into other 
types of societal and intercommunal relations. Thus, national loyalty among some 
Lebanese communities is low and national institutions have rarely succeeded in 
forging voluntary intercommimal bonds. Of course, the size and strength of each of 
Lebanon's communities add to the problem of achieving viable socio-political 
integration. Lebanon is composed of several religious communities, none of which is 
strong enough to dominate and shape a national destiny in its communal image, and 
yet none is so weak as to be effectively subdued.^  The history of trust among the 
various Lebanese minorities is very poor. The roots of fear go back to the nineteenth 
century and earlier - fear of massacres, subjugation, or marginalization and control. 
Obviously, the events of recent past have not reduced the level or scope of fear and 
anxiety among the minorities in Lebanon or elsewhere in the West Asia.^  
Each community has a homeland, a section of the country where its people are concentrated and 
where they have been ling for centuries. The Sunnis predominate in the smaller coastal towns, in 
Tripoli, and in the Akkar region to the north of Tripoli. The Maronites live in Mount Lebanon. The 
Druze inhabit the mountains to the east of Beirut. The Shiites live in southern Lebanon and in the Biqa 
Valley. Members of all communities are found in Beirut, but segregate themselves into different 
quarters, with the exception of upper-middle- and upper-class persons, who tend to live together in the 
nicest part of the city. 
^ Edward E. Azar, The Emergence of New Lebanon: Fantasy or Reality? (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1984) p.40. 
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In fact, Lebanese national integration and stability have never had a chance to 
flourish due to the blatant external intervention in Lebanese socio-political affairs and 
the exploitation of intercommunal fears. Compared Mdth the rest of the states in the 
Arab League, Lebanon can boast a liberal parliamentary democracy with 
consociational characteristics and strong achievement-oriented communities. These 
features should be a source of strength for most multiethnic and multiracial societies. 
In Lebanon, however, political democracy and the lack of a strong police force have 
made it easy for external forces, in collaboration with their Lebanese clients, to 
exploit the system and destabilize it.^ 
2 - Arab - Israeli Conflict and Its Impact on Lebanon 
Although the geographical area of Lebanon is home to some of the earliest human 
settlements and its Phoenician ports of Type, Sidon, and Byblos (today's Jubayl) were 
major centres of commerce and culture dating back to the third century B.C., the 
contemporary state of Lebanon was not created until 1920. Thereafter, it became a 
republic in 1926 and gained full independence in 1943. Since its birth, Lebanon's 
struggles have been caused by internal political, social, and economic strife as the 
nation's diverse ethnic-religious groups have attempted to co-exist. Lebanon's 
internal conflicts have repeatedly been complicated by confrontations centered on the 
country's relationship to Israel, its Arab neighbours, and numerous Palestinian 
refugees who relocated there following the Arab-Israeli wars and the Jordanian civil 
war.^  It is because of this reason that Syria, Israel, and the Palestine have influenced 
^ Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and tite Peace Process (New York: Palcrave 
Macmillan, 2003) pp. 1-2. 
" Edward E. Azar, N.2, p.41. 
' Carl L. Bankston III, ed., World Conflict: Asia and Middle East, v.2, (New Jersey: Salem Press, Inc, 
2003) p.325. 
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Lebanon's political system, and each continues to be inextricably involved in 
Lebanon's internal affairs. Each has fought wars on Lebanon's soil that continue to 
imperil both the future of the region and Lebanon itself^ 
2.1 - Lebanon and the First Arab-Israeli War 1948 
The First Arab-Israeli War and Lebanese Participation 
The UN Assembly on the night of 29-30, November 1947 passed the UN 
resolution to partition Palestine.^  This partition was the starting point for a sixteen-
month war, (November 1947 - January 1948), between Jews and Arabs. 
As the British Mandate drew to a close in May 1948, conditions along the 
Palestine-Lebanon boxmdary reverted to the chaotic state that had prevailed during the 
Arab revolt of 1936-37. In the war, an Arab guerrilla band known as the Arab 
Liberation Army, under the leadership of Fawzi al Qawuqji operated on both sides of 
the Lebanon-Palestine frontier and southern Lebanon, now part of the independent 
Republic of Lebanon, served as a sanctuary and staging area for Palestinian guerrillas. 
* Kail C. Ellis, Lebanon: "Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, v.21, n.l, winter 1999, p.5. 
^ Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) p.29. 
UN Special Commission on Palestine (1947) On 15 may 1947 a special session of the UN General 
Assembly appointed a 11-member Special Commission of Palestine, consisting of Australia, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. 
While Arab Palestinians refused to cooperate with it, the Zionists took a contrary line. It submitted its 
report on 31 August 1947. Seven of its members proposed partitioning mandate Palestine into a Jewish 
state (53.5% of Palestine), an Arab state (45.4%), and Jerusalem and its suburbs (1.1%) under 
international trusteeship. India, Iran and Yugoslavia proposed an independent federal state composed of 
Arab and Jewish segments. On 29 November 1947 the UN General Assembly approved the majority 
proposal for partition by 33 votes to 13, with 10 abstentions. With 72% of the voting members 
favouring partition, above the required two-thirds majority, partitioning Palestine became official UN 
policy. Challenging the UN's authority to partition a country against the wishes of its majority, the 
Arab members proposed that the matter be referred to the International Court of Justice for its verdict, 
but their motion was defeated by 21 votes to 20, with 15 members abstaining. (Dilip Hiro, Dictionary 
of the Middle East, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) p.333) 
' Sobir Taimah, Al-Tareek al-Yahudee al-Aam "The General History of the Jews" (Beirut: Dar al-
Yeel, 1975)v.2,pp.261-62. 
The 26,000 Arab troops comprised 7,000 Egyptians, 4,000 Iraqis, 5,000 Jordanians, 2,000 Lebanese, 
4,000 Palestinian irregulars and 4,000 Syrian. The overall commander of the Arab forces was King 
Abdullah ibn Hussein. 
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In the midst of this conflict, it became apparent that an intervention by the regular 
armies of Arab states including Lebanon in support of the Palestinians was imminent. 
Zionist leaders to counter to this move sought to mobilize Christian opinion within 
Lebanon.^  
Meanwhile, Lebanon along with Egypt, Syria, Transjordan and Iraq 
participated in the first Arab-Israeli war.'" On 15 May 1948, Israel's first day as an 
independent state, two Lebanese infantry battalions and a company of armour 
attacked and overran the tiny settlement of Malkiya. The seizure of Malkiya placed 
Lebanon in opposition to the UN Partition Plan as it was located in an area designated 
by the UN as part of the projected State of Israel. Three days later, Israel launched a 
counter-attack, took the Lebanese army by surprise and recaptured Malkiya." The 
settlement was to change hands once again when the Lebanese army reacting to its 
defeat successfiilly stormed Malkiya and another settlement Kadesh - Naftaki on 6 
June. After this victory Lebanon retired fi-om active combat, turning over its gain in 
the central sector to the Arab Liberation Army.'^  
The Israeli-Lebanese Armistice Negotiations 1949 
Israeli's first official relations with the state of Lebanon came about soon after 
the creation of Israel itself. The war of 1948 was followed by a set of armistice talks, 
known as General Armistice Agreements (GAAs), between Israel and the 
' Jawaid Iqbal, Israeli Intervention in Lebanon: Strategic Imperatives and Security Interests 
(Bhubaneswar: Mahavir Prakashan, 1999) p. 41. 
"* Michael D. Harkavy, ed.. The New Webster's International Encyclopedia (Florida: Tridend Press 
International, 1998) p.61. 
" Jawaid Iqbal, N.9, p.42. 
'^  Edgar O'Ballance, The Arab-Israeli War 1948 (London: Faber and Faber, 1956) p. 185. 
'^  Jawaid Iqbal, N.9, p.42. 
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neighbouring countries of Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon from 7 January to 11 
August 1949 under the auspices of the UN Security Council.''* 
hi general, the Israeli-Lebanese negotiations proceeded more smoothly than 
Israel's negotiations with any of the other countries.'^  On 14 January, 1949 Israel and 
Lebanon had already concluded a military agreement, two weeks before the beginning 
of the armistice negotiations at Ras El-Naqura (Rosh Hanikra). This agreement 
included the 'partial evacuation of Lebanese territory which had been occupied by 
Israeli forces in the course of the fighting as a good will gesture.'^ 
This understanding during the negotiations can partly be attributed to the 
Israeli belief that Lebanon, according to David Ben Gurion, had participated in the 
war 'without enthusiasm and with limited forces'.'^ Indeed, military correspondent 
Moshe Zak who reported on the war from MetuUah, claims there were no Maronites 
among the troops crossing the border into Israel.'* Further, Ben Gurion's perception 
''* Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) p.20. 
General Armistice Agreements 1949 (GAAs): The agreements divided up the territory allocated by 
the UN to the Arabs in Palestine (area 10,435 sq miles/27,026 sq km) among Egypt, Israel and Jordan. 
Egypt retained control of the Gaza Strip, measuring 146 sq miles/378 sq km, as an Egyptian 
administered territory. Having acquired 2,220 sq miles/5,750 sq km above the 5,600 sq miles/14,500sq 
km allocated to it by the UN partition plan, Israel annexed them. Thus the Jews, who formed nearly a 
third of the population of Palestine on the eve of the war, seized 75 percent of the country instead of the 
54 percent allocated to them by the UN. Having acquired 2,297 sq miles/5,949 sq km. King Abdullah 
annexed them. Jerusalem, earmarked for international administration by the UN, was divided between 
Israel and Jordan, with Jordanian East Jerusalem measuring 2.5 sq mile/6.5 sq km. As for Lebanon and 
Syria, the international borders of Palestine became the armistice lines between them and Israel. 
" Representing the State of Israel were Mordechai MaklefF, Yehoshua Pahnon and Shabtai Rosenne. 
The delegates of the Republic of Lebanon were Tewfic Salem, Mohammed Ali Hamada, Joseph Harb 
and Djezl Houssami. 
" Sydney D. Bailey, Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process (London: Macmillan Press, 1990) 
p.60. 
'^  David Ben Gurion (David Grun; 1886-1973), polish-bom Israeli statesman and first Prime Minister 
of Israel. After World War I, he helped to found the Haganah, the underground Jewish army, and the 
Histadrut, the General Federation of Jewish Labour (1920). He became leader of the Mapai Labour 
Party (1930) and the World Zionist Organization (1935). As Prime Minister (1949-53 and 1955-63) he 
helped to mold the state of Israel. 
'* Kirsten E. Schulze, Israel's Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998) p. 
27. 
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of Lebanon as a potential ally and past 7w//z -^Maromte relations played to a large 
extent in shaping Israel's position.'^  On 21 May 1948, he wrote the following in his 
dairy: 
The Achlles heel of the Arab coalition is the Lebanon. Muslim 
supremacy in this country is artificial and can be easily overthrown. A 
Christian state ought to be set up there, with its southern frontiers on the 
River Litani. We should sign a treaty of alliance with this state.^ ° 
Critical to the understanding of the Lebanese position, however, was the fact 
that the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations had already been successfully completed on 24 
February 1949 and thus served as a formula for the Israeli-Lebanese armistice. During 
official meetings, the Lebanese delegation tried to copy Egypt's example but in 
unofficial meetings, they presented a different picture. Privately, the Lebanese, it is 
believed to have said to the Israeli delegates that they were not really Arabs and that 
they had been dragged into the Palestine adventure against their will. However, it is 
doubtful that, without the existence of an Egyptian-Israeli armistice, the Lebanese 
would have agreed to these more direct negotiations and secret meetings. '^ 
2.2 - Lebanon and the Suez War of 1956 
Lebanon during the Suez Canai Crisis and the Eisenhower Doctrine 
A state of emergency was declared in Lebanon during the Sinai-Suez crisis at 
the end of October 1956. The Chamber of Deputies announced its support for Egypt, 
but Lebanon did not break off diplomatic relations with the British and France.^ ^ In 
" Ylshuv {Hebrew: Settlement) the term Yishuv means the Jewish community in Palestine, starting 
with the first aliya in 1882 and ending with the founding of Israel in May 1948. Used in contrast to tiie 
term Diaspora, the Yishuv was viewed as the vanguard of world Jewry, laying the groundworic for the 
Jewish state in Palestine. 
^ Michel Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: The Armed Prophet (Englewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968) 
p. 130. 
'^ Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, pp. 27-8. 
^ Suez Crisis 1956: Tension in the region rose to a critical level in 1956 when Egypt's Gamal Abdul 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company, while was controlled by British and French interests. 
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November, there were disturbances, however, at Tripoli and Beirut against the attitude 
of the Govemment.^^ The 'Eisenhower Doctrine', a new programme, annoimced in 
January 1957, of US economic and military aid intended as a means of ensuring an 
anti-Soviet front in the West Asia, evoked a favourable response in Lebanese 
circles?'' Some of the political groups in Lebanon protested against this pro-Western 
alignment, asserting that it should not be used to isolate Lebanon from the other Arab 
states (which had declined to accept the terms of the Doctrine) and thus impair Arab 
solidarity. None the less, in April the Government obtained from the Chamber of 
While UN endeavored to work out a compromise solution, Israel's troops invaded Egypt on 28 October 
1956 and with a few days occupied the Gaza Strip and most of the Sinai Peninsula, while an Anglo-
French force landed in die Suez Canal Zone. To help resolve the crisis, the Security Council established 
the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Gaza and Sinai 
frontiers.^ The main winner of the entire affair was President Nasser, who not only achieved 
nationalization of the Suez Company and expelled the last vestiges of British presence along the Canal, 
but also emerged as the uncontested leader of the Arab people and became, along with India's 
Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavia's Josef Broz Tito, one of the outstanding leaders of the neutralist bloc 
of nations. 
Suez Canal, canal in Egypt linking the Gulf of Suez (an arm of the Red Sea) to the eastern 
Mediterranean. About 100 mi (160 km) long, the canal cut over 4,000 mi (6,400 km) from the route 
from Britain to India and has been a major commercial waterway since its opening in 1869. It has a 
minimum width of 179 ft (54 m), a dredged depth of ahnost 40 ft (12 m), and no locks. Work began in 
1859-69 under Ferdinand de Lesseps. In 1875 Britain acquired the canal from the Ottoman ruler of 
Egypt. In 1956 it was nationalized by President Gamal Abdul Nasser, prompting on invasion by 
Britain, France, and Israel. After UN intervention, the canal reopened in 1957 under Egyptian control. 
It was closed again by the arab-Israeli War of 1967, but cleared of wreckage in 1974 and reopened in 
1975. The canal was deepened (1976-80) to permit the passage of oil tankers up to 500,000 tons 
(453,600 metric tons) and 53 ft (16 m) in draft. 
^ George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics: A Concise History (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 
1961)pp.l20-21. 
^* The Eisenhower Doctrine, given in a message to the US Congress on January 5, 1957, was the 
foreign policy of US President Ehvight D. Eisenhower. The doctrine stated that the US would use 
armed forces upon request in response to imminent or actual aggression to the US. Furthermore, 
countries that took stances opposed to Communism would be given aid in various forms. The military 
action provisions of the Doctrine were applied in the Lebanon Crisis the following year, when America 
intervened in response to a request by that country's president. On the regional level, then, the intent 
was that the Doctrine would work to provide the independent Arab regimes with an alternative to 
Nasser's political control, strengthening them while isolating Communist influence through isolation of 
Nasser. The doctrine largely failed on that front, with Nasser's power quickly rising by 1959 to the 
point where he could shape the leadership outcomes in neighboring Arab countries including fraq and 
Saudi Arabia, but in the meantime Nasser's relationship with the Soviet leaders deteriorated, allowing 
the US to switch to a policy of accommodation. The Eisenhower Administration also saw the area as 
being influential for fiiture foreign policy for not only the US but also its allies. The Western Asia 
region contains a large percentage of the world's oil supply. If the area was to fall to communism, the 
US and its allies would suffer immense economic consequences. 
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Deputies a vote expressing confidence in its policies. Military equipment granted 
under the Doctrine began to reach Beirut in June?^ 
The Impact of the Suez Canal Crisis 
There was general unrest in the Arab world following the Suez Canal Crisis 
and the abortive attacks on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel. More specifically, 
however, political struggles occurred in two fields: rivalry among Lebanese political 
leaders who were linked to religious or clan groups and their followers; and 
ideological struggle causing polarization between Lebanese nationalism and growing 
Pan-Arabism.^^ President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt^ ^ became the symbol of Pan-
Arabism after the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1958 merger of Egypt with Syria to form 
the United Arab Republic (UAR).^^ He had great influence on Lebanese Muslims, 
who looked to him for inspiration. In this period of unrest, the Lebanese authorities, 
most of whom were Christians, insisted on two things: maintaining the country's 
autonomy and cooperating with the West Christians considered their fiiendly 
relations with the West as the only guarantee of Lebanon's independence. President 
^ Joanne Maher, ed.. Middle East and North Africa 2003 (London: Europa Publications, 2003) p.684. 
^' Peter Manfield, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980) pp.434-35. 
^' Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-70), Egyptian president (1956-70) and Arab leader. He led the military 
coup d'etat overthrowing King Farouk (1952), and named himself Prime minister (1954). He ended 
British military presence in Egypt (1954) and nationalized the Suez Canal (1956), precipitating a brief 
war with Britain, France, and Israel. Elected president of Egypt imopposed (1956), he was also 
president of the short-lived United Arab Republic, UAR (1958-61). His "Arab Socialism" policy 
brought new land ownership laws and agricultural policies, more schools, and the building of the 
Aswan High Dam. He resigned after the disastrous 1967 Arab-Israeli War but resumed office by 
popular demand. 
^ United Arab Republic (UAR) (1958-61) in February 1958 Egypt and Syria merged to form the 
UAR. Part of the reason why the political and military leaders of Syria sought union with Egypt was to 
forestall the rise of leftists in their country. But once Syria had been incorporated into the UAR its 
president, Gamal Abdul Nasser, extended to the Syrian region his policy of nationalizing banking, 
insurance and major industries. He thus alienated an important social class in Syria. Likewise his ban 
on all political parties in Syria alienated almost all Syrian politicians and the creation of a unified 
military command, in which Syrian officers were relegated to secondary positions, created discontent 
in the officer coup. These factors created widespread disaffection in Syria and prepared the ground for 
its secession from the UAR, which came in September 1961 amid much rancour. 
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Chamoun's refusal to respond favourably to Pan-Arab pressures was indirect 
opposition to the stand of several prominent Sunni leaders, who devoted themselves to 
Nasser and the Pan-Arab cause. 
2.3 - First Lebanese Civil War 1958 
The Causes and Resolution 
Fifteen years after Lebanon became officially free of French mandatory 
control, in May 1958, the nation of 1.1 million people, whose political institutions 
reflected the balance of power between its confessional communities, exploded in 
civil war. Rooted in a series of interlocking factors of domestic, regional, and 
international origin, the primary causes of the war were domestic in nature. They were 
shaped by the policies of the presidential regime of Camille Chamoun (1952-1958). 
In 1957, the question of the re-election of Chamoun was added to these 
problems. In order to be re-elected, the President needed to have the Constitution 
amended to permit a re-election. A constitutional amendment required a two-thirds 
vote by the Chamber of Deputies, so Chamoun and his followers had to obtain a 
majority in the May-June 1957 elections.^ " 
Chamoun's followers did obtain a solid majority in the elections, which the 
opposition considered "rigged" (with the result that some non-Christian leaders with 
Pan-Arab sympathies were not elected). Deprived of a legal platform from which to 
voice their political opinions, they sought to express them by extralegal means. The 
conflict between Chamoun and the Pan-Arab opposition gained intensity when Syria 
merged with Egypt, in the United Arab Republic (UAR). Pro-Nasser demonstrations 
29 
30 
George E. Kirk, N.23, p.l20. 
Malcolm B. Russell, The Middle East and South Asia 2000 (West Virginia: Stryker-Post 
Publications, 2000) p. 152. 
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grew in number and in violence until a full-scale rebellion was underway. The 
unrest was intensified by the assassination of Nassib Matni, the Maronite anti-
Chamoun editor of At Talagraph, a daily newspaper known for its outspoken Pan-
Arabism.^ ^ The revolt almost became a religious conflict between Christians and 
Muslims. The commanding General, Fuad Shihab, refused to attack on the rebellions 
for fear that the army, which was composed of Christians and Muslims, would split 
apart. The Chamoun government took the issue of extemal intervention to the UN, 
accusing the UAR of intervention. Subsequently, the Security Coimcil voted to send a 
team of UN observers to Lebanon. 
This state of turmoil increased when, in the early hours of July 14, 1958, a 
revolution overthrew the monarchy in Iraq and the entire royal family was killed. In 
Lebanon jubilation prevailed in areas where anti-Chamoun sentiment predominated, 
with radio stations announcing that the Chamoun regime would be next. Chamoun, 
realizing the gravity of his situation, summoned the ambassadors of the US, Britain, 
and France on the morning of July 14 and requested immediate assistance, insisting 
that the independence of Lebanon was in jeopardy.^ "* 
Chamoun invoked the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which Lebanon had 
signed the year before. According to its terms the US would "use armed forces to 
assist any [West Asia] nation.. .requesting assistance against armed aggression from 
any country controlled by international communism." Argxiing that Lebanese Muslims 
were being helped by Syria, which had received arms from the Soviet Union, 
'^ George E. Kirk, N.23, pp. 123-124. 
^^  Reinhard Schulze, A Modem History of Islamic World (London: LB. Tauris, 2000) p. 154. 
" George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1971) p.340. 
^ Yahya Armajani and Thomas M. Ricks, Middle East: Past and Present (New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Inc., 1986) p.289. 
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Chamoun appealed for US military intervention.^^ The US responded, in large 
measure because of concern over the situation in Iraq and the wish to reassure its 
allies, such as Iran and Turkey, that the US could act, while Great Britain gave 
protective cover to the Jordanian regime. The first contingent of 3,600 US marines 
landed in Beirut on July 15, followed by further units of the army. US troops took no 
action in the conflict: they merely stayed, distributed on the beaches and at the airport. 
But their very presence constituted an important factor in the situation. 
In the meantime. President Chamoun declared that he would not seek re-
election for the second term, thus, depriving the opposition of their main argument for 
stj^ing the revolt. After considerable negotiations, the following solution was 
accepted by the interested parties: President Chamoun would stay in office until the 
end of his term in September 1958; then he would relinquish his position to a new, 
legally elected president, presimiably General Fuad Shihab, commander of the army, 
whose compromise candidacy proved acceptable to all the warring factions. 
Despite these important developments, sporadic fighting continued until early 
September. On September 23 General Fuad Shihab assumed the duties of the 
presidency and on the following day he appointed Rashid Karami, former rebel leader 
of Tripoli, as Premier.^' Peace having been restored and the US troops evacuated 
Lebanese territory. By mid-November the UN observer group also withdrew as its 
^^  Zachary Lockman, Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp.119-20. 
*^ Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, Encyclopedia of Muslim World, v. 15 (New Delhi: Anmal Publications PVT. 
Ltd., 2003) pp.62-3. 
^' George Lenczowski, N.33, pp.340-1. 
*^ It should be pointed out that in agreeing to this solution the insurgents had abandoned some of their 
earlier demands, such as the immediate resignation of President Chamoun and the evacuation of 
American troops before the election of the new president. General Fuad Shihab was elected President 
of the republic by the Chamber of Deputies by a 48 to 7 vote. The seven votes went to Raymond Edde. 
" Joanne Maher, ed., N.25, p.685. 
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task deemed accomplished.'*^ In the course of the 1958 Civil War, between 2,000 and 
4,000 casualties occurred, primarily in the Muslim areas of Beirut and in Tripoli. '^ In 
December, the US extended to Lebanon a $10,000,000 grant to restore its economy, 
which had been gravely affected by the hostilities. There was a gradual return to 
normalcy, both in the economic and the political sectors."*^  
United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) 
In May 1958, a rebellion by armed Muslims broke out in Lebanon when 
President Camille Chamoun annoimced his intention to seek a constitutional 
amendment that would enable him to stand for a second term. Lebanon's government 
brought the matter before the Security Council, charging that the UAR was supporting 
the rebellion. By Resolution 128 of 11 June 1958, the Security Council decided to 
dispatch the UN Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). The UNOGIL found no 
evidence of foreign intervention or army consequence."*^  In September 1958, General 
Fuad Shihab, the Maronite commander of the army, was elected president of Lebanon, 
effectively removing the question of a second term for Chamoun. In November 1958, 
Lebanon's government informed the Security Council that cordial and close relations 
had been re-established between Lebanon and the UAR. The UNOGIL was 
terminated the following month.'*^  
*° M. S. Agwani, ed., TTte Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary Study (London: Asia Publishing 
House, 1965) pp.390-393. 
"' Tarn Bahl, M. H. Syed, N.36, p.63. 
*^ George Lenczowski, N.33, pp.341-342. 
*' Don Peretz, ne Middle East Today (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1971) p.338. 
*• Philip Mattar, ed.. Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, v.4 (Maine: 
Thomson Gale, 2004) p2277. 
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2.4 - Lebanon in the Aftermath of the Six Day War of 1967 
Lebanese Government during the War 
Lebanon did not participate and stayed out of the Six Day War of 1967.''^  
Lebanon's President Charles Helou took great care not to entangle the Lebanese army 
in the fighting and not to allow the other Arab armies to utilize Lebanese territory in 
their war efforts.^ ^ However, he did express formal solidarity with the Arab side and it 
has been claimed that had the war lasted any longer, Lebanon would not have been 
spared firom getting involved.'*^ 
During the war, anti-British and anti-US feeling reached a high pitch, 
especially among the Muslims, and there was serious rioting and damage to Anglo-US 
property. The British and US ambassadors were asked to leave Lebanon.'** However, 
*' The Six Day War 1967, (June 5, 1967 - June 10, 1967) commonly known as the Six Day War, the 
length of the military operations properly speaking, this was the third conflict between Israel and its 
neighbours (Syria, Egypt, etc.). Like its predecessors, it ended with a crushing victory for the Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF), but it also brought about a profound alteration of frontiers: with the occupation 
of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Sinai, Israel quadrupled the area of its 
territory. (Nicholas Comfort, Brewer's Politics: A Phrase and Fable Dictionary (London: Cassell pic, 
1995)p.557). 
^ Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, p.70. 
Charles Helou (September 25, 1913-7 January 2001) was President of Lebanon from 1964 to 1970. 
Bom in Beirut, Helou was the scion of a powerful Maronite family from Baabda. He graduated with 
honours from St. Joseph's University in Beirut in 1929, and went on to complete a Law degree in 1934. 
Helou was also a successfiil businessman and founded two French language newspapers, L'Eclair du 
Nord and Le Jour. In 1936, he made his first foray into politics, when he joined with Pierre Gemayel 
and three others in launching the Kataeb (Phalangist) Party. Differences with Gemayel later led Helou 
to quit the party, however. Helou's first governmental appointment was as Ambassador to the Vatican 
in 1947. In 1949 he took part in the Israel/Lebanese armistice negotiations where Israel tried to gain 
diplomatic concessions in exchange for the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese Sovereign territory. He 
later served in the Cabinet as Minister of Justice and Health (1954-1955) and as Minister of Education 
(1964). Initially Helou's lack of political afTiIiation gave him the appearance of a leader able to unite 
Lebanon and he was chosen to succeed Fuad Shihab as President by the National Assembly in 1964. 
The alliance between Shihab and Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami, a staunch Arab nationalist, 
soon left Karami in effective control of the Lebanese government. Helou founded and launched the 
Institute for Palestine Studies in 1963. In 1970, Helou endorsed Elias Sarkis as his chosen successor, 
but he lost the election hi the National Assembly by one vote to Suleiman Frangieh. Unlike other 
former Presidents, who remained politically active after retirement, Helou faded from the scene. He 
was involved in a philanthropic venture, founding a number of restaurants to provide free hot meak to 
elderly people. Helou died of a heart attack on January 7,2001. He was 87. 
^' Kamal S. Salibi, Crossroads to Civil War: Lebanon 1958-1976 (New York: Ithaca Press, 1976) 
p.30. 
"* Peter Mansfield, ed., N.26, p.439. 
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the months following the war witnessed a gradual easing of tensions, the Lebanese 
Cabinet agreed to reinstate its ambassadors in Washington and London.'*^  
Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon 
In Lebanon, of the 800,000 Arab refugees who fled Palestine or Israel during 
the 1947-49 fighting, mainly fi-om the Galilee in northern Palestine, about 150,000 
crossed into southern Lebanon, most of them expecting to return to their homes within 
a short time. Additional thousands came to Lebanon during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
and after the 1970 fighting in Jordan. Most of them crowded into seventeen reftigees 
camps (now reduced to twelve) built with the help fi-om the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) near Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli, Beirut, and Baalbak in the 
Biqa.^ " (See Map No.8) By 1999, estimates of the nimiber of Palestinians in Lebanon 
were as high as 375,000. '^ Some Palestinians, especially professionals, since then 
have obtained Lebanese citizenship, but most of the Palestinian refiigees have 
remained stateless, destitute refiigee camps dwellers. The Lebanese government and a 
majority of Lebanese have consistently rejected the local settlement or assimilation of 
the Palestinians; this rejection on their part is primarily based on the socio-political 
threat that their settlement would pose to the delicate demographic power balance in 
*' Joanne Maher, ed., N.25, p.686. 
^ Haraid Voche, The Lebanese War: Its Origins and Political Dimensions (London: C. Hurst & 
Company, 1978)pp.35-37. 
Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon: The principal Palestinian camps in Lebanon were: 1. Mar 
Elias, 2. Shatila, 3. Burj al-Barajneh, 4. Tel al-Zatar, 5. Jisr al-Basha, 6. al-Dubayya, 7. Nahr al-Beared, 
8. Baddawi, 9. Ain al-Hulwa, 10. Mieh-Mieh, 11. al-Buss, 12. Burj al-Shimali, 13. al-Rashidiyya, 14. 
al-Nabatiyya, 15. Wavel. 
*' Estimates of the Palestinian population vary widely for any country but especially for Lebanon (and, 
after the early 1990s, for Kuwait). The UNRWA figures for their Field of Operation-where they 
maintain ofRcial refugee camps-are based on registered Palestinians and are given as 370,144 for 
Lebanon, of whom 204,999 are in the 12 UNRWA camps. 
Please see: http://www.un.org./unrwa/refugees/me.htm]. 
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Lebanese politics and to the already stressed social fabric/^ Having witnessed the 
"Palestinization" of Jordan and having suffered repeated Israeli invasions and 
bombing raids because of Palestinian and pro-Palestinian activity on their soil, the 
Lebanese rejected further perpetuation of the half-century-long turmoil.^^ 
United Nations Relief and Worlc Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA) 
Following a resolution in December 1949 by the UN General Assembly to 
care for those Palestinians who had lost their homes and means of livelihood during 
the 1948-49 Palestine War, the UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees 
in the Near East (UNRWA) was created at the UN's offices in Vienna, Austrian/'' 
This was meant to deal with 914,221 Palestinians, of whom some 500,000 qualified 
for UNRWA relief Following Israel's seizure of the West Bank and Gaza during the 
June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, there were a further 335,000 displaced Palestmians, of 
whom 193,600 were eligible for UNRWA support.^^ This can be summarised as 
follows: 
'^  Bany Rubin, The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State-Building 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp.157-158. 
" Collert C. Held, Middle East Pattern: Places, Peoples, and Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000)pp.263-64. 
^ Edward H. Buehrig, The UN and the Palestinian Refugees: A Study in Nonlerritarial 
Administration (London: Indiana University Press, 1971) pp.5-6. 
Who is a Palestine Refugee? Under UNRWA's operational definition, Palestine refugees are persons 
whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both tiieir 
homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNRWA's services are 
available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with 
the Agency and who need assistance. UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of 
persons who became refugees in 1948. The number of registered Palestine refugees has subsequently 
grown from 914,000 in 1950 to more than four million in 2002, and continues to rise due to natural 
population growth, (http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html). 
'^DilipHiro,N.14,p.331. 
Assessment of UNRWA: The mandate for UNRWA is renewed year after year and with the 
phenomenal increase in problems, its responsibilities also increase. The fu t^ and foremost need is to 
create stable political conditions in Lebanon so that Palestinian refugees live in peace and UNRWA can 
continue its activities undisturbed. Secondly, the international community should exert pressure on 
Israel to restrain its unleashing of terrorist attacks on Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip. Only 
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A. Relief Services 
UNRWA's relief services included maintenance and rectification of records of 
Palestinian refugees, supply of rations, providing shelter, social welfare and 
work programmes. UNRWA inherited about one million refugees in 1949, both 
registered and unregistered. As the years rolled on, the number of refugees 
increased mainly due to the Zionist attacks on Palestinians in Gaza Strip in 
1956, the Lebanese crisis in 1958, renewal of Israel-Arab hostilities in 1967 and 
1973, strife in Jordan in 1970, crisis in Lebanon in 1975-76 and again in 1982 
since the renewal of hostilities in Lebanon. UNRWA provides shelter and 
emergency assistance to refugees displaced during and immediately after 
periods of heavy fighting. It also helps refugees living in camps to repair their 
battle-damage shelters. 
B. Education Programme 
UN Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) provides 
technical and professional gviidance to the Commissioner-General on aspects of 
UNRWA's educational programme which includes schooling for some 350,000 
Palestinian refugee children. ^ ^ Due to the unstable situation in Lebanon and 
continued Israeli attacks on Palestmian camps especially in Sabra, Shatila and 
Burj el-Barajneh, the UNRWA's educational programmes, however, have been 
disturbed from time to time. 
C. Health Programme 
UNRWA's health care programme, which is community-health oriented, 
provides with World Health Organisation (WHO) assistance primary health care 
then will the exodus and internal migration of Palestinian refugees stop, and thus reduce UNRWA's 
burden. The member countries should increase their contributions to UNRWA so that it can tide over 
the financial crisis and thus provide necessary help to the refugees. 
Figures as of 31 March 2006 
Field Operations 
Jordan 
Lebanon 
Syria 
West Bank 
Gaza Strip 
Agency total 
Official 
Camps 
10 
12 
10 
19 
8 
59 
Registered Families in 
Camps 
61,063 
49,836 
25,740 
38,954 
92,322 
267,915 
Registered Refugees in 
Camps 
316,549 
214,093 
116,253 
185,121 
474,130 
1,306,191 
Registered 
Refugees 
1,835,704 
405,425 
434,896 
705,207 
993,818 
4,375,050 
** The curriculum in each field is that of the host country, thus, ensuring that refugee children have the 
same qualifications as other children in their respective host countries. UNRWA also provides 
vocational and technical education to some 4,000 young men and women in the training centres 
situated throughout UNRWA's areas of operations. 
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confirmation rectify the violation. The Party shall immediately notify the Security 
Arrangements Committee of the rectification. Upon receiving the notification the 
teams will ascertain that the violation has been rectified. 
(7) The Joint Supervisory Teams shall be subject to termination upon 90 days notice 
by either Party given at any time after two years fi-om the date of entry into force of 
the present Agreement. Alternative verification arrangements shall be established in 
advance of such termination through the Joint Liaison Committee. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing the Joint Liaison Committee may determine at any time that there is no 
further need for such arrangements. 
g. The Security Arrangements Committee will ensure that practical and rapid contacts 
between the two Parties are established along the boundary to prevent incidents and 
facilitate coordination between the forces on the terrain. 
4. It is understood that the Government of Lebanon may request appropriate action in 
the United Nations Security Council for one unit of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNEFIL) to be stationed in the Sidon area. The presence of this unit will 
lend support to the Govenmient of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in 
asserting governmental authority and protection in the Palestinian refugee camp areas. 
For a period of 12 months the unit in the Sidon area may send teams to the Palestinian 
refugee camp areas in the vicinity of Sidon and Tyre to survey and observe if 
requested by the Government of Lebanon following notification to the Security 
Arrangements Committee. Police and security functions shall remain the sole 
responsibility of the Government of Lebanon which shall ensure that the provisions of 
the present Agreement shall be fully implemented in these areas. 
5. Three months after completion of the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon 
the Security Arrangements Committee will conduct a full-scale review of the 
adequacy of the security arrangements delineated in this Aimex in order to improve 
them. 
6. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: 
a. Within 8 to 12 weeks of the entry into force of the present Agreement all Israeli 
forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon. This is consistent with the objective 
of Lebanon that all external forces withdraw fi-om Lebanon. 
b. The Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces will maintain 
continuous liaison during the withdrawal and will exchange all necessary information 
through the Security Arrangements Committee. The Israel Defense Forces and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces will cooperate during the withdrawal in order to facilitate the 
reassertion of the authority of the Government of Lebanon as the Israeli armed forces 
withdraw. 
.si* 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/liistoric_documents/lebanon_israel/l 
983_may_l 7_agreement.asp 
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Palestinians in Lebanon.^ " If before they could have been regarded as a more or less 
settled community, they were now a revolutionary movement, a community in 
transition, a people at the centre of Arab support to regain their country. Commando 
operations which had been launched from Lebanon and Jordan into Israel since 1965 
became a regular feature after the war. They resulted in an Israeli reprisal policy 
aimed at 'convincing' the Jordanian and Lebanese authorities that they should prevent 
the commandos from operating out of their territory. '^ However, the Israelis were not 
alone in having to counter the new militarization of the Palestinians: Lebanese forces 
and Palestinians clashed increasingly over the issue of political and military freedom 
which was threatening the fragile Lebanese system. In search for stability which the 
authorities failed to provide, each Lebanese sectarian community started arming itself 
and looking for an outside protector. 
On 28 December 1968, 8 Israeli helicopter-borne commando raided on Beirut 
International Airport and desfroyed 13 civil aircraft. The raid was a reprisal for an 
earUer attack on an Israeli air-liner, EI AI plane, at Athens airport by two Palestinians 
who, the Israelis said, had come from Beirut. Lebanon at once appealed to the UN 
Security Council and disclaimed responsibility for commando activities on its 
territory. The raid was followed by violent demonstrations led by students demanding 
that Lebanon improve its defences and adopt a more anti-Israeli line. This attack set 
the stage for the government crises that marked Lebanese life for the next five years, 
until the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War." 
60 Ilan Peleg, Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-1983 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) p.l44. 
*' Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, p.70. 
62 
63 
David Kimche, T/te Last Option (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991) p. 126. 
Peter Mansfield, N.26, pp.439-40. 
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The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Lebanon. 
Lebanon's involvement in the Palestine question entered a new phase with the 
establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its military arm, the 
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), by the Arab League in 1964. Whereas, the other 
Arab states sharply restricted the movements of the Palestinians and controlled the 
resistance through government-sponsored guerrilla groups, Lebanon's laissez-faire 
political system permitted neither the national consensus nor the authoritarian system 
necessary to enforce such measures.^ 
The emergence of the Palestinian movement as the standard bearer of Arab 
resistance after the Arabs' military defeat in the June 1967 war was the next phase of 
Lebanon's involvement in the Palestine question. The defeat had so discredited the 
Arab governments and the Arab masses had become so demoralized that the Arab 
public opinion looked to the skirmishes and commando operations of the Palestinians 
against Israel for some consolation.^ ^ The rise of the Palestinian resistance, however, 
contained within it the seeds of division between the Palestinians and the established 
Arab governments. The Palestinians recognized this danger from the begiiming but, 
determined to pursue the cause of their own national identity and develop the 
organizations necessary for their political and military operations, largely ignored it. 
In Lebanon they established guerrilla bases and began recruiting them from the 
refugee camps.^ ^ 
^ Michael Hudson, Arab Politics: TIte Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1977) pp.299-30. 
" Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, Minorities and the State in the Arab World (London: Lynne 
Publishers, 1999) p. 116. 
^ Tanya Reinhart, Israel/Palestine: How to End the War of 1948 (New Delhi: LeftWord Books, 
20003) p.9. 
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The Palestinian resistance movement accentuated the deep social and political 
fissures between the Muslim and Christian confession in Lebanon. '^ The specter of 
refugee camps being turned into fortified arsenals and of young Palestinians being 
trained for commando operations threatened most Christian Lebanese and even some 
of the more conservative Muslims.^ * When the Lebanese authorities attempted to 
restrict these activities, the Palestinians took advantage of the social and sectarian 
cleavages between Christians and Muslims to establish a firm basis of support in the 
century among Muslims and leftist Lebanese of both confessions. 
Cairo Agreement 1969 
In October 1969, violent clashes between Palestinian guerrillas and the 
Lebanese army, which was attempting to restrict their activities, threatened Lebanon's 
fiagile political system and brought down the Government.'" In November, General 
Bustani, the Lebanese army chief, and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, 
71 
negotiated an agreement in Cairo with the help of President Nasser of Egypt. Under 
" Ewan W. Anderson, TIte Middle East: Geography and Geopolitics (London: Routledge, 2000) 
p.233. 
** Joseph J. Molone, The Arab Lands of Western Asia (New Jersey: Prentice-HoU, 1973) pp.32-33. 
^' Kail C. Ellis, N.6, pp.7-8 
™ Helena Cobban, The Palestine Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984) p.47. 
^^  Mohammed Abdel Rahman Abdel Raouf Arafat al-Qudwa al-Husseini (August 24, 1929 -
November 11, 2004), popularly known as Yasser Arafat (or amongst Palestians as Abu Ammar), was 
a Palestinian leader. He was Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), President of the 
Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and leader of the secular Fatah political party, which he founded 
1959. Arafat spent much of his life fighting against Israel in the name of Palestinian self-determination. 
Originally opposed to Israel's existence, he modified his position in 1988 when he accepted UN 
Security Council Resolution 242. Arafat and his movement operated from several Arab countries. In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, Fatah faced off with Jordan in a brief civil war. Forced out of Jordan 
and into Lebanon, Arafet and Fatah were major targets of Israel's 1978 and 1982 invasions of that 
country. The majority of the Palestinian people — regardless of political ideology or faction — viewed 
him as a freedom filter and martyr who symbolized their national aspirations, many Israelis described 
him as a terrorist for the many attacks his faction led against civilians. Later in his career, Arafat 
engaged in a series of negotiations with the government of Israel to end the decades-long conflict 
between that country and the PLO. These included the Madrid Conference of 1991, the 1993 Oslo 
Accords and the 2000 Camp David Summit. His political rivals, including Islamists and several PLO 
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the so-called 'Cairo Agreement' Lebanon made important concessions to the PL07^ 
The Palestinian guerrillas were given complete control over their military bases in 
southern Lebanon and also the right to administer and maintain law and order in the 
refugee camps, where most of the 250,000-300,000 Palestinians in Lebanon lived." 
The residents of the camps had complained bitterly about harassment from the 
Lebanese police and army intelligence services. The agreement legalized the uneasy 
existence of a Palestinian state-within-a-state in Lebanon, highlighted the weakness of 
the Lebanese Government and further aggravated the deep divisions within Lebanese 
society. Many Lebanese, especially, the poorer Muslims, Sunni and Shiite, were 
sympathetic to the Arab solidarity and revolutionary aspirations represented by the 
Palestinian resistance. '^* They supported the Palestinian struggle, hoping for their 
assistance in bringing about changes in the Lebanese state that would give them a 
fairer share of wealth and power. The Lebanese right feared that the Palestinian 
resistance was undermining the character of the Lebanese state, whose institutions and 
power structure they wished to preserve. The Lebanese Government, meanwhile, was 
afraid that if it sent the Lebanese army against the Palestinians, it would provoke open 
revolt. The agreement did not bring an end to clashes between the Lebanese army and 
Palestinian guerrillas. 
leftists, often denounced him for being corrupt or too submissive in his concessions to the Israeli 
government. In 1994, Arafat received the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon 
Peres, for the negotiations at Oslo. During this time, Hamas and other militant organizations rose to 
power and shook the foundations of the authority Fatah under Arafat had established in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories. In late 2004, after effectively being confined within his Ramallah compound for 
over two years by the Israeli army, Arafat became ill and fell into a coma. While the precise cause of 
death remains unknown, doctors spoke of idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura and cirrhosis, but no 
autopsy was performed. Arafat died on November 11,2004 at the age of 75. 
'^ Reinhard Schulze, N.32, p. 191. 
73 Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution 
(London: W.H. Allen, 1990) p.l44. 
''' Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary (California: ABC-Clio Information Services, 
1984)pp.314-315. 
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Black September 1970 
In September 1970, the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan finally turned against 
the Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM) in Jordan and began to subdue them - a 
process which was to take over twelve months to complete/^ The Palestinian 
guerrillas were reduced, step by step, in a succession of encounters until their power 
in the country was completely destroyed and the Palestinian popular support for them 
was silenced. The crushing defeat of the PLO at the hands of the Jordanian army 
considerably weakened the Resistance Movement both in military as well as political 
terms7^ 
During what is known as Black September, the Jordanian army attacked 
refugee camps, forcing those who were lucky enough to escape, over the border into 
Lebanon and Syria. Lebanon now was the only state left that shared a border with 
Israel and had insufficient means to control the PLO.^^ And Lebanon now remained 
the only Arab country where the PRM could operate with some degree of autonomy. 
'^  Radhey Shyam Chaurasia, History of Middle East (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers and Distributors, 
2005)pp.l24-125. 
Up to September 1970 the guerrilla movement had been based in Jordan which shared the longest 
border with Israel. From there the PLO had pursued a policy of eroding the strength and will of Israel 
by using guerrilla operations to show up IsraeU failure to maintain effective control and provide 
protection within the country. Israel, in return, had a policy of retaliation not only disproportionate to 
the ordinal attack, but also aimed at punishing the country hosting the guerrillas. The combination of 
attracting unwelcome Israeli military strikes against Jordan and the fear of losing control of Jordan to 
the Palestinians who had set up a state-within-a-state, shaped the decision of the Jordanian military and 
political elites to stop the erosion of their state's authority by force. (Yahya Armajani and Thomas M. 
Ricks, N.34,pp.309-310). 
Palestine Resistance Movement (PRM): there were two other guerrilla organizations that belonged to 
the PRM. First there was the Syrian sponsored Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War better known 
after its militia Saiqa. It was created after the June 1967 War and was the direct instrument of the 
Syrian regime. The other organisation called Arab Liberation Front was much smaller and followed the 
directions of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime. (Jawaid Iqbal, N.9, p.93). 
'* Philip Kohvas, A History of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) pp. 131-32. 
" Helena Cobban, N.70, pp.50-51. 
'* Jawaid Iqbal, N.9, pp.79-80. 
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For a short time after the move of the PLO headquarters to Beirut from 
Amman, Lebanon enjoyed a brief respite. The Palestinians were reluctant to face 
another confrontation and the Lebanese were still satisfied with their new choice of 
president. However, the newly-increased Palestinian presence had not gone unnoticed 
by Israel, hideed, because of this Palestinian presence Israel expanded its contact with 
the Maronites to include Maronites and other Christians living in the territory of South 
Lebanon, giving the minority-alliance new life. '^ And when the Guerilla attacks 
against Israeli increased, Israeli commandos began to attack Palestinian guerrilla 
training camps in Lebanon and to assassinate Palestinian guerrilla leaders at their 
homes in Beirut. ^ ° 
Israeli Occupation of the Shebaa Farms 
During the 1967 Six Day War Israeli forces seized a piece of Lebanese 
territory called the Shebaa Farms, a 25 square kilometer area consisting of 14 farms 
located south of the Shebaa, a Lebanese village on the western slopes of Mount 
Hermon. Since Lebanon was not a participant in the Six Day War, UN representatives 
were biased for Israel, pointing out that the 1923 Anglo-French demarcation and the 
1949 Armistice line clearly designated the area as Syrian territory. The UN backed 
O 1 
Israel and certified Israeli puUout from Lebanon. (See Map No.9) 
However, Lebanese and Syrian officials insisted that Syria was officially given 
the territory to Lebanon in 1951. Lebanese officials pointed to the fact that a number 
of residents in the area have land deeds stamped by the Lebanese government.*^ 
'^ Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, p.75. 
*° Joseph J. Molone, N.68, pp.32-33. 
*' Charles P. Tnimbull, 2001 Britannica Book of the Year (Chicago: encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 
2001)p.459. 
" Asher Kanfinan, "Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute", Middle East 
Journal, v.56, n.4, autumn 2002, p.578. 
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Lebanese army maps published in 1961 and 1966 specifically pinpoint several of the 
Shebaa Farms, including Zebdine, Fashkoul, Mougr, Shebaa and Ramta, all of which 
are designated as being Lebanese. Lebanese Ministry of Tourism maps also show the 
Lebanese-Syrian border rurming west of the Shebaa Farms. Syria has officially 
acknowledged the Farms are Lebanese.^^ 
The controversy over the Farms first arose in 2000, as the UN certified that 
Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon was complete. Israeli's annexation of the Shebaa 
Farms has been contested by Hezbollah (smce May 2000), and advanced as a reason 
for its continued attacks on Israel after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Syrian President Bashar Asad said the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms belong 
to Lebanon. Asad told a news conference in Paris before ending a state visit to France, 
Beirut and Damascus will demarcate their countries' border at Shebaa Farms after 
Israel withdraws from the region. The will then submit a new map to the UN. The 
Lebanese Resistance has vowed to keep up resistance operations in the area until 
Israel withdraws. 
2.5 - Lebanon in the Aftermath of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 
The Yom Kippur War 1973 
The sporadic fighting that followed the Six-Day War again developed into 
full-scale war in 1973. On October 6, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur (thus "Yom 
Kippur War"),^^ Israel was attacked by Egypt across the Suez Canal and by Syria on 
'^  http://www.shebaafarms.org/briefhistory.html 
^ Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002) pp. 187-88. 
8S http://www.shebaafarms.org/briefliistory.html 
^ Yom Kippur, also known in English as the Day of Atonement, is the most solemn and important of 
the Jewish holidays. Its central themes are atonement and repentance. Jews traditionally observe this 
holy day with a 25-hour period of fasting and intensive prayer, often spending most of the day in 
synagogue services. Yom Kippur is the tenth and final day of liie Ten Days of Repentance which begin 
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the Golan Heights.*^ The Arab armies showed greater aggressiveness and fighting 
ability than in the previous wars, and the Israeli forces suffered heavy casualties. The 
Israeli army, however, pushed its way into Syrian territory and encircled the Egyptian 
Third Army by crossing the Suez Canal and establishing forces on its west bank. 
However, the advances on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts were initially 
successful but when a cease-fire was enforced on 24 October, Israel had not only 
repulsed the Egyptians and Syrians but also annexed further territories.*^ 
The October War and its Impact on Lebanese-Palestinian Relations 
In the aftermath of the war, Lebanon began to face serious difficulties in its 
relationship with the Palestinians as a result of new conflict developed in the Arab 
world. This war was between the forces which favoured the idea of a final negotiated 
settlement with Israel within the fi-amework of the US-sponsored UN Security 
Coimcil Resolution 338 and those which opposed it.*' While the Lebanese Christian 
favoured it, the radical Palestinian and Lebanese Forces denounced it as surrender 
with Rosh Hashanah. According to Jewish tradition, God inscribes each person's fate for the coming 
year into a "book" on Rosh Hashanah and waits until Yom Kippur to "seal" the verdict. During the Ten 
Days of Repentance, a Jew tries to amend his behavior and seek forgiveness for wrongs done against 
God (bein adam leMakom) and against his fellow man {bein adam lechavero). The evening and day of 
Yom Kippur are set aside for public and private petitions and confessions of guilt (Vidui). At the end of 
Yom Kippur, one considers himself absolved by God. 
*' Golan or Golan Heights [gohlan], Arabic Al Jawlan pop (1983) 19,727; area 1,176 sq km/ 454 sq 
mi, overlooking the Sea of Galilee and Jordan River. Israeli-occupied area of Syria administered as part 
of North Israel; of great strategic importance; occupied by Israel in 1967, and aimexed in 1981; rises to 
1,204 ni/3950 ft at Month Avital. Syria does not accept Israel's claimed. 
** Akhtar Majeed, ed.. Encyclopedia of West Asia (Aligarh, U.P.: Centre of West Asian Studies, 
Aligarh Muslim University, 1996) pp. 162-163. 
" UN Security Council Resolution 338 (October 1973). Adopted by 14 votes to one, with one 
abstention (China) on 22 October 1973. the security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military 
activity immediately, on later than 12 hours after the moment of adoption of this decision, in 
the positions they now occupy; 
2. Calls upon the parties to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiation shall start between 
the parties concerned under appropriate auspices at establishmg a just and durable peace in the 
West Asia. 
(DilipHiro,N.14,p.332). 
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plan.^° In December, radical student groups in Beirut along with the Palestinians 
organized a strike to protest the first visit to the US Secretary of State, Henry 
Kissinger to West Asia in connection with the Arab-Israeli peace settlement. 
The Palestinians, on their part, began to extend the cover of the Cairo 
Agreement, after the October War, to all the Lebanese radical parties and factions and 
the Nasserists movement in Lebanon. These meant that all these radical groups could 
now arm themselves and form their own militias, under the umbrella of the 
Palestinian movement. The radical parties and factions and the Nasserist organizations 
formed a political coalition called the National Movement and Kamal Jumblat was 
accepted as its chief spokesman. As the Palestinians and the National Movement 
began to co-ordinate their forces, Palestinian cause became confused with Lebanese 
domestic issues to such a degree that it became impossible to disentangle them from 
one another. Unable to cope with the deteriorating situation in the country, Taqi al-
Din al-Sulh's, who happened to be the Lebanese Prime Minster, resigned in 
September 1974 whereupon Lebanese President Franjieh went ahead and assigned the 
premiership to Rashid al-Sulh.'^ By the time, the government of Rashid came to 
power in Lebanon, it was becoming apparent that an over all settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute was no longer a possibility. 
^ A. K. Pasha, ed., Arab-Israeli Peace Process: An Indian Perspective (New Delhi: Manas 
Publications, 2000) p.320. 
"lbid.,p.321. 
Henry Kissinger Alfred [kisinjuh] (1923- )US academic and statesman. Secretary of State (1973-6), 
bora 1923 at Furth, Germany. He became President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs in 
1969, was the main American figure in the negotiations to end the Vietnam War (for which he shared 
the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize), and became Secretary of State under Nixon and Ford. His 'shuttle 
diplomacy' was aimed at bringing about peace between Israel and the Arab states. (David Crytal, The 
Cambridge Concise Encyclopedia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 412). 
Soaring prices, increased political and administrative corruption, labour demands, student unrest, 
continued Israeli raids on South Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps, protest against the 
ineffectiveness of the Lebanese defence mechanism, Shiite grievances, and a growing Muslim clamour 
for full Muslim participation in all the fiinctions of the chaos the like of which had not been previously 
experienced. 
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In Lebanon itself the Christians were greatly worried by the Palestinian 
problem. Many Christians, realizing that their best hope of eliminating their own 
Palestinian problem was through the attainment of an overall West Asia peace 
settlement which provided for an independent Palestinian State, were perturbed that 
the US efforts to arrive at limited agreements could leave them indefinitely saddled 
with the Palestinian problem. They, therefore, concluded that the time had come for a 
show down with the Palestinians in order to destroy their military and political power 
in Lebanon. 
Kissinger's limited step by step diplomacy in a way heightened the hostility 
between the Lebanese Christians and the Palestinians along with their Muslim and 
radical supporters and thereby helped - together with the various internal social, 
economic, psychological, ideological and other factors and forces - to create 
conditions that could lead only to a violent confrontation.'^  
Though Lebanon was not directly involved in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, 
but continued to suffer Israeli reprisals, as the villages of southern Lebanon bearing 
the brunt of Israeli raids. These attacks drove large niunbers of poor Lebanese, mainly 
Shiite Muslims, to swell the rootless, shifting population living in the shanty towns 
and refiigee camps around Beirut. In these 'belts of misery', the radical and left-wing 
groups rapidly acquired supporters.^ '* 
^ Bansidhar Pradhan, From Confrontation to Hostile Intimacy: PLO and tfte US (New Delhi: Sehyog 
Prakashan, 1994) p. 131. 
^ Lucy Dean, ed.. Middle East and North Africa 2006 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Frances Group, 
2005) p.695. 
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3 - Second Lebanese Civil War 1975 - 76 
3.1 Lebanese Front and Lebanese National Movement 
By the mid-1970s the country was divided between two large coalitions: the 
Lebanese Front, a Maronite Christian alliance between the private armies of the rival 
Gemayel, Chamoun and Franjieh families, who wanted to retain the existing political 
system, favoured links with the West and opposed direct Lebanese involvement in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict; and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM), which was 
mainly Muslim and consisted of a loose coalitions of mostly small left-wing parties 
who demanded a more representative political system, closer links with Arab world 
and a more active role for Lebanon in the conflict with Israel. The LNM was led by 
Kamal Jumbiatt, the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), and enjoyed 
PLO support.*'^  
The growing strength of the Palestmian guerrillas prompted the Maronite 
organizations to seek to boost their own military power. The Maronite were concerned 
about the links between the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement (LNM). The 
LNM, under the leadership of Kamal Jumbiatt, was pressing for reform of the political 
system to end Christian dominance and ultimately abolish confessionalism. The LNM 
argued that an improvement of the Muslims' economic lot was impossible while the 
Christians dominated the political structure. The left-Muslim alliance also proclaimed 
unreserved support for the PLO. The Maronite feared that political reforms would 
destroy the existing guarantees of Christian security and they also resented the 
fi-eedom of action enjoyed by the PLO, as the incidents between Palestinian guerrillas 
and Maronite militiamen became more and more frequent around Palestinian refiigee 
camps sited in Christian area. 
'^ Ibid., p.696. 
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Radical Maronite leaders believed that it was important to reduce the 
Palestinians' power before PLO military might could be combined with Muslim 
superiority in numbers to threaten Christian privileges and security. The Maronite also 
gambled on receiving support from outside forces - Arab states, Israel and the West -
in the task of cutting the PLO down to size.^ ^ 
Apart from the PLO, thus there were also local issues which exacerbated the 
already disturbed situation in Lebanon. 
In late February 1975, trouble broke out in Sidon over a controversy about 
fishing rights which had been smoldering for several months. Camille Chamoun 
(Prime Minister 1952-1958) headed a new concern, fimded by Lebanese and Kuwaiti 
capital, that had been licensed for commercial fishing along the southern coast of 
Lebanon. The Proteine Company, as it was called, was to be an upscale enterprise 
using modem equipment and a mechanized fishing fleet. The local fishermen, still 
working the waters much as they had for thousands of years, were afraid that the new 
company would take most of the fish and destroy their livelihood. Although, some 
protections against such an outcome were offered, the issue was soon politicized into 
a struggle between the Muslim poor of Sidon and the mainly Christian rich who were 
to operate the Proteine Company. 
On February 26, a protest march led by the redoubtable Sidon rebel Ma'ruf 
Sa'd was halted by local police and elements of the army; the standoff soon 
deteriorated into a riot. Shots were fired, a soldier was killed, and several of the 
demonstrators were wounded, including their leader, Ma'ruf Sa'd, who died a few 
days later. Like magic, thousands demonstrated in Beirut and Tripoli the following 
day, and the government responded by temporarily removing the governor of the 
** Trevor Mostyn, ed., Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) p.372. 
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southern region where Sidon is located. Although the issue had to do with the grant of 
an exclusive license to Chamoun and his business associates, it soon became a test of 
the government's authority in south Lebanon.^ ^ 
3.2 Civil War and External Interference 
Tensions started to increase in early 1975. In February, a prominent Sunni 
Muslim politician, Ma'ruf Sa'd, was assassinated in Sidon as he led a march to protest 
against a new fishing project planned by Camille Chamoun. The killing sparked off a 
round of fighting between the army and local Muslim militias, backed by PLO 
guerrillas.'^  On 13 April, Maronite militias killed 27 Palestinians passing through the 
Christian 'Ayn al-Rummana quarter of Beirut. '^ The incident followed an attack by 
unknown guimien earlier in the day on Kataeb leader Pierre Gemayel. Soon after that 
fighting broke out between Palestinians and the Kataeb in 'Ayn al-Rummanan and 
around the Palestinian camps in Christian east Beirut.'"^ The political crisis caused by 
the fighting was briefly resolved by the formation of a new cabinet at the end of June 
by the new Prime Minister Rashid Karami. At the same time, a cease-fire agreement 
was signed between the commander of the army and PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. 
But in September, heavy fighting broke out again, and by the end of 1975 Lebanon 
'" Charles Winslow, N.58, pp. 180-181. 
^ A. K. Pasha, ed., N.90, p.324. 
" Bashir Gemayel, in an interview to the French weekly Le Mouvel Observateur a few weeks before 
the beginning of the Operation Peace of Galilee, according to the daily Israeli Ma'ariv, September 17, 
1972: 
"On the 13* of April 1975 at two o'clock in the afternoon . . . we were about to 
consecrate a new church in Ayn Rumanan in the presence of Sheikh Pierre. A bus full of 
armed Palestinians wanted to pass in front of the church. A police roadblock tried to stop 
them, so that they would not come mto conflict with the group of Phalangists at the 
entrance to tiie church . . . The bus broke through the barrier.. . . Outside the church, our 
regulars asked the bus to go back. By way of answer, we received a hail of bullets . . . 
That is how it began." 
(Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance (London: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) p. 109). 
'"" Reinhard Schulze, N.32, p.215. 
146 
was in the throes of all-out Civil War.'"' Attempts at inter-Lebanese political dialogue 
came to noting, as the Maronites pressed for army intervention to restore security and 
the LNM, viewing the army as biased in favour of the Christians, insisted that 
political reform should come first. Arafat kept the bulk of the PLO's fighters out of 
the conflict, but the PLO was active in arming and training LNM militiamen. The 
main beneficiaries of PLO help were the Sunni, Nasserist Murabitun and Amal. 
Syria's Intervention 
The escalation of the war in January 1976 impelled Syria to step up its 
mediation effects. Pro-Syrian PLO military units were sent into Lebanon to be used as 
a counterweight against 'Arafat's fighters. Syria also tried to defuse political tensions 
by helping draft - a compromise package of political reforms, imveiled by President 
Franjieh on 14 February. The package offered the Muslims equal representation in 
parliament, but otherwise fell far short of the changes sought by the LNM. On 11 
March, Brigadier 'Aziz al-Ahdab occupied Beirut's television station and demanded 
Franjieh's resignation. This was taken as a signal for a move on the presidential 
palace by units of Ahmad al-Khatib's Lebanese Arab Army, which had recently split 
from the regular army. This move was blocked by pro-Syrian PLO units, which were 
playing an increasing role in checking LNM efforts to secure an outright military 
victory over the Maronite.''*^ 
Although Syria watched the dangerous security on its border intently, over a 
year of bloodletting and destruction passed before it mtervened. Its maction, in part 
was a result of the inherent cautiousness of its Ba'thist leadership and the need for 
"" Yahya Armajani and Thomas M. Ricks, N.34, p.294. 
'"^ Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.96, pp.372-373. 
'"^  Ibid., p.373. 
147 
international acceptance of its intervention by Israel, the other Arab countries, the US, 
1 1 • 1 1 ' 104 
belied the pressure Syria was undergoing from vanous sources to stop the killing. 
On 8 May 1976, under Syrian prompting, the Chamber of Deputies elected 
Elias Sarkis to become the next president when Franjieh's term ran out in 
September.'°^ By this stage relations between the LNM and Syria had badly 
deteriorated."^ However, in May Syria, which had tried unsuccessfully to mediate in 
the conflict, sent troops into Lebanon against the Palestinians and their Lebanese 
allies, whom it had previously supported. Syria feared that if the PLO and LNM were 
victorious, it would be unable to control them and their victory would inevitably 
provoke an Israeli intervention, v^th the possibility of a new confrontation between 
Syria and Israel. Having been rescued by the Syrians, the Christian militias began a 
new offensive against Muslim and Palestinian areas.'°' By the end of September, the 
LNM and PLO had been subdued.*''^  In the meantime the Maronite forces took 
advantage of the Syrian action against the LNM and PLO to attack Palestinian and 
104 Kail C. Ellis, N.6,p.ll . 
'"' Elias Sarkis (20 July 1924 - 27 June 1985) was the President of the Lebanese Republic from 1976 
to 1982. Bom in Shabbaniah, Sarkis graduated with a Law degree from Saint Joseph University in 
1948. After joining the judicial corps in 1953, he became a judge with the Accounting Department. 
During the presidency of Fuad Shihab, he was appointed Judicial Manager at the presidential palace in 
Baabda, and in 1962 he became General Manager for Presidential Matters. Following the Intrabank 
Crisis of 1968, Sarids was appointed Governor of the Bank of Lebanon. Sarkis contested the 
presidential election of 1970 as Shihab's prot6g6 and was expected to win, but owing to a last-minute 
change of mind by several National Assembly members aligned to Kama! Jumblatt, he was defeated by 
Suleiman Frangieh by a single vote. He was, however, elected President on 8 May 1976, while the 
Lebanese Civil War was raging. With Syrian forces occupying two thirds of the country and private 
militias much of the rest, his power was limited. Just before the end of his presidency in 1982, Israel 
invaded southern Lebanon in the 1982 Lebanon War and had advanced to the outskirts of Beirut. Saiicis 
was to be succeeded by Bashir Gemayel, who was elected President on 21 August 1982, but Gemayel 
was assassinated 9 days before he was due to take office. Amine Gemayel, Bashir's brother, was 
subsequently elected in his stead, and Sarkis handed the presidency over to him on 23 September. 
Sarkis died in Switzerland in 1985, at the age of 61. 
"^ Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.96, p.373. 
'"' Lucy Dean, ed., N.94, p.696. 
'°* Avraham Sela, ed.. Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 1999) 
p.477. 
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Muslim enclaves in east Beirut. In early August, the Shiite Nab'a quarter fell. On 12 
August, after a three-month siege, the Palestinian Tal al-Za'tar camp fell. More than a 
thousand of the camp's inhabitants were massacred during its evacuation,'°^ The 
Palestinians were forced to retreat from Beirut to their bases in the south. It was not 
until October that a lasting cease-fire came into effect at a summit meeting of the 
League of Arab States (Arab League) in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.^'° (See Map No. 10, 
n) 
Israeli Influence 
Israel watched the developments in Lebanon with concern. To the Likud 
government, the fighting provided an opportunity to weaken the Palestinian 
resistance."' In 1975, request for Israeli aid were voiced by both Christians in South 
I 1"? 
Lebanon and in Beirut. Consequently, Israel increased its military and political 
involvement with the Lebanese and armed the militia of Major Saad Hadad, which 
had been formed to protect Christian villages in the South against the leftist Lebanese 
and Palestinian guerrillas. It also allowed recruits from the Maronite militias to be 
sent to Israel for training and used them as a surrogates in the battle against the 
Palestinians. In an effort to build a favourable position in the south, Israel extended 
109 
110 
Trevor Mostyn, ed., N.96, p.373. 
Lucy Dean, ed., N.94, p.696. 
'" Kail C. Ellis, N.6,p 11. 
Likud is the major Centre-right political party in Israel. Founded in 1973 as an alliance of several 
right-wing and liberal parties, Likud's victory in the 1977 elections was a major turning point in the 
country's political history, marking the first time the left had lost power. However, after ruling the 
country for most of the 1980s, the party has won only one Knesset election since 1992, though its 
candidate, Binyamin Netanyahu, did win the popular vote for Prime Minister in 1996. After a big win 
in the 2003 elections, a major split in 2005 saw Likud leader Ariel Sharon leave to form the new 
Kadima party, with Likud slumping to fourth pJace in elections the foJJowing year. A member is called 
a Likudnik and the party now leads tiie opposition in the Knesset. 
"^  Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, p.86. 
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the so-called "Good Fence Policy" it had established in 1974 to allow local Lebanese 
residents to cross into Israel for medical treatment, jobs, and shopping. 
Israel also sought to check Syrian influence in the country. It prevented Syria 
from extending its pacification efforts southward by establishing its "Red Line," 
defined as a point somewhere midway between Sidon and Tyre on the coast and the 
Syrian border. Although this area was controlled by the PLO-leftist coalition, Israel 
1 1 T 
preferred their presence to having Syrian troops on its northern border. 
Since the Palestinians constituted a well-trained force, Israel always felt 
threatened by them. And during the 1975-1976 Civil War when the Maronites 
considered partition and withdrew to Mount Lebanon, it was the Syrian forces whose 
intervention in favour of the Maronites led to the Palestinian defeats but for Israelis 
then, the removal of the Palestinians was crucial to the establishment of the Maronite 
state. 
4 - Riyadh - Cairo Arab Summit Conferences 1976 and After 
Riyadh - Cairo Arab Summit Conferences and the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) 
1976 
In mid-October 1976, while the fighting continued the Saudi King Khaled 
invited five Arab leaders for an emergency conference to be held in Riyadh."'' The six 
leaders as member of the Arab League met in a limited Arab Summit in Riyadh from 
16-18 October 1976. The mini-summit then worked out a series of agreement to 
resolve the Lebanese crisis. It called for an immediate ceasefire and for the 
establishment of a 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) from their six Arab states. 
This force was composed of 24,000 man Syrian contingent, under the command of 
'" Kail C. Ellis, N.6,pp 11-12. 
"'' These were Saudi King Khaled son of King Abdul Aziz, Syrian President Hafez Asad, Lebanese 
President Ellas Sarkis, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, PLO leader Yasir Arafat, and Prince Sabah of 
Kuwait. 
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President Elias Sarkis."^ This was to strengthening the Arab Security Force (ASF) 
already in Lebanon in agreement with the Lebanese President who would be free to 
determine the size of each contributing coimtry's force. The Riyadh resolutions were 
then ratified by the fiill plenary summit of the Arab League in Cairo on 25 and 26 
October, 1976. 
The Riyadh - Cairo Arab Summit conferences amounted to a partial victory 
for Syria. It legitimized Syria's continued nulitary presence in Lebanon. Syrian units 
made up most of the ADF coordination committee composed of representatives of 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Kuwait besides the Syrians. By the end of 1976 a relative 
calm descended on Lebanon as the Civil War gradually came to an end. Though 
tensions continued to Imger throughout the country, the ferocity of violence of the 
past eighteen months subsided."^ In July 1977, the Syrians persuaded the Maronites 
and Palestinians to come to the conference table to sign the Chtaura Agreement, 
which stipulated that the Palestinian presence in Lebanon would be monitored. Sarkis, 
m order to pacify the Musluns and Druze, also set up a Board of Reconstruction and 
Development in their welfare."^ 
After the Riyadh Summit, Lebanon re-emerged with a confessional system and 
state as before. It re-emerged, however, maimed and divided. No longer did one hear 
the name Beirut without the adjectives 'East' or 'West'. These were right-wing areas 
and LNM areas. (See Map No. 12) A 'Christian' Lebanon existed in the south along 
the Israeli border. Confessionalism, thanks to Arab reactionaries and imperialism, had 
"* George E. Deluiy, ed., World Encyclopedia of Political System, v.l (Essex: Longman Group 
Limited, 1983) p.622. 
^^^JawaidIqbal,N.9, p.l il. 
"^ Asaf Hussain, Political Terrorism and the State in the Middle East (London and New York: 
Mansell Publisliing Limited, 1988) pp.165-166. 
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been maintained. This confessional state, however, by this time had lost its major 
feature: cohesion. Without cohesion such a state ruled only with the direct support of 
external forces. 
Most significant perhaps was the fact that the LNM had been contained. It 
still, however, enjoyed the allegiance of the majority of the Lebanese. It had also 
matured under fire and most important of all, it never relinquished its guns. 
The First Israeli Invasion 1978 (Operation Litani) 
David Bin Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, from the beginning was 
very actively toying with the idea of the establishment of the Christian state. In his 
diary he wrote: 
"A Christian state ought to be set up [in Lebanon] with the southern 
frontier of the Litani... which would allow Israel to extend its borders as 
far as the Litani river and enable Israel to annex large parts of homeland 
of Muslims [Lebanese Shiites] in Israel. Moshe Dayan, the Chief of 
Staff, was also in favour of the idea and plans had been drawn up for the 
diversion of Litani water into Israel." 
The idea of annexing Arab lands received active consideration ten years later 
when Menachem Begin came to power."' After some PLO men attacked an Israeli 
bus south of Haifa on 11 March 1978, (killing thirty-seven Israeli and nine PLO men 
"* B. J. Odeh, Lebanon: Dynamics of Conflict (A Modern Political History), (London, Zed Books 
Ltd., 1985) pp.183-184. 
" ' Menachem Wolfovlch Begin (Polish: Mieczyslaw Biegun, August 16, 1913 - March 9, 1992) was 
the sixth prime minister of the State of Israel. Before the establishment of the state, he was the leader of 
the Irgun, playing a central role in Jewish resistance to the British Mandate of Palestine. After eight 
consecutive defeats in the years preceding his premiership. Begin came to embody the opposition to the 
Ashkenazi Mapai-led Israeli establishment. His electoral victory in 1977 ended three decades of Labor 
Party political hegemony. Begin's most significant achievement as prime minister was signing a peace 
treaty with Egypt in 1979, for which he won the Nobel Prize for Peace together with Anwar Sadat. In 
the wake of the Camp David Accords, the Israel Defense Forces withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and 
returned the Egyptian territories captured in the Six-Day War. Later, Begin's government promoted the 
construction of Israeli settlements in the Israeli-occupied territories. In retaliation for Arab attacks from 
the north, Begin authorized the uivasion of Lebanon in 1982, igniting the 1982 Lebanon War. As 
Israeli military involvement in Lebanon deepened, and the Sabra and Shatila massacre carried out by 
the Christian militia shocked world public opinion. Begin grew increasingly isolated. As IDF forces 
remained mired in Lebanon and the economy suffered from hyperinflation, the public pressure on 
Begin mounted. Further depressed by the death of his wife Aliza in November 1982, he gradually 
withdrew from public life, until his resignation in September 1983. 
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dying in the shoot-out), 25,000 Israeh troops crossed into Lebanon and occupied all 
the territory south of Litani. In the bombardment and atrocities which were 
committed through use of cluster bombs, some 2,000 Arabs died. The Lebanese state 
authorities did nothing to protect their citizens. Neither did the army intervene nor 
was there any sympathy for the plight of the massacred Muslims nor any 
compensation or rehabilitation for their losses. To the Arabs, to this end, the Chtaura 
Agreement was proved to be a worthless piece of paper. 
However, as Israel's actions raised fears that it intended to annex and settle the 
area, in maimer of the Golan Heights and the West Bank, in order to guarantee its 
access to the waters of the Litani River the UN called on Israel to withdraw all its 
forces from Lebanon. The Secretary-General raised a United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon (UNIFEL) to supervise the areas occupied by Israel. Israel withdrew slowly 
but not without handing its occupied belt to Major Saad Hadad's militia (then 
constituted as the Army of Free Lebanon and later the South Lebanon Army), an 
Israeli trained protege, to control the area. Major Hadad established himself as Israel's 
agent and his army was provided with money and arms by Israel. Neither President 
Sarkis, nor Prime Minister Salim Hoss could do anything about it.'^' Israeli continued 
their occupation of Lebanon through this self-style "Security Zone", (an area 6 
mile/10 km deep and extending 62 mile/100 km) and its defiance of Resolution 425 
did little to accomplish peace on its northern border.'^^ It was not imtil 2000 when 
they withdrew their forces finally from southern Lebanon. 
'^ ^ The Litani River (Nahr aI-LT{anI; classical name: Leontes) is an important waterway in southern 
Lebanon. It rises west of Baalbek in the fertile Beqaa Valley valley and empties in the Mediterranean 
Sea north of Tyre, one of Lebanon's largest cities. Exceeding 140 km, it is the longest river that 
originates and flows entirely within the borders of Lebanon. Most of its catchment area was under 
Israeli control during 1978 and from 1982 to 2000. It is a major water supply for Southern Lebanon. 
'^ 'Asaf Hussain,N.II7, pp.166-167. 
'^^KailC.Ellis,N.6,p.l2. 
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United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL 
On 19 March 1978, hours after the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) had begun to 
move towards the Litani, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425. The two 
key points of the resolution which was sponsored by the US, were: 
(i) A call upon Israel to immediately "cease its military action against 
Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all 
Lebanese territory", and 
(ii) The establishment of a United Nations Interim Force for Southern 
Lebanon for the purpose of "confuming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, 
restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of 
Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area".'^^ 
(SeeMapNo.13,21) 
Despite its vehement opposition to the US-sponsored Resolution 425, Israel 
declared xmilateral ceasefire two days later. The Israeli Defence Minister met with 
Commander of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and 
Commander of the newly appointed UNIFIL. At the meeting three points were agreed 
upon between Israel and the UN officer. 
1. The area overrun by the IDF in the second stage of the invasion would 
become a 'Buffer Zone'; 
2. UNIFIL would be responsible for patrolling the buffer zone; and 
3. The strip of territory lying between the Israeli-Lebanese boundary and the 
UNIFIL buffer zone would be designated a "peace zone" to be patrolled 
by the militia of Major Hadad and units of the Lebanese army. Israel 
would be permitted to continue its "Good Fence Policy" v^th the Lebanese 
inhabitants of the border region. 
Consequently, instead of being pressured into turning over its ten-kilometre 
"Security Belt" to UNIFIL, Israel simply bargained away its additional conquests, 
thereby buying time in which to solidify Hadad's grip on the strip of Lebanese 
territory.'^'' The UNIFIL encountered serious difficulties in the field, and proved 
'^ John Mackinlay, The Peacekeepers: An Assessment of Peacekeeping Operations at the Arab-
Israel Interface (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989) pp.43-44. 
^^ Jawaid Iqbal, N.9, pp.148-149. 
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incapable of accomplishing the task assigned to it. The South Lebanese Army (SLA) 
of Major Saad Hadad and the Israelis opposed any deployment of UN soldiers in the 
zones under their control in the south. 
In addition, there were numerous clashes between the Palestinian Progressive 
and the SLA in which UNIFIL has been involved. Although the UN troops installed 
themselves in the north of 'Hadadland', they were unable to separate the SLA 
completely from its Palestinian Progressive opponents because a gap remained in the 
narrow Litani Valley aroimd the Beaufort Castle, allowing the two sides to cross 
swords. This gap was also one of the principal routes of Israeli penetration during 
Operation Peace in Galilee. *^^ In 1996, UNIFIL was comprised of six thousand men, 
of whom five thousands were soldiers. It consisted at that time of six battalions (from 
Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Nepal and Norway) and four logistical detachments 
(from France, Italy, Poland and Norway).'^ ^ 
The Second Israeli Invasion 1982 (Operation Peace for Galilee) 
In 1981, when Begin was re-elected, the real interests of Israel, the creation of 
a Christian state, was planned. The Defence Minister Arial Sharon began planning the 
invasion of Lebanon when he assumed office in July 1981.* '^ In that very same year 
125 Ahron Bregtnan, Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947 (London: Routledge, 2003) p. 151. 
'^ * Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, The New A-Z of the Middle East (London: LB. Tauris, 2004) 
p.312. 
' " Ariel Sharon (bom Ariel Scheinermann on February 26, 1928) is a former Israeli Prime Minister 
and military leader. Sharon served as Prime Minister from March 2001 until April 2006, though the 
powers of his office were exercised by Minister of Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert following 
Sharon's massive stroke on January 4, 2006. At that time, Sharon fell into a coma; as of August 2008, 
he is in a persistent vegetative state. During his lengthy career, Sharon was a highly controversial figure 
among many factions, both uiside and outside Israel. Some of his critics have sought to prosecute him 
as a war criminal for alleged crimes related to the Sabra and Shatila massacre during the 1982 Lebanon 
War. Sharon lost his post as Defense Minister as a result, but remained in the cabinet as minister 
without portfolio. Sharon continued as a leading figure in the Likud Party, and held various senior 
cabinet and party posts, ultimately becoming party leader in 1999 and Prime Minister in 2001. During 
his tenure as Prime Minister, Sharon's policies caused a rift within the Likud Party, and he ultimately 
left Likud to form a new party called Kadima. He became the fu-st Prime Minister of Israel who did not 
belong to either Labor or Likud—the two parties that have traditionally dominated Israeli politics. The 
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Israel had contemplated another attempt, but as American negotiator Philip Habib 
arranged a ceasefire the plans had to be postponed until 1982. Sharon even visited 
Beirut incognito to survey the plans for "Operation Peace for Galilee". 
The next step was to get US consent for the invasion. Sharon visited the US 
and met Alexander Haig, the then Secretary of State, to discuss the plans with him. 
The response was positive, for Haig commented after the invasion that it was "a great 
strategic opportunity" and "America's moment in the West Asia" to restructure 
Lebanon by getting rid of "an international terrorist organization." The third step was 
to create a pretext for the invasion. From April 1982, Israeli forces began looking for 
a cause, but despite various provocations, could not force the PLO to retaliate. On 3 
June 1982, Palestinian guimien of the Abu Nidal group shot the Israeli Ambassador to 
London, ShIomo Argov, and seriously injured him.'^^ Israeli forces started shelling 
southern Lebanon and West Beirut. The PLO retaliated, giving the reason for which 
Israel was looking. Israel's objectives in Lebanon go beyond their claims to 
"retaliation" or "buffer zone". One must understand that besides the contradictions 
that arose between the regional considerations mentioned earlier vis-a-vis the US and 
Israel, the other Israeli objectives in invading Lebanon as given by B. J. Odeh were: 
1. To break the backbone of the LNM-PLO alliance. 
2. To strengthen the Right-wing forces in Lebanon so that they could have 
the upper hand in the Lebanese Presidential election that year. 
3. To defeat Syria militarily. 
4. To crush the PLO and the LNM. 
new party created by Sharon, with Olmert having stepped in as its leader, after Sharon fell ill in the 
mids of election season, won the most Knesset seats in the 2006 elections, and is now the senior 
coalition partner in the Israeli government. 
'^ * Edgar O'Ballance, The Palestinian Intifada (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998) pp. 10-11. 
Abu Nidal (Arabic "Fatiier of the Struggle") bom May 1937, Jaffa, Palestine [now Tel Aviv-Yafo, 
Israel] died August 16?, 2002, Baghdad, Iraq. Byname of Sabri Khalil al-Banna, militant leader of the 
Fatah Revolutionary Council, more commonly known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), or Abu 
Nidal Group, a Palestinian organization that engaged in numerous acts of terrorism begirming in the 
mid-1970s. 
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For Israel hoped these objectives would allow it to: 
1. Sign a peace treaty with a Lebanese Right-wing government. 
2. Negotiate a phony autonomy with Israeli selected Palestinians who would 
be willing to sign away Palestinian national rights to Israel. 
3. Aimex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
4. Bridge the diplomatic gap and any secondary misunderstanding between 
Israel and the US that had arisen on the basis of the Camp David 
Accords.'^' 
5. Rest assured that it had quelled the revolutionary process in the area 
whose storm centre has been the LNM-PLO.'^ " 
The invasion of Lebanon commenced on 6 June 1982 with combmed sea, air 
and land-based attacks. (See Map No. 14) This was labelled as a war against terrorists, 
but the main casualties were innocent men, women and children.* '^ Israel began its 
three-month siege of Beirut. Intense fighting inflicted severe hardships on West 
Beirut's 600,000 civilian population, but the PLO was finally forced to withdraw fi-om 
Beirut.'^ ^ The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, however, succeeded in driving out 
the PLO, after a strong resistance, to a new homeland in Tunisia. A Multinational 
Force (MNF) was established to oversee the PLO withdrawal on 1 September was 
anxious to complete its mission, and itself left Beirut on 10 September, leaving the 
Palestinian civilians unprotected.^ "^* In July 1983 Israel, faced v^ ath mounting 
'^ ' Camp David Accords: Documents signed by the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, and the Prime 
Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, at Camp David, USA, in 1978. They were a preliminary to the 
signing of the formal peace treaty (1979) between the two countries. 
'^°B.J.Odeh,N.118,p.201. 
'^ ' Asaf Hussain, N.l 13, pp.l67-I68. 
"^KaiIC.Ellis,N.6,p.l3. 
' " Asaf Hussain, N.l 17, p.l69. 
"" John Mackinlay, N.123, p.76. 
Multinational Forces (MNF) in Beirut 1982-1984. 
(a) MNF 1 consisted of 2,000 troops from the US, France and Italy deployed to Beirut between 25 
Aug. 1982 and 10 Sept. 1982. Their task was to oversee the withdrawal of the armed 
Palestinian forces from Beirut. They deployed at the request of the Lebanese government. 
(b) MNF 2 consisted initially of 2,000 froops from France, 2,000 troops from Italy and 1,700 from 
the US who were later joined by a British contingent of 110 troops. These forces were 
deployed to Beirut directly after the massacres of the Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila and 
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casualties, began unilaterally to pull back its forces south of the Awali River and to 
reduce the number of troops deployed in Lebanon. (See Map No. 15) In the wake of 
the departing Israelis, fighting between rival Lebanese militias, particularly the 
Phalangists and the Druze, intensified. At first the 5,800-strong Multmational Force 
(composed mainly of French, Italian and US troops) attempted to keep the peace 
between opposing factions in Beirut, but it steadily abandoned its neutral peace-
keeping role, and came under attack fi-om Muslim militias and suicide bombers 
suspicious of its support for a Christian-led Government and the presence off shore of 
US naval forces. The force's position became increasingly untenable and in early 
1984 the US and its allies decided to withdraw their troops from Beirut. A cursory 
glance of the table 4 given below indicates the pattern of PLO evacuation from Beirut 
as follows: 
remained in the city at the request of the Lebanese government until spring 1984. Each 
contingent was autonomous in its command and logistically self-supporting. 
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Table-4 
PLO Evacuation from Beirut 
Destination 
Jordan 
Iraq 
Tunisia 
South Yemen 
Syria 
Sudan 
Cyprus and Greece 
(wounded only) 
Greece 
Algeria 
Biqa Valley 
Lebanon - some 
crossed into Syria 
North Yemen 
Lebanese 
count 
265 
132 
982 
700 
594 
570 
697 
1751 
727 
764 
1,500 
445 
395 
682 
488 
167 
63 
588 
1,500 
1,200 
446 
Israeli 
count 
265 
132 
973 
518 
575 
538 
680 
1,351 
760 
762 
1,280 
423 
359 
720 
472 
167 
61 
560 
2,029 
1,574 
415 
Means of 
evacuation 
Ship to Cyprus 
then plane 
Ship to Cyprus 
then plane 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Truck 
Ship 
Ship 
Truck 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship 
Ship to Cyprus 
Truck 
Truck 
Ship 
Date of 
evacuation 
Aug 21 
Aug 21 
Aug 22 
Aug 23 
Aug 24 
Aug 25 
Aug 26 
Aug 27 
Aug 27 
Aug 28 
Aug 29 
Aug 29 
Aug 31 
Sepl 
Aug 25 
Aug 26 
Aug 30 
Aug 30 
Aug 30 
Aug 31 
Aug 31 
Affiliation 
of evacuees 
Pal. Lib. 
Army 
Arab Lib. 
Front 
Varied 
Varied 
Varied 
Varied 
As-Saiqa 
PLA 
Varied 
Varied 
PLA 
As-Saiqa 
Varied 
Varied 
Al-Fatah 
Varied 
Al-Fatah 
Al-Fatah 
Syrian 
Army 
Syrian 
Army 
Al-Fatah 
Source: The New York Times, September 2,1982 
Sabra and Shatiia Massacres 1982 
Shortly after Israel invaded Lebanon on 6 June 1982, the Israel Defense Force 
(IDF) laid siege to Beirut. A ceasefire accord reached in August allowed the entry into 
West Beirut of a Multinational Force (MNF), including a contingent of US Marines. 
Following a US pledge to protect Palestinian civilians, PLO fighters and officials 
departed the city, as did the MNF.'^ ^ The day after the President of Lebanon, Bashir 
135 John Mackinlay, N.123, p.76. 
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Gemayel, was assassinated (14 September), Israel sent troops into West Beirut, where 
they surrounded two Palestinian refugee camps in violation of the cease-fire 
agreement. Defense Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan arranged 
for the Israel-supported Phalange militia to enter the camps to clear out what Sharon 
described as "2,000-3,000 terrorists who remained behind. We even have their 
names."'^ ^ The Phalangist on this pretext and provocation murdered hundreds of 
Palestinians, mostly women, children, and older men. Israel put the figure of 800; 
other sources estimated it at 1,500.'^ ' (See Map No. 16,17) 
The international community condemned Israel's role in the mass killing, and 
up to 400,000 Israelis (8 percent of the population) demonstrated against the 
government of Menachem Begin and demanded a judicial inquiry. A three-man Israeli 
commission foimd that Israeli officials were "indirectly responsible" because they 
arranged for the Phalange, (moral enemies of the Palestinians), to enter the camps 
and, even though Israeli officers and government officials received reports about the 
atrocities, they ignored them and allowed the Phalange to extend their stay in the 
camps. The UN commission subsequently also charged that under international 
law, Israel was directly responsible because the camps were under its jurisdiction as 
an occupying power and because the IDF planned and facilitated its ally's entry into 
and activities in the camps, prevented survivors from leaving the camps, and did not 
stop the mass killings after hearing about it. Despite the findings of both 
commissions, no one was prosecuted.'^ ^ 
"* Kirsten E. Schulze, N.18, pp.137-138. 
' " Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'arii Israel's Lebanon War (London: George Allen&Unwin, 1984) 
pp.266-268. 
"* Ahron Bregman, N.125, pp. 177-178. 
" ' Philip Mattar, ed., Encyclopedia of the Modem Middle East and North Africa, v.3 (Maine: 
Thomson Gale, 2004) pp. 1954-1955. 
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Lebanese - Israeli Peace Treaty 1983 
Under US pressure. President Amine Gemayel, soon after assuming office in 
September 1982, agreed to enter into talks with Israel provided the US acted as the 
mediator. This led to an agreed draft of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel in 
early May 1983 known as 17* May Agreement of 1983.''^ ° ft formally ended the state 
of war between the two countries, and banned Lebanon from allowing the use of its 
territory or airspace for the passage of troops or military equipment from any state 
that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel.''*' It also required Lebanon to 
abrogate any regulations, laws or treaties that were in conflict with the Lebanese-
Israeli accord, including all the commitments that Lebanon had made as a founder 
member of the Arab League since 1945.''*^ It curtailed the Lebanese government's 
power to station troops between the Zahrani and Awali rivers, and required it to 
recognize the Israeli-backed Christian militia, commanded by Major Saad Hadad, as 
the sole force authorized to patrol the area up to Zahrani, and allow the stationing of 
Lebanese-Israeli supervisory teams charged with detecting and destroying any armed 
guerrillas in the area.'''^  
The document was denounced by left-of-centre forces in Lebanon and Syrian 
President Hafez Asad. Its passing by 64 Lebanese members of parliament (to two 
opposing), followed by the signing of it by Israel, made little difference to their 
''"' Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) p.l45. 
"" Lawrence Ziring, N.74, p.332. 
'''^  The founding member states of Arab League were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan (now 
Jordan), Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Other members are Libya (1953); The Sudan (1956); Tunisia and 
Morocco (1958); Kuwait (1961); Algeria (1962); Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE (1971); 
Mauritania (1973); Somalia (1974); the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; 1976); Djibouti 
(1977); and the Comoros (1993). (When Yemen was a divided country, from 1967 to 1990, the two 
regimes were separately represented). 
'"' Avraham Sela, ed., N.108, p.481. 
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stance. They continued to express their opposition publicly. Protesting at Israel's 
continued occupation of a large part of Lebanon in the aftermath of June 1982 Israeli 
invasion. President Gemayel withheld his signature on the treaty.''*'* Further, following 
a truck-bombing of their military barracks that resulted in 300 US and French deaths 
in October 1983, the four leading Western nations withdrew their peace-keeping 
contingents from Beirut in February 1984, Gemayel found himself without his 
Western guardians.'''^ However, after the departure of the foreign troops who had 
supported Gemayel's Government, he traveled to Damascus on 29 February and gave 
in to Syria's demands: he annulled the Agreement with Israel on 5 March, as the pre-
conditioned price for the resumption of the reconciliation process, and Syrian 
guaranteed internal security in Lebanon.''*^ 
The Geneva - Lausanne Conference 1983-1984 
From the outset, the Geneva meeting was stalemated. The Muslim participants 
and Suleiman Franjieh, with encouragement from the Syrian representative, insisted 
on the abrogation of the May 17* 1983 Agreement and on forcing Israel's withdrawal 
before attending to Lebanon's domestic conflict issues. The meeting's only 
accomplishment was the definition, by consensus, of Lebanon's identity as an 
independent and sovereign Arab state. 
During the Lausaime meeting, following the abrogation of the May 17* 
Agreement in March 1984, two visions of Lebanon were discussed. Members of the 
Lebanese Front proposed for the establishment of a federal system composed of 
confessionally homogeneous units. Muslim participants submitted a joint settlement 
""DilipHiro,N.14,p.l83. 
"' Nicholas Comfort, Brewer's Politics: A Phrase and Fable Dictionary (London: Cassell pic, 1995) 
p.39. 
146 1 
' Lucy Dean, ed., N.94, p.697. 
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plan that proposed elimination of political sectarianism, administrative 
decentralization, limiting the powers of the president and expanding the powers of the 
coimcil of ministers. Clearly, the leadership of the Lebanese Front was demanding 
political decentralization (a federal system) to counter the demands of the Muslim 
leadership for the elimination of political sectarianism. (Abolishment of political 
sectarianism would undermine the Maronite leader's privileged status in the political 
system and relegate them to a minority position.) Similarly, Muslim participants were 
demanding the complete elimination of the sectarian system to counter the Maronite 
establishment's resistance to any reform.''*^ During the deliberations, it became 
evident that agreement was possible on a broad number of necessary reforms. 
Unfortunately, differences over the relative powers of the president, on the one hand, 
and the council of ministers and prime minister, on the other, prevented participants 
from approving an accord that could have settled the Civil War. On this issue, 
participants remained divided along religious lines.''** 
The Geneva-Lausanne Conference was the only forum that Lebanon's leading 
political figures attended in person, and in which they had an opportimity to fully 
articulate their positions in uninterrupted negotiations. This occasion was also the 
closest that Lebanese leaders ever came to reaching an agreement. Although the 
conference disbanded without adopting a mutually acceptable agreement - testimony 
to the continued strength of sectarian rivalries and suspicions - the common groxmd 
between the various factions had expanded. 
"" Avraham Sela, ed., N.108, p.483. 
'"•' Deirdre Ceilings, ed., Peace for Lebanon?: from War to Reconstruction (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1994)pp.25-26. 
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The Damascus Tripartite Agreement 1985 
The deadlock reached at Lausanne signaled an end to hopes for national 
dialogue and reconciliation at the hands of the traditional elite. Lebanon's most 
prominent oligarchs seemed unwilling, to make the concessions required to resolve 
internal differences. In the aftermath of the Lausanne conference, fighting erupted on 
many fronts and among various factions, including former allies. Syria attempted a 
new approach to peacemaking. The leaders of the three major militias, Elie Hobeiqa 
(Lebanese Forces, LF), Nabih Berri (Amal), and Walid Jumblat (Progressive Socialist 
Party, PSP), met in Damascus to negotiate a settlement plan.''*^ 
The resulting Tripartite Agreement departed radically from former peace plans 
in several areas, especially in its call for the abolition of the sectarian system and for 
the definition of a special relationship with Syria. Following a transitional period, the 
sectarian system of representation in the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches 
of government would be totally abolished. Even the three highest offices - president, 
prime minister, and speaker of the parliament - would no longer be apportioned on a 
sectarian basis. A senate would be created, and each muhafazah (district) would 
become an electoral district. With respect to Syria, the agreement considered the 
establishment of distinctive relations with Syria to be the test of Lebanon's 
"Arabism," and called for strategic complementarity between the two countries.'^" 
The Tripartite Agreement^ however, was short-lived. Two weeks after its 
signing, Samir Ja'ja led a rebellion that removed Elie Hobeiqa from the leadership of 
the Lebanese Forces (LF), and annulled the accord.'^' Nevertheless, the plan's two 
"" Avraham Sela, ed., N.108, p.485. 
150 Deirdre CoUings, ed., N.148, p.26. 
Samir Ja'ja: Bom in 1952, came to prominence after a 1978 raid on a rival Maronite Christian clan 
leader which split the Maronites and still haunts the LF to date. Seized control of Lebanese Forces in 
131 
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new elements (phased abolition of sectarianism and special relations with Syria) 
became key issues to be taken care of in future negotiations. 
The Resurgence of the PLO and the 'War of the Camps' 
In the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985, fighting was 
renewed between Christian and Muslim militias along the 'Green Line', which had 
effectively divided east and west Beirut between Christian and Muslim communities 
since early 1984. 
The withdrawal of Israeli Forces also facilitated the return of an estimated 
5,000 Palestinian guerrillas to Lebanon, as the PLO, under Chairman Arafat, was 
attempting to re-establish its power base there. Syria was strongly opposed to the PLO 
revival in Lebanon because the presence of Palestinian guerrillas loyal to Arafat 
challenged its own hegemony over the coimtry and efforts to bring the Palestinian 
resistance movement under Syrian control. Amal also wanted to prevent the PLO 
from re-establishing itself in Lebanon, fearing that this would provoke new Israeli 
reprisal raids and challenge its own control over southern Lebanon. 
Subsequently in May 1986, fighting between Palestinian guerrillas and Amal 
militiamen for control of the refugee camps in south Beirut escalated. In June, a 
cease-fire was imposed around the Beirut camps, as part of a Syrian-sponsored peace 
plan for Muslim west Beirut. The deployment of Lebanese and Syrian troops in west 
Beirut succeeded temporarily in curbing the activities of the Amal, Druze and Sunni 
militias in the area, but failed to prevent fighting across the 'Green Line'. In October 
there was further conflict between Amal and Palestinian fighters around refugee 
1986 and given five life terms for murder, including 1987 killing of PM Rashid Karami and of National 
Liberal Party leader Dany Chamoun in 1990. In 1994, Ja'ja was arrested and spent 11 years in solitary 
confinement. He was the only Lebanese wartime leader to be punished Oailed) for crimes during the 
15-year civil war, which ended in 1991. He was pardoned on 18 July 2005, then in October 2005 to 
become president of the Executive Committee of the Lebanese Forces. 
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camps in Tyre, Sidon and Beirut. A Syrian-supervised cease-fire at the camps entered 
effect in April 1987 but was short-lived.'" In May the Lebanese National Assembly 
voted to annul the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which defined and regulated the PLO's 
activities and legitimized its presence in Lebanon.'^ ^ In September, Amal and the 
PLO announced an agreement to end the 'War of the Camps', in which more than 
2,500 people had died. However, differences over the withdrawal of some 5,000-
8,000 Palestinian guerrillas led to renewed fighting to the east of Sidon by October. In 
January 1988, avowedly as a gesture of support for the uprising {Intifada) by 
Palestinians resident in Israeli-occupied territories, which had begun the previous 
month, the Amal leader, Nabih Berri, announced an end to the siege of the Palestinian 
refugee camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon.'^ '' 
After having its withdrawal fi"om the Palestinian camps, Amal turned its forces 
against its rival, Hezbollah, and sporadic fighting occurred between the two militias in 
Beirut and southern Lebanon for control over areas of Shiite population. In May 1988, 
Syrian troops encircled the southern suburbs of Beirut to enforce a Syrian- and 
Iranian-mediated cease-fire agreement between Amal and Hezbollah.'^ ^ 
'^ ^ ne Europa World Year Book 2000,41'' Edition (London: Europa Publications, 2000) p.2236. 
' " Lucy Dean, ed., N.94, p.698. 
'^ ne Europa World Year Book 2000, N.152, p.2236. 
The First Intifada (1987 - 1993) (also "intifada" and "war of the stones") was a mass Palestinian 
uprising against Israeli rule that began in the Jabalia refugee camp and quickly spread throughout Gaza, 
the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Palestinian actions ranged from civil disobedience to violence. In 
addition to general strikes, boycotts on Israeli products, graffiti, and barricades, Palestinian 
demonstrations that included stone-throwing by youths against the heavily-armed Israeli Defense 
Forces brought the Intifada international attention. Intra-Palestinian violence was also a prominent 
feature of the Intifadfi, with widespread executions of alleged Israeli collaborators contributing ahnost 
half of the death toll among Palestinians. Over the course of the first Intifada, an estimated 1,100 
Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces and 160 Israelis were killed by Palestinians. In addition, an 
estimated 1,000 Palestinians were assassinated by their own people as alleged collaborators, although 
fewer than half had any proven contact with the Israeli authorities. 
' " Lucy Dean, ed., N.94, p.698. 
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Although Lebanon's involvement in regional crises was not the underlying 
cause of its civil unrest, it has played an important part in sparking the problems 
Lebanon has endured since its independence. Lebanon was unable to isolate itself 
from the chronic Palestinian-Israeli crisis, nor could it find any effective way to deal 
with the presence of Palestinian refugees. Lebanon is struggling to recover from the 
effects of the many conflicts and wars that have plagued the country for several years 
and produced thousands of its own internal refugees. While Lebanon's energies will 
be occupied with these problems, the future of the Palestinians in Lebanon will 
continue to be a source of uncertainly and contention. 
The uneasy balances within its own constitutional arrangement forced the 
Lebanese to live with the escalating cycles of Palestinian-Israeli violence. The intense 
polarization that the Palestinian issue caused among dissatisfied elements during the 
civil war has given way to a broad national consensus - at least on the surface - that 
the Palestinian problem should not be settled at Lebanon's expense. This consensus 
has been reached despite the continued non-resolution of the underlying causes of the 
Lebanese conflict - social disparity, political representation and confessionalism. 
Lebanon's association with Syria has not been fully defined, and its future 
relationship with Israel awaits the resumption of the peace negotiations. The broader 
Arab-Israeli conflict and the slowness of the regional peace process will continue to 
complicate Lebanon's relations with its neighbours, Syria and Israel, as well as the 
fate of the Palestinians living in Lebanon. 
CHAPTER - IV 
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CHAPTER-IV 
1989 TAIF ACCORD AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
1. Taif Accord and Lebanese Second Republic 
LI Back^ound of the Accord 
The end of Amine Gemayel presidency in September 1988 presented another 
challenge for Lebanon. The Lebanese political factions, Syria, and the US had failed 
to agree on the election of an acceptable successor. Consequently, in the closing hours 
of his term, Amine Gemayel created a constitutional crisis by appointing General 
Michel Aoun as interim prime minister. Aoun's appointment was not recognized by 
the Lebanese opposition or Syria. Complicating matters, the incumbent Simni prime 
minister, Salim al-Hoss, refused to step down and in turn claimed executive power. 
Lebanon's internal divisions were now mirrored in these two legal authorities. 
Initially, General Aoun attempted to broaden his base of support among the 
Christian and Muslim populations. He appealed to their common sense of Lebanese 
identity and blamed outside forces for their misery. His goals of national unity, rule of 
law, sovereignty, and the withdrawal of all foreign forces (Syrian) from Lebanon were 
greeted enthusiastically by the Christian community, and received the cautious 
support of the Muslims.* 
When Gen. Michel Aoun declared his War of Liberation against Syria on 14 
March 1989, he set in motion events that led directly to the resolutions adopted by 
Arab leaders at the Casablanca Summit on 26-29 May 1989.^ These resolutions 
' Kail C. Ellis, Lebanon: "Lebanon: The Struggle of a Small Country in a Regional Context", Arab 
Studies Quarterly, v.21, n.l, winter 1999, p. 15. 
^ Eric V. Thompson, "Will Syria Have to Withdraw from Lebanon?" The Middle East Journal, v.56, 
n.l, winter 2002, p.80. 
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provided for creation of a Tripartite Arab High Commission comprising the kings of 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia and the president of Algeria; notably, Syria was excluded. 
On 30 July 1989, the commission released a report criticizing Syria as an obstacle to 
the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty. Syria's protest at this juncture halted the 
Arab mediation effort.^  
At the beginning of September 1989, however, as the follow up the 
commission resumed its effort, conducting negotiations in Beirut and Damascus (and 
to some extent between Beuiit and Damascus) before convening a meeting of sixty-
two (thirty-one Christians and thirty-one Muslims) of the seventy-three surviving 
members of Lebanon's ninety-nine deputies of the Lebanese National Assembly, 
(originally elected in 1972) in Taif, Saudi Arabia on 30 September 1989. At Taif, the 
Lebanese deputies examined a draft agreement that was proposed at Casablanca 
Summit as a basis for the resolution of conflict in Lebanon.'' 
Out of the Taif meeting came a Document of National Understanding, better 
known as the Taif Accord. Although calling for the abolition of confessionalism in the 
long run (a promise that was not to be taken too seriously), this path-breaking 
agreement preserved, for the immediate future, the principle of dividing political 
offices among the coimtry's various sects. However, it redistributed power among 
' Hussein Sirriyeh, Adelphi Papers 243, Lebanon: Dimensions of Conflict (London: Brassey's for the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, autumn, 1989) pp.24-25. 
As fer as immediate factors are concerned, the Taif Accord sprang from the conjunction of three major 
failures: the ^ilure of Gen. Aoun's was or liberation against Syria; the failure of Syria to impose a 
solution acceptable to all of Lebanon's communities, especially the Maronite Christians; and finally, 
the failure of attempts to resolve the conflict through international intervention. 
* Deirdre Collings, ed.. Peace for Lebanon?: From War to Reconstruction (Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1994) p.33. 
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them in a way that reflected more accurately the country's new demographic and 
political realities.^ 
Throughout the Cold War, the bitter rivalry between the US and the Soviet 
Union - particularly in the West Asia - precluded an international solution to the 
Lebanese problem. When Soviet power collapsed, leaving the US as the sole 
superpower in the West Asia, a US-sponsored solution, effected through a close and 
reliable Arab ally, became possible.^ Although purely fortuitous, the choice of Saudi 
Arabia as site for the Lebanese reconciliation meetings did symbolize a significant 
change. Saudi Arabia's role as host and sponsor of the talks signified, in effect, a shift 
in general political influence away fi-om the Syrian and toward the Saudis.' 
1.2 Provisions of the Taif Accord 
A. New Lebanese Order 
The Taif Accord modified the "rules of the game" of the First Republic but did 
not alter its basic charter. Postwar Lebanon - in form - thus remained more-or-less a 
consociational democracy. Sectarian proportionality was still there, but the proportion 
of Muslim to Christian legislators and officials had been increased to 50-50. The 
President of the Republic thus remains for the foreseeable future a Maronite Christian, 
but his powers have been substantially reduced. The Prime Minister remains a Simni 
* Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeiix, and Robert Springborg, Legislative Politics in the Arab World: 
The Resurgence of Democratic Institutions (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) p.94. 
* Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a 
Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997) p.l36. 
' Deirdre Collings, ed., N.4, p.33. 
Saudi Arabia was not a new player on the Lebanese scene. Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia had acted 
as a force for compromise and had played a useful mediating role. It was at the Arab League summit in 
Riyadh (17-18 October 1976) that the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) was created as part of an Arab 
effort to help restabilize Lebanon; Saudi Arabia initially contributed troops to ADF ranks, and, as a 
contributor to ADF, participated in the 1978 conference at Beit Eddin convened to address the growing 
crisis in Lebanese Christian-Syrian relations. It also formed part of the quadripartite Arab Vigilance 
Committee responsible for implementing the resolutions on Lebanon passed at the Arab summit in 
Tunis, 20-22 November 1979. By the time of Lebanon's 1989 crisis, Saudi Arabia was well positioned 
to step again into the Lebanese arena, taking full advantage of its reputation as a privileged mediator. 
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Muslim, but the powers of the Council of Ministers, which he chairs, have been 
increased. The office of President of the Chamber of Deputies still goes to a Shiite, 
but his term has been increased from one year to four, and so has his influence. The 
power of the Chamber itself is increased by the elimination of the old provision 
allowing the Executive to pass "urgent" legislation v^thout parliamentary 
involvement. At the same time, Taif explicitly calls for a gradual phasing out of 
political sectarianism. 
B. Disarming of Militias and Restoration of the Central Government Authority 
The charter envisaged for the election of a President and the formation of a 
new government.^ A further provision was the implementation of two security plans 
in Lebanon, one within six months and the other within twenty-four months. For a 
maximimi period of two years, the Syrian army would then assist the new government 
in implementing the security plan.*" As for Lebanon's relations with Syria, the Accord 
envisaged that Syrian troops accordingly would leave Beirut and be redeployed in the 
Lebanese Biqa Valley within two years of the formal ratification of the Accord.'* 
C. Taif Accord and Israel's Withdrawal from South Lebanon. 
Finally, with respect to Lebanon's relations with Israel, the Taif Accord called 
for implementation of UN Resolution 425 that demands the withdrawal of Israeli 
* Thomas Scheffler, "Religious Coininunalism and Democratization: The Development of Electoral 
Law in Lebanon" Orient, 2003, pp.22-23. 
' W. B. Fisher, Hie Middle East and North Africa 1992 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1991) 
p.649. 
'" Lucy Dean, ed., Middle East and North Africa 2006 (London: Routledge, Taylor & Frances Group, 
2005) P.699. 
" Michael C. Hudson, "Lebanon After Taif: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, v.21, n.l, winter 1999, p.28. 
Two years later, with a new president and cabinet in place, the Syrian refiised to redeploy on the 
ground that all the political reforms (by which they meant begiiming the process of desectarianization) 
had not yet been achieved. Furthermore, as long as Israel controlled its self-styled "security zone" in 
southern Lebanon, Syria could justify keeping its own military presence in the country. 
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troops from the south Lebanon, hi so far as Lebanon's legal relations with Israel are 
concerned, Taif calls for the resurrection to the 1949 Israeli-Lebanese armistice. In the 
interim, "all necessary steps will be taken to liberate Lebanese territory from Israeli 
occupation."'^  
1.3 Resistance of the Taif Accord 
A. General Michel Aoun's Rejection of Taif Accord 
After the signing of the Taif Accord, General Aoun remained Syrians' last 
significant opponent in Lebanon. He opposed the Accord, and in fact obstructed its 
implementation, at least m the territory under his control. The Syrians exercised 
restraint for a long period out of concern that direct Syrian action against Aoun might 
cause a bloodbath and arouse opposition within Lebanon and, more important, in the 
1 "X 
Arab and international arena. Only at the end of 1990, the conditions ripened for the 
Syrians to make a military move against Aoun. 
First, by this time they had successfiilly won the support of most of the 
political and military forces in Lebanon for the Taif Accord, including Hezbollah and 
even the "Lebanese Forces" under Samir Ja'ja, and the Maronite reUgious 
establishment m Bkerki (the seat of the Maronite patriarch). At the beginning of 
October, President Hrawi officially requested Syrian assistance to rid them of the 
Maronite general.''' 
Second, during 1990 and particularly after outbreak of the Gulf crisis m 
August that year, Syria improved its image m the inter-Arab and international 
" Deirdre Collings, ed., N.4, pp.36-37. 
" Taru Bahl, M. H. Syed, Encyclopedia of Muslim World, v. 15 (New Delhi: Anmal Publications PVT. 
Ltd., 2003) p.2. 
" Walid Phares, Lebanese Christian Nationalism: The Rise and Fall of an Ethnic Resistance 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1995) pp. 169-170. 
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arenas.'^ Its joining the US-led anti-Iraq coalition led to warmer ties with Western 
countries, especially the US. The Syrians apparently received the green light to move 
against Aoun during James Baker's visit to Damascus in September 1990. 
On 13 October 1990, Syrian troops attacked Aoun's enclave around the 
Baabda presidential palace in Beirut and after capturing it took over all of East Beirut. 
Aoun himself took refiige in the French embassy, and later went into exile in France. 
B. Dany Chamoun as Aoun Supporter 
Eight days after the capture of Aoim's enclave, Dany Chamoim, the son of 
Camille Chamoim, fell to the hand of an assassin, apparently sent by Syrian 
intelligence. He was murdered in October 1990, with his wife and two small sons, 
during the takeover of Beirut by the army and the pro-Syrian militias. Dany Chamoun 
was a leading supporter of Aoun and hence one of Syria's principal remaining 
enemies in Lebanon. His assassination was a clear signal from Damascus that it was 
intractable on the issue of implementing the Taif Accord and would tolerate no 
resistance either to the Accord or to Syria's own presence and influence in Lebanon.'^ 
^ The Persian Gulf War or Gulf War (2 August 1990-28 Febraary 1991) was a UN-authorized 
military conflict between Iraq and a coalition force from 34 nations commissioned with expelling Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait after Iraq's occupation and annexation of Kuwait in August of 1990. Though there 
were nearly three dozen member states of the coalition, the overwhehning majority of the military 
forces participating were from the US and the UK. 
" Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, Minorities and the State in the Arab World (London: Lynne 
Publishers, 1999) p. 125. 
" Eyal Zisser, Asad's Legacy: Syria in Transition (London: Hurst & Company, 2001) pp.140-141. 
On this matter see the announcement made by the US Ambassador in Damascus following the Syria 
attack on Michel Aoun, according to which Washington supported the implementation of the Taif 
Accords and stated that the Syrian move was intended to enable the Lebanese government to extend its 
sovereignty over all Lebanese teiritory; SANA, 24 October - OR, 25 October 1990. 
'* Yaacov Shimoni, Biographical Dictionary of the Middle East (New York: Facts On File, 1991) 
p.69. 
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C. The Shiite Muslim Resistances 
Resistance to the Taif Accord from the Shiite community in general and from 
Hezbollah and its Iranian masters in particular, stemmed from their concern lest it 
should benefit the Maronites and Simnis and create a threat to their own gains made 
during the protracted Civil War.'^  They perceived the compensation granted to the 
Shiite community - an increase in the power of Shiite speaker of parliament and his 
being placed, at least formally, on an equal footing with the Maronite president and 
Sunni prime minister - as grossly inadequate in view of the fact that Shiite 
community had become the largest in the country and, by virtue of its militia, the 
strongest as well. 
Furthermore, the process of rehabilitating the Lebanese state necessitated a 
return to the corridors of political power, and their transformation into the principal 
sphere in which struggles would thenceforth take place. Here, however, the Shiite had 
traditionally been at a disadvantage because, among other things, they had difficulty 
in - filling the political offices and positions of power allocated to them with educated 
members of their community. As a result, they were handicapped in the competition 
for a share of the national pie. 
Beyond weakening the Shiite community's position, the Taif Accord carried 
the seeds of a real threat to Hezbollah smce it claimed to breathe new life into the 
Lebanese polity, and to a significant extent succeeded in living up to this claim. Thus, 
the vacuum exploited for years by Hezbollah was being filled. Before the Accord, the 
lack of a living, breathing Lebanese entity had enabled that organization to propose its 
own alternative to the privation suffered by the members of Lebanon's Shiite 
" Reinhard Schulze, A Modem History of Islamic World (London: LB. Tauris, 2000) p.255. 
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commvmity - the Islamic alternative?" The Taif Accord gave a clear advantage to 
Hezbollah's rival organisation "Amal", which was prepared to reconcile itself to the 
existence of a Lebanese framework and hence was more capable of gaining a foothold 
within it. 
D. Iranian Government and the Taif Accord 
At the Taif conference, which began its meetings on 29 September 1989, a 
nimiber of Arab governments were represented, but Iran had not been invited -
despite and because of its deep involvement in Lebanese affairs. The Iranian 
government was worried about the future of Hezbollah and the prospects for the 
struggle against Israel, as the then foreign minister Ali-Akbar Velayati stated at a 
press conference on 4 October that Iran not optimistic, adding that since a majority of 
Lebanese were Muslims, government should be in their hands as well. The next day 
Rafsanjani told a visiting delegation of Lebanese and Palestinians that if Muslims at 
Taif voted in favour of Maronites, they would commit an act of treason against the 
'Muslim Nation of Lebanon'. Ironically, this put Iran in the same camp as Iraq, which 
also opposed Taif on the grounds that it left Syria's domination in Lebanon intact.^ ^ 
1.4 Ja'ja: Shifting Alliance 
The key element of change in the balance of the Syrian-Lebanese, then the 
intra-Lebanese, conflict was undoubtably the radical move taken by the Christian 
20 Eyal Zisser, N.17, pp.139-140. 
'^ Avraham Sela, ed., Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East (New York: Continuum, 1999) pp.34-
35. 
^ Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, ed., Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the last 500 years 
(London; I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2006) pp.2g7-28g. 
Saddam Hussein, who ended his war with Iran in 1988, was happily supplying both sides with weapons 
in order to undermine his rival Hafez Asad's position in Lebanon. (Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor, 
N. 16, p. 125). 
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militia leadership of Samir Ja'ja. This is commonly known as the LF-Damascus 
cooperation?^ 
Beyond ideology, no doubt, Ja'ja was also a pragmatic visionary. The Civil 
War forced him to choose between the survival of the militia's power (and thus his 
own) and his people. The power struggle over the Christian community did not end 
when its leaders were faced with a common, external enemy: the Syrian-Islamic 
alliance. To the surprise of many, Ja'ja sought an alliance with the "other side." When 
faced with the choice of either conceding to Aoun to stop the Syrians or conceding to 
the Syrians to eliminate the general, the Phalangist leader opted for the second choice. 
Ja'ja's argument focused on the "mistakes" of his foes instead of defending its 
deviation. In several open appeals to Hrawi's government and meetings with Syrian 
ofiScials, Ja'ja accepted the Taif Accord, including its stipulations erasing the 
objectives of the Lebanese Christian resistance. The pragmatist also agreed, no doubt 
with a little arm twisting, to a military collaboration with Damascus to oust Aoun 
from Baabda. The collaboration between Ja'ja and the Syrians started openly after a 
series of meetings took place between his aides and the Syrian intelligence in mid-
August 1990.^ '* 
" The shift, unprecedented since the outbreak of the Lebanese war in April 1975, was in complete 
contradiction to the behavior of the Christian camp, in general, and the Lebanese forces, in particular. 
In feet, since their founding in 1977, the LF were adamantly against the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
The militia, moreover, had constantly called for a political system that would ensure the recognition of 
the pluralistic nature of the Lebanese society; that is, acknowledgment of the non-Arab identity of the 
Christians. Indeed, it was Ja'ja's personal position on this issue that had earned him a reputation as one 
of the most extremist among the militia's leadership. It was his "Christian radicalism," in fact, that had 
promoted his leadership throughout the Intifada period. 
^* Walid Phares, N.14, pp.169-170. 
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2. Implementation of the Taif Accord 
2.1 President Rene Mouawad and His Assassination 
In an annex to the Taif Agreement, the Tripartite Arab Committee on Lebanon 
had appealed to the National Assembly to meet in November 1989 to ratify the charter 
and to elect a new President. The session of the National Assembly was duly held in 
the northern town of Qlaiaat on 5 November, when Ren6 Mouawad, a Maronite 
notable Christian deputy from Zagharta, (hometown of Suleiman Franjieh), and 
former Minister of Education and Arts, was elected as President.^ ^ Of the 58 votes 
cast in the second round of voting in the presidential election, Mouawad received 52, 
Georges Saade and Elias Hrawi, another Maronite Christian deputy, withdrew after 
the first roimd of voting. Deputies also unanimously endorsed the Taif Agreement and 
re-elected Hussein al-Husseini as President of the National Assembly. ^ ^ On 13 
^ Marius Deeb, Syria's Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process (New York: Palcrave 
Macmillan,2003)p.l72. 
^^  Speakers of the Parliament of Lebanon: By constitutional edict, the holder of this post must be a 
Shiite Muslim. However, several in the past (before independence) have been Christian. 
Before Independence 
Daoud Amoun: Sep 22, 1922 - Mar8, 1922 
Habib Assaad: May 25, 1922 - Oct 15, 1923 
Naoum Ubaki: Oct 15, 1923 - Oct 29, 1924 
Emile Edde: Oct 21, 1924 - Jan 13, 1925 
Moussa Namour: Jul 13, 1925 - Oct 18, 1927 
Mohammed Aljesr: Oct 18, 1927 - May 10, 1932 
Charles Debbas: Jan 30, 1934 - Oct 31, 1934 
Petro Trad: Nov 10,1934 - Oct 21,1935 
Khaled Chehab: Oct 22,1935 - Jun 5,1937 
Petro Trad: Oct 29, 1937 - Sep 21, 1939 
After Independence 
Sabri Hmede: Sep 21, 1943 - Oct 22, 1946 
Habib Abou Chahla: Oct 22,1946 - Apr 7, 1947 
Sabri Hmede: Jun 9, 1947 - Mar 20,1951 
Ahmed Alassad: Jun 5, 1951 - May 30, 1953 
Adel Osseiran: Aug 13, 1953 - Oct 15,1959 
Sabri Hmede: Oct 20, 1959 - May 8, 1964 
Kamel Alassad: May 8, 1964 - Oct 20, 1964 
Sabri Hmede: Oct 20, 1964 - May 9,1968 
Kamel Alassad: May 9, 1968 - Oct 22, 1968 
Sabri Hmede: Oct 22, 1968 - Oct 20, 1970 
Kamel Alassad: Oct 20, 1970 - Oct 16, 1984 
Hussein el-Husseini: Oct 16, 1984 - Oct 20, 1992 
Nabih Berri: Oct 20, 1992 - present 
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November 1989, President Mouawad invited Dr. Salim al Hoss to form a 'government 
of national reconciliation.'^ ^ 
Rene Mouawad was President of Lebanon for less than three weeks. On 
Lebanon's Independence Day, 22 November 1989, he was killed by a car bomb in 
West Beirut on his way to a parade. Some twenty-three others had to lose their lives 
in this vicious act of determining power. Mouawad was not a major personality within 
Lebanon's Christian communiiy and seems to have been assassinated sixnpJy because 
he was the man chosen to hold the presidency under new constitutional formula. 
Although Mouawad was acceptable to Syria and the US, as well as to moderate 
Lebanese of both Christian and Muslim communities, he was obviously not 
" Yaacov Shimoni, N.18, p. 106. 
The Prime Ministers of Lebanon: By an unwritten agreement following independence, the holder of 
this post must be a Sunni Muslim. Several in the past 
Riad el-Solh: 25 Sep 1943 - 10 Jan 1945 
Abdul Hamid Karami: 10 Jan - 20 Aug 1945 
Sami el-Solh: 23 Aug 1945 - 22 May 1946 
Saadi al-Munla: 22 May -14 December 1946 
Riad el-Solh: 14 Decl946 - 14 Feb 1951 
Hussein al-Oweini: 14 Feb - 7 Apr 1951 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 7 Apr 1951 - 11 Feb 1952 
Sami el-Solh: 11 Feb - 9 Sep 1952 
Nazim al-Akkari: 10 Sep -14 Sep 1952 
Saeb Salam: 14 Sep -18 Sep 1952 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 24 Sep - 30 Sep 1952 
Khaled Chehab: 1 Oct 1952 -1 May 1953 
Saeb Salam: 1 May -16 Aug 1953 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 16 Aug 1953 - 16 Sep 1954 
Sami el-Solh: 16 Sep 1954 -19 Sep 1955 
Rashid Karami: 19 Sep 1955 - 20 Mar 1956 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 20 Mar -18 Nov 1956 
Sami el-Solh: 18 Nov 1956 - 20 Sep 1958 
Khalil al-Hibri: 20Sep - 24 Sep 1958 
Rashid Karami: 24 Sep 1958 -14 May 1960 
Ahmed Daouk: 14 May - 1 Aug I960 
Saeb Salam; 2 Aug 1960-31 Oct 196i 
Rashid Karami: 31 Oct 1961 - 20 Feb 1964 
Hussein al-Oweini: 20 Feb 1964-25 Jul 1965 
Rashid Karami: 25 Jul 1965-9 Apr 1966 
lave been Christian. 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 9 Apr - 2 Dec 1966 
Rashid Karami: 7 Dec 1966-8 Feb 1968 
Abdallah El-Yafi: 8 Feb 1968 - 15 Jan 1969 
Rashid Karami: 15 Jan 1969 -13 Oct 1970 
Saeb Salam: 13 Oct 1970 - 25 Apr 1973 
Amin al-Hafez: 25 Apr - 21 Jun 1973 
Takieddin el-Solh: 21 Jun 1973 - 31 Oct 1974 
Rashid el-Solh: 31 Oct 1974 - 24 May 1975 
Nureddin Rifai: 24 May - 30 Jun 1975 
Rashid Karami: 1 Jul 1975 - 8 Dec 1976 
Selim al-Hoss: 8 Dec 1976 - 20 Jul 1980 
Takieddin el-Solh: 20 Jul - 25 Oct 1980 
Shafik Wazzan: 25 Oct 1980 - 30 Apr 1984 
Rashid Karami: 30 Apr 1984-1 Jun 1987 
Selim al-Hoss: 2 Jun 1987 - 22 Sep 1988 
Michel Aoun: 22 Sep 1988 -13 Oct 1990 
Selim al-Hoss: 14 Oct 1990 - 24 Dec 1990 
Omar Karami: 24 Dec 1990-13 May 1992 
Rashid el-Solh: 13 May - 31 Oct 1992 
Rafiq al-Hariri: 31 Oct 1992-2 Dec 1998 
Selim al-Hoss: 2 Dec 1998 - 23 Oct 2000 
Rafjq aJ-Hariri: 23 Oct 2000 -2) Oct 2004 
Omar Karami: 21 Oct 2004 - 15 Apr 2005 
Najib Mikati: 15 Apr - 30 Jun 2005 
Fouad Siniora: 30 Jun 2005 - present 
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acceptable to Gen. Aoun. There were also those among the radicals who doubted his 
"Arabist" credentials?'' 
2.2 New President Elias Hrawi 
On 24 November 1989, immediately after the death of Ren6 Mouawad, 52 
deputies of the National Assembly convened a meeting and elected Elias Hrawi as the 
new President. Hrawi, son of a Maronite notable family of secondary importance, was 
known to be in league with the Syrians; despite of bis being close to Maronite leaders 
in many years. At the same session, deputies voted to extend the term of office of the 
National Assembly imtil the end of 1994. Thus, the rehabilitation of Lebanon's 
governmental institutions - the presidency, the government and the parliament - was 
complete and received a unanimous vote of confidence fi*om the National Assembly. 
On the Cabinet meeting, the newly formed government on 28 November 1989 also 
dismissed General Michel Aoun firom the post of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Lebanese army, and that General Emile Lahoud had been appointed in his place.^° 
*^ Charles Winslow, Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society (London: Routledge, 1996) 
p.274. 
To date, the identity of the assassins has remained unknown: They may have been Iranians or 
Hezbollah, seeking to express their opposition to the Taif Accord, with they viewed as injurious to the 
standing of the Shiite community and as a threat to Hezbollah's future. However, the finger of 
accusation also pointed at the Syrian who, it was claimed, were troubled by Ma'awwah's over-
independent nature and therefore quickly eliminated him. (Eyal Zisser, N.17, p. 139). 
^'MariusDeeb,N.25,p.l73. 
^° Carl L. Bankston III, ed.. World Conflicts: Asia and Middle East, v.2 (New Jersey: Salem Press, 
Inc, 2003) pp.336-337. 
General ^miie Jamil Lahoud (bom January 12, 1936) is a former President of Lebanon. He is the son 
of General Jamil Lahoud, a leader in the independence movement. His mother is of Armenian descent 
from the Armenian village of Kasab in Syria. Before being elected in 1998, he was Chief of Staff in the 
Army. Lahoud served under General Michel Aoun during the final years of the Lebanese Civil War 
(1975-90). After an Arab League-brokered cease-fire took effect, Lahoud crossed over into Syrian-
controlled west Beirut. A Maronite military officer was needed to assume the position of army 
commander for the West Beirut-based Lebanese government endorsed by the 1989 Taif Agreement. 
Lahoud was offered the position. He served in various posts in the military, including commander-in-
chief of the army Svm 1989 to 1998, and then ran for the presidency in 1998, after having the 
constitution amended to allow the army commander-in-chief to run for office within three years of 
holding that post. Under the Lebanese constitution, the President's term was limited to one six-year 
term. However, under continued pressure from Syria, in 2004, the parliament voted to extend his term 
for an additional three years to 2007 (his predecessor, Elias Hrawi, did the same). 
179 
2.3 Lebanese-Syrian Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination 1991 
In May 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of 'fraternity, cooperation and 
coordination.' The treaty was in tune of the Taif Agreement. The treaty declared that 
Syria and Lebanon had 'distinctive brotherly relations' based on their geographic 
propinqmty, similar history, common belonging, shared destiny and common 
interests, and specified the executive mechanism by which these relations were to be 
managed and developed. '^ 
Hafez Asad's speech delivered at the signing of the treaty expressed a sense of 
satisfaction and relief, and revealed his view of Lebanon, particularly over Syria's 
interests and goals there: 
"We [the Syrians] did not create [that which binds] us to Lebanon. [This 
bond] is God's handiwork. We all share a common history, a common 
geography, and [ties of] blood. Therefore, the ties we establish today 
between the two countries are a reflection of our common heritage. This 
heritage cannot be erased, nor will it disappear with the passage of time, 
for brothers are brothers, whether or not they live in the same house. We 
are one people, even if we live in two separate states. This is the truth, 
and no one can ignore it. Turning away from this truth does not serve the 
interests of either of the two independents states, or of the people who 
live in them."^ ^ 
The most important of these was the Higher Coxmcil, comprising the 
Presidents of Lebanon and Syria, their Prime Ministers, Deputy Prime Ministers and 
the presiding officers of their respective legislatures. The Higher Council assumed 
responsibility for the coordination and cooperation of the two states in political, 
economic, security, military and other spheres. Its decisions were to be binding, albeit 
within the constitutional and legal frameworks of both counties. The treaty, however, 
received a mixed welcome in Lebanese political circles. Opponents claimed that the 
'^ Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.699. 
32 EyalZisser,N.17,p.l29. 
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joint councils constituted a violation of Lebanese sovereignty and amounted, in effect, 
to Syria's annexation of Lebanon. In view of Syria's military strength, they regarded 
the treaty as unbalanced, and predicted grave consequences for Lebanon's 
independence, its democratic practices and its traditions. The Maronite Patriarch, 
Nasrallah Sfeir, warned that the treaty contravened the National Pact of 1943. 
Supporters of the treaty, however, argued that it did not affect Lebanese freedom, and 
that close relations with Syria were necessary for Lebanon's stability. In September 
1991, Lebanon and Syria formally concluded a security agreement, as envisaged in 
the bilateral accord, which permitted Lebanon and Syria to seek mutual military 
assistance in the event of a challenge to the stability of either country. In mid-October, 
President Hrawi travelled to Damascus to attend the first session of the Lebanese-
Syrian Higher Council. In late March 1992, Syrian forces began to withdraw from 
Beirut, in preparation for their redeployment in eastern Lebanon by September (in 
accordance with the Taif Agreement).^ ^ 
In many ways, the Lebanese-Syrian agreement of 22 May 1991 marked the 
close of a crucial chapter in the history of the countries' relationship. During this 
period Syria succeeded in implementing its strategic - and historical - goals in 
Lebanon, at the core of which was the acquisition of a position of influence and 
indeed fiill control over Lebanese affairs. Nevertheless, an examination of Syrian-
Lebanese relations in historical perspective is likely to show Syria's conduct in 
Lebanon, and especially its greater achievement with regard to Lebanon in recent 
years, in slightly different light from the prevailing view.^ '* For example in 1991, the 
Lebanese government, with Syrian backing, called for the disarming of the various 
" Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, pp.699-700. 
"Eyalzisser,N.17,p.l30. 
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militias, which did not oppose this move by the central government in Beirut, and 
even began transferring most of their activity from the military to the political sphere. 
Hezbollah received permission to continue to bear arms in South Lebanon for the 
purpose of carrying on the struggle against Israel, but in the rest of the country its 
members were prevented from carrying arms. In a parallel development, the Lebanese 
army began to deploy troops throughout the country, for example, in the southem 
region, as an additional step in restoring the sovereignty and authority of the central 
govemment.^ ^ The campaign of the Lebanese security forces, backed by Syria, against 
illegal drug growers and smugglers, along with the Beirut government's energetic 
activity against political opponents and opposition elements, illusfrated the 
determination the Lebanese government to impose its authority throughout the 
country, and its success at least in part.^ ^ 
2.4 Parliamentary Elections since 1992 
A. National Assembly Election 1992 (First after Taif Accord) 
On 16 July 1992 the National Assembly approved a new electoral law 
whereby, the number of seats in the Assembly was raised from 108 to 128, to be 
divided equally between Christian and Muslim deputies.^ ^ The Government's 
intention to conduct legislative elections in mid-1992 prompted Christian groups to 
threaten a boycott of the polls, since it was not certain that Syrian forces would have 
" Malcolm B. Russell, The Middle East and South Asia 2000 (West Virginia: Stryker-Post 
Publications, 2000) pp. 154-155. 
^' Eyal Zisser, N.17, pp.141-142. 
The dnig trade in Lebanon is not new. Soon after the Second World War the Italian Mafia set up 
heroin-refining laboratories in the Biqa Valley to process opium from Iran and Turkey. The start of the 
Civil War in 1975, with Christian and Muslim militias fighting each other and the Palestinians, set in 
motion the drugs-money-arms cycle. (Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: 
Forecasts and Remedies (London: Routledge, 1990) p.l03). 
" W.B. Fishers, The Middle East and North Africa 1994 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 
1993)p.616. 
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withdrawn to the eastern area of the Biqa valley by that time, in accordance with the 
Taif Accord. The Government, for its part, stated that the Lebanese army was not yet 
-JO 
able to guarantee the coimtry's security in the absence of Syrian troops. 
Despite these apprehensions of the Christian groups, Lebanon's first 
legislative elections (in 20 years) were held in three rounds, on 23 August (in the 
govemorates of the North and the Biqa valley), 30 August (in Beirut and Mount 
Lebanon) and 6 September 1992 (in South and An-Nabatiyah). (See Map No. 18) The 
rate of participation in the poll was low (averaging 32 percent), especially in Maronite 
districts where leaders had urged to boycott the election. 
As for the results f the election, Hezbollah (for the first time contesting the 
elections as a political party) enjoyed considerable success, wdth its eight members 
elected notably firom southern constituencies. The Amal leader, Nabih Berri, was 
appointed President of the new National Assembly (Speaker of Parliament) in 
October. Shortly afterwards Hrawi invited Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese-bom Saudi 
Arabian business executive, to form a new government, as Prime Minister, amid 
hopes that he would restore some confidence in the Lebanese economy and thus 
*^ Most Christian leaders called for a boycott of the elections, arguing that these should have been 
postponed until the Syrian authorities redeployed their troops to the Biqa Valley, in accordance with 
the Taif Accord. Christians also opposed certain provisions in the electoral law. They complained that 
the subdivision of Mount Lebanon and the Biqa into smaller electoral districts had been done in a way 
that fevoured pro-government, pro-Syrian candidates. In addition, they objected to the selective manner 
in which the disbanding of the militias had been implemented. The Lebanese Forces (a coalition of 
Maronite militias) and the militias associated with the Amal, the PSP, and Palestinian groups had all 
been dissolved. However, Hezbollah, backed by both Iran and Syria, remained heavily armed. Some 
Christian leaders argued that legislative elections should be postponed until Hezbollah, too, had been 
dismantled. By calling for a boycott. Christian leaders were hoping that they would attract enough 
international attention and support (particularly from the Vatican, Paris, and Washington) to pressure 
the Lebanese government into canceling the elections. That strategy, however, failed; despite the 
Christian boycott, the Lebanese government decided to go ahead with the elections, which were held 
on three consecutive Sundays, beginnings on August 23, 1992. (Abdo Baaklini, Guilain Denoeux, and 
Robert Springborg, N.5, pp.98-99). 
^' Joanne Maher, ed., Middle East and North Africa 2003 (London: Europa Publications, 2003) p.700. 
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would facilitate the country's reconstraction.'*^ Hariri's Cabinet included many 
technocrats, and (unlike in previous administrations), portfolios were not distributed 
on an entirely 'confessional' basis. Following a meeting between Hrawi and President 
Hafez Asad of Syria shortly after the elections, it was aimoimced that a timetable for 
the withdrawal of Syrian armed forces would be complied in October that year. It 
subsequently emerged, however, that there would be no withdrawal until a 
comprehensive peace treaty had been concluded between Syria and Israel.'" 
The term for the president in Lebanon is six years, and incumbents are 
constitutionally prohibited from succeeding themselves. Although, the prerogatives of 
the president were reduced in the Taif Accord, the position continues to be preserved 
for a Maronite. Whereas, prior to Taif the presidency was the strongest political 
position in Lebanon, it is now checked by the prime minister, a Surmi Muslim, and the 
speaker of parliament, a Shiite Muslim. In effect, the top leadership is now a troika of 
presidents: the president of the republic, the president of the cabinet (Prime Minister), 
and the president of the parliament (Speaker of Parliament). 
In the autumn of 1995, an election was scheduled to replace President of the 
republic Elias Hrawi, a second tier politician from the town of Zahle in the Biqa 
Valley. Hrawi was elected in 1989, following the assassination of President Rene 
Mouawad, who was killed 17 days after his election. Of the troika, Hrawi's pubUc 
profile was by far the lowest. He maintained friendly ties with Syria, and Syria was 
clearly content with his presidential style, as was with Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 
Despite the constitutional prohibition, parliament voted on 19 October 1995 to extend 
Hrawi's term of office for three years. Speaker Nabih Berri put aside his declared 
*° Alain Gresh and Dominique Vidal, The New A-Z of the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004) 
p. 196. 
Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.701. 
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opposition and lent his support to the extraordinary measure. For its part, Syria 
signaled its preference somewhat subtly, but Lebanese politicians strain hard to read 
Syrian signals, and they were willing, as in this case, to contort and even ignore 
Lebanese laws in order to please their Syria brothers. In the 128-seat parliament, only 
eleven members found the will to oppose the extension of Hrawi's term, which 
eventually expired in 1998.'*^  
While some restructuring of the political system had occurred, there was little 
prospect for comprehensive political reforms so long as power remains in the grip of a 
coterie of politicians on good terms with Damascus, histead, the govermnent was used 
like a giant patronage machine, enabling newly entrenched political bosses to busily 
create networks of clients and to grow richer on sweetheart deals.'*^  
B. National Assembly Election 1996 (Second after Taif Accord) 
Elections to the National Assembly took place, in five rounds, in August-
September 1996.'*^  Pro-Hariri candidates enjoyed considerable success in the first 
*^ Resisting the interpreted will of Damascus has its coats. Of the eleven members who voted against 
the term extension, only six managed to win re-election in the 1996 elections. Among the victims of 
government manipulation of flie elections were several popular and well-regarded figures, including the 
leftist Habib Sadeq, who has strong popular support in southern Lebanon; Mikhail Daher, who was 
promoted for the presidency by Syria in 1988; and 'Isam Na'man, a respected Beirut attorney. 
^^  Augustus Richard Norton, "Lebanon's Conundrum", Arab Studies Quarterly, v.21, n.l, winter 1999, 
pp.46-47. 
For instance, in September 1997, the government decided to reduce the number of authorized television 
stations to four. On the fiice of it, the decision was sensible, since a crazy-quilt of stations had emerged 
during the war, most associated with one militia group or another. The details tell a different story. The 
four authorized stations are owned by the prime minister, the speaker of the parliament, the interior 
minister, and a wealthy businessman in partnership with the grandson of a former president. Not only 
are the stations important sources of advertising revenue, but the government seems to be intent on 
controlling the political coverage offered by television, just as it has somethings sought to intimidate 
and control the stubbornly outspoken print media. Reportedly, Syria objected that the government's 
decision affected al-Manar, the Hezbollah television station, and on 2 October of the same year, al-
Manar was allowed to resume broadcasting. 
** According to the new law, the elections were held in four of Lebanon's five areas (Muhafazat): the 
North, South, Beirut and the Biqa, whereas in the fifth region, Mount Lebanon (largely Christian), 
elections were held separately in each of the subdistricts (Qadar). The purpose was to block the election 
of Maronite opposition leaders, as well as prevent the Maronites from ousting leading governmental 
leaders, such as Walid Jumblatt. After much opposition and an appeal to the Lebanese Constitutional 
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three rounds of voting (in Mount Lebanon, North Lebanon and Beirut govemorates), 
with the Prime Minister himself winning the largest number of votes at the third 
round; there were, however, allegations of vote-buying involving Hariri's supporters 
in Beirut. In the fourth and fifth roimds (in the South and An-Nabatiyah, and in the 
Biqa Valley) an electoral alliance led by Amal and Hezbollah was reported to have 
won all but one of the total 46 seats. Prior to the fifth round Syria had redeployed 
some 12,000 of its estimated 30,000 troops in Lebanon to the eastern part of the Biqa 
valley. (Under the terms of the Taif Accord, the redeployment should have been 
completed in 1992.) The overall rate of participation averaged about 45 percent, 
suggesting that many voters had disregarded demands particularly by Aoun, Gemayel, 
Edde and other exiled figures for a boycott of the polls. Berri was re-elected President 
of the National Assembly when the new legislature convened in October 1996. Hrawi 
invited to form a new government: the distribution of portfolios in the new Cabinet 
(named in early November, following consultations with Syrian leaders) among the 
country's various interests, however, remained largely unchanged as follows:''^ 
Court, the new law was declared unconstitutional, but the government added a clause to it making it 
valid for one time only and the elections proceeded duly. (Avraham Sela, ed., N.21, p.491). 
*^ Abdo Baaklini, Guilam Denoeux, and Robert Springboi;g, N.5, pp. 104-107. 
Other MaronJte opposition leaders, such as Edde, Gemayel and Aoun, still reside in France while Samir 
Ja'ja was sentenced to prison after the LF was involved in unlawful activities after it was disbanded in 
1991 and became a political party. (Avraham Sela, ed., N.21, p.491). 
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Table-5 
The Confessional Allocation of Seats in Lebanese Parliament Before and After 
the Taif Accord 
Confession 
Maronite 
Greek Orthodox 
Greek Catholic 
Armenian Orthodox 
Armenian Catholic 
Protestant 
Other Christians 
Total Christians 
Sunni 
Shiite 
Druze 
Alawite 
Total Muslims 
Total 
Before Taif 
30 
11 
6 
4 
1 
1 
1 
54 
20 
19 
6 
0 
45 
99 
After Taif 
34 
14 
8 
5 
1 
1 
1 
64 
27 
27 
8 
2 
64 
128 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Lebanon 
C. National Assembly Election 2000 (Third after Taif Accord) 
Elections to the National Assembly took place in two phases on 27 August 
(Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon) and 3 September 2000 (Beuiit, the Biqa valley, 
An-Nabatiyah and the South). In this election, it was for the first time since 1972, that 
Lebanese citizens (living in the former Israeli-occupied zone of souHiem Lebanon) 
participated. Voting patterns in the first round swiftly indicated a rejection of al-
Hoss's premiership, as the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt (one of former premier Rafiq 
ne Hindu (New Delhi), 30 August 2000. 
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Hariri's staunchest allies), secured an overwhelming victory in Mount Lebanon 
govemorate. Furthermore, while Deputy Prime Minister Michel Murr retained his seat 
in the Maronite Northern Metn district, the election there of Pierre Gemayel, son of 
Amine Gemayel, was regarded as a considerable reverse for President Lahoud. 
Turn-out by voters was estimated at 51 percent of the registered electorate, apparently 
indicating that voters had largely ignored appeals by some Christian parties for a 
boycott of the poll. At the second round of voting, with a period of political 
'cohabitation' between Lahoud and Hariri already appearing likely, the latter's Al-
Karamah (Dignity) list proceeded to secure 18 of the 19 assembly seats in Beirut (the 
remaining seat being won by a Hezbollah candidate); al-Hoss lost his own seat in the 
legislature. In the south an alliance of Hezbollah and Amal candidates took all the 
48 
govemorate's 23 seats, while Hezbollah enjoyed similar successes in the Biqa. 
Independent monitors reported numerous instances of electoral malpractice. In all, 
Hariri secured the support of 97 of the 128 seats in the new legislature. Subsequently 
in October, President Lahoud formally appointed Rafiq Hariri as Prime Minister of 
Lebanon.''^ Prior to his appointment, Hariri was reported to have reached an informal 
""^  Pierre Amine Gemayel (commonly known as Pierre Gemayel Jr., Pierre Amine or simply Pierre 
Gemayel; September 24, 1972 - November 21, 2006) was a Lebanese politician in the Kataeb Party, or 
the Phalange Party. Lebanon's second-youngest MP, he was a rising star in his party. He was a vocal 
critic of Syria's military presence in and political domination of Lebanon, and an active member of the 
anti-Syrian and pro-Western parliamentary majority, the March 14 Alliance. He was serving as 
Minister of Industry when he was assassinated on November 21,2006. He was the third member of his 
family to be assassinated in 25 years. His uncle Bachir Gemayel was assassinated in 1982, also at age 
34, and Bashir's 1-year-old daughter was killed in a car bomb attack in 1980, initially supposed to 
target him. Gemayel was the fifth prominent anti-Syrian figure to be killed in Lebanon in two years. 
*^ Joanne Maher, ed., N.39, p.707. 
*' The Hindu (New Delhi), 25 October 2000. 
The composition of his radically altered Cabinet (newly expanded to 30 members) was announced a 
few days later. Issam Fares was named as Deputy Prime Minister, while Suleiman franjiya became the 
Minister of Public Health. One notable appointment was that of Elias Murr, the son-in-law of President 
Lahoud and a non-parliamentarian, who replaced his fether, Michel Murr, as Minister of the Interior 
and Municipal and Rural Affairs. (Resistance and Development, the party list including Hezbollah, had 
declined to join the Government). (The Europa Worid Year Book 2003, v.2, 44"' Edition (London: 
Europa Publications, 2003)p.2546). 
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'power-sharing' agreement with President Lahoud, whereby he would be responsible 
for economic policy, while the President would take charge of defence and foreign. 
Though, there were reports of increasing tensions between the two men during the 
latter part of 2000.^ ° 
D. The Extension of Lahoud Term 
On September 3, 2004, the on-going political and economic struggle in 
I^banon reached its most critical period since the Taif Accord. The incident sparking 
the crisis in September was the Syrian decision to extend the term of President Emile 
Lahoud beyond his constitutional entitlement, and the heavily-handed methods Syrian 
security agents and their Lebanese allies used to force an amendment through the 
country's parliament. This was despite the direct threat to the govermnent as 29 MP's 
from various sects includmg Sunni Mosbah Ahdab, Druze Akram Shehayeb and 
Maronite Nassib Lahoud voted against the constitutional amendment. '^ 
While the Syrians and Lahoud ultimately succeeded in parliament, they failed 
at the UN Security Council, where Resolution 1559 was passed on September 2, 
2004. The Resolution called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops in Lebanon and 
for the Lebanese to be able to select their leaders free from foreign influence. Syrian 
protestations that the Resolution set a dangerous precedent by interfering in the 
internal affairs of the member state were rebuffed by the French ambassador, Jean-
Marc de la Sabliere, who countered that non-action by the UN would permit Syrian 
"interference in the internal affairs of another state." 
The French position was significant at the time because it was to herald 
untypical coordination with the US over a West Asia issue. US Ambassador to the 
50 Joanne Maher, ed., N.39, pp.707-708. 
'^ Daily Star (Beirut), 4 September 2004. 
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UN John Danforth stated that Syria's continue miUtary presence in Lebanon was 
"wrong" and more significantly, that "it would be very wrong of Syrian to continue to 
interfere in the presidential electoral process in Lebanon." This US-French 
convergence agamst Syria nurtured prospects for major changes in the West Asia, not 
only in the Lebanese context but in terms of a broader regional peace. Isolating Syria 
would marginalize Iran and eliminate its foothold in Lebanon, disentangle Israeli-
Palestinian negotiations from the wider Arab scene and restore democracy to 
Lebanon. 
The Syrian decision to extend Lahoud's term led to a united Lebanese 
opposition that included prominent Christian, Surmi, and Druze leaders. This 
opposition was significant for two reasons. First, it included a broad coalition of 
Lebanon's sects, which had previously been a red line in the Syrian government's 
approach to Lebanese political affairs. Secondly, this opposition was uncormected to 
exiled General Michel Aoun, who rejected from the outset the Syrian-influenced 
peace arrangement known as the Taif Accord. The Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah 
Boutros Sfeu", Druze leader Walid Jumblat and others constituting this new united 
opposition in 2004, had all previously recognized Syria's dominant role in Lebanon 
during Israel's occupation of the southern part of the coimtry in the 1990s.^ ^ 
The political crisis was tied to a long-standing economic polarization. Under 
Lahoud the national debt had reached $34 billion, or 185 percent of GDP. This debt 
crisis was arguably the underpiiming of the political crisis that erupted in 2004. 
'^  Lahoud's backing came from the major Shiite parties, Amal and the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. The 
opposition was not a cohesive group, but all to a greater or lesser degree believed that Syria's role in 
Lebanon had created an authoritarian regime based on military rule - Lahoud v/as Lebanon's former 
Army Commander-in-Chief- backed by a security apparatus that restricted freedoms and, significantly 
for minorities such as the Druze, threatened the pluralism of Lebanese society. In this tense stand-off, 
the role of then Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the most influential Sunni leader sine Taif, 
became the key not only to understanding what went wrong in Lebanon, but also came to provide a 
preview of the direction in which events were heading. 
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According to the opposition, the debt was a result of years of corruption, 
mismanagement, and the deliberate channeling of funds to benefit groups and 
individuals loyal to Syria, as well as directly to Syria itself. Opponents argued that 
extending the Lahoud era beyond 2004 merely prolonged this pattern. Even Minister 
Suleiman Franjieh, Syria's loyal Maronite ally in Lebanon, called the Lahoud era "the 
worst in post-independence Lebanon."'^ 
E. National Assembly Election 2005 (Fourth after Taif Accord) 
Elections for a new National Assembly began as scheduled on 29 May 2005 in 
four stages, according to the existing electoral law introduced in 2000.^ "* Many 
Christians argued that it favoured Syria's allies, but their demands for a new electoral 
law dividing the country into smaller constituencies had been rejected by the 
Government.^' In the first round of voting in the Beirut region, the anti-Syrian 
opposition 'Future Movement,''^ led by Rafiq Hariri's son, Saad, who had succeeded 
his father as leader of Lebanon's Simni Muslim community, allied with Druze leader 
Walid Jumblatt's PSP and some right-wing Christian groups, won a sweeping victory, 
taking all 19 seats, nine of which were uncontested, as rival candidates had withdrawn 
*' Talal Nizameddin, "The Political Economy of Lebanon Under Rafiq Hariri: An Interpretation" 
Middle East Journal, v.60, n.l, Winter, 2006, pp.96-97. 
^ The Asian Age (New Delhi), 29 May 2005. 
'^ The elections are the first in Lebanon without Syrian troops for three decades and look sure to see the 
Opposition strengthened at the expense of pro-Damascus politicians (The Indian express (New Delhi), 
25 May 2005). 
^ Future Movement {Tayyco' Al Mustaqbal) (FM) is a Sunni Muslim political movement in Lebanon, 
led by Saad Hariri, younger son of the assassinated former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Rafiq Hariri. 
The movement is die largest member of the March 14 Alliance, which won a majority of the seats in 
the May 2005 parliamentary elections. The current leader, Saad Hariri, has vowed to transform it into a 
political party when the country becomes stable and the regime without religious references. Most of 
its support comes from Sunni Muslims and it is allied to the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Druze 
Party, and Maronites who are associated with the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb parties (main 3 allies of 
FM). The main opponent of Future Movement is the March 8 Alliance, most important parts being Free 
Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by General Michel Aoun and Hezbollah. 
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before the election.^^ Official figures put voter turn-out at 28 percent, slightly lower 
than in 2000; though the turn-out was lower in Christian than Muslim districts.^^ The 
second round of voting took place on 5 June in southern Lebanon, where an alliance 
of pro-Syrian Amal and Hezbollah secured all 23 seats in this mainly Shiite-populated 
region by a wide margin; six seats were uncontested because of the lack of rival 
candidates. Voter turn-out was estimated at 45 percent, but only 10 percent-12 percent 
in some Christian areas as prominent local politicians and Gen. Aoun's Free Patriotic 
Movement had called on Christians to boycott the election.^^ In the run-up to voting, 
there was fierce competition between candidates from the numerous lists competing 
for 35 seats in Mount Lebanon and 23 seats in the Biqa (only two seats remained 
uncontested).^" In an unexpected development. Gen. Aoun (who had made last-minute 
" Saad ed Deen Rafiq ai Hariri (bom April 18, 1970 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia) is a Saudi-Lebanese 
businessman and politician, and the second son of Rafiq Hariri, the assassinated former prime minister 
of Lebanon. After his father's death, he inherited the helm of the Future Movement, an essentially 
Sunni movement that was created and led by his father. Saad Hariri is the son of Rafiq Hariri and an 
Iraqi motiier (Nidal Al-Bustani). He has been bom and raised in Saudi Arabia and managed part of his 
father's business there until his father's assassination. When his father was assassinated in Febmary 
2005, he inherited some USD 4.1 billion in 2005 earning him and each of his siblings a place on the 
2006 Forbes list of richest people in the world (released in March 2006). He was the Chairman of the 
executive committee of Oger Telecom, which pursues telecommunication interest in West Asia and 
Africa. In addition to heading Saudi Oger, Hariri was the Chairman of Omnia Holdings, and Board 
Member of Oger International Enterprise de Travaux Intemationaux, Saudi Investment Bank, Saudi 
Research and Marketing Group and Future Television. After his father, Rafiq Hariri, was killed on 
February 14, 2005 by a car bomb in central Beirut, Saad Hariri retumed to Lebanon and took up his 
father's political path engaged in politics. 
'* The Asian Age (New Delhi), 31 May 2005. 
Four days later a car bomb exploded in a Christian district of Beirut, killing Dr. Samir Kassir, a 
prominent joumalist and vocal critic of Syria's role in Lebanon. The opposition blamed remnants of 
Syria's intelligence services for the murder and reiterated calls for the immediate resignation of 
President Lahoud. (The Hindu O^ Iew Delhi), 3 June 2005). 
*' The Hindu (New Delhi), 7 June 2005. 
The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) (Al-Tayyar Al-Watani Al-Hur), also known as the "Aounist 
Current" {Tayyar Al-Aouni) by opponents, is a Lebanese political party, led by Michel Aoun, a former 
commander of the Lebanese army who served as a transitory Prime Minister of one of two 
governments that contended for power in the final years of the Lebanese Civil War (1988-1990). The 
movement was officially declared a political party on September 18, 2005. According to the results of 
the 2005 parliamentary elections, more than 70 percent of the Christian heartland population in 
Lebanon supports the FPM. Though originally, most of the party's support came from Lebanon's 
Christian community, it is gaining considerable support and sympathy from Muslims. The FPM party 
advocates secularism and the right to vote for Lebanese abroad. 
*° The Hindu (New Delhi), 13 June 2005. 
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alliance with pro-Syrian factions declaring that his feud with Damascus was over now 
that Syrian troops had withdrawn from Lebanon) and his allies won 21 seats. Gen. 
Aoun's surprise victory was a setback for Hariri and his allies, who secured 25 seats 
but had hoped to gain more in order to command a majority in the new Assembly. In 
the final roimd in north Lebanon on 19 June, however, Hariri and his allies swept to 
victory, gaining all 28 seats and decisively defeating Gen. Aoun's allies. Turn-out of 
voters according to official sources was 49 percent. The election result confirmed 
that Hariri's Future Movement had obtained 72 seats in the new Assembly, (a clear 
majority); Amal and Hezbollah secured 35 seats; and Gen. Aoun and his allies shared 
21 seats. Although there had been some minor complaints, polling had taken place in 
a calm atmosphere and voters had been free from any pressure or interference.^'' 
At the end of Jime 2005, the new National Assembly re-elected Nabih Berri, a 
loyal ally of Syria, as Speaker by a comfortable majority.^ Two days later. President 
Lahoud, after consultations, appointed Fouad Siniora, a member of Saad Hariri's 
Future Movement, as Prime Minister and asked him to form a new Govenunent.^^ 
" The Hindu (New Delhi), 14 June 2005. 
62 The Times of India (New Delhi), 21 June 2005. 
" me Hindu (New Delhi), 21 June 2005. 
International observers expressed general satisfaction with the voting process. The US and the EU 
praised the high levels of co-operation between international election observers and Lebanese officials, 
and offered to convene an international conference aimed at consolidating support for the Lebanese 
people and the new Government. Mikati and his Cabinet resigned after the elections but continued in a 
caretaker capacity. (Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.717). 
" The Hindu (New Delhi), 29 June 2005. 
Fouad Siniora (alternative spellings: Fouad Sanyoura, Fuad Siniora, Fouad Saniora, Fouad 
Seniora) is the Prime Minister of Lebanon, a position he held from 19 July 2005 to May 25, 2008, the 
date of the election of the new President of Lebanon; he was renominated to the post on 28 May 2008 
and held the post as Actmg Prime Minister between those dates. Siniora was bom into a Sunni Muslim 
family in Sidon on 14 April 1943, He went on to earn a degree in business administration from the 
American University of Beirut. After working for Citibank and teaching at his alma mater in Beirut in 
the 1970s, Siniora worked for the Central Bank's audit committee before being employed by Prime 
Minister Hariri in 1982 in his rapidly growing business empire. Smiora was Minister of Finance for 
most of the post-war period in Lebanon in Hariri's successive cabinets. 
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Siniora, a close ally of the late Rafiq Hariri and Minister of Finance in all five of his 
administrations, won the support of 126 of the 128 members of the National 
Assembly.^^ 
The National Assembly Election 2005 was the first elections in thirty years 
without a Syrian military or intelligence presence in Lebanon. The Lebanese elected 
128 members of parliament (MPs), with equal representation for Christians and 
Muslims. Many Lebanese felt that the election, which was won by an anti-Syrian 
coalition led by Saad Hariri, constituted the end of the Cedar Revolution. This 
election was the first in Lebanese history to be won outright by a single electoral 
block and was also the first to be monitored by the UN.^' However, after Syria's 
withdrawal earlier 2005, Lebanon was for the first time in 30 years free of foreign 
occupation. The election presents a historic opportunity but also leave the people of 
Lebanon with much uncertainty and many womes. 
2.5 Taif Accord and the Release of the Western Hostages 
Another major development in 1991 was the begirming of the release, in 
earnest, of the Western hostages. On August, 8 1991, Islamic Jihad released John 
McCarthy, a British journalist who had been kidnapped in 1986.^' Then, following a 
hiccup in the pattern, when a Frenchman, Jerome Leyraud, was kidnapped (to protest 
" The Asian Age (New Delhi), 1 July 2005. 
Efforts to form a government of national unity, however, failed after disagreements over the portfolios 
to be allocated to Gen. Aoun's group. Siniora then proposed to form a cabinet of technocrats, but this 
was rejected. Eventually, after three weeks of political wrangling, Siniora announced a new 24-member 
Cabinet including parliamentarians and technocrats. Only Gen. Aoun's group was not represented. 
Aoun had stated that he would not take part in the government and would lead the main opposition in 
the Assembly. (Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.718). 
67 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_general_election%2C_2005 
'*http://www.stephanrauch.com/site/details.php?image_id=2&sessionid=9f7f2a240Gd292dl 11 Gaf274 
2c5c]2 
*' Philip Mattar, ed.. Encyclopedia of the Modem Middle East and North Africa, v.2 (Maine: 
Thomson Gale, 2004) p. 1046. 
194 
Iran's new policy on the hostages), both he and Edward Austin Tracy were let go on 
August 11. Tracy was freed by the Revolutionary Justice Organization, another 
Hezbollah group, signalling that all the hostages held by organizations tied to Iran 
would soon be released. On September 23, Revolutionary Justice also handed over 
Jack Mann to Syrian authorities; he had been seized by a group, the Cells of Armed 
Struggle, in 1989. On September 11, 1991, Israel released fifty-one Lebanese 
prisoners it had been holding and, in exchange for information on Israeli held or killed 
in Lebanon, became part of the programme to get the release of the hostages. These 
continued to come out: the British Thomas Sutherland and Terry Waite in November 
and, finally, Americans Joseph Cicippio, Alann Steen, and Terry Anderson, a few 
weeks later in early December 1991. Only Thomas Kemptner and Heinrich Strubig, 
two Germans held by the Hamadai clan, remained in captivity. Their case was 
complicated by the fact that this family hoped to trade Kemptner and Strubig for their 
kin imprisoned in Germany as convicted terrorists. These two men were not freed 
until the summer of 1992.^ ° 
This process helped Lebanon restore its international status and reputation on 
the one hand, and receive international aid necessary to rebuild it on the other. As 
many countries renewed their dealings with Lebanon.^ ' 
2.6 Naturalization of Syrian Workers and Palestinian Refugees 
Lebanon holds a large number of Syrian workers, most of whom are employed 
on a seasonal basis and do not hold citizenship. They entered Lebanon mainly after 
Syria established its controversial military and political presence there during the 
Lebanese Civil War. They are employed in menial labour, working in areas such as 
70 
71 
Charles Winslow, N.28, p.286. 
Avraham Sela, ed., N.21, p. 490. 
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construction. They are generally very poor and compete with the Palestinians over 
low-wage jobs. Some right-wing Lebanese argue that the presence of such a large 
number of Syrian workers should in fact be considered part of a Syrian colonization 
attempt, interlocking the economies and making Lebanon excessively dependent on 
Syria. Others have argued that the Syrian labourers have been essential to post-war 
reconstruction.'^  
In 1994, Lebanese authorities - then under Syrian domination - authorized a 
controversial granting of citizenship to Syrians (and a small number of Palestinians 
and others) in Lebanon. The precise number is disputed, figiires ranging from a 
100,000 people to half a million. It seems clear, however, that the act shifted the 
religious balance in Lebanon in favour of Suimi Muslims, and this had important 
effects on the sectarian makeup of Lebanese politics. The Syrians in Lebanon are 
Arab in the same linguistic sense as the Lebanese, but with a less ambiguous Arab 
self-identification. They are mainly Muslims of the Sunni sect, but due to Syria's 
diverse religious and ethnic population, many other groups are also included.'^  
Palestinians to the time of 60,000 have also been naturalized in Lebanon since 
1994. The majority of these were Shiites from border villages who had Palestinian 
refiigee status; others were "Simnis who, for reasons not made public, were 
naturalized in 1995, perhaps to balance out the Shiite naturalization."''* Most 
Their exact numbers are disputed, with right-wing Lebanese nationalists tending to give high 
estimates (up to 1.5 million) while others go as low as 300,000. The CIA Factbook suggests a figure of 
1 million (2001). Regardless of which estimate is closer to the truth, numbers would naturally fluctuate 
according to season and to the situation of the Lebanese and Syrian economies. 
^'http.V/en.wikipedJa.org/w'iki/Demographics_of_Lebanon 
''* Asher Kaufinan, "Between Palestine and Lebanon: Seven Shi'i Villages as a Case Study of 
Boundaries, Identities, and Conflict", Middle East Journal, v.60, n.4, autumn, 2006, pp.698-699. 
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Palestinian Christians had already been given Lebanese citizenship; the few who 
remained, about 10,000, have since been naturalized.'^  
3. Rafiq Hariri and the Rebuilding of Lebanon 
The fifteen years of Civil War, from 1975-1990, however, severely set back 
Lebanon's economy. The industrial and commercial sectors were devastated. Many 
industries were destroyed. Communications facilities were also damaged. Water 
supplies, roads, and electric generation and transmission facilities at best were 
maintained, but clearly declined in comparison to the rest of the region. The difficulty 
of maintaining and improving the basic infrastructure did not end with the Civil War. 
Several IsraeU air raids in the decade following the end of the civil conflict did 
significant damage to electric facilities in particular.''^  
A desire to revive the Lebanese economy was a significant factor in the 
election of Rafiq Hariri as prime minister in 1992. Hariri, an extraordinarily 
successfiil Lebanese businessman, had amassed a fortune in Saudi Arabia. Lebanese 
and many international observers hoped that Hariri would apply his business skills 
and entice significant international investment in Lebanon and, thus, restore Lebanon 
to its former standing.^' 
3.1 Hariri Economic Reconstruction Policies 
The Hariri goveniment imdertook various programmes of re-development and 
reconstruction with the hope that the Lebanese community at home and abroad, as 
well as the international financial markets, would support these endeavors. Large 
" Kail C. Ellis, N.l,p.25. 
*^ David E. Long and Bernard Reich, The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North 
Africa (Colorado: Westview Press, 2002) p.706. 
" Steven Heydemann, ed. Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic 
Reform Revisited (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) pp. 170-171. 
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sums of money were spent to make up for years of neglect and destruction. The cost 
of these projects far exceeded Lebanon's capacity to pay. As a result, the government 
of Lebanon borrowed very large simis of money. When Hariri came to office the 
national budget was about $900 million; six years later, it reached $18 billion and was 
increasing rapidly. Debt service exceeded more than half the national debt. Though, 
despite large government deficit spending, economic growth was only modest, 
unemployment was staggering, and the once robust middle class saw its economic 
status erode. As much as 60 percent of the population slipped below the poverty line. 
The government was blamed as Hariri's development efforts focused on central 
Beirut, leaving much of the coxmtry untouched. Most worrisome was the large number 
of educated and skilled Lebanese workers who had emigrated during the Civil War 
and did not return to help rebuild their nation. 
Peace in Lebanon and the region were essential for his plans to succeed. This 
did not occur. Sanctions against Iraq further disrupted regional trade patterns. Finally, 
the heavy hand of Syrian and Israeli occupation stifled freedom and destroyed 
confidence in Lebanon's ability to again become an economic centre. 
Hariri reduced inflation and strengthened the pound. The banking sector, 
which had never defaulted on a transfer in 20 years of Civil War, began rebuilding 
itself. But most of the $23 billion set aside for development was hijacked by 
parliament and funneled into payrolls for civil servants, the army and intelligence 
agencies. In 1998, Hariri resigned after losing a power struggle to President Emile 
Lahoud. '* 
Hariri's successor inherited an impossible economic and political situation, 
although he did well to prevent the economy from becoming even worse. It is at this 
'* Stephen Glain, Dreaming of Damascus: Arab Voices from a Region in Turmoil (London: John 
Murray, 2003) p.27. 
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junction that, the Lebanese again showed their confidence in Hariri and he was re-
elected prime minister in the fall of 2000.'^ Hariri, however, was unable to revive the 
economy. The outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada in September 2000 and Hezbollah 
attacks on Israeli forces in the Golan Heights created international tensions and this 
further added an impediment to economic recovery.^" A huge national debt left over 
from his first term in office drained the govenmient of the few resources it had. The 
D I 
stalled economy remained the greatest long-term threat to the future of Lebanon. 
3.2 Saudi-Syrian Roles during Hariri's Premiership 
Saudi support for Hariri in 2000 served as form of loan guarantee for Lebanon 
that eased the concerns of both bankers and investors. Many Saudi citizens also 
personally invested in Lebanon. But an impression was given that the Saudis would 
invest in Lebanon only as long as Hariri remained in power. This led to a view that 
Saudi Arabia and Syria were competing powers in Lebanon, with Lahoud 
representing Syria and Hariri representing the Saudis, acting as a proxy for the US in 
the West Asia. Some critics of Syria's role in Lebanon and of Hariri's political goals 
'^  Carl L. Bankston III, ed., N.30, p.338. 
^ The Second Intifada, also known as the al-Aqsa Intifada refers to the second Palestinian uprising 
which began in September 2000. "Intifada" is an Arabic word that literally translates into English as 
"shaking off' and "Al-Aqsa" is the name of a prominent mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem. Most 
Israelis consider it to be a terrorist campaign whereas supporters describe it as a war of national 
liberation against foreign occupation. Palestinian tactics ranged from carrying out mass protests and 
general strikes, as in the First Intifada, to armed attacks on security forces, mounting suicide bombing 
attacks, and firing Qassam rockets into Israeli residential areas. Israeli tactics consisted of creating 
checlq)oints, enforcing strict curfews in certain areas, riot control (sometimes shooting stone throwers 
along with better-armed rioters), returning fire, mounting incursions, constructing the West Bank 
barrier, demolishing houses, destroying shops without permits, conducting arrests, and assassinating 
militant leaders (sometimes also causing civilian casualties). It is also called the Oslo War by Israelis 
who consider it to be the result of concessions made by Israel following the Oslo Accords, and Arafat's 
War, after the late Palestinian leader whom some blame for starting it. Both Israelis and Palestinians 
have blamed each other for the failure of the Oslo peace process. As of 2008, this Intifada has yet to be 
officially ended and the Israeli NGO BTselem maintains a list of the casualties up to the present time. 
The death toll, both military and civilian, over the entire period in question (2000-2008) is estimated to 
be over 5,300 Palestinians and over 1,000 Israelis. To date, 64 foreign citizens have also been killed. 
*' David E. Long and Bernard Reich, N.76, p.207. 
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claimed that Saudi and Syria shared similar regional goals that were at Lebanon's 
82 
expense. 
In reality, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Syria are complex. 
Syrian control of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah was valued by Saudis as a means of 
limiting Tehran's regional influence. Moreover, the Saudis were more secure 
engaging Syria than confronting it, considering that Syria enjoyed a degree of support 
among the Arab masses, who believed it to be uncompromising to Israel and opposed 
to US interests. The Saudis had thus partially covered the expenses of Syrian forces in 
Lebanon since 1990, and to ensure stability the Saudis also acted throughout the 
1990s as an economic safety net for Lebanon's government, as highlighted by the 
Kingdom's $700 million aid package at the Paris 11 conference.*^ 
But Saudi support for Lebanon, through Syria, was viewed as a double-edged 
sword. Critics contended that Saudi Arabia money served to prolong and justify the 
Syrian presence in Lebanon, undermining its sovereignty. Further still, this Saudi 
safely net prevented the implementation of political and economic reforms urgently 
needed to address imderlying problems, that over time were creating worsening social 
and political ills.*'' 
" One contributor to the anti-Syrian Middle East Intelligence Bulletin noted that "Syrian-Saudi relation 
have been among the closest in the Arab world since the late 1960s, when Riyadh contributed petro-
dollars to the rebuilding of Syria's armed forces [after the 1967 defeat]...Subsequently, the Kingdom 
has been a regular, if not always consistent, financial backer of the Ba'thist regime." Saudi support for 
Syria peaked after the 1991 Gulf War, when Asad joined the anti-Iraq coalition. (Talal Nizameddin, 
N.53,p.l03). 
An effort to tackle the country's debt problems led to an international conference, known as Paris II, 
in 2002 in which participant states were asked to help Lebanon restructure its domestic debts at lower 
rates of interest. Initially Hariri hailed Paris II as a success, with Saudi Arabia, France and other states 
combining to provide $2.5 billion in soft loans. Among the conditions for assistance to Lebanon as a 
consequence of Paris U were demands for cuts in public spending and the privatization of key services, 
including electricity. 
** Talal Nizameddin, N.53, pp.103-104. 
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3.3 Deteriorating Relations with Syria 
Hariri as Prime Minister and Lahoud as President spent the four years from 
2000 to 2004 in a state of perpetual conflict, leading to a failiire to formulate 
significant economic and social policies or undertake urgently needed reforms. Syna 
acted ostensibly as peace-maker whenever the differences between the two men 
threatened to escalate out of control, but in reality, Damascus often prompted Lahoud 
and his supporters to undermine Hariri. Hariri had strong connections with Saudi 
Arabia (which had granted him citizenship in the 1980s), and France, as well as 
general US support, leaving him precariously stranded between opposing interests by 
2004. In Syria's calculations, Hariri represented a Western foothold in Lebanon that 
imdermined its own position, therefore, making it logical that a weakened Hariri 
meant less influence for his backers m Lebanese, or what Damascus considered to be 
Syrian, affairs. 
Despite this, the opposition in Lebanon did not warmly receive Hariri as one 
of their own. In part, this was because of Hariri's careful efforts not to antagonize 
Syria by appearing too closely associated v^ dth anti-Syrian groups. Some MPs, mainly 
Christian, considered Hariri and Lahoud to be part of the same package, and 
specifically blamed Hariri for creasing a state based on corruption. Fierce criticisms 
of Hariri were also to be found among Lebanon's pro-Syrian forces, who complained 
that Hariri's economic policies deliberately sought to imdermine Syria's position by 
relying too much on Western participation in the country's reconstruction process. 
Moreover, tacit allegations were made that Hariri had banked on peace with Israel as 
a means of encouraging further Western investment in Lebanon. Perhaps predictably, 
some members of each of these groups also insinuated that Hariri's policies only 
85 Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.706. 
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served to enrich him personally and/or that Hariri had secretly promised the US that 
he would welcome a peace treaty with Israel under the right conditions. 
Hariri as a political actor therefore became pro-Western and pro-Syrian and 
pro-regime and pro-opposition all at the same time. In Lebanese politics, paying lip-
service to the dominant foreign power was, historically speaking, part and parcel of 
the way of doing business.^ ^ Hariri's resignation in October 2004 seemed to show that 
his political and economic interests were not inextricably liidced with Syria's, and that 
his verbal support of Syria while he was in fact pursuing his own agenda was in fact a 
reflection of this Lebanese tradition of lip-service to the foreign power. 
3.4 The Hariri Assassination and the UN Resolutions 
The Hariri-Syrian struggle, which remained largely behind closed doors until 
late 2004, took centre stage in the intemational arena after February 2005, although 
pro-Syrian politicians in Lebanon had suggested that Marwan Hamadeh, Rafiq Hariri, 
and Ghassan Salameh were behind Resolution 1559, passed in September 2, 2004.** 
Resolution 1559 essentially sought to "ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
forces from Lebanon" (reference to Syria), and expressed concern "at the continued 
** From the days of Phoenician kings praising their Assyrian overlords, through the era of Ottoman rule 
to the time of Nasserite pan-Arabism, the reality and brutality of the region made such behavior 
imperative for Lebanese leaders. 
" Talal Nizameddin, N.53, pp.97-98. 
" Riad Nourallah, Beyond the Arab Disease: New Perspectives in Politics and Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2006) p.3. 
UN Security Resolution Council IS59. sponsored by the US and France and supported by Lebanese 
reformers like Hariri, calls for "foreign forces" to leave Lebanon and end their interference in Lebanese 
affairs. It does not refer to Syria by name. It also calls for the disarmament of militias. All militias were 
supposed to be disarmed after the civil war, but the Lebanese exempted Hezbollah, which they call a 
national Lebanese resistance movement aimed at fighting Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon. In 
January, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed a special envoy for the implementation of 
Resolution 1559. Terje Roed-Larsen, formerly U.N. special coordinator for the West Asian peace 
process, began meeting with Lebanese and Syrian officials in early February. 
Source: http://www.cfi-.org/publication/785 l/middle_east.html 
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presence of armed militias in Lebanon" (reference to HezboUah).^ ^ Two of the three 
names implicated in the Resolution were assassination targets, while the third remains 
in Paris for safety reasons. 
On 14 February 2005, former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was killed in a huge 
bomb explosion in central Beirut. Seven of his bodyguards who were travelling with 
him in a convoy of vehicles were also killed, while some 135 people were injured in 
the powerful blast.^ ° UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen reported on Resolution 1559 and 
German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis led the investigative committee established by 
Security Council Resolution 1595 to look into the Hariri assassination.^ ^ Both men 
submitted reports in October 2005 that were critical of Syria, either for complicity in 
Hariri's murder (under 1595) or for undermining Lebanese sovereignty and 
continuing to illegally smuggle weapons to some of its allies, particularly Palestinian 
groups (under 1559).^ ^ 
The Mehlis report provided a bulk of evidence highlighting tense relations 
between Hariri and the Syrians. The report also points to clear evidence of an 
orchestrated campaign to blacken Hariri's name by linking the former Prime Minister 
with corruption. The investigation indicated that the corruption and cronyism was 
instead so rife among the Syrian-Lebanese security network that its report did not rule 
out the possibility that the murder of Hariri coiild was because he posed a threat to 
their financial interests, rather than being politically motivated (probably through his 
** Robert G. Rabil, Syria, The United States, and The War on Terror in the Middle East (Connecticut: 
Praeger Security International, 2006) p. 168. 
^ The Asian Age (New Delhi), 15 February 2005. 
91 The Indian Express G e^w Delhi), 31 August 2005. 
See also: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mehlis_report " 
^ John Cherian, "Syrian Under Pressure", Frontline, v.22, n.23, November 5-18, 2005, pp.58-60. 
•^< 
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effect to privatize and make Lebanon's economy more attractive to Western 
interests).^ ^ 
Subsequent to the UN reports, Resolution 1636 was passed unanimously on 
October 31, 2005, demanding genuine Syrian cooperation with the investigation, with 
the use of force becoming an implicit threat.^ '' The irreconcilable clash in the fall of 
2004 between Syria and Hariri thus, developed from undermining Syria in Lebanon to 
threatening the Syrian regime itself by the fall of 2005.^ ^ 
4. West Asian Peace Process: Experience of Lebanon 
4.1 Lebanon and Madrid Conference 1991 
The Madrid Conference was hosted by the govermnent of Spain and co-
sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union. It was an early attempt by the 
international community to start a peace process through negotiations involving Israel 
and the Arab coimtries including Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. In the 
aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, US President George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of 
State, James Baker, formulated the framework of objectives, and together with the 
Soviet Union extended a letter of invitation to Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the 
Palestinians.^ ^ 
^ Talal Nizameddin, N.53, p.l 14. 
** U.N. Security Council Resolution 1636 was adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council on 
31 October 2005. In the resolution, the Council insisted that the Syrian authorities fully co-operate with 
the inquiry of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) into the 14 
February 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri, not least by arresting 
the suspects identified by the commission in its final report. Following tiie adoption of the resolution, 
Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara stated that his country had ah-eady co-operated in full and 
expressed his regret that such a resolution should have been adopted. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1636 
' ' Peter R. Demant, Islam vs. Islantism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World (Connecticut: Praeger 
Publisers,2006)p.l73. 
** Yevgeny M. Primakov, A World Challenged: Fighting Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century 
(New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2005) pp.37-38. 
The Palestinian team, due to Israeli objections, was initially formally a part of a joint Palestinian-
Jordanian delegation and consisted of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza without open PLO 
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The Government's decision to send a Lebanese delegation to the opening 
session of the West Asia peace conference held in Madrid, Spain, in 30 October 1991 
and to participate in subsequent rounds of bilateral negotiations, was criticized in both 
governmental and non-governmental circles. Critics argued that, since the terms of 
reference for the conference were UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 only, 
Lebanon's participation was tantamount to a repudiation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 425 of March 1978, which demanded a comprehensive withdrawal of all 
Israeli armed forces from southern Lebanon; and that the implementation of 
Resolution 425 would henceforth be linked to the implementation of other UN 
resolutions.'^ They asserted, moreover, that Lebanon had nothing to discuss in 
associations like Saeb Erekat and Haidar Abdel-Shafi, the head of the delegation. However, the 
delegation was in constant communication with the PLO leadership in Tunis. Over Israeli objections, 
the PLO dispatched an unofficial "advisory delegation," headed by Faisal Husseini to act as a liaison. 
The purpose of the conference was to serve as an opening forum for the participants and had no power 
to impose solutions or veto agreements. It inaugurated negotiations on both bilateral tracks and on 
multilateral tracks that also involved the international community. The Syrian and Lebanese negotiators 
agreed on a common strategy. The first-ever public bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors 
(except Egypt) were aimed at achieving peace treaties between the 3 Arab states and Israel, while the 
talks with the Palestinians were based on a 2-stage formula, the first consisting of negotiating interim 
self-government arrangements, to be followed by permanent status negotiations. (This formula was 
essentially followed in the later Oslo Accords.) They opened immediately following the conference on 
November 3, 1991 in Madrid, and were followed by over a dozen formal rounds in Washington, DC 
fi-om December 9, 1991 to January 24, 1994. 
" U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (S/RES/242) was adopted unanimously by the UN Security 
Council on November 22, 1967 in the aftermath of the Six Day War. It was adopted under Chapter VI 
of the UN Charter. The resolution was drafted by British ambassador Lord Caradon and was one of 
five drafts under consideration. It calls for "the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the West 
Asia" to be achieved by "the application of both the following principles:" "Witiidrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and: "Termination of all claims or states 
of belligerency" and respect for the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and 
recognised boundaries. Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Lebanon entered into consultations with the UN 
Special representative over the implementation of 242. However, Syria the other state concerned did 
not at that time or later accept the resolution. It is one of the most commonly referenced UN resolutions 
in West Asian politics. It has been argued that UNSC 242 has binding force under Article 25 of the UN 
Charter owing to its incorporation into UN Security Council Resolution 338 and that it is also binding 
on Israel and the PLO by agreement owing to its incorporation into the Oslo Accords. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_242 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 338 (October 1973). Adopted by 14 votes to one, with one 
abstention (China) on 22 October 1973. the security Council, 
1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity 
immediately, on later than 12 hours after the moment of adoption of this decision, in the positions 
they now occupy; 
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bilateral negotiations with Israel, since its relations with that country were regulated 
by the Armistice agreement of 1949, which remained valid till date. 
Before the opening session of the conference, Lebanon sought assurances 
from the US on the following issues: 
That the implementation of UN Resolution 425 would not be linked to the 
unplementation of other UN resolutions; that the country would receive 
support for the establishment of an international fund for Lebanon; that 
restrictions imposed by the US Administration on its citizens with regard 
to travelling and investing in Lebanon would be removed; that the US 
Consulate in Beirut would be reopened; that the Lebanese national carrier. 
Middle East Airlines, should be allowed to resumed flights to New York; 
and that arms paid for by the Government during Amine Gemayel's 
presidency would be delivered by the US and US-based training 
programmes for Lebanese army officers would be resumed. 
With regard to Resolution 425 Lebanese diplomacy was rewarded by a written 
US commitment to support its implementation in isolation from the wider West Asia 
peace process. On the other issues that Lebanon had raised, however, the US 
remained non-committal, pending the release of all Western hostages being held in 
Lebanon.'* Some observers also regarded the US assurance on Resolution 425 to be 
unclear, since the US Government's letter of intent failed to distinguish between the 
2. Calls upon the parties to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security 
Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts; 
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiation shall start between the 
parties concerned under appropriate auspices at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle 
East. 
Source: Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996) p. 332. 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 425 was issued five days after the Israeli invasion to Lebanon on 
March 14, 1978 in what was referred to as Operation Litani. This invasion was triggered by the March 
11, 1978 massacre of 37 Israeli civilians riding in a bus in the Tel Aviv area by members of PLO 
infiltrating from Lebanon. Following Lebanese government claims, the UN, driven by the US, began 
seeking a peacekeeping force for the area that Israel had occupied in order to bring about a withdrawal 
of the Israeli forces, and to reintroduce the authority of the Lebanese government in southern Lebanon. 
These efforts cuhninated in Resolution 425, during the 2074* meeting of the UN Security Council on 
March 19, 1978. That led to the formation of UN Interim Force m Lebanon, UNIFIL, the objective of 
which was to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security, and 
help the Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in the area. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiAJnited_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_425 
** It was not until the middle of 1992 that all Western hostages in Lebanon were released following 
intense diplomatic efforts by the UN, notably Giandominico Picco, the Assistant Secretary-General. 
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nature of the Israeli and the Syrian armed presence in Lebanon. Another potential 
point of contention was the US's demand that the activities of Hezbollah units in 
southern Lebanon should cease before the peace conference commenced. The 
Lebanese Government insisted that Hezbollah's resistance would continue until the 
Israeli armed forces had withdrawn from Lebanese territory.'^ 
4.2 Oslo Accord 1993 and Lebanese Reaction 
On 13 September 1993, the PLO and Israel signed a "Declaration of Principles 
on Interim Self-Govemment Arrangements or Declaration of Principles, (DOP)" the 
Oslo Accord, on Palestinian self-rule in Jericho and the Gaza Strip.'"^ The Accord had 
no effect on the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon, however. Indeed, the fitful 
progress of the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations has had negative ramifications on 
" Lucy Dean, ed., N. 10, p. 700. 
Israel cites as a major benefit of the conference and the process, the greatly increased number of 
countries which recognize and have some degree of diplomatic relations with it - nearly doubling - in 
particular citing the major powers of China and India and some even in the Arab world, like Oman, 
Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, along with the decline of the Arab boycott and economic 
relations with some of the Arab countries. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Madrid_Conference_of_l 991 
'"" Bansidhar Pradhan, From Confrontation to Hostile Intimacy: PLO and tite US (New Delhi: 
Sehyog Prakashan, 1994) p.32. 
The Accords were finalized in Oslo, Norway on 20 August 1993, and subsequently officially signed at 
a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993, with Yasser Arafat signing for the PLO 
and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signing for the State of Israel. It was witnessed by Warren 
Christopher for the US and Andrei Kozyrev for Russia, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton. 
The Oslo Accords were a framework for the future relations between the two parties. The Accords 
provided for the creation of a Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority would have 
responsibility for the administration of the territory under its control. The Accords also called for the 
wididrawal of the Israel Defence Forces from parts of the Gaza Strip and West Bank. It was anticipated 
diat this arrangement would last for a frve-year interim period during which a permanent agreement 
would be negotiated (beginning no later than May 1996). Permanent issues such as Jerusalem, 
Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were deliberately left to be decided at a 
later stage. Interim self-government was to be granted by Israel in phases. Support for the Accords, of 
the concessions made and the process were not free from criticism. The repeated public posturing of all 
sides has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the possibility of achieving 
peace, at least in the short-term. The momentum towards peaceful relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians as demonstrated by the signing of the Oslo Accords has been seriously jolted by the 
outbreak of the Second Intifeda in 2000. Further strain was put on the process after Hamas won 2006 
Palestinian elections. Although offering Israel a number of long-term ceasefires and accepting the 2002 
Arab Peace Initiative, Hamas has repeatedly refused to officially recognise Israel, to renounce violent 
resistance, or accept some agreements previously made by the Palestinian Authority, claiming it is 
being held to an imfair standard and points out the fact that Israel has not recognized a Palestinian state, 
renounced violence or lived up to all pledges it has made during previous negotiations. Hamas has 
always renounced the Oslo Accords. 
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Lebanon.'"' In September 1995, for example, the Libyan government decided to show 
its disapproval of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by expelling 30,000 Palestinian 
migrant workers, about half of whom were from Lebanon. This action renewed fears 
that Lebanon will have to pay the price of permanently settling the Palestinians after 
any Israeli-Palestinian peace settlement. 
Conversely, the Palestinian presence in post-civil war Lebanon has served as 
rare, if negative, unifying element in the Lebanese national political identity. With 
few exceptions, Lebanese of all factions agreed that the Palestinians should not be 
resettled permanently in Lebanon.'°^ This principle is enshrined in the preamble of the 
new constitution of Lebanon, which states: 
Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. There shall be no segregation 
of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no 
jfragmentation, partition, or colonization. 
The then Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss also expressed his concern that there is 
no mention of the Palestinians of 1948 in the Israel-PLO accord. Hoss visualized that 
the resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon would upset the sectarian balance in the 
country. He also pointed out that the Taif Accord said "no" to jfragmentation, division, 
and implantation. "Implantation" (colonization), he said, refers to the Palestinians in 
Lebanon. Lebanon's Foreign Minister, Paris Buwayez, advocates the following 
measures to resolve the Palestinian issue in Lebanon: 
(1) The Palestinians from the areas covered by the Israeli-PLO 
agreement should be given the right of return to Gaza and Jericho. The 
UN decided this twenty years ago in UN Resolution 194. (2) The 
Palestinians should be given the right of family unification. "Wherever 
the majority of a given family is located, whether in Israel, the West 
"" Avraham Sela, ed., N.21, pp.501-502 
'"^  Kail C. Ellis, N.l,p.21. 
103 CoUert C. Held, Middle East Pattern: Places, Peoples, and Politics (Colorado: Westview Press, 
2000) p.263-264. 
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Bank, Egypt, the US, etc., the members of that family should be allowed 
to rejoin the family." (3) Finally, the Palestinians should be given the 
right to immigrate to their country of choice. Countries like Canada, 
according to Buwayez, are accepting numerous immigrants and so 
should allow the Palestinians to immigrate. According to Buwayez, the 
"implementation of these measures would solve 30 percent of the 
Palestinian problem in Lebanon."'"^ 
Palestinians living in Lebanon not only face physical danger, but also suffer 
the afflictions of poverty, unemployment, and political disenfranchisement. Although, 
a few have been granted Lebanese citizenship, most Palestinians feel marginalized by 
a peace process that holds out no hope of repatriation. As a result, Palestinians cling 
to their refugee status because it legitimizes theh right of return to Palestine. In the 
interim, some Palestinians are now seeking to redefine themselves as a legal minority 
in Lebanon with the hope that this will protect them fi-om further displacement and 
redefine their place in Lebanese society.'°^ 
In late February 1994, Lebanon together with the other Arab parties, withdrew 
fi-om the West Asia peace process, following the murder, by a right-wing Jewish 
extremist, to some 30 Muslim worshippers at a mosque in Hebron on the West Bank. 
However, together with Syria and Jordan, Lebanon rejoined the peace process in 
March.^°^ 
4.3 Beirut Summit and Arab Peace Initiative 2002 
The Beirut Summit known as the Arab Summit Conference was convened in 
March 2002 in Beirut, Lebanon, to present a plan to defuse the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. It became especially noteworthy for the adoption, by the Arab states 
attending, of a proposal offering a comprehensive peace between the Arab nations and 
"** Kail C. Ellis, N.l,p.21. 
'"^  Edward W. Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (London: Granta Books, 2000) 
pp.236-237. 
106 1 
' Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p. 700. 
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Israel, i.e. the Arab Peace Initiative. The proposal, from Saudi Arabia (itself 
something of a novelty, as the Saudis usually prefer to be less forward on the world 
diplomatic stage) stated that should Israel:'*'^  
"Withdraw from all territories occupied since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, 
provide a just solution to the Palestinian reftigee problem, and recognize 
the establishment of a sovereign and independent Palestinian state in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip then the Arab countries would in turn 
recognize Israel, enter into peace agreements with it, and establish 
normal relations with it." 
To the Jordanian as Jordan's foreign minister reiterated: 
"The Arab initiative put forth at the Beirut Summit in March offers 
comprehensive peace in the region based on the internationally 
recognized formulation of "land for peace" ~ a return to June 4, 1967, 
borders in exchange for normal relations and a collective peace treaty." 
The Arab Peace Initiative was floated by the then acting Saudi regent Crown 
Prince Abdullah as a potential solution to both the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. It was published on March 28, 2002, during the meeting of the 
Arab League at the Beirut Summit, and achieved the unanimous consent of all 
members of the Arab League.'°^ Considered by the Arabs as a progressive proposal, it 
calls for the state of Israel to withdraw its forces from all the Occupied Territories, 
including the Golan Heights, to recognize "an independent Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital" in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a "just solution" 
for the Palestinian refugees. In exchange, the Arab states affirmed that they would 
'"' Yevgeny M. Primakov, N.96, p.56. 
The initiative does not appear to have gained momentum since its publication. However, as of 
January 30, 2004, it appeared that the Saudis were preparing a supplementary mitiative in preparation 
for the next Arab League summit meeting. The Kuwaiti newspaper, as-Siyasa, has reported that the 
supplementary initiative would call for the resettlement of up to 2 million refugees in Arab countries 
and the rest in a Palestinian state. However, the Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath 
called the report "nonsense," and Saudi officials denied such a plan was in the ofFmg. The central 
committee of Fatah, the ruling party in the Palestinian Authority at that time, issued a statement 
describing the Saudi initiative as another "stab" against the struggle of the Palestinian people. 
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recognize the state of Israel, consider the Arab-Israeli conflict over and establish 
"normal relations" with Israel. "^ ^ 
The 4* section of the proposal was inserted at Lebanese insistence as the 
saved reflect its concern that the settlement of the refugee problem not be at what it 
considers the expense of Lebanon and its "demographic balance." The initiative calls 
for the establishment of a special committee composed of a portion of the Arab 
League's concerned member states and the Secretary General of the League of Arab 
States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for the initiative at all levels, 
particularly from the UN, the Security Coxmcil, the US, the Russian Federation, the 
Muslim states and the European Union. In response, on March 28, 2002 Israeli 
Foreign Minister Shimon Peres welcomed the initiative and said: 
"Israel views positively every initiative aimed at arriving at peace and 
normalization. In this respect, the Saudi step is an important one, but it is 
liable to founder if terrorism is not stopped. We carmot, of course, ignore 
the problematic aspects which arose at the Beirut Summit and the harsh 
and rejectionist language used by some of the speakers. 
It is also clear that the details of every peace plan must be discussed 
directly between Israel and the Palestinians, and to make this possible, 
the Palestinian Authority must put an end to terror, the horrifying 
expression of which we witnessed just last night in Netanya."''" 
"" The goals of the initiative are: 
1. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 
2. Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. 
3. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital 
4. A just solution to the Palestinian Refugee problem, to be agreed upon in accordance with 
section 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194. 
5. The normalization of relations in the context of a comprehensive peace 
"" The Passover massacre (also known as the Netanya bombing) was a Palestinian suicide bombing 
in the Park Hotel at Netanya on March 27, 2002. The attack killed 30 Israeli civilians and triggered 
Operation Defensive Shield. The attack occurred on the night of March 27, when the traditional Jewish 
holiday of Passover was celebrated. The Park Hotel in Netanya held a big Passover dinner for its 250 
guests, especially elderly Jews who didn't have family and relatives, in the ground-floor dining room. A 
Palestinian suicide bomber passed a security guard at the hotel's entrance, walked through the lobby 
passing the reception desk and entered the hotel's dining room where he detonated an explosive device 
he carried in a suitcase. Twenty-eight people were immediately killed, and about 140 were injured, of 
whom 20 were seriously injured. Two of the injured later died from their wounds. Many of the victims 
were Holocaust survivors. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. The bomber was identified as 
Abdel-Basset Odeh, a 25-year-old from the nearby West Bank city of Tulkarem. Odeh claimed that the 
attack was in response to a series of Israeli incursions into Palestinian refiigee camps earlier in the 
month that resulted in several Palestinian civilian deaths. Hamas would later claim that the attacks were 
specifically designed to derail momentum from a recently announced peace offer from the Saudi 
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At the 2002 Beirut summit, Lebanon and Syria campaigned for the inclusion 
of a reference to UN Resolution 194, which emphasizes the Palestinian right of return 
to Israel. A compromise was eventually reached, citing the resolution but stating that 
the league would support any agreement between Israel and Palestinians on the issue. 
Similarly Palestinian criticism greeted the Geneva initiative's formula to send most of 
the refugees to third countries and only a symbolic number to Israel.''' 
5. Hezbollah and Political Instability in Southern Lebanon 
5.1 Hezbollah's Logic of Resistance 
Hezbollah's resistance priority is partly a function of its commitment of fulfill 
its religious obligation to fight oppression, and partly attributable to its reasoning that 
armed resistance is the only means of ensuring an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese 
territory. On the surface, the party's adherence to the dictates of Islam appears to be a 
far more compelling reason its resistance to the Israeli occupation, and hence a more 
firmly entrenched part of its intellectual foundations, than its logic that armed 
confrontation is the only means of liberating national territory. However, for 
Hezbollah, the logic of its resistance has continuously validated itself over time, to the 
1 17 
extent that it has become an indissoluble part of the party's intellectual structure. 
government at the Beirut Summit. In July 2005 Netanya was hit by a bomber again, this time one 
dispatched by Islamic Jihad. Five were killed and dozens wounded. 
' " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beirut_Summit 
What is left out by the initiative 
The initiative does not address the following matters: 
1. The nature of the envisioned Palestinian state 
2. The nature of the "just solution" to the refugee problem 
3. The level of militarization of the Palestinian state 
4. The use of water resources 
5. Access to Jerusalem and its holy sites 
6. Access to other holy sites within the territory of the British Mandate of Palestine 
7. Access between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
8. TTie dismantling of non-governmental armed groups within the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
9. Border controls between Israel and the Palestinian state 
10. The fate of Palestinian prisoners 
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According to Hezbollah's logic, 'the more body bags that are sent to Israel' 
the greater the heated debate that will be ignited within Israeli society. In turn, the 
growing domestic opposition to the continuation of Israel's occupation will pressure 
the Israeli government to unilaterally withdraw from Lebanon. 
As perceived by Hezbollah, Israel's enforced withdrawal only confirmed and 
accentuated the logic of its resistance. It also served as a valid argument against those 
who contended that Hezbollah's resistance activity only incurred Israel's wrath, and 
that, therefore, the party should cease enraging it. Sheikh Subhi Tufayli remonstrated 
that, had the party adopted this line of reasoning, 'We would have become Israel's 
soldiers and it would have made us reach the point whereby we constituted another 
security zone for it, just so it would not get angry!'' ''* 
So effective was this strategy of deterrence, that Israel not only failed to 
expand its occupation beyond the security zone after 1985, but announced in 1999 its 
intention to unilaterally withdraw from the occupied zone by July 2000. Hezbollah, 
therefore, prides its 'war of attrition' against Israel for creating a 'greater dilemma' 
for its government, Knesset, military, and society in general, who were all divided 
"^  Based on the premise that 'there are no occupations which last', Hezbollah has always believed that 
Israel's occupation of South Lebanon would eventually end as have other occupations in history by 
armies much larger than Israeli's. Of course, it was only with the active resistance of the occupied 
peoples that tiiese occupying forces were defeated. One such example that is frequently invoked by the 
party is the US' enforced withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 at the hands of the Vietcong. By killing 
tens of thousands of American soldiers, the Vietcong generated huge confroversy in American society, 
whereby a large section of the American electorate came to staunchly oppose the war. 
'" After killing over 640 Israeli troops, this is precisely what Hezbollah was able to achieve in 1985 
when it forced Israel to retreat from the West and Central Biqa', Mount Lebanon, East and West Beirut 
and southern suburbs of Beirut, to the 'security zone'. 
"'* Hezbollah Leaders: 
Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah 
Ibrahim al-Amin, early pre-eminent leader 
Sheikh Subhi Tufayli, Secretary-General in late 1980s 
Sheikh Abbas Musawi, Secretary-General, 1991-1992 
Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary-General after March 1992 - present 
(Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, N.6, p. 140) 
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over whether a withdrawal should be unilateral or accompanied by security 
guarantees, or within the context of a peace agreement, hi any event, it was the Israeli 
government's admission of 'defeat' that has proven of Hezbollah that its resistance 
logic is a sound one. 
It has also proven to the party that violence is the only means that could ensure 
an Israeli withdrawal, as Israel only understands 'the logic of force'. Concomitantly, it 
has lent credence to Hezbollah's belief that land-for-peace negotiations with Israel are 
imnecessary and ultimately futile. This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that 
Israel's unconditional withdrawal to the security zone in 1985 was directly 
attributable to 'the pressure of the mujahidiri's attacks' rather than any negotiations or 
international agreements. 
Accordingly, Hezbollah sees no point in 'begging for peace or security' from 
Israel when it can attain both, unconditionally, through armed confrontation: 'We 
want to make peace for our umma with our blood, rifles, and severed limbs ... This is 
the peace we believe in.' Assuming then, that both armed confrontation and 
negotiations are equally conducive to a hasty Israeli withdrawal, faced with a choice 
between the two, Hezbollah would opt for the former.''^  
Nonetheless, Hezbollah's resignation on the concept of negotiations with 
Israel is offset by the party's continuation, and occasional escalation, of its resistance 
activity against the Israeli occupation, thereby rendering the party's recognition of the 
negotiations a de facto as opposed to a de jure one. Accordingly, the party is able to 
"* Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbu'llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002) pp.118-119. 
Hezbollah attempts to validate this reasoning by pointing to the Zionists' violation of UN Resolution 
182 - which partitioned Palestine into Jewish and Muslim halves - by 'swallowing all of Palestine'. By 
extension, it is naYve to think that, in the absence of military pressure, Israel would implement 
Resolution 425, which calls for Israel's unconditional withdrawal from Lebanon, when Israel aspires to 
'evict the inhabitants of South Lebanon and to plunder the region's land, water and resources. The 
party also cites the failure of Arab diplomas, 'even in the heyday of Arab unity, to liberate one inch of 
Palestinian land' by means of negotiations, as further proof of the futility of any coiu^e of action other 
than resistance. 
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maintain its non-recognition of the state of Israel and its refusal to reward Israel's 
occupation with security guarantees, despite its tacit acceptance of the peace 
negotiations. 
5.2 Hezbollah: From Revolutionary Movement to Political Party 
Throughout the 1980s, nothing in Hezbollah's actions or statements hinted at 
any possibility that the party would adapt to the Lebanese political game, particularly 
running for election and sitting in the National Assembly. To the contrary, the 
Lebanese political system was condemned by Hezbollah as "rotten to the core" and 
"unreformable." By the early 1990s, however, things began to change. Several factors 
explain Hezbollah's new approach: the end of the Cold War, change in Iran, and the 
end of the Civil War in Lebanon. 
Not only did the end of the Cold War facilitate the formation in 1990 of a US-
dominated war coalition, including Syria, but it also permitted people at least to 
imagine an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If Syria were to sign a peace agreement 
with Israel, the Hezbollah knew that disarming the resistance would be part of the 
package."^ Meanwhile, the death of AyatoUah RuhoUah Khomeini in 1989 signaled 
the begirming of Iran's Thermidor or postrevolutionary phase. "^ Indeed, even before 
his death, the internecine fighting between Amal and Hezbollah had provoked an 
attitude shift in Tehran, where the bloodletting was viewed with disgust. President 
Rafsanjani did not hide his impatience with Hezbollah as a militia and publicly 
declared his intention to shift Iran's orientation in Lebanon to state-to-state relations 
"* Avraham Sela, ed., N.21, p.288. 
" ' Ayatollata Ruhollah Khomeini (Ruholloh Moussavi; 1900?-1989), spiritual and political leader of 
Iran, 1979-1989. Khomeini received the title AyatoUah (Persian, "reflection" or "sign") for achieving 
the highest status that can be bestowed upon a Shiite Muslim. He was forced into exile in 1963 because 
of his opposition to the rule of the Shah O^g), Muhammad Reza Pahlevi. In exile in Turkey, Iraq, and 
France, he emerged as the leader of the anti-Shah forces, which overthrew the Pahlevi regime. He 
returned to Iran in January 1979 to become absolute leader of his new Islamic republic. He held US 
hostages (1979-1981) and waged war with Iraq (1980-1988). 
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and the Shiite community as a whole. "^ Finally, the Civil War in Lebanon officially 
ended with the 1989 Taif Accord, though the war in effect went on until October 
1990, when Gen. Michel Aoun (who objected that Taif did not address Syria's 
preponderant role in Lebanon) was forced to end his so-called uprising by the 
pressure of Syrian arms."^ 
All of these factors provided the context for a debate that took place in 1992 
over whether or not to field candidates in that year's parliamentary elections. A 
minority led by Hezbollah's first secretary-general. Sheikh Subhi Tufayli (expelled 
fi-om the party in January 1998 for his vehement criticism of his successors), 
staunchly opposed participation, arguing that Hezbollah would be co-opted and 
sacrifice its ideals. The vast majority supported participation, accurately reflecting the 
aspirations of Hezbollah's constituency, which wanted a more effective voice in the 
political system.'^ ° 
The upshot was that Hezbollah took part in the 1992 elections and came away 
with eight seats, the largest bloc in the 128-member parliament (its allies fi-om other 
sects won an additional four). From this time forward, Hezbollah began to develop a 
reputation as a serious political party adept at pragmatic parliamentary alliances and 
tactics, even while intensifying its guerrilla warfare against the occupier.'^' The 
representative of Hezbollah in Lebanese parliament frt)m 1992 onwards thus can be 
suiimiarised as follows: 
"* Houchang Esfandiar Chehabi, ed., N.22, pp.294-298. 
' " Kaleem Ahmad, "Asad's Policy in Lebanon", Journal of the West Asian Studies Society 1987-88, 
Centre of West Asian Studies, Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, n.3&4, pp.138-189. 
'^ ° Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, In tfie Path of Hizbullah (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004) 
pp.110-111. 
'^' Malcohn B. Russell, N.35, p. 155. 
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Table-6 
Distribution of Shiite Pariiamentary Seats by Hezbollah, Amal and Shiite 
Zu'ama Families 
Year Hezbollah Amal Families Total 
1992 8 9 10 27 
1996 7 8 13 27 
2000 9 6 12 27 
Source: Figures complied from the election records of Lebanon's Ministry of the Interior for the years 
1992, 1996, and 2000. 
5.3 HezboUah-Amal Relations 
By the end of the Civil War the Shiite were, with some exceptions, 
concentrated into two major communal parties, Amal and Hezbollah, which now 
represent the two alternative and competing versions of Shiite political expression. On 
the one hand, Amal stands for the secular Shiite view of the future Lebanon. It is a 
party willing to use governmental powers to advance the communal cause, and 
willing to play an active part in cabinet. Its view in this, regard is antithetical to that of 
Hezbollah, which has come to represent in the present the more radical aspect of 
Shiite political expression. Having started out as a militia organisation and only then 
transformed itself into an organised political party, Hezbollah has struggled to come 
to terms with the Lebanese Republic.'^ ^ Decrying the legitimacy of the Lebanese 
governmental system, it has chosen to participate in parliament without participating 
in government. This has allowed the party to position itself as a legitimate 
parliamentary opposition and to alleviate the concerns many Lebanese had about its 
political intentions. But, regardless of each party's views about the benefits to 
'^ Peter R. Demant, N.95, pp.123-125. 
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Lebanon of being secular of Islamic, both are united on one issue: the need to change 
the electoral law to reflect the country's demographic realities. It is only by achieving 
this goal that Shiite political parties feel they will truly be able to advance their 
commimity's cause.'^ ^ 
This change was in the attitude of Hezbollah came at a later stage. However, 
since its genesis and development, it is resorting to violence and unlawful activities. 
Earlier in 1993 Israel took the pretext of even attacking on southern Lebanon 
targeting to them and to their actions. 
5.4 The Operation Accountability and the Operation Grapes of Wrath 1993-96 
On 25 July 1993, Israeli forces launched their heaviest artillery and air attacks 
on targets in southern Lebanon since the 1982 invasion, with the declared aim of 
eradicating the threat posed by Hezbollah and Palestinian guerrillas and, moreover, of 
creating a flow of refugees so as to compel the Lebanese and Syrian authorities to 
take action to curb Hezbollah and the Palestinians.'^'' According to Lebanese figures, 
Israel's so-called 'Operation Accountability' displaced some 300,000 civilians 
towards the north and resulted in 128 (mainly civilian) fatalities.'^ ^ What was termed 
a cease-fire 'imderstanding' (brokered by the US) entered into effect at the end of July 
1993, ending the week-long Israeli campaign. Yet, this proved short lived, and mutual 
offensives continued in subsequent months.'^ * In June 1994, Israeli forces mounted an 
air attack on an alleged Hezbollah training camp in the Biqa Valley close to Syrian 
border and in October attacked the southern town of Nabatiyah. Hezbollah responded 
'^' Rodger Shanahan, The Shi'a of Lebanon: Clans, Parties and Clerics (London: Tauris Academic 
Studies, 2005) p. 132. 
'^ '' Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel and the Palestinians (New Delhi: 
India Research Press, 2004) p.528. 
125 
126 
Edgar O'Ballance, The Palestinian Intifada (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1998) p. 151. 
Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.702. 
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with rocket attacks on Israeli targets, and the conflict in and around the security zone 
escalated. At the end of March 1995, the assassination of a Hezbollah leader by 
Israeli forces in southern Lebanon gave rise to fierce fighting between the two sides in 
the area east of Sidon and to rocket attacks by Hezbollah on Israeli targets in 
Galilee.'^ * 
In April 1996, Israel launched massive combined air and artillery strikes 
against southern Lebanon, the Biqa Valley and in the southern suburbs of Beirut. 
The declared aim of Israel's campaign, code-named 'Operation Grapes of Wrath', 
was to strike a fatal blow at Hezbollah, which since the late 1980s had become 
Israel's fiercest opponent in Lebanon, enjoying widespread support among the 
country's Shiite inhabitants. In the weeks before the operation, clashes between 
Hezbollah fighters and Israeli troops in and around the security zone had intensified. 
Hezbollah had fired rockets into settlements in northern Israel, wounding several 
people and causing widespread panic among the civilian population, in retaliation for 
attacks on Lebanese civilians by Israeli troops.'^ ° The operation resulted in the 
' " Marius Deeb, N.25, p. 191. 
Shaykh Muhammad Husain Fadlallah, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, threatened retaliations: "From 
now on the battle with Israel is open on all fronts. Hezbollah, as Fadlallah had correctly predicted, 
retaliated by blowing up a seven-story building of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, m Buenos 
Aires, on July 18, 1994, killing over a hundred people and wounding over two hundred and thirty 
others. 
'^ * In late April a Hezbollah fighter carried out a suicide bomb attack on an Israeli military convoy 
inside the security zone, in \\1iich 11 Israeli soldiers were injured. In early July, in response to an attack 
three days earlier by Hezbollah guerrillas, in which two Israeli soldiers were killed, Israeli armed 
forced reportedly attacked Nabatiyah with flechette anti-personnel missiles (which were subject to an 
international ban) and three children were killed. Hezbollah retaliated with rocket attacks on targets in 
northern Israel. Israeli armed forces launched air and artillery attacks against Hezbollah targets in 
August, which were reported to have resulted in heavy casualties. 
'^' In April 1996, following Israel's Grapes of Wrath operation, during which the resistance, Hezbollah, 
fired more than 600 Katyushas into Israel, while Israel fu-ed an estimated 25,000 shells at Lebanese 
targets and flew about 600 combat air sorties. 
"" CoUert C. Held, N.103, p.275. 
After Israel assassinated Hezbollah Secretary-General 'Abbas Musawi in 1992, his successor, Hassan 
Nasrallah, enunciated a tit-for-tat policy: If Israel hits Lebanese civilian targets, then Hezbollah hits 
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displacement of some 400,000 Lebanese, who were forced to flee north to escape the 
shelling.* '^ During the campaign, the IDF not only targeted suspected Hezbollah 
bases but also attacked the Damour power station near Beirut and the city's 
international airport. The indiscriminate nature of the Israeli assault and the civilian 
casualties that resulted briefly united Christian and Muslim Lebanese behind 
Hezbollah, which was praised as a symbol of national resistance.'^ ^ On 18 April 1996, 
Israeli shells hit a UN base at Qana, near the port of Type, killing over 100 Lebanese 
civilians who had taken shelter there and wounding many others, including troops 
serving with UNIFIL.'^ ^ A UN investigation into the tragedy rejected Israel's claim 
that the attack was the result of technical and procedural errors. The attack on Qana 
brought international condemnation of Israel and led to diplomatic efforts, notably by 
the US and France, to bring about a cease-fire.'^ "* 
After over two weeks of fighting, a cease-fire 'imderstanding' was reached 
between Israel and Hezbollah, effectively a compromise confining the conflict to the 
security zone and recognizing both Hezbollah's right to resist Israeli occupation and 
Israel's right to self-defence. Hezbollah agreed that it would not launch attacks fi-om 
near civilian areas, and Israel promised to refi-am fi-om attacking civilian targets. 
The 'understanding' also led to the establishment in June of an Israel-Lebanon 
Monitoring Group (ILMG), comprising Israel, Lebanon, Syria, France and the US, to 
Israel. Although the action-reaction cycle was not always transparent, generally the cycle started with 
an Israeli attack on a civilian target, intentional or otherwise. 
" ' Greg Philo and Mike Berry, Bad News From Israel (London: Pluto Press, 2004) p.75. 
"^ Lucy Dean, ed., N.IO, p.702-703. 
' " Noam Chomsky, N.124, p.529. 
"* Edgar O'Ballance, N. 125, pp.211-212. 
' " Augustus Richard Norton, "Hizballah, and the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon" Journal of 
Palestine Studies, v.30, n.l, issue 117, autumn, 2000, p.29. 
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supervise the cease-fire.'^ ^ Refugees began returning to southern Lebanon, where 
whole villages and much infrastructure had been destroyed by Israeli shelling. Many 
observers maintained that 'Operation Grapes of Wrath' had been laimched by Israeli 
Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, primarily to show that he was tough to security in the 
run-up to Israeli elections. If so, the exercise backfired; Hezbollah was undefeated and 
its standing in Lebanon enhanced. 
5.5 The Resistance to Israeli Occupation of Southern Lebanon and Israeli 
Withdrawal 2000 
During the south Lebanon conflict (1982-2000) Hezbollah waged a guerrilla 
campaign against Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon. It ended with Israeli 
withdrawal in 2000, in accordance with 1978's UN Security Council Resolution 425 
and 426, after 22 years of direct occupation. Given that prior Arab Israeli wars were 
characterized by either Israeli victory or UN-enforced ceasefire, this is often regarded 
as a success of Hezbollah, which was able to extend its control of southern Lebanon. 
The conflict has been described as a sub-conflict of the Lebanese Civil War (the 
1982-1990 period). Various participants use different terminology to label the 
conflict: it has been called an Israeli military occupation, a Lebanese resistance 
movement and etc. Ultimately the argument that leaving southern Lebanon would 
make Israel less secure has been borne out. 
Israel occupied a security zone of varying sizes in southern Lebanon between 
1982 and 2000. Hezbollah, along with the mainly leftist and secular groups in the 
Lebanese National Resistance Front, fought a guerilla war against Israel and the 
Israeli allies South Lebanon Army (SLA). The National Resistance Front militias 
"* Joanne Maher, ed., N.39, pp.701-702. 
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disarmed in accordance with the Taif agreement, but Hezbollah continued to maintain 
a sizable fighting force after the Israeli withdrawal. 
The incoming Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak (who was elected on 17 
May 1999), had made a pre-election pledge to effect an Israeli withdrawal from 
southern Lebanon by July 2000.'^ ^ After the victory of Barak's Labour-led one Israel 
coalition, Hezbollah began to concentrate its efforts on forcing Israel out of Lebanon 
and seeking to dismantle the demoralized SLA. On 5 March 2000, the Israeli Cabinet 
voted unanimously to withdraw its forces fi-om southern Lebanon by July, even if no 
peace agreement had been reached between Israel and Syria.'^ ^ 
In May 2000, there was a fiirther escalation in the fighting between Israeli 
forces and Hezbollah; two senior SLA fighters were killed in the middle of the month. 
On 23 May Israel's Security Cabinet voted to accelerate the withdrawal of its 
remaining troops from Lebanon, after Hezbollah had taken control of about one-third 
of southern Lebanon following the evacuation by the SLA of outposts transferred to 
its control by the Israeli army.'^ ^ Both the government of Israel and the UN had 
expected the withdrawal to take place on 1 June; however, amid considerable chaos, 
the rapid withdrawal of all Israeli forces from southern Lebanon was completed on 24 
May, almost six weeks ahead of Barak's original deadline of July. As the withdrawal 
was taking place, on 23 May Lebanese citizens stormed the notorious al-Khiam prison 
137 Marius Deeb, N.25, p.213. 
" ' The Israeli Government issued an apology to the Lebanese authorities in December 1999, after an 
attack by its forces in which at least 15 Lebanese schoolchildren were injured. The incident came amid 
an escalation in Hezbollah operations following the announcement of a resumption of Israeli-Syrian 
peace negotiations. In order to facilitate progress in the talks, in December an 'understanding in 
principle' was reportedly reached between Israel and Syria to curb the fighting in southern Lebanon. 
" ' Meanwhile, in June 2000, the Lebanese authorities initiated military court proceedings (some in 
absentia) against more than 2,500 former SLA militiamen, on charges of having collaborated with 
Israel during its occupation of southern Lebanon. The trail attracted strong criticism from human ri^ts 
organizations. Reports stated that 2,041 alleged collaborators had been convicted by early January 
2001. 
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in Israel's former 'security zone' and released around 144 Lebanese prisoners, several 
of whom had been detained there for many years.'''^  
On June 16, 2000, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, officially declared 
that Israel had completed its withdrawal.''*' Although, Hezbollah and the Lebanese 
government challenged Annan's declaration and announced that the withdrawal was 
in fact not complete. They made claims to several sites along the withdrawal line 
where Israel still held Lebanese land, but the most serious allegation and bone of 
contention evolved to be an area on the western slopes of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-
Shaykh) named the Shebaa [Shib'a] farms. Hezbollah, with the tacit acceptance of the 
Lebanese and Syrian govenunents, declared that until Israel secedes fi-om this area the 
continuation of the muqawama, or resistance, is legitimate.''*^ 
However, the area close to the Blue Line remained under the control of 
Hezbollah and there were numerous reports of stone-throwing by Lebanese at the 
heavily fortified Israeli outposts. (See Map No. 13) Continuing tension had 
discouraged most of the civilian population from returning to the territory.''*^ 
Israel considered this move as tactical withdrawal since it always regarded the 
Security Zone as a buffer zone only to defend Israel's citizens. With an end to the 
140 Joanne Maher, ed., N.39, pp.705-707. 
" ' Kofi Atta Annan, GCMG (bom 8 April 1938) is a Ghanaian diplomat who served as the seventh 
Secretary-General of the UN from 1 January 1997 to 1 January 2007 and he was succeeded by Ban Ki-
moon (Korean). Annan and the UN were the co-recipients of the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize. Annan 
currently serves on the board of directors of the UN Foundation, a public charity created in 1998 with 
entrepreneur and philanthropist Ted Turner's historic $1 billion gift to support UN causes. The UN 
Foundation builds and implements public-private partaerships to address the world's most pressing 
problems, and broadens support for the UN. Annan is a member of the Africa Progress Panel (APP), an 
independent authority on Africa launched in April 2007 to focus world leaders' attention on delivering 
their commitments to the continent. The Panel launched a major report in London on Monday 16 June 
2008 entitled Africa's Development: Promises and Prospects. Kofi Annan was appointed the 
Chancellor of the University of Ghana in 2008. 
'"•^  Asher Kaufinan, "Who Owns the Shebaa Farms? Chronicle of a Territorial Dispute", Middle East 
Journal, v.56, n.4. Autumn 2002, pp.576-577. 
'^ ^ Lucy Dean, ed., N. 10, p.705. 
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"occupation", Israel could assume it would improve its worldwide image. The 
tentative peace, resulting from the withdrawal, lasted for years. However, the Israeli 
Air Force (lAF) continuously overflew the Lebanese airspace for reconnaissance 
while Hezbollah continued to attack the Shebaa Farms area.*''^ 
5.6 Hezbollah, Terrorism and September 11 
Throughout most of the Arab and Muslim world, Hezbollah is regarded as a 
legitimate resistance movement though with reservations. Hezbollah's violent acts are 
characterized by some countries as terrorist attacks, while others regard them as a 
resistance movement engaged in defensive Jihad.'"'^ 
In 1999, Hezbollah was placed on the US State Department terrorism list. 
After Hezbollah's condemnation of the suicide attacks on New York and Washington 
on September 11, 2001, it was removed from the list, but it was later returned to the 
list.'''^ Some days after the attacks, Hezbollah issued a statement in which it expressed 
'•"^  Israeli security expert Zeev Maoz views the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon as the "first clear cut 
defeat of the IDF'. "Interestingly this defeat was not fully recognized by the IDF or by many other 
elements in the political system", because the conflict had transformed from a conventional war into a 
prolonged low-intensity conflict. 
"** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Lebanon_conflict_%281982%E2%80%932000%29 
In the article "Standing with my Brother", Laleh Khalili writes that "Hizbullah's military wing has 
garnered symbolic capital in Lebanon and beyond as the only militant organization to have forced 
Israel to cede occupied territories in 2000". Also, the Winograd Commission found that, "[t]he ability 
of Hezbollah to sit 'on the border', its ability to dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its 
military abilities and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel's unilateral withdrawal 
in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the 
border with Israel)". 
'•"^  The countries below have officially listed Hezbollah in at least some part as a terrorist organization: 
Australia The Hezbollah External Security Organization 
Canada The entire organization Hezbollah 
Israel The entire organization Hezbollah 
Netherlands The entire organization Hezbollah 
United Kingdom The Hezbollah External Security Organization 
United States The entire organization Hezbollah 
'*^  The September 11, 2001 attacks, September 11th, and 9/11 are several terms used to describe a 
series of coordinated suicide attacks by al-Qaeda in the eastern US on that date. That morning, 
terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. The hijackers 
intentionally crashed two of tfie airliners into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York 
City, killing everyone on board and many others working in the building, causing both buildings to 
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regret at the killing of innocent people anywhere in the world but urged caution, 
arguing that the US Administration would use the resulting fear and panic to practice 
'all matter of aggression and terrorism under the pretext of fighting aggression and 
terrorism.' The statement declared that the Lebanese had been the victims of repeated 
Zionist massacres which US Administration had refused to condemn.'''* In 2002, US 
State Department official, Christopher Ross, was cited as explaining that while "the 
Hezbollah party and some of its members carried out terrorist acts in the past," "the 
acts that it carried out against the Israeli forces in South Lebanon were not terrorist 
acts." 
The European Union (EU) does not list Hezbollah as a "terrorist 
organization," but does Ust the late Imad Mugniyah, a senior member and founder of 
Hezbollah, as a terrorist.*'*^ In addition, on March 10, 2005, the European Parliament 
collapse within two hours, destroying at least two nearby buildings and damaging others. The hijackers 
crashed a third airliner into the Pentagon. The fourth plane crashed into a field near Shanksville in rural 
Somerset County, Pennsylvania after passengers and members of the flight crew on the fourth aircraft 
attempted to retake control of their plane, which was said to have been heading for The White House. 
There are no known survivors fi"om any of the flights. 
'** Joanne Maher, ed., N.39, p.711. 
Whenever Hassan Nasrallah talks about the terrorist tactics with which Hezbollah has become 
synonymous, the message is still tortuously two-faced. Our exchange about al-Qaeda and the Sept. 11, 
2001, attacks was typical; 
"What do the people who worked in those two [World Trade Center] towers, along with 
thousands of employees, women and men, have to do with war that is taking place in the 
Middle East? Or the war that Mr. George Bush may wage on people in the Islamic 
world? ... Therefore we condemned this act — and any similar act we condemn. ... I said 
nothing about the Pentagon, meaning we remain silent. We neither favored nor opposed 
that act .... Well, of course, the method of Osama bin Laden, and the fashion of bin 
Laden, we do not endorse them. And many of the operations that they have carried out, 
we condemned them very clearly." 
'*' Stephen Glain, N.78, p.53. 
The European Union (EU) is a political and economic union of twenty-seven member states, located 
primarily in Europe. It was established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 upon the foundations of the 
pre-existing European Economic Community. With almost 500 million citizens, the EU combined 
generates an estimated 30% share of the world's nominal gross domestic product (US$16.8 trillion in 
2007). The EU has developed a single market through a standardised system of laws which apply in all 
member states, guaranteeing the freedom of movement of people, goods, services and capital. It 
maintains a common trade policy, agricultural and fisheries policies, and a regional development 
policy. Fifteen member states have adopted a common currency, the euro. It has developed a role in 
foreign policy, representing its members in the World Trade Organisation, at G8 summits and at the 
UN. Twenty-one EU coimtries are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It has 
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passed a non-binding resolution recognizing "clear evidence" of "terrorist activities 
by Hezbollah" and urging the EU Council to brand Hezbollah a terrorist organization 
and EU governments to place Hezbollah on their terrorist blacklists, as the bloc did 
with the Palestinian Hamas group in 2003.'^° The Council, however, has been 
reluctant to do this, because France, Spain, and Britain fear that such a move would 
further damage the prospects for West Asia peace talks, hi the midst of the 2006 
conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, Russia's government declined to include 
Hezbollah in a newly-released list of terrorist organizations, with Yuri Sapunov, the 
head of anti-terrorism for the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, 
saying that they list only organizations which represent "the greatest threat to the 
security of our country." Prior to the release of the list, Russian Defense Minister 
Sergei Ivanov called "Hezbollah to stop resorting to any terrorist methods, including 
attacking neighbouring states." '^' 
developed a role in justice and home affairs, including the abolition of passport control between many 
member states under the Schengen Agreement. The EU operates through a hybrid system of 
intergovemmentalism and supranationalism. In certain areas it depends upon agreement between the 
member states. However, it also has supranational bodies, able to make decisions without the 
agreement of members. Important institutions and bodies of the EU include the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the European 
Court of Justice and the European Central Bank. EU citizens elect the Parliament every five years. 
'* Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya or "Islamic Resistance Movement") is a Palestinian 
Sunni Islamist organization and political party which currently holds a majority of seats in the elected 
legislative council of the Palestinian Authority. Hamas was created in 1987 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin 
and Mohammad Taha of the Gaza wing of the Muslim Brotherhood at the beginning of the First 
Intifada. Notorious for its numerous suicide bombings and other attacks on Israeli civilians and security 
forces, Hamas also runs extensive social programs and has gained popularity in Palestinian society by 
establishing hospitals, education systems, libraries and other services throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. Hamas' charter calls for the destruction of the State of Israel and its replacement vnth a 
Palestinian Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. Hamas 
describes its conflict with Israel as political and not religious or anti-Semitic. However, its founding 
charter, writings, and many of its public statements reflect the influence of anti-Semitic conspiracy 
theories. 
'*' Hezbollah not on Russia's "terrorist" list, because of the party is not representing the greatest tfireat 
to the security of Russia and it has not any link to separatist militants in Chechnya and Islamic radicals 
in Central Asia made the list. 
226 
The Quartet's fourth member, the UN, does not maintain such a list. Human 
rights organizations - Amnesty hitemational and Human Rights Watch - have 
accused Hezbollah of committing war crimes against Israeli civilians, but at the same 
time, they also accused Israel of war crimes but against Lebanese civilians. 
Some other coimtries have criticized Hezbollah, citing terrorist activities, 
without maintaining such a list. "France condenms Hezbollah's attacks, and all types 
of terrorist attacks which may be carried out against soldiers, or possibly Israel's 
civilian population." Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema differentiated the 
wings of Hezbollah: "Apart from their well-known terrorist activities, they also have 
political standing and are socially engaged." Germany does not maintain an 
independent national list of terrorist organizations, choosing instead to adopt the 
common EU list; however, German officials indicate that they would likely support a 
designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.'^^ 
In contrast, supporters of Hezbollah justify Hezbollah's attacks against Israel 
on several grounds. Firstly, Hezbollah justifies its operations against Israel as 
reciprocal to Israeli operations against Lebanese civilians and as retaliation for 
^^ ^ Amnesty International (commonly known as Amnesty or AI) is an international non-
governmental organisation which defines its mission as "to conduct research and generate action to 
prevent and end grave abuses of human rights and to demand justice for those whose rights have been 
violated." Founded in London, England in 1961, AI draws its attention to human rights abuses and 
campaigns for compliance with international standards. It works to mobilise public opinion which 
exerts pressure on individuals who perpetrate abuses. The organisation was awarded the 1977 Nobel 
Peace Prize for its "campaign against torture" and the UN Human Rights Prize in 1978, but has 
received criticism for both alleged anti-Western and alleged pro-Western bias. 
Human Rights Watch is a US based, international non-governmental organization that conducts 
research and advocacy on human rights. Its headquarters are in New York City. Human Rights Watch 
was founded under the name Helsinki Watch in 1978 to monitor the former Soviet Union's compliance 
wifli the Helsinki Accords. As the organization grew, it formed other "watch committees" to cover 
other regions of the world. In 1988, all of the committees were united under one umbrella to form 
Human Rights Watch. Robert L. Bernstein was a president of the organization and is one of the original 
founders. The current executive director of Human Rights Watch is Kenneth Roth. He has held this 
position since 1993. Roth is a graduate of Yale Law School and Brown University. His father fled Nazi 
Germany in 1938. Roth started woricing on human rights after the declaration of martial law in Poland 
in 1981, and later became engaged in Haiti issues. 
153 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hezbollah 
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Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory. Many of these attacks took place while 
Israel occupied the southern part of Lebanon and held it as a security zone in spite of 
UN Security Council Resolution 425. Although Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 
2000, and their complete withdrawal was verified by the UN, Lebanon now considers 
the Shebaa farms (piece of land captured by Israel from Syria in the 1967 war and 
considered by the UN to be disputed territory between Syria and Israel) to be 
Lebanese territory. Finally, Hezbollah and others among the Muslim world consider 
Israel to be an illegitimate state. For these reasons, many in the Arab world consider 
acts performed by Hezbollah against Israel to be justified. Although some Arab states 
(Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) have condemned Hezbollah's actions, saying that 
"the Arabs and Muslims can't afford to allow an irresponsible and adventurous 
organization like Hezbollah to drag the region to war" and calling it "dangerous 
adventurism," Hezbollah is regarded as a legitimate resistance movement throughout 
much of Lebanese society and the Arab and Muslim world.'^ '* 
5.7 Hezbollah and Siniora Government 
After 2005 parliamentary election, Hezbollah and Amal secured 35 seats in the 
128 member parliament in Lebanon. Soon after their joining the government 
Hezbollah demanded a reallocation of portfolios and more representation for those 
opposed to the pro-American policies of the government. The Prime Minister, Fouad 
Siniora, and his supporters from the major Sunni party and section of the Christian 
and Druze minorities refiised to countenance the demands.'^' 
The main grouse of Hezbollah and other Opposition groups was that the 
Lebanese government was complicit in the American-Israeli plan to redraw the 
' " Sukumar Muralidharan "Israel in Lebanon: Wreaking Havoc and Violence" Economic and Political 
Weekly, July 29, 2006, pp.3277-3279. 
' " Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 4 December 2006. 
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political map of West Asia. Nassrallah alleged the Siniora was conspiring against his 
party when the US gave Israel the green signal to launch an all-out attack against 
Lebanon.'^ ^ Many conservative Arab governments also seemed to have given their 
tacit support for the initial Israeli military response in July 2006. The Saudi Arabian 
government criticized Hezbollah for the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers from the 
disputed Shebaa farms region, indirectly blaming it for the military escalation. Israel 
used the incident as an excuse to launch an attack where in the cluster bombs and 
other lethal ammunition were all provided by Washington. 
After the Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah and its allies, including the 
Communists and the Christian Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by Gen. Michel 
Aoun, a former Lebanese Army chief, demanded that the pro-American government 
either share power equitably or resign. Siniora offered to increase slightly the number 
of Cabinet posts for the Opposition. But the Opposition wanted an effective say in the 
running of the government and not symbolic representation. Importantly, it wanted to 
reorient Lebanese foreign policy and halt the pro-Western draft. 
Since 2006, the Opposition has been holding massive protests in Beirut, and 
on several occasions the crowds numbered over a million.^ ^^ The Western media have 
not been giving the rallies the kind of coverage they accorded to the "Cedar 
"* Aijaz Ahmad, "Imperial Sunset?", Frontline, v.24, n.6, March 24-April 6,2007, pp.7-9. 
The US has been wholly complicit in all this. Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, wanted the invasion 
from the beginning but had faced opposition from some of his senior colleagues; that opposition was 
silenced when the US authorized Israel to go into Lebanon and eliminate Hezbollah. The US then 
shielded Israel from universal condemnation and made it possible for its forces to carry on for 34 days; 
and, as Israel was destroying villages, towns and infrastructure, US Secretary of State Condoleezza 
Rice breezily described all that as the "birth-pangs of a New Middle East". A crisis for Israel is a crisis 
for the US as well, and saner voices there are likely to become louder to insist that the US must 
restrain, not encourage, Israel's venal rulers and that it should not mortgage its own fiiture in this 
strategic region to Israel's whims. 
137 Nicholas Blanford, "Can the Center Hold?", Time, v. 168, n.22, November 27,2006, p.9. 
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revolution", when the well-attired middle class took to the streets demanding the 
ouster of the pro-Syrian government. 
In the third week of January 2007, the Opposition ultimately gave Siniora an 
ultimatimi to resign. However, with the support of the West and neighbouring 
1 ^R 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Prime Minister is clinging on to power. 
The Lebanese goverrmient is trying to paint the Opposition as a cat's paw for 
Iranian ambitions. Some governments in the region have not cared to hide their fears 
about the rise of what they describe as the Shiite crescent. An upsurge in Sunni 
sentiment following the hanging of Saddam Hussein has further complicated 
matters.'^' 
The administration of President George W. Bush views Hezbollah as a pro-
Iranian outfit and has said that its top-most priority is to curtail Iranian influence in 
the region. Hezbollah continues to be labelled a terrorist organisation by the US 
Sections of the Arab media. For it is trying to instigate Sxmnis in Lebanon against 
Hezbollah. There is a concerted attempt to stoke Surmi fears about the dangers of a 
ISg John Cherian, "Lebanon on the Boil" Frontline, v.24, n.3, February 10-23, 2007, p.50. 
^^ ^ Saddam Hussein Abd al-Majid al-Tikriti (April 28, 1937 - December 30, 2006) was the 
President of Iraq from July 16, 1979 until April 9, 2003. A leading member of the revolutionary Ba'th 
Party, which espoused secular Pan-Arabism, economic modernization, and Arab socialism, Saddam 
played a key role in the 1968 coup that brought the party to long-term power. As vice president under 
the ailing General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, Saddam tightly controlled conflict between the government 
and the armed forces — at a time when many other groups were considered capable of overthrowing 
the government — by creating repressive security forces. In the early 1970s, Saddam spearheaded 
Iraq's nationalization of the Western-owned Iraq Petroleum Company, which had long held a monopoly 
on the country's oil. Through the 1970s, Saddam cemented his authority over the apparatuses of 
government as Iraq's economy grew at a rapid pace. As president, Saddam maintained power during the 
Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the first Persian Gulf War (1991). During these conflicts, Saddam 
repressed movements he considered threatening to the stability of Iraq, particularly Shiite and Kurdish 
movements seeking to overthrow the government or gain independence, respectively. Whereas some 
Arabs looked upon him as a hero for his aggressive stance against foreign intervention and for his 
support for the Palestinians, US leaders continued to view Saddam with deep suspicion following the 
1991 Persian Gulf War. Saddam was deposed by the U.S. and its allies during the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq. Captured by U.S. forces on December 13, 2003, Saddam was brought to trial under the Iraqi 
interim government set up by U.S.-led forces. On November 5, 2006, he was convicted of charges 
related to the executions of 148 Iraqi Shiites suspected of planning an assassination attempt against 
him, and was sentenced to death by hanging. Saddam was executed on December 30,2006. 
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Shiite takeover. Nasrallh warned, on the occasion of Ashoura (Moharram),'^ " that 
"some in the government are working day and night to push matters towards a civil 
war in Lebanon". He said it would not allow that to happen.'^' 
6. The Contemporary Situation in Lebanon 
6.1 Lebanon since the Hariri Assassination 
The dramatic events that began to unfurl in Lebanon since the Hariri 
assassination on February 14, 2005 - the mass demonstrations in Beirut; the 
withdrawal of the Syrian army; the marking of the war's thirtieth anniversary by 
thousands of Lebanese; and the parliamentary elections in which the opposition 
candidates emerged victorious - all signaled a change in the relationship between the 
state, the political society, and the civil society in Lebanon. 
The public demonstrations in Beirut in the wake of Hariri's murder, which 
reached their pinnacle when an estimated one million people assembled there on 
March 14, 2005, were an imprecedented show of force by Lebanon's civil society. By 
appropriating Lebanon's national symbols, these groups are posing a direct challenge 
to the state's leaders and the political society.'^ ^ 
The dramatic developments in Lebanon since February 2005 also highlight the 
deep divisions in its society, manifest in the widening gap between the "March 14 
Forces" (Saad Hariri's Future Movement, Jumblat's PSP, the Qomet Shehwan 
Gathering and smaller groups such as the Tripoli Bloc, The Democratic Renewal 
'** Moharram: (1) The first month of Muslim year (2) The first ten days of the month observed in 
commemoration of the martyrdom of al-Husain, the second son of Fatimah, the Prophet's daughter, by 
AH. These days of lamentation are only observed by the Shiite Muslims, but the tenth day of Moharram 
is observed by the Sunnis in commemoration of its having been the day on which Adam and Eve, 
heaven and hell, the pen, fate, life and death, were created. 
'*' John Cherian, N.158, pp.50-51. 
' " Oren Barak, "Don't Mention the War? The Politics of Remembrance and Forgetfulness in Postwar 
Lebanon", The Middle East Journal, v.61, n.l, winter 2007, p.66. 
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Movement, and the Democratic Left Movement (DLM)), on the one hand, and the 
"March 8 Forces" (Amal, Hezbollah, 'Aoun's FPM, and the pro-Syrian Ba'th Party 
and Syrian Social Nationalist Party), on the other hand/^^ The two groups are also 
divided along religious lines, with most Sunnis and Druze supporting the government, 
and most Shiite supporting the opposition group. The Christian community is split 
between the two factions, with Michel Aoun, the leader of the Free Patriotic 
Movement, claiming to have more than 70 percent support among the Christians, 
according to the results of the 2005 parHamentary elections. "^ 
Although in July 2005, Amal and Hezbollah did join the new government 
formed by Fouad Siniora - the radical Shiite movement did so for the first time since 
its establishment - both movements sought to acquire veto power within the cabinet 
in order to forestall potentially harmfiil decisions. One of the major obstacles to a 
compromise between the two rival camps was that some groups, possibly with foreign 
assistance, used violence in order to promote their goals, thus, undermining 
Lebanon's formal and informal conflict regulation mechanisms. 
Yet, violence did not remain confined to Lebanon's territory. Despite 
mounting domestic and external pressures to decommission and become a legitimate 
'*^  Ibid., p.68. 
The March 8 Alliance is a coalition of various political parties in Lebanon. The alliance forms the 
opposition against the government of the March 14 Alliance. The alliance is considered to be pro-
Syrian. The name dates back to March 8, 2005 when different parties called for a mass demonstration 
in downtown Beirut in response to the Cedar Revolution. The demonstration thanked Syria for helping 
stop the Lebanese Civil War and the aid in stabilizing Lebanon and supporting the Lebanese resistance 
to the Israeli occupation. Main parties were Hezbollah, Amal Movement, Marada Movement, Lebanese 
Communist Party and the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. On February 6, 2006, the Free Patriotic 
Movement which was a part of the March 14 Alliance, and was part of the Cedar Revolution's mass 
demonstration on the 14th of March, 2005 signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Hezbollah 
and thus was considered by the March 14 Alliance as part of the March 8 Alliance, something that the 
Free Patriotic Movement refuses and insists that they are an independent political movement that 
instigated the original 14 March movement in 1989 and currently disagrees of the practices of the 
March 14 Alliance. In March and April 2008 Michel Murr and his bloc quited the March 8 Alliance 
and the Change and Reform Bloc of Michel Aoun. 
164 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008_Lebanese_political_protests 
232 
party, like Lebanon's other militias, which were disbanded in 1991, Hezbollah's 
leaders insist that it is a "resistance" i.e., a party with a legitimate military wing, and 
not a militia. In order to solve this and other political disagreements, a "National 
Dialogue" between Lebanon's political leaders was launched in March 2006. But on 
July 12, before the question of Hezbollah's right to keep its weapons could be 
resolved, Hezbollah fighters attacked an Israeli patrol across the "Blue Line" and 
abducted two of its soldiers. In response, Israel launched a military campaign aimed 
to destroy Hezbollah's military capacities and pressurized Lebanon to decommission 
it and deploy the Lebanese Army along the "Blue Line," with or without the 
deployment of an international force in Southern Lebanon. The result, however, was 
hundreds of casualties, including many civilians on both sides.'^^ 
In the wake of the confrontation, Hezbollah and Amal resumed their attempts 
to secure veto power in the cabinet and the resignation of its Shiite ministers in 
November undermined its representativeness.'^^ Hezbollah, for its part, threatened to 
launch mass demonstrations in order to compel Siniora's government to resign, and 
on December 1, 2006, himdreds of thousands of supporters of Hezbollah and its allies 
(especially Amal, the FPM, and the SNNP) held a huge rally in Beirut and encircled 
several government offices. 
'" In Lebanon, an estimated 845-1,181 people were killed during this confrontation (the first figure 
includes 743 civilians, 34 soldiers and 68 Hezbollah fighters) and 4,051 were wounded, while in Israel 
157 people were killed (118 soldiers and 39 civilians) and 860 were wounded. 
'** November 11, 2006 - The five Shiite Ministers resigned from the Cabinet; one independent, two 
from Hezbollah, and two from the Amal Movement. A sixth Cabinet Minister also resigned from the 
Cabinet. Prime Minister Fouad Siniora rejected all six resignations. Nevertheless, two days later, the 
remaining eighteen Cabinet Ministers unanimously approved a draft accord outlining the creation of an 
international tribunal to try suspects in the assassination of Raiq Hariri, sending it to the Security 
Council for endorsement. Pro-Syrian leaders in Lebanon argued that the Cabinet did not have the 
authority to approve the accord because it lacked the sectarian representation called for in the Lebanese 
constitution. 
'*'Oren Barak, N. 162, p.69. 
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On 8 April 2007, Hassan Nasrallah, leader of the opposition, declared the 
situation deadlocked, but expressed an unwillingness to escalate the protests into a 
civil war. He suggested the status quo would continue until the regularly scheduled 
elections in 2009. Nevertheless, a new wave of sectarian violence started in Lebanon 
during the first decade of May 2008.'^* Following the one week clashes in May 2008 
the leaders of both opposition and majority, however, reach an agreement through the 
medium of Qatar, known as Doha Agreement, that ended the 18-month crisis by 
electing General Michel Suleiman as President of the republic and forming a national-
imity government under Fouad Smiora.'^^ 
After the Doha Agreement, the street demonstrations came to an end after 
nearly two years. Recent negotiations between Saudi Arabia which supports Siniora, 
and Iran which supports the opposition, show promise of producing a power sharing 
compromise for the country in the present, but Siniora, with strong support by the 
Arab countries, the US, France, and the UN, in addition to the Lebanese Parliamental 
Majority, remains opposed to giving the opposition a veto-wielding block in the 
cabmet.'^" 
'** Responding to the government's crackdown on Hezbollah's secured network the militants belonging 
to the organization and its allies have blocked Beirut airport as well as main city streets, paralizing the 
life in the capital. On May 8, 2008, gun battles erupted between Hezbollah supporters and pro-
government loyalists, while the leader of the organization called the government's decision "a 
declaration of war," 
"'http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006%E2%80%932008_Lebanese_politicalj5rotests 
Michel Suleiman or Sleiman (bom 21 Nov 1948) is the current President of Lebanon. Before 
assuming office as President, he held the position of commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces. After 
LAP commander Emile Lahoud took office as president in Nov of 1998, Suleiman succeeded him, 
taking his place in December. Suleiman was later elected President and was sworn into office on May 
25, 2008. Suleiman was bom in Amsheet. He joined the Lebanese Armed Forces in 1967 and went on 
to graduate from the Military Academy as 2nd Lieutenant in 1988. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in 
Politics and Administrative Sciences from the Lebanese University. He is married to Wafaa Suleiman 
and has three children. His mother tongue is Arabic and he is also fluent in both French and English. 
'™ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fouad_Siniora 
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6.2 Israel-Lebanon Conflict 2006 
Apart from internal power sharing disputes, Lebanon also remain involved in 
the Israel-Lebanon conflict 2006, known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as 
the second Lebanese War was a military conflict in Lebanon and northern Israel, 
primarily between Hezbollah paramilitary forces and Israel. It started on 12 July 2006 
and ended when a UN-brokered ceasefire went into effect on 14 August 2006. 
The conflict began when Hezbollah fired Katyusha rockets and mortars at 
Israeli military positions and border villages to divert attention from another 
Hezbollah unit that crossed the border and captured two Israeli soldiers. Israel 
responded with massive airstrike and artillery fire on the Lebanese civilian 
infrastructure, which Israel claimed members of the Hezbollah militia were using as 
cover, and air and naval blockade, and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. 
Hezbollah in turn launched rockets into northern Israel and engaged the Israel 
Defense Forces (DDF) in guerrilla warfare.''^ (See Map No. 19) 
The conflict killed over 1,500 people, mostly Lebanese civilians, severely 
damaged Lebanese infrastructure, displaced about one million Lebanese and 500,000 
Israeli, and disrupted normal life across all of Lebanon and northern Israel. Even after 
the ceasefure, at least 12,000 Lebanese remained internally displaced just around 
Beirut alone, while most Israelis returned to their homes. 
On 11 August 2006, the UN Security Council unanimously approved UN 
Resolution 1701, in an effort to end the hostilities."'* The resolution, which was 
"^ David Hirst, "The First Real Setback for Israel's Deterrent Power" Young Muslim Digest, v.28, 
issue 8, September, 2006, p.36. 
' " AtuI Aneja, "Fractured Nation" Frontline, v.23, n.24, December 2-15, 2006, p.54. 
173. Tim McGirk, "Losing Lebanon", Time, v. 168, n.24, December 11, 2006, p.32. 
"* UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is a resolution intended to resolve the 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
conflict. It was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council on 11 Aug 2006. The Lebanese 
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approved by both Lebanese and Israeli governments the following days, also called 
for the disarming of Hezbollah, for Israel to withdraw and for the deployment of 
Lebanese soldiers and an enlarged UN Interim Force (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. 
The Lebanese army began deploying in southern Lebanon on 17 August 2006. Israel 
began to withdraw some of its forces from the country; the blockade was ended 8 
September.'^^ (See Map No.20) 
6.3 The 2007 Lebanon Conflict 
Apart from power sharing tussle, Lebanon also witnessed a low intensity 
conflict in 2007. The conflict began when fighting broke out between Fatah al-Islam, 
an Islamist militant organization, and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) on May 20, 
2007 in Nahr al-Bared, (an United Nations Relief and Work Agency, UNRWA) at 
Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli.'''^ It was the most severe internal fighting since 
cabinet, which includes two members of Hezbollah, unanimously approved the resolution on 12 Aug 
2006. On the same day, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallh said that his militia would honour the call 
for a ceasefire. He also said that once the Israeli offensive stops, Hezbollah's rocket attacks on Israel 
would stop. On 13 August the Israeli Cabinet voted 24-0 in favor of the resolution, with one abstention. 
The ceasefire began on Monday, 14 Aug 2006 at 8 AM local time, after increased attacks by both sides. 
The Resolution demands: 
• Full cessation of hostilities (OP 1) 
• Israel to withdraw all of its forces from Lebanon in parallel with Lebanese and UNIFIL 
soldiers deploying throughout the South (0P2) 
• Hezbollah to be disarmed (OPS) 
• Full control of Lebanon by the government of Lebanon (OPS) 
• No paramilitary forces, including (and implying) Hezbollah, will be south of the Litani River 
(OPS). 
The Resolution at the same time also emphasizes: 
• The need to address urgently the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers, that 
have given rise to the current crisis. 
Source: "http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiAJnited_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_l 701" 
175 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Israel-Lebanon_conflict 
" ' Fatah al-lslam (Conquest of Islam) is a radical Sunni Islamist group that first formed in November 
2006. Fatah al-Islam's leader is Shaker al-'Abssi. It has been described as a militant Jihadist movement 
that draws inspiration from al-Qaeda. It became very well known in May 2007 and June 2007 after 
engaging in combat against the Lebanese Army in the Nahr al-Bared UNRWA Palestinian refiigee 
camp. The US Department of State classified the group as a terrorist organization on August 9, 2007. 
The Islamist Fatah al-Islam group is alleged to have links with al-Qaeda and Lebanese government 
officials also believe it has ties to Syrian intelligence. Government officials have accused the latter of 
trying to undermine Lebanon's efforts in the establishment of an international tribunal to deal with the 
murderers of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Syrian officials have denied these charges. 
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Lebanon's 1975-1990 Civil War. The conflict evolved mostly around the Siege of 
Nahr el-Bared, but minor clashes also occurred in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in 
southern Lebanon and several bombings took place in and aroimd Lebanon's capital 
Beirut. Fighting continued into early September till the LAF declared victory on 
September 7. 
Fouad Siniora, Lebanon's Prime Minister, accused Fatah al-Islam of trying to 
destabilize the country which happens to be the "part of the Syrian intelligence-
security apparatus."'^^ Though Syrian leaders vehemently denied fomenting violence 
in Lebanon. Syria's ambassador to the UN, Bashar Jaafari, further denied that his 
country had any links to the group, and said some of them (members of Fatah al-
Islam) had been in jail in Syria for their support of al-Qaeda.'^^ 
This shows that the internal and external conditions were very fiagile making 
it difficult for the government to function smoothly. To come out from their suspicion 
and divide among its population, the government at their stage needed to initiate 
various programmes to bring cohesion in the country. 
' " In March 2007 Seymour Hersh, investigative reporter for New Yorker magazine, suggested that the 
Lebanese government was giving support to Fatah al-Isiam, in order to defeat Hezbollah. 
Independently, Dr. Franklin Lamb, a researcher at the American University of Beirut, a Hezbollah 
expert and the author of "Hezbollah: A Brief Guide for Beginners," located at the time in Lebanon, 
makes similar allegations, in more detail. He claims that assistant to Secretary of State, David Welch 
negotiated with the Saudis and Saad Hariri of the American backed Siniora government to funnel aid to 
Fatah al-Islam, so that the Sunni group could eventually attack Shiite Hezbollah. But Michael Young, a 
writer for Reason Magazine, casts doubts on Seymour Hersh's claims. Additionally, Professor Barry 
Rubin, Director of the Global Research in International Affairs Center, has alleged that Al-'Abssi is in 
feet a Syrian operative engaged in destabilizing the government of Lebanon. Other indications that 
Fatah al-Islam, and specifically Path Al-Islam leader Shaker Al-'Abssi, may have Syrian support come 
from Samir Ja'ja, executive body chairman of the Lebanese Forces, who asked why if anyone is found 
out to be a Muslim Brotherhood activist, he receives a death sentence, and if he is very lucky, he gets 
hard labour. So how come Shaker Al-'Abssi - who is no ordinary militant but a leader... and who 
committed a crime in Jordan and was sentenced to death there, and was arrested in Syria - has been 
released [from prison]? 
178 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2007_Lebanon_conflict 
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6.4 The National Unity Programmes 
The state sought to promote "national unity" among the youths through its 
educational system, including by introducing new textbooks in the field of history and 
civic education. The Taif Accord had called for "reconsidering and developing 
curricula so to strengthen national affiliation, the national melting-pot and spiritual 
and cultural openness" and for achieving "uniformity in books in the fields of history 
and national education." However, various projects that attempted to attain these 
goals in the postwar era failed because of differences among their participants and the 
sensitivity of these issues. 
Actors within the country's civil society criticized the state's efforts to use its 
educational system to disseminate a common past among Lebanon's youth. While 
some of these objections reflected communal considerations, such as Christians' fear 
that their identity would be encroached upon by the Muslim de facto majority, the 
state's assertive national integration efforts in the postwar era elicited resistance since 
they represented a significant break fi-om its past. Since independence, Lebanon's 
political elite has abided by the principle of laissez-faire, and together with its fears of 
mutual domination, this engendered a small and weak government. As a result, the 
schools, one of the major instruments for national integration, were "not only one of 
the main institutions that perpetuated Lebanon's dual cultural heritage, but one of 
principal institutions of confessionalism itself."'^ ' 
Although the books extol coexistence among Lebanese of different 
backgrounds, who are referred to as members of a "large family" and as "brothers," 
communal differences are not mentioned. At the same time, the lies between the 
Lebanese and their coimtry are underscored, and the students are encouraged to obey 
179 Oren Barak, N.162, pp.63-64. 
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the law. They are told, moreover, that: "a society whose members obey the law is an 
advanced society, which lives in freedom and peace," a message that reflects the 
"state of institutions" concept. By highlighting Lebanon's cultural diversity and 
questioning the state's ability of foster "national unity" without becoming oppressive, 
civil society groups sought to legitimize their country's pluralist character, in the face 
of centrally-based efforts to change it. 
6.5 Lebanon: The State of Political Paralysis 
As Lebanon falls increasingly into a state of political paralysis, the risk of 
militants setting up base here is raising alarms. In 2006, this country found itself in 
the middle of a war between Israel and Hezbollah. Although the war's catastrophic 
damage drew Lebanese together, they quickly turned on one another politically. 
Killings, bombings and political protests have become routine. 
Political forces find themselves stalemated, with no one firmly in charge. 
Politicians on each side accuse those on the other of blocking reconstruction to 
prevent them from getting credit. "If you are in a hole, at least stop digging," said Ali 
Hamdan, foreign affairs adviser to Nabih Berri, speaker of Parliament and a close ally 
of Hezbollah. "Unfortvmately, the Lebanese keep digging." 
While Lebanon's troubles are not principally about Islamic militancy, some 
fear it could become the kind of place that attracts more of it, especially from the Iraq 
war. 
Today, the Lebanese are increasingly divided by rolls of razor wire spread 
across roads and wrapped aroimd buildings and homes. They are separated by military 
checkpoints that tie up traffic. Nearly a dozen members of parliament have left the 
coxmtry, fearful they will be killed. Some UN officials have moved from their heavily 
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guarded offices in the centre of Beirut to smaller, less obvious space deep behind a 
sea of razor wire. 
Given Lebanon's fractured politics - and the backing of Hezbollah by both 
tan and Syria and of the government by Western powers - it is too soon to know who 
has been behind the many incidents. If there is one unifying element to the national 
psyche, it seems to be that the leadership - both of the government and of the 
opposition - has failed by paralyzing the country and failing to find a governing 
consensus. 
Hezbollah came out of the war against Israel highly popular. But, today its 
leaders are accused by some of focusing too much on domestic politics and failing to 
achieve their stated goals, which has prompted unusually heated debate within 
Hezbollah over its direction. Talal Atrissi, a political sociology professor at Lebanese 
University and an expert on Hezbollah, said: 
"They were not expecting the results of instigating against the government 
to be transformed into sectarian tensions between Suimis and Shiites in the 
street, which was about to become an even bigger problem. The other 
party was able to use the sectarian tension to face Hezbollah and to 
transform the battle to its benefit." 
However, on the street, there remains great admiration for Hezbollah, but 
dissatisfaction with its political management.'^ ° 
'*° The Indian Express (New Delhi), 9 July 2007. 
CHAPTER - V 
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CHAPTER-V 
CONCLUSION 
The Republic of Lebanon came into existence in 1920. Prior to this Lebanon 
traditionally referred to Mount Lebanon. The geographic boundaries of Mount 
Lebanon included that part of the present Lebanese territory which extends roughly 
from the Lebanon mountain ranges to the sea excluding Beirut and the regions of 
Tripoli and Sidon. Mount Lebanon was in the main the ancestral home of two 
important religious sects - the Maronites and the Druzes. 
In 1516, the Ottomans captured Mount Lebanon and Syria from Mamluks and 
set about reorganizing the administrative structure of the conquered territories, hi 
1590, they set up an emirate over Mount Lebanon. Mount Lebanon had throughout 
history provided refiige to threatened minorities. Fleeing from conquering invaders or 
religious persecution, minority communities had foimd relative security in the isolated 
valleys and mountains of Mount Lebanon. At the time of creation of the emirate, 
Mount Lebanon was by and large dominated by two sects - the Maronites Christian, 
in the North and the Druze Muslims in the South. The feudal system which had been 
introduced by the Mamluk continued to develop under Ottoman rule and reached its 
culmination in the creation of the emirate. During the entire period of its existence 
(1590-1841) the emirate was governed by two main dynasties - the Maans (1590-
1696) and the Shihabs (1697-1841). 
hi the last decade of Shihabi-Emir Bashir's rule began open and direct 
confrontation started between the Maronites and Druze Muslims. This period also 
witnessed the direct intervention of European powers in the political structure and 
destiny of Lebanon. The breakdown of inter-sectarian harmony between the two 
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principal sects - Maronites and Druzes - as a result of socio-economic difference that 
had arisen between them, offered an enticing opportunity for the divide-and-rule 
policy of the Western powers now competing to replace the "sick man of Europe" in 
West Asia. 
Resentful of Maronite ascendancy and angered by Christian intrusion into the 
south, the Druze revolted in the mixed districts of the mountain in 1841. This led the 
five major European powers (France, England, Austria, Prussia and Russia) to 
pressurize the Ottoman authorities into effecting a major realignment in the system of 
rule in the mountain. 
In 1842, the Ottoman authorities abolished the emirate, and divided Mount 
Lebanon into two districts or Qaimaqamate, one Druze and the other Maronite, 
governed by a district ruler (qaim-maqam) who was appointed and could be removed 
by the Pasha of Sidon, the Sultan's direct representative in the coastal Levant. Each 
district governor was assisted by a council composed of a deputy governor, a judge 
and an adviser for each of the major sects. The creation of the double Qaimaqamate 
marked the first consecration of the principal of sectarian representation. It was in the 
double Qaimaqamate that for the first time sectarian representation got legal 
recognition as the basis of the political structure of Lebanon. 
The Christian Maronites backed by the French wanted authority over all 
Christians including those in the southern district while the Druze backed by the 
British wanted it on the basis of the geographic divisions. While hostility between the 
two sects was on the increase in 1858, Maronite peasants rose against their Maronite 
lords. The peasant revolt soon spread in the Druze area where it pitted Maronite 
peasants against Druze overlords. Thus by the end of 1860, the Druze lords had been 
successful in turning this class struggle into a religious war as they rallied their own 
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people, peasants and artisans against the Maronite peasants and villages. The Druze, 
though now numbering a little over a third of the Maronites succeeded in 
overwhehning their opponents. Between 15,000-30,000 Christians died in the conflict 
and many more became homeless. 
In the face of the peasant revolts and religious massacres which erupted during 
the 1858-1860 period the European powers intervened a-new in Lebanese politics. 
The representatives of the five European powers met with the representatives of the 
Ottoman Empire and on 9 June 1861 signed the Organic Statute which called for the 
unification of Mount Lebanon and the creation of a semi-autonomous governorship 
(Mutassarrifiyya). The governor (Mutassarrif) was to be a non-Lebanese Christian, 
designated by the Ottoman Sultan with the consent of the European powers. He was 
to report directly to the Sultan and was aided by an administrative council (chosen 
fi-om Mount Lebanon by the heads of each religious community). Originally each 
community had two representatives in the Coimcil but an 1864 amending statute 
distributed council seats on the basis of the size of each sect roughly determined. Thus 
four Maronites, three Druzes, two Greek Orthodox, one Greek Catholic, one Sumii 
and one Shiite made up the Mutassarrifs advisory council. The new arrangements put 
Lebanon on a firm basis of sectarian politics. The consuls of the signatory powers, 
therefore, started fi-equently intervening with the local politicians, each attempting to 
maintain his sphere of influence with a given sect; France with the Maronites, Britain 
with Druze, Russia v^ ath Greek Orthodox and Austria with Greek Catholics. The 
establishment of the Mutassarrifiyya thus began the process of Maronite ascendancy 
in Lebanese politics. The fimdamental assumption underlying this new political 
arrangement was that, while all the religious sects coexisted, the Maronites were 
dominants. 
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In time the Mutassarrifiyya came to be regarded as a Maronite national 
homeland by a majority of the Maronite Christians. However, conscious of their 
status, the Maronites visualized the Mutassarrifiyya not as an end in itself but as a 
stepping stone towards full Lebanese statehood. The borders of the Mutassarrifiyya 
were confined to Moimt Lebanon. But in order to make the state economically viable 
it was imperative that it should have access to ports and suitable agricultural lands. 
Hence, they argued that the Mutassarrifiyya's borders should be enlarged to include 
the Biqa Valley, the Akkar plain, the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre 
and Southern Lebanon. However, these regions were still directly administered by the 
Ottomans as separate districts, hi order to reali2e the vision of an expanded Lebanon 
the Maronite leadership, therefore, had to turn to their long time ally France for help. 
The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 temporarily disrupted the 
Maronite plans for a separate state with extended boundaries. Shortly after the 
abolition of the Mutassarrifixte in 1915, Syria, including Lebanon (both still part of 
the Ottoman Empire), came under French Mandate. In 1920, France announced the 
creation of the new State of Greater Lebanon {Le Grand Liban), in the context of a 
French move which divided geographical Syria into a number of states. The 
boundaries of this new state, which coincide with those of contemporary Lebanon, 
diverged considerably from the portion of the Ottoman Empire that had constituted 
the area previously referred to as Lebanon. The French decision thus doubled 
Lebanon's land area and increased its population by half In addition to Mount 
Lebanon, it was to include the coastal towns and surrounding districts of Tripoli, 
Beirut, Sidon and Tyre, Jabal Amil in the south and the Biqa Valley in the east: that 
is, the area constituting present-day Lebanon. More critical still, the residents of the 
aimexed areas differed significantly, particularly in terms of religions, from those of 
244 
the core area. The former state, consisting principally of the area of Mount Lebanon, 
was composed primarily of Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians and Druze, 
while most of the residents of the annexed areas were Shiite and Sunni Muslims. 
Given the social, economic, and political significance of religious identity in the area, 
this new configuration had enormous import for the viability of the enlarged state. 
hi 1926 a constitution was promulgated, declaring Lebanon a republic. Its 
provision for a 'temporary' and 'equitable' distribution of sects in public office and 
the ministries constituted the confessional basis for Lebanon's current political and 
administrative system. In creating this new state, France had not only planted the 
seeds for an uneasy fiiture relationship between it and Syria but had also sanctioned 
Maronite predominance, accentuated sectarian consciousness and laid the foundation 
for an uncohesive and vulnerable society that was confiised about its identity. 
The 1920s and 1930s saw Muslim resentment at this division of Syrian and the 
creation of Greater Lebanon, but by the early 1940s a rapprochement had developed 
between the Sunni leadership and those Maronites aspiring to an independent Arab 
Lebanon. This led in 1943 to an unwritten understanding between the first post-
independence Maronite President, Bishara al-Khouri, and his Sunni Prime Minister, 
Reyad al-Sulh, which became known as the National Pact. Domestically, this 
provided for the following distribution of power: the state President was to be a 
Maronite, the Prime Minister a Suimi, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies 
(parliament) a Shiite. It also set out that representation in the parliament should be 
based on a 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims (in the light of the 1932 census, which 
gave the Christians a slight majority). This basic confessional formula was applied 
throughout the country's institutions, affecting the cabinet, the civilian bureaucracy 
and key posts in the Army. In its foreign policy, independent Lebanon was to have an 
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'Arab face', but it would not seek union with any Arab countries, including Syria, nor 
attempt to look for Western, particularly French, protection. Having given Lebanon its 
independence in 1943, France withdrew in 1946. 
In Lebanon, one can understand therefore that the dominant culture among the 
various communities is an Arab culture influence by Western themes. Lebanon's 
shared language, heritage, history, and reUgion with its Arab neighbours, however, 
tended to minimize the distinctiveness of the Lebanese culture. Ethnically, most 
Lebanese are Arabs, many of whom can trace their lineage to ancient tribes in Arabia. 
This ethnic majority constitutes more than 90 percent of the population. Muslim and 
Christian Lebanese speak Arabic, and many of their families have lived in what is 
now Lebanon for centuries. Moreover, the difference in dialects in Lebanon is a 
function of geographical location and not of confessional affiliation. Minority non-
Arab ethnic groups include Armenians, Kurds, and Jews, although some members of 
these groups have come to speak the language and identify with the culture of the 
majority. 
Though Lebanon is a small covmtry with a population of nearly four million, it 
is characterized by extreme social fragmentation. Lebanon consists of a multiplicity 
of religious sects organized in a hierarchical manner accommodating their own 
conflicts and interests within the confines of system that tends to promote sectarian 
identities and acts as a barrier to social integration. Evidence regarding the 
fragmented social structure is sought in the following dominant characteristic features 
of the Lebanese society: 
(A) Non-separation of religion from the state and legitimation of sectarian 
differences. The Lebanese republic has given official recognition to seventeen 
different sects. The acknowledgement of separate religious sects as politico-
246 
legal units has not only helped to perpetuate the fragmented nature of the 
social structure of Lebanon but over the years, the divisions have become 
more crystallized as the sects became the major focus of loyalty, self 
definition and self identification for the Lebanese. Each of the officially 
recognised sects is legally permitted to have its own legislative courts and 
councils. 
(B) Geographical concentration of different religious sects. The various sects tend 
to be concentrated in specific regions and even where different sects live in 
the same city or village, they tend to live in separate neighbourhoods. 
(C) Absence of unified educational system. The Lebanese educational system is as 
diversified as the country's social situation. There have been as many systems 
and philosophies of education as there have been religious communities, for 
education being primarily an endeavour of the religious communities, each 
sect has come to have its own autonomous private schools without any 
government supervision. 
The Augmented character of Lebanese society is also reflected in a whole 
array of organizations and associations that are secular in other societies, but in 
Lebanon reinforced a particularistic orientation. Thus, hospitals, orphanages, old-age 
homes, dispensaries and clubs are organized on sectarian lines. Even such a 
humanitarian organization like Red Cross is not free from religious considerations, hi 
Lebanon one can witness the Red Cross and the Red Crescent existing side by side. 
This burgeoning of sectarian institutional life "enables an individual, if he wishes, to 
pass his entire life in schools, youth organization and voluntary associations with only 
members of his own faith." 
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As a result of the firagmentation of Lebanese society on the basis of dominant 
traditional loyalties, religion has come to play the most important role in the life of an 
individual. The Lebanese citizens participate in public life only through their 
respective commimities and under these conditions any feeling of national solidarity 
manifests itself only through these intermediate and unavoidable elements such as 
political parties. This interaction between citizen is effected exclusively through the 
religious communal web and this in turn influences their social consciousness and 
political behaviour. People in Lebanon tend to look at the world from the point of 
view of their community. Thus sectarian considerations far outweigh national 
considerations since each sect has its own world view and its own interest which 
more often than not stands in opposition to the interests and world-views of other 
sects. There is thus a lack of consensus on such fundamentals as a constitution, a 
popular National Pact, a political order for the country and above all the national 
identity of Lebanon. Whereas the Christians, particularly Maronites consider Lebanon 
to be an independent, separate, sovereign, complete and eternal entity, the Muslims 
have developed no such attitude towards it. Their strong pro-Arab sympathies have 
always stood in the way of giving total allegiance to Lebanon. This disagreement over 
the national identity has been extended to other related fields also. Thus, whereas 
Christians want Lebanon to be pro-West, capitalist and a liberal democracy, the 
Muslims want Lebanon to identify more closely with the Arab world, the Palestine 
cause, the socialist coimtries and socialism. In the best of times social fragmentation 
on the basis of dominant traditional loyalties rends Lebanese society and dims the 
prospects for harmony between the major sects. 
Lebanon is a multiparty democracy and parties have a great deal of visibility. 
They espouse ideologies, put forward political progranmies, praise and criticize the 
248 
government, and inform and misinform the public. Generally they appeal to the 
members of one sect, their political ideology harmonizing with its dominant values. 
Their name ("national," "liberal," "progressive") may indicate an ideological stance 
conunon to persons of all sects, but inevitably their following is very homogeneous. 
The parties publish their own newspapers, or at least have access to ones that 
are sympathetic to their point of view. Several operate their own youth organisations, 
which sponsor sports and recreation programmes and inculcate in the young the 
ideology of the party. Many run private militias, the ranks of which are filled with 
young men who are well-trained, disciplined, and equipped with small arms and some 
heavy weapons. In times of civil disorder the militias protect the villages, regions, and 
urban quarters where the party is strong. They are beyond the control of the 
government, and the Lebanese army and national police have traditionally refrained 
from interfering in fights among them. However, after the Taif Accord 1989, all 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias were disbanded, but some of them remained and 
later by elections they transferred themselves to become the legal and fully-functional 
political party. 
There are a large number of political parties operating in Lebanon and most of 
them are based on a clear cut division between Christians and Muslims. Parties in 
Lebanon also function as pressure groups for their respective religious constituencies. 
Some of the prominent parties/political forces which play a vital role in the Lebanese 
political arena are as follows: Phalangist or Kataeb Party, National Liberal Party, 
Guardians of the Cedars, South Lebanon Army, Lebanese Front, Marada Brigade or 
Zghrta Liberation Army, Lebanese Forces are the parties and forces operating in the 
Christian camp (Right). Independent Nasserite Movement, Progressive Socialist 
Party, Amal Movement, Hezbollah, Lebanese Communist Party, Organization of 
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Communist Action, Syrian Social National Party, Lebanese National Movement are 
the parties and forces operating in the Muslim camp (Left). And Dashnak, Himchak, 
Ramgavar Parties of Armenian and Kurdish parties are the minority parties. 
Since the creation of the republic, the Lebanese have disagreed over the 
identity of the new state. Muslims, specially the Sunnis, from the beginning are 
inclined toward a close association with Greater Syria and the Arab world. Christians, 
particularly the Maronites, opt for linking Lebanon culturally and politically to the 
Western world. Christians are not opposed to economic cooperation with Arab 
countries, to which Lebanon exported most of its products, but they insist on 
distinguishing Lebanon's foreign policy from that of its Arab neighbours. The 
question is not whether Lebanon should be Arab, since as early as 1943 the National 
Pact (the governing formula) declared Lebanon as having "an Arab face." Rather, the 
post-independence debate is really over how Arab Lebanon should be. This debate 
was exacerbated in the 1950s by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser's 
pan-Arab activism on the one hand, and former Lebanese President Camille 
Chamoim's pro-Western administration on the other. 
Ever since its inception Lebanon's problems have been caused by intemal 
political, social, and economic strife as the nation's diverse ethnic-religious groups 
have attempted to coexist. Lebanon's intemal conflicts have repeatedly been 
complicated by confrontations centred on the country's relationship to Israel, its Arab 
neighbours, and numerous Palestinian refugees who relocated there following the 
Arab-Israeli wars and the Jordanian civil war. The twentieth century saw Lebanon 
serve as a continual battlefield upon which both intemal forces and foreign powers 
unrelentingly massacred militiamen and civilians. To this end, Lebanon has remained 
an active front in the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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When Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, Lebanon joined 
Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq in immediately refusing to recognize the new Jewish 
state and declared war on the Zionist settlers. Following the Israeli victory in its war 
of independence, many of the 150,000 Palestinian refugees who were driven out of 
the conquered Israeli territories fled north into Lebanon. 
With the rapid influx of Palestinian Arabs, Lebanese Muslims critically 
questioned the National Pact, which distributed seats in the national assembly 
proportionally between Christians and non-Christians. Mounting Muslim discontent 
combined with a cry for Arab unity by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser 
resulted in an intractable conflict between Muslims and Christians beginning in May, 
1958. At this time the Lebanese government appealed to the US for ground troops to 
establish a temporary peace. 
The presidency of Camille Chamoun jfrom 1952 to 1958 coincided with 
ascension of Nasser in Egypt. Chamoun invoked Nasser's wrath by refusing to 
terminate diplomatic relations with Britain and France, which had united with Israel 
in attacking Egypt during the 1956 war over the Suez Canal. Diuing this time, 
Lebanon received financial, economic, and military assistance fi-om the US through 
the Eisenhower Doctrine. These events caused other West Asia nations to view 
Lebanon as having become too pro-Westem. 
As the internal opposition to Chamoun presidency grew, Chamoun declared 
that he would not seek re-election for the second term and he would stay in office 
until the end of his term in September 1958. On 23 September 1958, General Fuad 
Shihab assumed the duties of the presidency and peace having been restored, (the US 
troops evacuated Lebanese territory in October 1958). The Shihab regime brought 
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stability and economic development to Lebanon. Shihab demonstrated the need for 
compromise if the Lebanese confessional system of government were to work. 
However, as Violent clashes erupted once again between Palestinian guerrillas 
and the Lebanese army, in 1969, the Lebanese army chief, and Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), negotiated an agreement in Cairo with the help of President 
Nasser of Egypt imder the so-called Cairo Agreement. The Palestinian guerrillas were 
given complete control over their military bases in southern Lebanon and also the 
right to administer and maintain law and order in the refugee camps. 
As more displaced Palestinians settled in southern Lebanon, the area soon 
became the major base for PLO guerrilla operations against Israel. When Israel 
retaliated by raiding PLO bases across its northern border, the Christian-dominated 
Lebanese government attempted to restrict PLO activities within its jurisdiction. 
Lebanon was, therefore, always at risk of Israeli reprisal raids. 
In 1970, when the PLO was forced out of Jordan because groups in the army 
saw it as a threat to the state, it moved its headquarters to Beirut where it grew in 
strength and in its international prestige. Palestinian refugees had not assimilated into 
Lebanese society and now Palestinian fighters were also seen by many Lebanese as 
outsiders and mtruders; but compared to the refugees, the PLO had guns and authority 
that often came across as arrogance. 
By the early seventies the number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon had gone 
up to 300,000. Such a massive presence of Palestinians, the majority of whom were 
Suimi Muslims, was bound to lead to a crisis in a country where the relative numerical 
strength of the Christians and Muslims was a subject of bitter political controversy. 
The Christian parties were alarmed by the massive presence of the Palestinians and 
began to solidify their ranks and strengthen their militias. In their view, if the 
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Palestinians were not subjugated quickly they would provide the muscle which the 
growing Muslim protest movement against Christian hegemony lacked. An increasing 
reference to the Palestinians as foreigners or strangers began to circulate and wall 
inscriptions appeared in the Christian quarters saying "No to the Resistance" and "No 
to Arabism". Exactly reverse inscriptions began appearing in Muslim quarters saying 
"Yes to the Resistance" and "Yes to Arabism". 
Israel, like the Lebanese Christians, too wanted the liquidation of the 
Palestinians present in Lebanon as they were posing a threat to Israeli security. For 
some years it relied on the Lebanese government to prevent guerilla attacks from 
across the Lebanese border. When the Lebanese government faltered, Israel took 
matters into its own hands and resorted to heavy handed raids and reprisals. Though 
this strengthened the hands of the Christians still fiirther, it hastened the downfall of 
organized political life in Lebanon by compromising the armed forces, polarizing 
politics and adding to the numbers of the homeless refugees. The solidarity between 
the Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims grew even stronger and the failure of the state 
to provide protection to the latter served in eroding the government's legitimacy still 
further. 
During the first few months of the Civil War, which started on April 1975, 
Syria supported the Lebanese National Movement (LNM) and PLO. To counter 
Israeli influence in Lebanon, however, Syria changed sides when Jumblat, the leader 
of LNM, insisted on completely crushing the Lebanese Front (an organised group 
consisting of Lebanese Christians) and gaining an outright victory. In 1976, Syria sent 
its troops into Lebanon against the PLO and their Lebanese allies, whom it had 
previously supported. Syria feared that if the PLO and LNM were victorious, it would 
be unable to control them and their victory would inevitably provoke an Israeli 
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intervention, with the possibility of a new confrontation between Syria and Israel. By 
the end of September 1976, however, the LNM and PLO had been subdued. The 
cease-fire came into effect at a summit meeting of the League of Arab States (Arab 
League) commonly known as Riyadh Summit, by the six-nation in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. Although the imderlying causes were in no way eliminated, the full-scale 
warfare stopped. Syria's presence in Lebanon was legitimated by the establishment of 
the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) by the Arab League in October 1976. After the 
Riyadh Summit, Lebanon re-emerged with a confessional system maimed and 
divided. 
The years from 1977 to 1980 saw the development of Israeli-Maronite 
relations from an indirect, covert relationship into a direct and overt one. On the 
Israeli side there was a parallel shift from indirect to direct intervention in Lebanon. 
Israeli's aid to the Maronites was no longer to 'help them help themselves', but had 
taken on the dimension of 'helping the Maronites to help the Israelis eradicate the 
Palestinian threat.' 
The victory of the Likud Party in the parliamentary elections of May 1977 was 
a momentous event in the history of Israel. For the first time since the establishment 
of the Jewish State, the Labour Party was defeated at the polls and the right wing 
Likud coalition under the leadership of Menachem Begin came to power. Likud's 
foreign policy was activist, supportive of frequent and extensive use of force as an 
instrument for dealing with Israel's political and military problems. The change over, 
therefore, brought with it a very assertive posture vis-a-vis Lebanon than hitherto 
pursued by the government of Yitzhak Rabin. 
In the spring of 1978, Israel's army invaded Lebanon in order to end any 
military presence in southern Lebanon, except that of the pro-Israel militia. Although 
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international opprobrium forced Israel southward, and despite the UN forces were 
deployed in southern Lebanon to pacify the region, Israel continued to occupy part of 
southern Lebanon, calling the strip of land "the Security Zone." Israel's continued 
occupation of Lebanon through this self-style "Security Zone", (an area 6 mile/10 km 
deep and extending 62 mile/100 km) and its defiance of UN Security Resolution 
Council 425 did little to accomplish peace on its northern border. 
The civil war took another turn in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon again; 
this time Israeli's forces reached Beirut. This invasion was not limited one like the 
March 1978 invasion. There were deeper and more fundamental objectives associated 
with this second Israeli invasion of Lebanon. These were (a) crushing and destroying 
the PLO both as a military and political force in Lebanon (b) inflicting a humiliating 
defeat on the Syrian army in Lebanon so as to effect its total or partial withdrawal (c) 
installation of Bashir Gemayel as the President of Lebanon and (d) signing of a peace 
treaty with Lebanon. Israel took advantage of the deteriorating security situation 
throughout the country and expected that popular frustration with the misconduct of 
members of the PLO, and Syrian and Lebanese troops, would provide positive climate 
for its all-out military intervention. Israel also wanted to influence the 1982 
presidential election; Bashir Gemayel was elected president but was assassinated a 
few days later. His assassination was the pretext that the Lebanese Forces gave for 
their mass killing of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. 
This was labelled as a war against terrorists, but the main casualties were 
innocent men, women and children. However, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 
succeeded in driving out the PLO, after a strong resistance, to a new homeland in 
Tunisia. A Multinational Force (MNF) was established to oversee the PLO 
withdrawal. During this time Bashir Gemayel was elected President of Lebanon in a 
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largely Israeli manipulated election. With the assassination of President elect Bashir 
Gemayel, Israel's immediate reaction was to occupy West Beirut so as to be in a 
position to control subsequent developments. The assassination also triggered the 
infamous massacre of Palestinian civilians in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by the 
Phalangists. The news of the massacre led to a storm of criticism worldwide. 
The Israeli occupation of West Beirut on September 1982 this time elicited no 
official US criticism, though the Sabra and Shatila massacres that followed aroused 
angry condemnation. In fact, Lebanese who resisted the Israeli invasion did become 
"terrorists" officially, which makes sense, given that it was an operation to liberate the 
Lebanese from terrorism. Since Palestinians are by definition all terrorists, or mothers 
of terrorists, or future terrorists - so different from Begin, Shamir and Sharon for 
example - whatever was done to them was regarded as legitimate. One can't rely on 
the US foreign policy towards West Asia countries - lies, lies, lies. Slobodan 
Milosevic (former Serbian President) was on trial in The Hague, Netherlands, and not 
only is Ariel Sharon (Israeli Defense Minister in 1982) not on trail, but Americans 
call him a man of peace, the hero of Sabra and Shatila a man of peace? 
Amine Gemayel, the next president, supported the signing of an Israel-
Lebanon peace treaty in May 1983. Lebanon's opposition, coupled with Syria's 
rejection on the pro-Israel, pro-US orientation of Gemayel, resulted in the abrogation 
of the treaty a year later. When Gemayel's term ended in 1988, he appointed the 
Maronite Commander-in-Chief of army. Gen. Michel Aoun, as interim Prime 
Minister. His appointment was rejected by many Lebanese, and Aoun launched a 
"War of National Liberation" against Syria's army in Lebanon. His shells, however, 
fell on innocent Lebanese living in areas under Syria's control. 
256 
The beginning of the end of the civil war came in October 1989, when 
Lebanese deputies gathered in the city of Taif in Saudi Arabia. The meeting produced 
a document of national accord. This constitutional compromise adjusted the 
parliament, presidency, and cabinet so that Christian and Muslim representatives 
would equally share political power, disarming of militias and restoration of the 
central government authority and called for Israel's withdrawal from south Lebanon. 
It was impossible to implement, however, until Gen. Aoun's forces were defeated in 
October 1990, when Syria's troops attacked his headquarters and he was forced to 
seek refuge in France. President Elias Hrawi who was known to be in league with the 
Syrians was elected in 1989, and the territorial integrity of Lebanon has been partially 
restored. 
If one analyse Lebanese political scene beginning from 1970s, one may notice 
that Lebanon's governing elite faced two mounting challenges: rising political, social, 
and economic discontent and increasing disruptions caused by external actors 
(especially the Palestinians and Israel). These proved more than Lebanon's fragile 
political system could manage. The rigidity of Lebanon's political organization - its 
sectarian quotas and its inability to allow for peaceful change - rendered it unstable 
and contributed to both the war's eruption and continuation. 
Moreover, the sectarian system contributed more to the state's weakness than 
to its strength. Rather than bolstering Lebanese citizens' allegiance to the state, the 
sectarian system encouraged the Lebanese to identify with their sects, or alienated 
them altogether. This tendency, in combination with high levels of intemal 
dissatisfaction and the historical ties linking Lebanon's communal groups with 
outside power, prompted many sectarian and political groups to look to foreign 
sponsors for backing in domestic power struggles. Concomitantly, foreign patrons 
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pursuing their own regional or international agendas were eager to sponsor Lebanese 
clients. In brief, this perilous patron-client symbiosis resulted in a proliferation of 
substate foreign policies that embroiled outside powers in Lebanon's domestic turmoil 
and entangled Lebanon in wider regional conflicts. Lebanon's vulnerability to 
regional influences, as Lebanese clients and their foreign patrons joined (often very 
briefly) to pursue their own shifting agendas, contributed substantially to the war's 
complexity and intractability. 
When fighting broke out in 1975, two basic coalitions formed. On one side 
was a conservative alliance (which became the Lebanese Front in 1976) that was anti-
reform and pro-status quo in terms of power sharing; it demanded restoration of 
Lebanon's sovereignty and, therefore, the elimination of Palestinian militancy and 
fi-eedom of action in Lebanon. In opposition was a broad-based alliance, the LNM, 
demanding pervasive socio-economic and political reform, including 
deconfessionalization of the political system. Domestic irreconcilability only 
increased when the LNM, intent on its quest for reform, forged an open alliance with 
Palestinian armed organizations in Lebanon. 
Once the war commenced in earnest, Lebanon's longstanding divisive issues 
became more intractable. Militia-orchestrated "ethnic cleansing" erected barriers of 
both fear and geography between Lebanon's confessional groups. The domestic 
debate concerning security versus reform became enmeshed in the debate over 
Lebanon's "Arab" identity and obligations. As the war continued, the number of 
Lebanese actors increased, as did the number of external "patrons"; Lebanon's 
prosperous economy became devastated and its structural imbalances more 
pronounced. Ultimately, the war developed an insidious life of its own as the militia-
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run "war system," dominated by those with weapons, patrons, and a vested interest in 
Lebanon's continued destabilization, became firmly entrenched. 
The years of civil war since 1975 and even afterwards till the Taif Accord of 
1989 have torn Lebanon internally to shreds, reduced large parts of the country to 
rubble, and caused massive movements of population between different region; but 
the civil war has failed as yet to destroy the fimdamental political and administrative 
structure of the Lebanese Republic or to put an end to its existence as a sovereign 
territorial state by removing it from the map. 
So far, the Christians of the country, whatever the rights or wrongs of their 
case, have proved irreducible by force. The Muslims - Sunni and Shiite - and the 
Druzes have proved equally irreducible. The two sides remain in strong disagreement 
on how the Lebanese Republic ought to be generally interpreted and run; but both 
sides, certainly at the level of the hard core, appear to have become equally convinced 
that there can be no viable alternative to Lebanon as territorially constituted. The war 
lords on either side fiercely hold on to the communal cantons they have come to head 
as virtually independent despots, and none among them show much intention of 
yielding any of their acquired powers for the general good. Yet, these same war lords, 
to maintain some public credibility, feel compelled to declare themselves in principle, 
every so often, for the continued existence and fimdamental territorial integrity of the 
country, even as they persist in acting to the contrary. In their public statements, all of 
them normally claim that their ultimate aim is to secure the reconstitution of a viable 
Lebanon. 
There is also the changed Arab attitude towards Lebanon to consider in 
rethinking the country's history. While some Arab parties at one time did express 
varying degrees of reserve about the peculiar political standing of Lebanon in the 
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Arab world, none do so at present, and not too much remains of the earlier Arab 
investments in Lebanese political discord. At the present stage of the Lebanese 
conflict, no Arab party openly declares itself for one Lebanese side against the other -
normally, the Muslim against the Christian - as some had done at the earlier stages. In 
fact, all of them have finally begun to express deep concern about the continuing 
plight of Lebanon, and seem genuinely to press for a Lebanese political settlement 
which would be fair to Christians and Muslims alike. 
In the Arab world today, the Lebanese identity is generally accepted for the 
reality it has become; no one any longer denounces it as an extravagant claim. Also, 
in many Arab circles, the general Arab culpability for what happened to Lebanon has 
finally come to be openly admitted and condemned. Certainly at the level of Arab 
political responsibility, a mood of rational understanding and political realism with 
regard to Lebanon is now noticeable. Arabs who have a sincere concern for the 
welfare of Lebanon fear that this mood may not survive the Lebanese conflict; but it 
is certainly there for the moment. 
From these facts of the present, three important conclusions may be drawn 
which bear on the question of the historical reinterpretation of Lebanon. 
1. The bitter experience of the civil war has amply demonstrated that neither 
side in Lebanon can easily force its opinion on the other. This means that the 
problems of Lebanon - including those concerning Lebanese history - can 
only be resolved by rational give-and-take among the Lebanese people in the 
light of the relevant realities. 
2. There are clear indications that the country, despite all appearances to the 
contrary, has somehow arrived at a stage of fundamental political consensus 
involving the non-combatant majority among the different Lebanese 
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communities, and perhaps others as well. Its continued existence as a 
sovereign and independent state within its present borders, should it come to 
be somehow secured, would now be possible regardless of whether or not 
there was such a thing as Lebanon before 1920. This means that one need 
not invent a special history for Lebanon before that date unless the coimtry 
happens to have one. 
3. The Arab world, whatever its initial position on the question of Lebanon, has 
come to accept the Lebanese Republic as it actually exists, and to understand 
and appreciate the delicate structure of Lebanese society, certainly for the 
time being, as at no time before. This means that the admission of the 
historical Arabism of Lebanon, to the extent that it is a fact, no longer need 
be taken to involve any danger to the continued sovereignty and integrity of 
the country; nor need it threaten the status of any particular group among the 
Lebanese, granting that it could have involved such a danger in the past. One 
may argue that the Arabs have finally become solicitous of the continued 
sovereignty and integrity of Lebanon because they have come to realize that 
the imdoing of Lebanon can easily spill out to the rest of Arab world and 
result in the undoing of other Arab countries and regimes. If this is the case, 
it would provide the ultimate guaranty that the present expressed Arab 
concern for the welfare of Lebanon is genuine for as long as it may last, for 
the very reason that it has complex ulterior motives involving a general Arab 
self-interest. 
It is because of this mature understanding that the Taif Accord was widely 
hailed as a great landmark on the way toward solving Lebanon's problems in Lebanon 
as elsewhere. Although Taif Accord has been credited with stopping the bloodshed 
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and restoring state authority, in it operation it lacked sound basis for uniting the 
country and integrating its shattered society. 
Lebanon's first legislative elections for 20 years on the lines of Taif Accord 
held in 1992 and the number of seats in the Assembly was raised fi-om 108 to 128, to 
be divided equally between Christian and Muslim deputies. Hezbollah, which the first 
time contested the elections as a political party, enjoyed considerable success. In the 
spirit of the Accord and proclaiming confessionalism as national objective President 
Hrawi invited Rafiq Hariri, a Lebanese-bom Saudi Arabian business executive, to 
form a new government, amid hopes that he would restore some confidence in the 
Lebanese economy and thus facilitate the country's reconstruction. 
The Hariri government imdertook various programmes of development and 
reconstruction with the hope that the Lebanese community at home and abroad, as 
well as the intemational financial markets, would support these endeavors. Large 
sums of money were spent to make up for years of neglect and destruction. The cost 
of these projects far exceeded Lebanon's capacity to pay. As a result, the government 
of Lebanon borrowed very large sums of money. But then policies initiated by Hariri 
were severely criticized as the development efforts focused only on central Beirut, 
leaving much of the country untouched. Peace in Lebanon and the region were 
essential for his plans to succeed. This did not occur. Sanctions against Iraq fiirther 
disrupted regional trade patterns. Finally, the heavy hand of Syrian and Israeli 
occupation stifled fi-eedom and destroyed confidence in Lebanon's ability to again 
become an economic centre. Hariri reduced inflation and strengthened the pound. 
Through these efforts though the banking sector began rebuilding itself, but most of 
the $23 billion fimd set aside for development work was hijacked by parliament and 
fimneled into payrolls for civil servants, the army and intelligence agencies. Hariri, 
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however, was unable to revive the economy. The outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada 
in 2000 and Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the Golan Heights created 
international tensions and these further added to political instability for the 
government. 
Rafiq Hariri as Prime Minister and Emile Lahoud as President spent the four 
years from 2000 to 2004 in a state of perpetual conflict, leading to a failure to 
formulate significant economic and social policies or undertake urgently needed 
reforms. The Syrian decision to extend Lahoud's term led to a imited Lebanese 
opposition that included prominent Christian, Sunni, and Druze leaders. Hariri's 
resignation in 2004, however, seemed to show that his political and economic 
interests were not inextricably linked with Syria's, and that his verbal support of Syria 
while he was in fact pursuing his own agenda was in fact a reflection of this Lebanese 
tradition of lip-service to the foreign power. On 14 February 2005, Hariri was killed 
in a huge bomb explosion in central Beirut. German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis who 
led the investigative committee established by Security Council Resolution 1595 to 
look into the Hariri assassination along with UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen submitted 
report in October 2005 that were critical of Syria, either for complicity in Hariri's 
murder or for undermining Lebanese sovereignty and continuing to illegally smuggle 
weapons to some of its allies, particularly Palestinian groups. 
Elections for a new National Assembly began as scheduled on 29 May 2005 in 
four stages, according to the existing electoral law introduced in 2000. Many 
Christians argued that it favoured Syria's allies, but their demands for a new electoral 
law dividing the country into smaller constituencies were rejected by the Government. 
However, the results of the 2005 election confirmed that the Future Movement 
of Saad Hariri (Rafiq Hariri's son) had obtained 72 seats (clear majority) in the 
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National Assembly. The new National Assembly re-elected Nabih Bern, a loyal ally 
of Syria, as Speaker. President Lahoud appointed Fouad Siniora, a member of Saad 
Hariri's Future Movement and a close ally of the late Rafiq Hariri, as Prime Minister. 
The dramatic events that began to unfurl in Lebanon since the Hariri 
assassination on 14 February, in 2005 - the mass demonstrations in Beirut; the 
withdrawal of the Syrian army; the marking of the war's thirtieth anniversary by 
thousands of Lebanese; and the parliamentary elections in which the opposition 
candidates emerged victorious - all signaled a change in the relationship between the 
state, the political society, and the civil society in Lebanon. 
In July 2005 Amal and Hezbollah did join the new government formed by 
Fouad Siniora (the radical Shiite movement did so for the first time since its 
establishment) but with the veto power within the cabinet in order to forestall 
potentially harmful decisions. 
Despite mounting domestic and extemal pressures to decommission and 
become a legitimate party (like Lebanon's other militias, which were disbanded in 
1991), Hezbollah's leaders insisted that it was a "resistance" i.e., a party with a 
legitimate military wing, and not a militia. In order to solve this and other political 
disagreements, a "National Dialogue" between Lebanon's political leaders was 
launched in March 2006. On July 12, however, before the question of Hezbollah's 
right to keep its weapons could be resolved, Hezbollah fighters attacked an Israeli 
patrol across the "Blue Line" and abducted two of its soldiers. In response, Israel 
launched a military campaign aimed to destroy Hezbollah's military capacities and 
pressure Lebanon to decommission it and deploy the Lebanese Army along the "Blue 
Line," with or without the deployment of an international force in Southern Lebanon. 
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The result, however, was hundreds of casualties, including many civilians on both 
sides. 
Hezbollah and Amal resumed their attempts to secure veto power in the 
cabinet and threatened to launch mass demonstrations in order to compel Siniora's 
government to resign. Hundreds of thousands of their supporters held a huge rally in 
Beirut and encircled several government offices. Consequently, in May 2008 the 
leaders of both opposition and majority reach an agreement through the medium of 
Qatar, known as Doha Agreement, that ended the 18-month crisis by electing General 
Michel Suleiman as President of the republic and forming a national-unity 
government under Fouad Siniora. 
If Lebanon today is to stand against the internal and external forces that 
threaten its sovereignty, it has no more compelling need than unity among its people. 
One may conclude, however, that no obstacle to national unity and social integration 
has proven more formidable than the confessional system. The disintegrative effect of 
this system has manifested itself in every aspect of Lebanese political life. 
Confessionalism is the root cause of the Lebanese problem. 
hi the context of Lebanon, the confessional system has maintained two main 
distinguishing features: (1) political rights and entitlements are allocated to 
individuals according to their confessional affiliation, and (2) personal status laws, 
and institutions through which these laws are applied, are under the exclusive control 
of the religious authorities of Lebanon's seventeen officially recognized sects. 
The sectarian culture has prevented the emergence of a common Lebanese 
identity and a shared national interest. Even the notion that Lebanese are Arabs (and 
thus share a common destiny or interest with neighbouring Arab peoples) has been 
bitterly contested along sectarian lines, with serious political consequences. Thus, 
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when regional developments or foreign challenges require a united national stand, 
Lebanon cannot muster the national will to act. 
An alterative political system must be found if Lebanon is to survive and 
flourish as an independent country. It is clear what such a system must do: transcend 
the barriers that separate Lebanese of different sects; promote social and political 
cohesion, with guarantees against the recurrence of the last Lebanese tragedy; 
generate common values, interests, and goals and give them expression in state laws 
and institution such that all Lebanese enjoy equal rights and opportunities; forge a 
common perception of the national interest and public good; and (while respecting 
pluralism) be effective in bringing about needed change by solving problems that are 
the inevitable product of political life in any society. 
Fortimately, such a political system need not be invented. Secular democracy 
is a from of governance that has withstood the test of time, constituting the solid 
foundation of the most advanced, stable and integrated states where the rights of 
individuals are respected. It is the political system most suitable to the establishment 
and maintenance of a modem state. 
In Lebanon, only secular democracy can provide the discourse likely to bring 
members of different sects to a durable agreement on national objectives and policies. 
The interest or voice of one sect cannot be the interest and voice of all Lebanon's 
citizens, nor can a mere totality of the contradictory interests and objectives of all the 
sects constitute a common "national" interest and objective; the entire history of 
modem Lebanon (not only the fifteen years of war) has sadly proven this. The 
solution offered by secular democracy is the only one capable of creating one 
Lebanese cause, of attracting Lebanese of all sects, of giving meaning to the sacrifices 
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suffered and lives lost, and of facilitating the emergence of a stable, independent 
country. 
Is the establishment of a secular democratic system in Lebanon achievable? 
Scholars who have studied successful democratic experiences have identified certain 
factors that contribute to the emergence of a democratic system. Most of these factors 
were/are present in Lebanon, accounting for the relative success of its pre-war 
democratic experience. Two factors, however, undermined this relative success: (1) 
Lebanon's vuhierability to intervention by outside forces opposed to democracy, and 
(2) the divisive effects of sub-cultural pluralism. 
However, it is the confessional system that has rendered Lebanon vulnerable 
to foreign intervention. The country's disintegrated society facilitated and guaranteed 
the success of foreign intervention, not the other way around. The only manifestation 
of sub-cultural pluralism in Lebanon occurs along religious lines. As Albert Hourani 
rightly observes: 
"The division along religious lines is not a total division. There is 
a unity of language: all groups are Arabic-speaking, except for some 
Armenians. There is a similarity of popular culture, of manners, habits of 
life cuisine, and even popular religion of the countryside; one can still find 
in the Lebanese mountains sacred springs and sacred trees on which 
votive rags are hung, the outward symbol of a divine presence. " 
The confessional system may foster ties among members of the same sect, but 
it encourages division and alienation among Lebanese of different religious sub-
culture. Its laws act as barriers to the development of trans-sectarian identifications 
and cross-cutting loyalties that are integral to forging national cohesion and successful 
democracy. 
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As Lebanon falls increasingly into a state of political paralysis, the risk of 
militants setting up base here is raising alarms. Killings, bombings and political 
protests have become routine. Political forces find themselves stalemated, with no one 
firmly incharge. Politicians on each side accuse those on the other of blocking 
reconstruction to prevent them fi-om getting credit. While Lebanon's troubles are not 
principally about Islamic militancy, some fear it could become the kind of place that 
attracts more of it, especially from the Iraq war. 
Today, the Lebanese are increasingly divided by rolls of razor wire spread 
across roads and wrapped around buildings and homes. They are separated by military 
checkpoints that tie up traffic. In the recent years, nearly a dozen members of 
parliament have left the coimtry, fearfiil they vnil be killed. Some UN officials have 
moved from their heavily guarded offices in the centre of Beirut to smaller, less 
obvious space deep behind a sea of razor wire. 
Given Lebanon's fractured politics - and the backing of Hezbollah by both 
Iran and Syria and of the govenmient by Western powers - it is too soon to know who 
has been behind the many incidents. If there is one unifying element to the national 
psyche, it seems to be that the leadership - both of the government and of the 
opposition - has failed by paralyzing the country and failing to find a governing 
consensus. This all shows that the experience of power sharing on the basis of 
confessional model as envisaged by the French and Arab leaders has not worked well. 
From termination of the country's long and devastating Civil War (1975-1990) 
until the dramatic events induced by the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq 
Hariri in February 2005, Lebanon experienced a brutal Civil War that engulfed all its 
major societal sectors (large families, regions, and communities). The country's close 
neighbours - the Palestinians, Israel, and Syria - as well as - a host of other player in 
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the West Asia and beyond, also were involved in the conflict, often in interaction v^ dth 
domestic actors. It is the time now when the Lebanese people have to rethink and ask 
themselves that how they have dealt with three war-related questions. First, should the 
war be remembered and commemorated? Second, who is responsible for the conflict 
and for the atrocities committed in its course? Finally, how to consider Lebanon's 
modem history in light of the war and how to pass on this knowledge to its youth? 
Apart from these the most important question which the Lebanese have to ask and to 
answer is whether it is possible and viable for them to restore and strengthen them the 
confessional model for the development of civil society and Lebanese political and 
social fabric. If so, how are they going to practice it for the development and growth! 
Lebanese people have to believe that violence could be an instrument of 
change, segregation, impose and imdergo communal cleansing. So, they have a 
common responsibility, Christians and Muslims alike, for the war that devastated their 
own country; and believe that recognizing this responsibility is an essential condition 
for learning the lessons of the war so that they will not be condemned to indefinitely 
repeat their past errors. They have suffered much, but they have also learned much. 
They also have to learn that resorting to violence can lead only to destruction and 
death, and that the destruction of "the other" leads only to the destruction of oneself 
And they have to learn, both Christians and Muslims, that they are boxmd together for 
better or for worse by the same destiny. 
It is at the same time that the neighbouring counties and the covmtries who 
have influence over them will also try to plan out the resolution for their ongoing 
problems both in the interests of the concerned coimties but also for the people and 
communities living their alike. 
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Map -13 
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and 
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Map -17 
Sabra and Shatila, 16 - 17 September 1982 
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Map -19 
Israeli Assault on Lebanon, July 12 - August 10,2006 
• l«»UMaiid3$ll«ain()e4 
• Uinir tedM i M Mknatf mtct mdiatt 
• I/3ii(c<siaMesncMilr«nttiia|ontrc«iiUns 
• UortMailmiionasDlKtd 
• ConiMt Hodnde ol M. 3<j t ian4 Iraadatt 
• Benil Mnnilicral Mpxl. «• fuboul 
iaiuirs and maicr LctMfln^ ptvts bortw] 
• Oectnat powtf cbnts Invited 
md rfMfd hiH tmks Ji&lJuyid 
• FKlcnnOooilinduslnttl. <nrtta«s«.tem. 
utKols. IV & ndk) stalxm, chnties. mosquev. 
fnsptiH. amManccs. mt (Mftnw oitfrt 
v 4 UN bax bonted 
• nmnandsc^ovkan homes dn>roy<d 
• (ttmaltd c«l ol ntrssaudiiit hit eit««h 
USS2iMion 
• RKorled tuMlt int ol MenuEonalV lianiKd 
toil As 
• Uort Oian 10 Itmsand Hxis ol Navf ol poMt 
inert Bun SO km cf s«a csasi 
Occupied Palestine 
ISRAELI ASSAULT ON LEBANON 
Major oty 
Smalltown 
Hi^iway 
Road 
o 
onAucuttlO 
o 61S«nl« 
MAP OF LOCATIONS BOMBED 
July 12-August 10 2006 
288 
Map - 20 
Israeli and UNFIL Positions, August 1, 2006 
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APPENDIX-1 
CHRONOLOGY OF MAIN EVENTS 
1516 Mount Lebanon came under the sway of Ottoman Empire, Sultan 
Salim I 
1842 The Ottoman authorities abohshed the emirate, and divided 
Mount Lebanon into two districts or Double Qaimaqamate, one 
Druze and the other Maronite, governed by a district ruler (qaim-
maqam) who was appointed and could be removed by the Pasha 
of Sidon, the Sultan's direct representative in the coastal Levant. 
1858 Begiiming of a peasant revolt in Mount Lebanon. 
1860 War in Mount Lebanon between Druze and Christians leaves 
more than 12,000 people killed. French troops land in Beirut to 
protect Maronites. 
1861 The major European powers and the Ottomans establish the 
Reglement Organique decreeing Mount Lebanon a 
Mutassarrifiyya (govemorate) system - a privileged 
administrative region within the Ottoman Empire under 
international guarantee and abolished feudalism in the Mountain. 
1914 World War I begins; the Ottoman Empire sides with Germany 
and Austria; Ottoman authorities end the autonomy of Mount 
Lebanon and rule it directly. 
1916 In the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, France, Britain, and Russia 
assign control over Syria and Lebanon to France following the 
defeat of the Ottoman Empire. 
1918 British and Arab troops capture Damascus from the Turks; Arabs 
under the leadership of Faisal (later to become king of Iraq) who 
attempt to establish an independent nation-state in Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan with its capital at Damascus. 
1919 The British begin to evacuate the coastal plain of Lebanon, and 
French forces move in. 
1920 Apr At the San Remo conference in Italy, the Allies place Syrian and 
Lebanon under French mandate. 
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Jul French troops defeat Arab forces near Damascus, capture it, and 
end the efforts to create an independent Arab nation-state. 
Sep French create Greater Lebanon {Grand Liban) by annexing to 
Mount Lebanon and Beirut the outlying provinces to the north, 
south, and east. 
1924 The mandatory government gives Lebanese citizenship to the 
resident Armenians. 
Lebanon declared a republic. Constitution Adopted. 
The French authorities take a official census. 
The Franco - Lebanese Treaty 
The Nazis conquer France; the Vichy French government 
attempts to maintain its authority over Lebanon. 
The British and Free French capture of Beirut from Vichy forces. 
The Free French government proclaims the independence of 
Lebanon, but French continue to exercise authority. 
General elections are held. 
The Chamber of Deputies elects Bishara al-Khuri president of the 
republic; he then appoints Riyad al-Sulh prime minister. The two 
men announce their unwritten agreement, the National Pact, to 
allow the country to proceed to independence. 
Nov The Chamber of Deputies amends the constitution, eliminating 
the articles referring to the mandatory power. 
1945 Lebanon joins Arab League and became a member of the UN. 
1946 Evacuation of French Troops from Lebanon. 
1948 First Arab-Israeli war as state of Israel declares independence. 
Palestinian refiigees flee, mainly to Lebanon and Jordan. 
1949 The Lebanese-Israeli Armistice Agreement. 
1952 Sep, 18 President al Khouri is forced to resign through mass action. 
1956 The Suez Canal crisis. Second Arab-Israeli war, Lebanon 
announced its support for Egypt, but did not break off diplomatic 
relations with the British and France. 
1957 Apr President Chamoun of Lebanon accepts the Eisenhower Doctrine. 
1958 Feb, 1 Egypt and Syrian form the United Arab Republic (UAR). 
May The first Lebanese Civil War begins. 
1926 
1932 
1936-1939 
1940 
1941 
1943 
Jun 
Nov 
Aug 
Sep 
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Jul, The Iraqi monarchy is deposed in a violent coup, the US lands 
troops in Lebanon at the request of the Lebanese president. 
1964 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). 
Bank of Lebanon founded. 
1967 In the June war. Third Arab-Israeli war, Israel captures East 
Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza, causing more Palestinian 
refugees to flee to Lebanon. 
1968 Dec, 28 In retaliation for Palestinian guerrilla attack in Athens, Israel 
blow up 13 Middle East Airlines Planes at Beirut Airport. 
1969 Cairo Agreement is signed between the Lebanese government 
and the PLO to allow the PLO to operate militarily out of 
Lebanon but with coordination v^th the Lebanese Army. 
1970 Aug, 17 Suleiman Franjieh is elected President of Lebanon. 
Sep The "Black September", Jordanian Army defeats Palestinian 
armed organization. Many Palestinian civilians and leaders flee 
to Lebanon. PLO relocates its headquarters to Beirut. 
1973 Apr, 10 Israeli commandos assassinate three top Fateh officials in Beirut. 
The Lebanese government is forced to resign the next day. 
May The PLO clashes with the Lebanese Army. 
Oct, 22 UN Security Council Resolution 338 calls for an immediate cease 
fire in the Yom-Kippur War, Fourth Arab-Israeli war, and for 
"the implementation of Security Coimcil Resolution 242 (1967) 
in all of its parts" including Israel's withdrawal from Shabaa 
farms and the Golan. Israel does not comply. 
1974 Arab League recognizes the PLO as the sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. 
1975 Feb Sidon fishermen demonstrate against the licensing of the Proteine 
Company. 
Apr The second Lebanese Civil War begins with the massacre of Ayn 
al-Rummanan committed by Phalangists (Kataeb). 
1976 Jan Syrian mediation team begins negotiations among the various 
Lebanese factions. 
May Elias Sarkis is elected President of Lebanon. 
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Syrian troops enter Lebanon to prevent a victory by the Lebanese 
National Movement (LNM) and PLO. 
Oct Riyadh Arab Sxmunit called for an immediate ceasefire and the 
establishment of a 30,000 man Arab Deterrent Force (ADF), 
which includes the 24,000 Syrian troops. 
1977 Mar, 16 Kamal Jumblat is assassinated. 
Jul Chtaura Agreement between Lebanese President Sarkis, Syria 
and the Palestinians reviving the Cairo Agreement of 1969. 
1978 Mar, 14-15 Israel invades Lebanon, "Operation Litani" occupying the 
southern part of the country up to Litani River. 
Mar, 19 UN Security Council passes Resolution 425, which calls on Israel 
to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and establishes the 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to confirm 
the Israeli withdrawal. Israel does not comply. 
May, 3 UN Security Council Resolution 427 authorizes in increase of 
UN forces to 6,000 troops and "Calls upon Israel to complete its 
withdrawal from all Lebanese territory without any ftirther 
delay;" Israel does not comply. 
Jun, 13 Israeli troops pull back, but create a self-declared "security zone" 
along the border, placing the zone under the command of Major 
Saad Haddad and his Israeli-controlled rebel forces, not to 
UNIFIL. 
1980 Right-wing Phalange (Kataeb) militia, imder Bashir Gemayel, 
crush their former allies, the Chamounists. 
Israel bombs PLO headquarters in Beirut. 
Palestinian gunmen of the Abu Nidal group shot the Israeli 
Ambassador to London and seriously injured him. 
Large-Scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon begins code name by 
Israel, "Operation Peace for Galilee". 
US troops land in Beirut as part of the Multi-National Force 
(MNF). 
Evacuation of PLO leaders and troops. 
President-elected Bashir Gemayel is assassinated, and his brother 
Amin is elected president. 
1981 
1982 Jun, 3 
Jun, 6 
Aug 
Aug-Sep 
Sep, 14 
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Sep, 16-18 Massacres of Sabra and Shatila by Phalanges with Israeli 
supervision. 
1983 Apr, 18 Truck bomb nearly destroys U.S. embassy in Beirut. 
May, 17 Lebanese - Israeli Peace Treaty 1983. 
Oct, 23 Truck bomb killed 241 people at U.S. Marine compound in 
Beirut. 
1984 Mar Conference of Lebanese warlords is held at Lausanne, 
Switzerland. Abrogation of Lebanese-Israeli Peace Treaty 1983. 
US and MNF withdraw from Lebanon. Shiites take control of 
West Beirut. 
Jan Major Saad Hadad died. 
1985 Jun Israel withdraws from Lebanon leaving only security zone along 
its southern border; afterward, terrorist attacks and hijackings by 
Shiite Muslims become frequent. 
Dec, 28 Syria-sponsored the Damascus Tripartite Agreement attempts to 
obtain political consensus among main militia leaders in 
Lebanon. 
1986 Jan The Damascus Tripartite Agreement is repudiated. Samir Ja'ja' 
ousts Hobeiqa from command of Lebanese Forces. 
Palestinian forces in southern Lebanon launch rockets against 
settlements in northern Israel. 
May "War of the Camp" between Amal and PLO. 
1987 Lebanese Prime Minister, Rashid Karami, is assassinated, and 
Syrian troops move into Beirut. 
1988 Apr-May Intra-Shiite fighting between Amal and Hezbollah for control of 
Beirut's southern suburbs; additional Syrian troops deployed. 
Sep Following end of Gemayel's term, Lebanon fails to elect a new 
president. Rival governments established: Gen. Michel Aoun 
(appointed by Gemayel) in East Beirut; Salim al-Hoss in West 
Beirut (successor to Rashid Karami). 
Nov Gen. Michel Aoun was dismissed as Commander-in-Chief by the 
Minister of Defence in the al-Hoss goveniment. 
1989 Mar Gen. Michel Aoim launches "War of Liberation" against Syria 
armed presence ui Lebanon. 
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Oct, 22 Taif Accord signed between different warring parties in Saudi 
Arabia. 
Nov, 5 Rene Mouawad is elected President of Lebanon. 
Nov, 22 Rene Mouawad was assassinated and, two days later, National 
Assembly elected Elias Hrawi as the new President. 
1990 Aug, 21 Lebanese parliament official adopted Taifs constitutional 
amendments. Implement begins. 
Oct Hrawi government ousts Gen. Aoim with Syrian backing. Aoun 
himself took refuge in the French embassy, and later went into 
exile in France. Lebanese militias, excluding Hezbollah, are 
disarmed xmder full Syrian control begins. 
1991 May Syria and Lebanon signed a treaty of 'fraternity, co-operation and 
friendship', confirming Syria's dominant role in the affairs of its 
neighbour. 
1992 Lebanon participates in West Asian conference. 
1992 Syria calls for elections, even though most political parties argue 
that it was too early. Christians boycott the elections and continue 
doing so until 2005. 
1993 Jul, 25 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, code-name Operation 
Accountability. 
1995 Oct, 19 Parliament voted to extend Elias Hrawi's term for three years. 
1996 Apr, 12 Begiiming of IsraeH invasion of Lebanon, code name "Grapes of 
Wrath." 
Apr, 18 Qana Massacre, over 100 people dead. US negotiates an 
"imderstanding" between Resistance Movement and Israel. 
1998 Jun, 14 First local elections in thirty-five years are concluded throughout 
coimtry. 
Oct, 15 National Assembly elects General Emile Lahoud president. 
2000 May, 22 Israel completed its withdrawal from the south of Lebanon in 
accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 (except for 
a number of villages called Shebaa farms and Kfarshouba hills), 
and SLA collapsed. May 25, Day of Freedom and Victory, 
declared official holiday. 
295 
Oct Election returns Rafiq al-Hariri to office as Prime Minister, 
replacing Salim al-Hoss. 
2001 Aug Lebanese security forces arrest a number of people opposed to 
Syria. This causes a serious break between President Emile 
Lahoud and Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. 
2003 Syria redeploys and 14000 troops remained in Lebanon. 
2004 Aug, 28 Parliament extends President Lahoud's term by three years. 
Sep The UN Security Resolution Council 1559 is approved by 
endorsement of US, France and co-sponsored by Germany and 
UK. 
2005 Feb, 14 Rafiq Hariri, former Sunni Muslim Prime Minister, was 
assassinated in Valentine's Day bomb in Beirut. A series of 
assassinations of political figures of all domains (Samir Qasir, 
Khalil Hawi, Jibran Toueni, Mai Chedyak & Elias Al-Mur). 
Apr, 7 UN Security Council Resolution 1595 is passed. 
Apr, 27 Syrian troops leave Lebanese soil. 
May, 7 Gen. Michel Aoun returned to Lebanon. 
June Prominent journalist Samir Qasir, a critic of Syrian influence, is 
killed by a car bomb. 
Jun, 20 Anti-Syrian alliance led by Saad al-Hariri, the son of Rafik 
Hariri, wins control of parliament following elections. New 
parliament chooses Hariri ally, Fouad Siniora, as Prime Minister. 
Oct, 31 UN Security Council Resolution 1636 is passed, insisted that the 
Syrian authorities fiiUy co-operate with the inquiry of the UN 
International Independent Investigation Commission into the 
assassination of former Prime Minister of Lebanon Rafiq Hariri. 
Dec, 12 Gibran Tueni, Lebanese Christian (a Greek Orthodox) MP and 
prominent newspaper editor, was killed in a car bomb attack. 
2006 Jul Israel launches an all out war on Lebanon under the pretext of 
destroying Hezbollah and returning two captured soldiers. 
Aug, 11 UN Security Council 1701 is passed, in an effort to end the 
hostilities. 
Nov, 13 6 Ministers backed by Hezbollah, President Lahoud, and Amal 
resigned from Siniora's cabinet. 
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Dec, 1 The opposition, primarily the pro-Syrian Shiite parties of Amal 
and Hezbollah, and the mainly FPM of Michael Aoun, launched 
a campaign of street demonstrations with the goal of getting veto 
power and creating a national unity government. 
2007 May-Sep The fighting broke out between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF), which the LAF declared victorious. 
2008 May, 16-21 The Doha Agreement reached by rival Lebanese factions. This 
Agreement marks the end of an 18-months long political crisis in 
Lebanon. 
May, 25 Lebanon's parliament elected General Michal Sulaiman as the 
President of the country, a post that had been vacant since 
November and forming a national-unity government under Fouad 
Siniora. 
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APPENDIX-2 
THE LEBANESE CONSTITUTION 
Adopted May 23,1926 
Modified by the constitutional laws of October 17,1927, May 8,1929, November 9, 
1943, December 7,1943, January 21,1947, August 21,1990, October 19,1995, and 
October 13,1998. 
Preamble 
a. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country. It is a final homeland for all 
its citizens. It is unified in its territory, people, and institutions v^thin the boxmdaries 
defined in this constitution and recognized internationally. 
b. Lebanon is Arab in its identity and in its association. It is a founding and active 
member of the League of Arab States and abides by its pacts and covenants. Lebanon 
is also a founding and active member of the United Nations Organization and abides 
by its covenants and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Government 
shall embody these principles in all fields and areas without exception. 
c. Lebanon is a parliamentary democratic republic based on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of opinion and belief, and respect for social justice 
and equality of rights and duties among all citizens without discrimination. 
d. The people are the source of authority and sovereignty; they shall exercise these 
powers through the constitutional institutions. 
e. The political system is established on the principle of separation, balance, and 
cooperation amongst the various branches of Government. 
f The economic system is free and ensures private initiative and the right to private 
property. 
g. The even development among regions on the educational, social, and economic 
levels shall be a basic pillar of the unity of the state and the stability of the system. 
h. The abolition of political confessionalism is a basic national goal and shall be 
achieved according to a gradual plan. 
i. Lebanese territory is one for all Lebanese. Every Lebanese has the right to live in 
any part of it and to enjoy the sovereignty of law wherever he resides. There is no 
segregation of the people on the basis of any type of belonging, and no fragmentation, 
partition, or colonization. 
j . There is no constitutional legitimacy for any authority which confradicts the 'pact of 
communal coexistence' [nuthaq al-aysh al-mushtaraq]. This Constitutional Law shall 
be published in the Official Gazette. 
PART I: FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
THE STATE AND THE TERRITORY 
Article 1 [Territory] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 1). 
Lebanon is an independent State, unitarian and sovereign. Its frontiers are those which 
now limit it: 
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IN THE NORTH: From the mouth of Nahr El Kebir, the line following the course of 
this river up to its junction with its tributary the Ouade Khaled at the height of Jisr El 
Kamar. 
IN THE EAST: The top line separating the valleys of Ouade Khaled and the Ouade 
Nahr-El Assi (Orontes) and passing through the villages of Meayssra, Harbaana, Halt, 
Ebbech, Faissan, at the height of the villages Brifa and Matrebeh. This line follows 
the northern limit of the caza of Baalbeck, towards the Northeast and Southeast, then 
the Eastern limits of the cazas of Baalbeck, Bekaa, Hasbaya and Rashaya. 
IN THE SOUTH: The present southern limits of the cazas of Tyre and Maijeyoim. 
IN THE WEST: the Mediterranean Sea. 
Article 2 [Territorial Integrity] 
No part of the Lebanese territory may be alienated or ceded. 
Article 3 [Administrative Areas] 
The limits of the administrative districts may not be modified except by law. 
Article 4 [Republic, Capital] 
The Greater Lebanon is a RepubUc. Beirut is its capital city. 
Article 5 [Flag] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 7 December 1943, sole article). 
The Lebanese flag is composed of three horizontal stripes two red ones firaming a 
white one. The top of the white stripe is equal to double of each of the red stripes. In 
the center of the white stripe figures a green cedar tree the vddth of which occupies 
the third of the latter and which, at its top and base, touches each of the red stripes. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE LEBANESE NATIONALS, THEIR RIGHTS AND THEIR DUTIES 
Article 6 [Nationality] 
The Lebanese nationality, the way it is acquired, is retained and forfeited, shall be 
determined by law. 
Article 7 [Equality] 
All the Lebanese are equal before the law. They enjoy equal civil and political rights 
and are equally subjected to public charges and duties, v^thout any distinction 
whatever. 
Article 8 [Personal Liberty, nulla poena sine lege] 
Individual liberty is guaranteed and protected. No one can be arrested or detained 
except in accordance wdth the provisions of the law. No infiingements and no 
sanctions can be established except by law. 
Article 9 [Conscience, Belief] 
Liberty of conscience is absolute. By rendering homage to the Almighty, the State 
respects all creeds and guarantees and protects their fi-ee exercise, on condition that 
they do not interfere with public order. It also guarantees to individuals, whatever 
their religious allegiance, the respect of their personal status and their religious 
interests. 
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Article 10 [Education, Confessional Schools] 
Education is free so long as it is not contrary to public order and to good manners and 
does not touch the dignity of creeds. No derogation shall affect the right of 
communities to have their schools, subject to the general prescriptions on public 
education edicted by the State. 
Article 11 [Official National Language] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 2). 
Arabic is the official national language. A law shall determine the cases where the 
French language is to be used. 
Article 12 [Public Office] 
All Lebanese citizens are equally admitted to all public functions without any other 
cause for preference except their merit and competence and according to the 
conditions set by law. A special statute shall govern Civil Servants according to the 
administrations to which they belong. 
Article 13 [Expression, Press, Assembly, Association] 
Freedom of expression by word or pen, freedom of the press, freedom of holding 
meetings and freedom of association are equally guaranteed within the framework of 
the law. 
Article 14 [Home] 
Domicile is unviolable. None can enter it except in cases provided by the law and 
according to the form it prescribes. 
Article 15 [Property] 
Property is imder the protection of the law. None may be deprived of his property 
except for public utility, in cases established by the law and in return of prior and fair 
compensation. 
PART II: POWERS 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 16 [Legislative Power, One Chamber] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 1). 
Legislature lies with a single assembly: the Chamber of Deputies. 
Article 17 [Executive Power, Council of Ministers] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 2, and the 
constitutional law of August 21, 1990). 
Executive power is entrusted to the President of the Republic who exercises it with 
the assistance of Ministers, according to conditions established by the present 
constitution. 
Article 18 [Bills] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 50). 
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The Parliament and the Council of Ministers have the right to propose laws. No law 
shall be promulgated until it has been adopted by the Chamber. 
Article 19 [Constitutional Council] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 50, and the 
constitutional law of August 21, 1990). 
A Constitutional Council shall be established to supervise the constitutionality of laws 
and to arbitrate conflicts that arise from parliamentary and presidential elections. The 
President, the President of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, along with any ten 
Members of Parliament, have the right to consult this Council on matters that relate to 
the constitutionality of laws. The officially recognized heads of religious communities 
have the right to consult this Council only on laws relating to personal status, the 
freedom of belief and religious practice, and the freedom of religious education. The 
rules governing the organization, operation, composition, and modes of appeal of the 
Coimcil will be decided by a special law. 
Article 20 [Judicial Power] 
Judicial power fimctioning within the framework of a statute established by law and 
ensuring essential guarantees to judges and the disputuig parties is exercised by courts 
of different order and degrees. The law fixes the limits and the conditions of the 
magistrates' tenure of office. Judges are independent in the exercise of their fimctions. 
The awards and judgments of all courts are rendered and executed in the name of the 
Lebanese people. 
Article 21 [Electoral Rights] 
Any Lebanese citizen aged 21 who meets the conditions of the electoral law is entitled 
to vote. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGISTLATIVE POWER 
Article 22 [The Senate] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of August 21, 1990). 
With the election of the first Parliament on a national, non-confessional basis, a 
Senate shall be established in which all the religious communities are represented. Its 
authority is limited to major national issues. 
Article 23 [Eligibility to the Senate] 
(Abrogated by the constitutional law of October 17, 1927, article 50). 
Article 24 [Electoral Laws] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article I, and the 
constitutional law of August 21, 1990). 
(1) The Chamber of Deputies shall be composed of elected members; their number 
and the method of their election shall be determined by the electoral laws in effect. 
Until such time as the Chamber enacts new electoral laws on a non-confessional basis, 
the distribution of seats is according to the following principles: 
a. Equal representation between Christians and Muslims. 
b. Proportional representation among the confessional groups within each religious 
community. 
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c. Proportional representation among geographic regions. 
(2) Exceptionally, and for one time only, the seats that are currently vacant, as well as 
the new seats that have been established by law, are to be filled by appointment, all at 
once, and by a majority of two thirds of the Government of National Unity. This is to 
establish equality between Christians and Muslims as stipulated in the Document of 
National Accord [The Taif Agreement]. The electoral laws will specify the details 
regarding the implementation of this clause. 
Article 25 [Dissolution] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article I). 
In the event of the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, the deed dissolving it must 
contain convocation of the voters for new elections which shall be held in conformity 
with article 24 and within a time-limit not exceeding three months. 
CHAPTERS 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 26 [Location of Government and Parliament] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 3). 
The Chamber and the Executive sit in Beirut. 
Article 27 [Representation] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1). 
The Chamber member represents all the Nation. No imperative mandate may be given 
him by his electors. 
Article 28 [No Incompatibility] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 8 May 1929, article I). 
No incompatibility exists between a deputy's mandate and ministerial office. 
Ministers may be taken indistinctively either from the Chamber or from outside. 
Article 29 [Incompatibility by Law] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 6). 
Cases of inaptness to the quality of deputy are determined by law. 
Article 30 [Validating Elections] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article I, and the 
constitutional law of August 21, 1990). 
The Deputies alone have competence to judge the validity of their mandate. No 
Deputy's mandate may be invalidated except by a majority of two thirds of the votes 
of the entire membership. This clause is automatically cancelled as soon as the 
Constitutional Coimcil is established and as soon as the laws relating to it are 
implemented. 
Article 31 [Illegal Sessions] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, Article 8). 
Any sitting of the Chamber outside the legal time of session is illegal and null as a 
matter of course. 
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Article 32 [Ordinary Sessions] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 9). 
The Chamber convenes every year in two ordinary sessions. The first opens on the 
first Tuesday following the 15th March and terminates at the end of the month of 
May. The second opens on the first Tuesday following the 15th October. It is devoted 
before any other business to budget debate and vote. It lasts xmtil the end of the year. 
Article 33 [Extraordinary Sessions] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 10). 
The ordinary sessions shall begin and end automatically on the dates fixed in Article 
32. The President of the Republic in consultation with the Prime Minister may 
summon the Chamber to extraordinary sessions by a Decree specifying the dates of 
the opening and closing of the extraordinary sessions as well as the agenda. The 
President of the Republic is required to convoke the Chamber if an absolute majority 
of the total membership so requests. 
Article 34 [Quorum] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 11). 
The Chamber may not be validly constituted except with the attendance of the 
majority of the members legally composing it. Resolutions are adopted by majority 
vote. In the event of a tie the matter under debate is rejected. 
Article 35 [Publicity] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 12). 
Debates in the Chamber are public. However, the Chamber convenes in secret 
committee upon Government request or of five of its members. It then decides if the 
debate must be resumed in public on the same subject. 
Article 36 [Voting Process] 
Voting is expressed in a loud voice or by sitting and standing, except in the event of 
an election, in which case ballot is secret. On laws as a whole and on the matter of 
confidence voting is always by nominal call and in a loud voice. 
Article 37 [Vote of No-Confidence] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 8 May 1929, article 2). 
The right of every deputy to question the responsibility of Ministers is absolute during 
the ordinary and emergency sessions. No motion of this nature may be debated and 
voted upon except five days at least after it has been tabled before the Chamber of 
Deputies and communicated to the Minister of Ministers concerned. 
Article 38 [Reintroduction of Bills] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 14). 
Any Bill which has not been rejected by the Chamber may not be tabled once more in 
the course of the same session. 
Article 39 [Indemnity] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 15). 
No member of the Chamber may be prosecuted for his expression of opinions or votes 
during the term of his mandate. 
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Article 40 [Immunity] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 16). 
No member of the Chamber may, while the session is in progress, be prosecuted or 
arrested for breach of the penal law - barring cases of flagrante delicto - except with 
the approval of the Chamber. 
Article 41 [Re-election] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1). 
When a seat in the Chamber has become vacant, the vacancy shall be filled within a 
time limit of two months. The term of office of the new member shall run up to the 
expiry of the term of office of his predecessor. No steps shall be taken to fill the 
vacancy if the Chamber is less than six months away fi^om the expire of its powers. 
Article 42 [General Elections] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1). 
General elections for the renewal of the Assembly are held within the sixty days 
which precede the end of its term of office. 
Article 43 [Rules of Procedure] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 19). 
The Chamber drafts its own internal regulations. 
Article 44 [First Session] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1 and in 1990). 
(1) Each time a new Chamber is elected the Chamber shall meet under the presidency 
of the oldest member and the secretariat of the two yoimgest. It shall then elect 
separately, by a secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the votes cast, the 
President and the Vice President of the Chamber to hold office for the length of the 
Chamber's term. At the third ballot, a relative majority shall be sufficient. Should the 
votes be equal, the oldest candidate shall be considered elected. 
(2) Every time a new Chamber of Deputies is elected, as well as in the October 
session of each year, the Chamber shall elect two Secretaries by secret ballot 
according to the majority stipulated in the first part of this Article. 
(3) The Chamber may, once only, two years after the election of its President and his 
Deputy, and in the first session it holds, withdraw its confidence fi-om the President of 
the Chamber or his Deputy by a Decision of two thirds of the Chamber, based on a 
petition signed by at least ten Deputies. The Chamber, at such point, must hold an 
immediate session to fill the vacant post. 
Article 45 [Presence] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 21). 
The members of the Chamber do not vote except if they attend the sitting; voting by 
proxy is not admitted. 
Article 46 [Parliamentary Order] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 22). 
Only the Chamber is entitled to maintain its own order, through the Speaker. 
Article 47 [Petitions] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 23). 
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Any petition to the Chamber must be made out and communicated in writing. It is 
forbidden to hand in petitions in person or on the floor. 
Article 48 [Remuneration] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 24). 
Indemnity to the members of the Chamber is determined by law. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE EXECUTIVE POWER 
SECTION 1: THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
Article 49 [Presidential Powers] 
(As modified by the constitutional laws of 8 May 1929, article 3, and 21 January 
1947, article 2 and in 1990 and in 1995). 
(1) The President of the Republic is the head of the state and the symbol of the 
nation's unity. He shall safeguard the Constitution and Lebanon's independence, unity, 
and territorial integrity. The President shall preside over the Supreme Defence 
Council and be the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces which fall under the 
authority of the Council of Ministers. 
(2) The President of the Republic shall be elected by secret ballot and by a two thirds 
majority of the Chamber of Deputies. After a first ballot, an absolute majority shall be 
sufficient. The President's term is for six years. He may not be re-elected until six 
years after the expiration of his last mandate. No one may be elected to the Presidency 
of the Republic unless he fiilfiUs the conditions of eligibility for the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
(3) It is also not possible to elect judges, Grade one civil servants, or their equivalents 
in all public institutions to the Presidency during their term of office or within two 
years following the date of their resignation or their leaving office for whatever 
reason. 
Constitutional Law 462 dated 19.10.1995 (Addition of a paragraph to article 49) 
The members of the parliament have ratified the following: 
1) The following text is added to article 49: "Exceptionally, and, for one time, the 
term of the present President of the Republic is continued for three years ending on 
the 23rd November 1998' 
2) The Constitutional Law will be effective as from date of publication in the official 
gazette. 
Constitutional Law 687 dated 13.10.1998 (Addition of a paragraph to article 49) 
The members of the parliament have ratified the following: 
1) The following text is added to article 49: "Exceptionally and for one time, it is 
possible to elect the President of the Republic from, judges, first category civil 
servants or from similar posts in the Public Administration and Establishments and 
other personalities in the Law": 
Article 50 [Oath] 
Before entering upon his duties, the President of the Republic takes the oath of 
allegiance to the Lebanese Nation and the Constitution, before Parliament, in the 
following terms: "I swear by Almighty God to observe the Constitution and the laws 
of the Lebanese people, to safeguard the independence of Lebanon and the integrity of 
its territory". 
305 
Article 51 [Promulgation of Laws] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 26 and in 1990). 
The President of the Republic shall promulgate the Laws after they have been 
approved by the Chamber in accordance with the time limits specified by the 
Constitution. He asks for the publication of these Laws, and he may not modify these 
Laws or exempt anyone from complying with their provisions. 
Article 52 [Negotiation of International Treaties] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 3 and in 1990). 
The President of the Republic shall negotiate international Treaties in coordination 
with the Prime Minister. These treaties are not considered ratified except after 
agreement of the Council of Ministers. They shall be made known to the Chamber 
whenever the national interest and security of the state permit. However, treaties 
involving the finances of the state, commercial treaties, and in general treaties that 
cannot be renounced every year shall not be considered ratified vmtil they have been 
approved by the Chamber. 
Article 53 [List of Additional Presidential Powers] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1 and in 1990). 
1. The President shall preside over the Council of Ministers when he wishes wdthout 
participating in voting. 
2. The President shall designate the Prime minister in consultation with the President 
of the Chamber of Deputies based on Parliamentary consultations which shall be 
binding and the content of which the President shall formally disclose to the Prime 
Minister. 
3. The President alone shall issue the Decree which designates the Prime Minister. 
4. He shall issue, in agreement with the Prime Minister, the decree appointing the 
Cabinet and the decrees accepting the resignation of Ministers. 
5. He shall issue, on his own authority, the decrees accepting the resignation of the 
Cabinet or considering it resigned. 
6. He shall forward to the Chamber of Deputies Bills that are delivered to him by the 
Council of Ministers. 
7. He shall accredit [Lebanese] ambassadors [abroad] and accept the credentials of 
[foreign] ambassadors. 
8. He shall preside over official fimctions and grant official decorations by Decree. 
9. He shall grant particular pardons by Decree, but a general amnesty cannot be 
granted except by a Law. 
10. He shall address, when necessary, letters to the Chamber of Deputies. 
11. He may introduce, from outside the agenda, any urgent matter to the Council of 
Ministers. 
12. He may, in agreement vdth the Prime Minister, call the Council of Ministers to an 
extraordinary session, whenever he sees it necessary. 
Article 54 [Countersignature] 
(As modified in 1990). 
The decisions of the President must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and the 
concerned Minister or Ministers except the Decree designating a new Prime Minister 
and the Decree accepting the resignation of the Cabinet or considering it resigned. 
Decrees issuing Laws must be countersigned by the Prime Minister. 
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Article 55 [Dissolution of Parliament by Decree] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 8 May 1929, article 4 and in 1990). 
(1) The President of the Republic may, in accordance with the conditions stipulated in 
Articles 65 and 77 of this Constitution, ask the Council of Ministers to dissolve the 
Chamber of Deputies before the expiration of its mandate. If the Council, based on 
this request, decides to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, the President shall issue the 
Decree dissolving it, and in this case, the electoral bodies shall meet as provided for in 
article 25, and the new Chamber shall be called to convene within fifteen days after 
the proclamation of the election. 
(2) The administrative staff of the Chamber of Deputies shall continue to ftinction 
imtil the election of a new Chamber. 
(3) If elections are not held within the time limit specified in Article 25 of the 
Constitution, the Decree dissolving the Chamber shall be considered null and void, 
and the Chamber of Deputies shall continue to exercise its powers according to the 
stipulations of the Constitution. 
Article 56 [Promulgation Time Limits] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 30 and in 1990). 
(1) The President of the Republic shall promulgate the Laws which have been adopted 
within one month of their transmission to the Government. He must promulgate Laws 
that were declared urgent by a special Decision of the Chamber within five days. 
(2) The President shall issue decrees and request their promulgation; he has the right 
to ask the Council of Ministers to review any Decision that the Chamber has taken 
within fifteen days of the decision's transmission to the Presidency. If the Council of 
Ministers insists on the Decision or if the time limit passes without the Decree being 
issued or returned, the Decision or Decree shall be considered legally operative and 
must be promulgated. 
Article 57 [Presidential Veto] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 31 and in 1990). 
The President of the Republic, after consultation with the Coimcil of Ministers, shall 
have the right to request the reconsideration of a Law once during the period 
prescribed for its promulgation. This request may not be refiised. When the President 
exercises this right he shall not be required to promulgate this Law until it has been 
reconsidered and approved by an absolute majority of all the members legally 
composing the Chamber. If the time limits pass without the Law being issued or 
returned, the law shall be considered legally operative and must be promulgated. 
Article 58 [Urgent Bills] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 32 and in 1990). 
Every Bill that the Council of Ministers deems urgent and in which this urgency is 
indicated in the Decree of transmission to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued by 
the President within forty days following its communication to the Chamber and after 
including it on the agenda of a general meeting, reading it aloud before the Chamber, 
and after the expiration of the time limit without the Chamber acting on it. 
Article 59 [Adjourning the Chamber] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 33). 
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The President of the Republic may adjourn the Chamber for a period not exceeding 
one month. He may not do so twice in the same session. 
Article 60 [Responsibility] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1). 
(1) The President of the RepubUc is not responsible for the acts of his functions 
except in cases of breach to the Constitution or high treason. (2) His responsibility for 
offences of common law is submitted to ordinary laws. For such offences, as for 
breach of the Constitution and high treason he may not be impeached except by the 
Chamber of Deputies deciding by a two thirds majority of the members of the whole 
Assembly; he is tried by the Higher Court provided in article 80. Public 
prosecutorship before the Higher Court is exercised by a magistrate appointed by the 
highest jurisdiction, with all the chambers meeting. 
Article 61 [Suspension after Impeachement] 
When indicted, the President of the Republic is suspended of his functions and the 
Presidency is vacant until the Higher Court adjudicates. 
Article 62 [Vacancy] 
(As modified in 1990). 
Should the Presidency become vacant for any reason whatsoever, the Council of 
Ministers shall exercise the powers of the President by delegation. 
Article 63 [Remuneration] 
The civil list of the President of the Republic is determined by law. During the 
President's tenure of office it may be neither increased nor reduced. 
SECTION 2: THE PRIME MINISTER 
Article 64 [Responsibility and Powers] 
(As modified in 1990). 
The Prime Minister is the head of the Government and its representative. He speaks in 
its name and shall be considered responsible for executing the general policy that is 
set by the Council of Ministers. He shall exercise the following powers: 
1. He shall head the Coimcil of Ministers and shall be, ex officio. Deputy Head of the 
Supreme Defense Council. 
2. He shall conduct the Parliamentary consultations involved in forming a Cabinet. He 
shall sign, with the President, the Decree forming the Cabinet. The Cabinet must 
present its general statement of policy to the Chamber and gain its confidence within 
thirty days of the date of issuance of the Decree in which the Cabinet was formed. 
The Cabinet shall not exercise its powers before it gains the Chamber's confidence nor 
after it has resigned or is considered resigned, except in the narrow sense of managing 
affairs. 
3. He shall present the Government's general policy statements before the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
4. He shall sign, along with the president, all decrees, except the Decree which 
designates him the head of the Government [i.e. Prime Minister], and the Decree 
accepting the Cabinet's resignation or considering it resigned. 
5. He shall sign the Decree calling for an extraordinary parliamentary session, decrees 
issuing Laws, and requests for reviewing Laws. 
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6. He shall call the Council of Ministers into session and set its agenda, and he shall 
inform the President and the Ministers beforehand of the subjects included on the 
agenda and of the urgent subjects that will be discussed. 
7. He shall supervise the activities of the public administrations and institutions and 
shall coordinate among the Ministers and provide general guidance to ensure the 
proper progress of affairs. 
8. He shall hold working meetings with the competent authorities in the Government 
in the presence of the concerned Minister. 
SECTION 3: THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
Article 65 [Powers] 
(As modified in 1990). 
Executive authority shall be vested in the Council of Ministers. It shall be the 
authority to which the armed forces are subject. Among the powers that it shall 
exercise are the following: 
1. It shall set the general policy of the Government in all fields, prepare Bills and 
organizational Decrees and make the decisions necessary for implementing them. 
2. It shall watch over the execution of Laws and regulations and supervise the 
activities of all the Government's branches including the civil, military, and security 
administrations and institutions without exception. 
3. It shall appoint Government employees and dismiss them and accept their 
resignations according to the Law. 
4. It shall dissolve the Chamber of Deputies upon the request of the President of the 
Republic if the Chamber of Deputies, for no compelling reasons, fails to meet during 
one of its regular periods and fails to meet throughout two successive extraordinary 
periods, each longer than one month, or if the Chamber returns an annual budget plan 
with the aim of paraly2dng the Government. This right caimot be exercised a second 
time if it is for the same reasons which led to the dissolution of the Chamber the first 
tune. 
5. The Council of Ministers shall meet in a locale specifically set aside for it, and the 
President shall chair its meetings when he attends. The legal quorum for a Council 
meeting shall be a two-thirds majority of its members. It shall make its decisions by 
consensus. If that is not possible, it shall make its decisions by vote of the majority of 
attending members. Basic national issues shall require the approval of two thirds of 
the members of the Council named in the Decree forming the Cabinet. Basic national 
issues are considered the following: 
The amendment of the Constitution, the declaration of a state of emergency and its 
termination, war and peace, general mobilization, international agreements and 
treaties, the annual Goverrmient budget, comprehensive and long-term development 
projects, the appointment of Grade One government employees and their equivalents, 
the review of the administrative map, the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, 
electoral Laws, nationality Laws, personal status Laws, and the dismissal of 
Ministers. 
Article 66 [Ministries, Responsibility] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 34 and in 1990). 
Only Lebanese who satisfy the conditions for deputization may assume Ministerial 
posts. The Ministers shall administer the Government's services and shall assume the 
responsibility of applying the Laws and regulations, each one according to the affairs 
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of his administration and what is specific to them. Ministers shall be collectively 
responsible before the Chamber for the general policy of the Government and 
individually responsible for their personal actions. 
Article 67 [Ministers in Parliament] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 35). 
Ministers may come to the Chamber without let or hindrance and make themselves 
heard whenever they please. They may seek the assistance of one or several Civil 
Servants of their department. 
Article 68 \Woit of No-Confidence] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 36). 
When, in conformity with article 37, the Chamber declares it has no confidence in a 
Minister, this Minister is required to resign. 
Article 69 [Government Resignation] 
(Abrogated by the constitutional law of 8 May 1929, article 5 and modified in 1990). 
(1). The Government shall be considered resigned in the following circumstances: 
a. If the Prime Minister resigns; 
b. If it loses more than a third of the members specified in the Decree forming it; 
c. If the Prime Minister dies; 
d. At the beginning of the term of the President of the Republic; 
e. At the beginning of the term of the Chamber of Deputies; 
f. When it loses the confidence of the Chamber of Deputies based on the Chamber's 
initiative or based on the Council's initiative to gain the Chamber's confidence. 
(2). Ministers shall be dismissed by a Decree signed by the President and the Prime 
Minister in accordance with Article 65 of the Constitution. 
(3). When the Coimcil resigns or is considered resigned, the Chamber of Deputies 
shall automatically be considered in extraordinary session until a new Council has 
been formed and has gained the Chamber's confidence. 
Article 70 [Impeachment] 
(As modified in 1990). 
(1) The Chamber of Deputies shall have the right to impeach the Prime Minister and 
Ministers for high treason or for serious neglect of their duties. The Decision to 
impeach may not be taken except by a two thirds majority of the total membership of 
the Chamber. (2) A special Law shall be issued to determine the conditions of the 
civil responsibility of the Prime Minister and individual Ministers. 
Article 71 [Judicial Impeachment Proceedings] 
(As modified in 1990). 
The impeached Prime Minister of Minister shall be tried by the Supreme Council. 
Article 72 [Consequences of Impeachment] 
(As modified in 1990). 
A Prime Minister or Minister shall leave office as soon as the Decision of 
Impeachment concerning him is issued. If he resigns, his resignation shall not prevent 
judicial proceedings from being mstituted or continued against him. 
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PART III 
CHAPTER 1 
ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC 
Article 73 [Election of the President] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 38). 
At least one month and at the latest two months before the expiry of the powers of the 
President of the Republic, the Chamber convenes on the invitation of its Speaker, for 
the election of a new President. In default of a convocation, the meeting shall be held 
as a matter of right the tenth day before the end of the President's term of office. 
Article 74 [Vacancy of Presidency] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927 article 39). 
Should the presidency become vacant through death, resignation or any other cause, 
the Assembly meets immediately and as a matter of right to elect a new President. If 
at the time the vacancy occurs, the Chamber happens to be dissolved, the electoral 
bodies are simmioned without delay and, soon after the elections are held, the 
Chamber meets as a matter of right. 
Article 75 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 40). 
The Chamber meeting to elect the President of the Republic constitutes an electing 
body and not a deliberating assembly. It must proceed solely, without delay or debate, 
with the election of the Head of the State. 
CHAPTER 2 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
Article 76 [Proposal] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 41). 
The Constitution may be revised on the initiative of the President of the Republic. 
In this event, the govenmient shall table before the Assembly a draft constitutional 
law. 
Article 77 [Request] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 42 and in 1990). 
The Constitution may also be revised upon the request of the Chamber of Deputies. In 
this case the foUoAving procedures shall be observed: 
During an ordinary session and at the request of at least ten of its members, the 
Chamber of Deputies may recommend, by a two-thirds majority of the total members 
lawfully composing the Chamber, the revision of the Constitution. However, the 
Articles and the questions referred to in the recommendation must be clearly defined 
and specified. The President of the Chamber shall then transmit the recommendation 
to the Govenmient requesting it to prepare a draft law relating thereto. If the 
Government approves the recommendation of the Chamber by a two-thirds majority, 
it must prepare the draft amendment and submit it to the Chamber within four month; 
if it does not agree, it shall return the Decision to the Chamber for reconsideration. If 
the Chamber insists upon the necessity of the amendment by a three-fourths majority 
of the total members lawfiilly composing the Chamber, the President of the Republic 
has then either to accede to the Chamber's recommendation or to ask the Council of 
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Ministers to dissolve the Chamber and to hold new elections within three months. If 
the new Chamber insists on the necessity of amending the Constitution, the 
Government must yield and submit the draft amendment within four months. 
CHAPTERS 
OPERATION OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Article 78 [Priority] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 43). 
When the draft constitutional law has been tabled before it, the Chamber must engage 
itself in no other business but that of revision, until the final vote. 
It may not deliberate and vote except those articles and issues which have been set 
down for the sake of limitation and clarified in the project duly communicated. 
Article 79 [Majority, Promulgation] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 44 and in 1990). 
(1) When a draft law dealing with a Constitutional amendment is submitted to the 
Chamber, it cannot discuss it or vote upon it except when a majority of two thirds of 
the members lawfiilly composing the Chamber are present. Voting shall likewise be 
by the same majority. 
(2) The President of the Republic shall be required to promulgate the law of the 
Constitutional amendment under the same conditions and in the same form as 
ordinary laws. He shall have the right, within the period established for the 
promulgation, to ask the Chamber to reconsider the draft, after consultation with the 
Council of Ministers, in which case the vote shall be by a two-thirds majority. 
PART IV: VARIOUS PROVISIONS 
CHAPTER 1 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Article 80 [Function, Composition, Organizational Law] 
(As modified by the constitutional law ofl 7 October 1927, article 45 and in 1990). 
The Supreme Council, whose fimction is to try Presidents and Ministers, shall consist 
of seven Deputies elected by the Chamber of Deputies and of eight of the highest 
Lebanese judges, according to their rank in the judicial hierarchy, or, in case of equal 
ranks, in the order of seniority. They shall meet under the presidency of the judge of 
the highest rank. The Decisions of condemnation by the Supreme Council shall be 
rendered by a majority of ten votes. A special Law shall be issued to determine the 
procedure to be followed by this Council. 
CHAPTER 2 
FINANCES 
Article 81 [Integral Tax Law] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1). 
Taxes are established for public utility. No taxes may be levied in the Lebanese 
Republic except in conformity with a uniform law applicable on the whole territory 
without exception. 
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Article 82 [Rule of Law] 
No tax may be modified or suppressed except by virtue of a law. 
Article 83 [Yearly Budget] 
Every year, early in the October session, the Government submits to the Chamber of 
Deputies, for examination and approval, the general budget of State revenue and 
expenditure for the following year. The budget is voted article by article. 
Article 84 [Budget Discussion] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 46). 
In the course of the budget debate and the discussion of the Bills providing for the 
opening of supplementary and emergency credits, the Chamber may not increase the 
credits proposed in the draft budget or in the abovementioned projects, either through 
amendment or through independent proposals. But once this debate is over, the 
Assembly may pass laws providing for new expenditures. 
Article 85 [Extraordinary Credit] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 1 and in 1990). 
No extraordinary credit may be opened except by a special Law. Nevertheless, should 
unforeseen circumstances render urgent expenditures necessary, the President of the 
Republic may issue a Decree, based on a Decision of the Council of Ministers, to 
open extraordinary or supplementary credits or transfer appropriations in the budget 
as long as these credits do not exceed a maximum limit specified in the budget Law. 
These measures shall be submitted to the Chamber for approval at the first ensuing 
session. 
Article 86 [Provisional Budget] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 48 and in 1990). 
If the Chamber of Deputies has not given a final Decision on the budget estimates 
before the expiration of the session devoted to the examination of the budget, the 
President of the Republic, in coordination with the Prime Minister, shall immediately 
convene the chamber for an extraordinary session which shall last till the end of 
January in order to continue the discussion of the budget; if, at the end of this 
extraordinary session, the budget estimates have not been finally settled, the Council 
of Ministers may then make a Decision on the basis of which a Decree is issued by 
the President giving effect to the above estimates in the form in which they were 
submitted to the Chamber. However, the Council of Ministers may not exercise this 
right unless the budget estimates were submitted to the Chamber at least fifteen days 
before the conmiencement of its session. Nevertheless, during the said extraordinary 
session, taxes (dara'ib, charges (takalif), duties [rusum), imposts [mucus), and other 
kinds of revenues (a'idat) shall continue to be collected as before. The budget of the 
previous year shall be adopted as a basis. To this must be added the permanent credits 
which have been dropped, and the Government shall fix the expenditures for the 
month of January on the basis of the "provisional twelvth". 
Article 87 [Final Financial Accounts, Auditing Bureau] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 17 October 1927, article 49). 
The fmal account of the finance administration for the closed fmancial year must be 
submitted to the Chamber and approved before the promulgation of the budget of the 
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second financial year following that to which the account refers. An Audit 
Department shall be created by special law. 
Article 88 [Public Loan] 
No public loan and no conunitment likely to burden the Treasury may be transacted 
except by virtue of a law. 
Article 89 [Contracts, Concessions, Resources, Monpolies] 
No concession aiming at the exploitation of a natural resource of the country or a 
public utility service, nor any monopoly may be granted except by virtue of a law for 
a limited period. 
PART V: PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE 
MANDATORY POWER AND LEAGUE OF NATIONS 
Article 90 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 4). 
Article 91 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 4). 
Article 92 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 4). 
Article 93 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Article 94 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 4). 
PART VI: ON THE ABOLITION OF POLITICAL CONFESSIONALISM 
Article 95 [National Committee] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 5 and in 1990). 
(1) The first Chamber of Deputies which is elected on the basis of equality between 
Muslims and Christians shall take the appropriate measures to realize the abolition of 
political confessionalism according to a transitional plan. A National Committee shall 
be formed headed by the President of the Republic, including, in addition to the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies and the Prime Minister, leading political, 
intellectual, and social figures. 
(2) The tasks of this Committee shall be to study and propose the means to ensure the 
abolition of confessionalism, propose them to the Chamber of Deputies and the 
Ministers, and supervise the execution of the transitional plan. 
(3) During the transitional phase: 
a. ITie confessional groups shall be represented in a just and equitable fashion in the 
formation of the Cabinet. 
b. The principle of confessional representation in public service jobs, in the judiciary, 
in the military and security institutions, and in public and mixed agencies shall be 
cancelled in accordance with the requirements of national reconciliation; they shall be 
replaced by the principle of expertise and competence. However, Grade One posts and 
their equivalents shall be excepted from this rule, and the posts shall be distributed 
equally between Christians and Muslims without reserving any particular job for any 
confessional group but rather applying the principles of expertise and competence. 
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PART VII: PROVISIONS RELATIING TO 
THE ELECTION AND FUNCTION OF THE SENATE 
Article 96 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Article 97 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Article 98 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Article 99 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Article 100 (Abrogated by the constitutional law of 21 January 1947, article 2). 
Part VIII: ADITIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article 101 [Greater Lebanon, The Lebanese Republic] As from 1 September 
1926, the State of "Greater Lebanon" shall bear the name of "Lebanese Republic", 
without change or modification of any other kind. 
Article 102 [Abrogation of Old Laws] 
(As modified by the constitutional law of 9 November 1943, article 6). 
All legislative provisions contrary to the present constitution are abrogated. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/lebanon/1926_le 
banese_constitution.asp 
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APPENDIX-3 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND ELECTORAL DISTRICTS IN LEBANON, 1960-2000 
Administrative units 
Muhafaza 
Beirut 
Mount 
Lebanon 
(Jabal 
Lubnan) 
North 
(Shimal) 
South (Janub) 
Nabatiyya 
Biqa 
Qada 
Jubayal 
Kisirwan 
Matn 
Baabda 
Alayh 
Shuf 
Akkar 
Tarabulus 
Zgharta 
Bsharri 
Kura 
Batrun 
Sayda 
Sur 
Jazzin 
Nabatiyya 
Marjayun 
Hasbayya 
Bint Jubayl 
Hirmil 
Baalbak 
Zahle 
West Biqa 
Rashayya 
Electoral districts 
1960-1972 
Beirut 
Beirut 
Beirut 
Jubayal 
Kisirwan 
Matn 
Baabda 
Alayh 
Shuf 
akkar 
Dinniyya 
Tarabulus 
Zgharta 
Bsharri 
Kura 
Batrun 
Sayda 
Zahrani 
Sur 
Jazzin 
Nabatiyya 
Marjayun 
Hasbayya 
Bint Jubayl 
Baalbak, Hirmil 
Zahle 
West Biqa, 
Rashayya 
1992 
Beirut 
Jubayal 
Kisirwan 
Matn 
Baabda 
Alayh 
Shuf 
North 
South and 
Nabatiyya 
Baalbak, Hirmil 
Zahle 
West Biqa, 
Rashayya 
1996 
Beirut 
Jubayal 
Kisirwan 
Matn 
Baabda 
Alayh 
Shuf 
North 
South and 
Nabatiyya 
Biqa 
2000 
Beirut l" 
Beirut II 
Beirut IIl*^  
1: Jubayal, 
Kisirwan 
II: Matn 
III: Baabda, Alayh 
IV: Shuf 
I: Akkar, 
Dinniyya, Bsharri 
II: Zgharta, 
Bsharri, Kura, 
Batrun 
I: Sayda, Zahrani, 
Sur, Bint Jubayl 
II: Nabatiyya, 
Marjayun, 
Hasbayya, Jazzin 
I: Baalbak, Hirmil 
II: Zahle 
III: West Biqa, 
Rashayya 
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a. From 1960-1972, the electoral district Beirut I included the city quarters (ahya) 
of Ashrafiyya, Rumayl, Mudawwar, Sayfi, Marfa, and Mina al-Husn; in 2000 it 
included Ashrafiyya, Mazra'a, and Sayfi. 
b. From 1960-1972, Beirut II included the city quarters of Zuqaq al-Blat, Bashura, 
and Dar al-Mraysas. In 2000, it included Musaytba, Bashura, and Rumayl. 
c. From 1960-1972, Beirut III included the city quarters of Ra's Bairut, Mazra'a 
and Musaytba. In 2000, it included Dar al-Mrayssa, Ra's Bairut, Zaqaq al-Blat, 
Mudawwar, Marfa, and Mina al-Husn. 
d. In the wake of the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon (1978-2000), the prewar 
govemorate (muhafaza) of South Lebanon was divided into two govemorates: 
South and Nabatiyya. 
Source: Thomas Scheffler, "Religious Communalism and Democratization: The 
Development of Electoral Law in Lebanon" Orient, 2003, p.33. 
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APPENDIX-4 
TEH LEBANESE - ISRAELI GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, 
MARCH 23,1949 
Preamble 
The Parties to the present Agreement, 
Responding to the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948, calling upon 
them, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter of the United 
Nations and in order to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent 
peace in Palestine, to negotiate an armistice; 
Having decided to enter into negotiations under United Nations chairmanship 
concerning the implementation of the Security Coimcil resolution of 16 November 
1948; and having appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an 
Armistice Agreement; 
The undersigned representatives, having exchanged their full powers found to be in 
good and proper form, have agreed upon the following provisions: 
Article I 
With a view to promoting the return of permanent peace in Palestine solid in 
recognition of the importance in this regard of mutual assurances concerning the 
future military operations of the Parties, the following principles, which shall be 
fully observed by both Parties during the armistice, are hereby affirmed: 
1. The mj unction of the Security Council against resort to military force in the 
settlement of the Palestine question shall henceforth be so scrupulously respected 
by both Parties. 
2. No aggressive action by the armed forces-land, sea, or air-of sillier Party shall be 
imdertaken, plaimed, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the 
other; it being understood that the use of the term "planned" in this context has 
no bearing on normal staff planning as generally practiced in military 
organizations. 
3. The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the 
armed forces of the other shall be fully respected. 
4. The establishment of an armistice between the armed forces of tire two Parties is 
accepted as an indispensable step toward the liquidation of armed conflict and 
the restoration of peace in Palestine. 
Article II 
With a specific view to the implementation of the resolution of the Security Coimcil 
resolution of 16 November 1948, the following principles and purposes are affirmed: 
1. The principle that no military or political advantage should be gained under the 
truce ordered by the Security Council is recognized. 
2. It is also recognized that no provision of this Agreement shall in any way 
prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either Party hereto in the ultimate 
peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, the provisions of this agreement 
being dictated exclusively by military considerations. 
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Article m 
1. In pursuance of the foregoing principles and of the resolution of the Security, a 
general armistice between the armed forces of the two Parties-land, sea and air-is 
hereby established. 
2. No element of the land, sea or air military or pare-military forces of either Party, 
including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the 
military or pare-military forces of the other Party, or against civilians in territory 
under the control of that Party; or shall advance beyond or pass over for any 
purpose whatsoever the Armistice Demarcation Line set forth in Article V of this 
Agreement; or enter into or pass through the air space of the other Party or 
through the waters within three miles of the coastline of the other Party. 
3. No warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory controlled by 
one of the Parties to this Agreement against the other Party. 
Article IV 
1. The line described in Article V of this Agreement shall be designated as the 
Armistice Demarcation Line and is delineated in pursuance of the purpose and 
intent of the resolutions of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948. 
2. The basic purpose of the Armistice Demarcation Line is to delineate the line 
beyond which the armed forces of the respective Parties shall not move. 
3. Rules and regulations of the armed forces of the Parties, which prohibit civilians 
from crossing the fighting lines or entering the area between the lines, shall 
remain in effect after the signing of this Agreement with application to the 
Armistice Demarcation Line defined in Article V. 
Article V 
1. The Armistice Demarcation Line shall follow the international boundary between 
the Lebanon and- Palestine. 
2. In the region of the Armistice Demarcation Line the military forces of the Parties 
shall consist of defensive forces only as is defined in the Armex (3) to this 
Agreement. 
3. Withdrawal of forces to the Armistice Demarcation Line and their reduction to 
defensive strength in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be 
completed within ten days of the signing of this Agreement. In the same way the 
removal of mines from mined roads and areas evacuated by either Party, and the 
transmission of plans showing the location of such minefields to the other Party 
shall be completed within the same period. 
Article VI 
All prisoners of war detained by either Party to this Agreement and belonging to the 
armed forces, regular or irregular, of the other Party, shall be exchanged as follows: 
1. The exchange of prisoners of war shall be under United Nations supervision and 
control throughout. The exchange shall take place at Ras En Naqoura within 
twenty-four hours of the signing of this Agreement. 
2. Prisoners of war against whom a penal prosecution may be pending, as well as 
those sentenced for crime or other offence, shall be included in this exchange of 
prisoners. 
3. All articles of personal use, valuables, letters, documents, identification marks, 
and other personal effects of whatever nature, belonging to prisoners of war who 
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are being exchanged, shall be returned to them, or, if they have escaped or died, 
to the Party to whose armed forces they belonged. 
4. All matters not specifically regulated in this Agreement shall be decided in 
accordance with the principles laid down in the International Convention relating 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, signed at Geneva on 27 July 1929. 
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission established in Article VII of this Agreement 
shall assume responsibility for locating missing persons, whether military or 
civilian, within the areas controlled by each Party, to facilitate their expeditious 
exchange. Each Party undertakes to extend to the Commission fiiU co-operation 
and assistance in the discharge of this function. 
Article VII 
1. The execution of the provisions of this Agreement shall be supervised by a 
Mixed Armistice Commission composed of five members, of whom each Party 
to this Agreement shall designate two, and whose Chairman shall be the United 
Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization or a senior officer 
firom the Observer personnel of that Organization designated by him following 
consultation with both Parties to this Agreement. 
2. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall maintain its headquarters at the Frontier 
Post north of Metulla and at the Lebanese Frontier Post at En Naqoura, and shall 
hold its meetings at such places and at such times as it may deem necessary for 
the effective conduct of its work. 
3. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall be convened in its first meeting by the 
United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization not later 
than one week following the signing of this Agreement. 
4. Decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission, to the extent possible, shall be 
based on the principle of unanimity. In the absence of unanimity, decisions shall 
be taken by majority vote of the members of the Commission present and voting. 
5. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall formulate its own rules of procedure. 
Meetings shall be held only after due notice to the members by the Chairman. 
The quorum for its meetings shall be a majority of its members. 
6. The Commission shall be empowered to employ Observers, who may be from 
among the military organizations of the Parties or from the military personnel of 
the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or from both, in such 
numbers as may be considered essential to the performance of its fimctions. In 
the event United Nations Observers should be so employed, they shall remain 
under the command of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce 
Supervision Organization. Assignments of a general or special nature given to 
Uiuted Nations Observers attached to the Mixed Armistice Commission shall be 
subject to approval by the United Nations Chief of Staff or his designated 
representative on the Commission, whichever is serving as Chairman. 
7. Claims or complaints presented by either Party relating to the application of this 
Agreement shall be referred immediately to the Mixed Armistice Commission 
through its Chairman. The Commission shall take such action on all such claims 
or complaints by means of its observation and investigation machinery as it may 
deem appropriate, with a view to equitable and mutually satisfactory settlement. 
8. Where interpretation of the meaning of a particular provision of this Agreement, 
other than the Preamble and Articles I and 11, is at issue, the Commission's 
interpretation shall prevail. The Commission, in its discretion and as tiie need 
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arises, may from time to time recommend to the Parties modifications in the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
9. The Mixed Armistice Commission shall submit to both Parties reports on its 
activities as frequently as it may consider necessary. A copy of each such report 
shall be presented to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for 
transmission to the appropriate organ or agency of the United Nations. 
10. Members of the Commission and its Observers shall be accorded such freedom 
of movement and access in the areas covered by this Agreement as the 
Commission may determine to be necessary, provided that when such decisions 
of the Commission are reached by a majority vote United Nations Observers 
only shall be employed. 
11. The expenses of the Commission, other than those relating to United Nations 
Observers, shall be apportioned in equal shares between the two Parties to this 
Agreement. 
Article VIII 
1. The present Agreement is not subject to ratification and shall come into force 
immediately upon being signed. 
2. This Agreement, having been negotiated and concluded in pursuance of the 
resolution of the Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 calling for 
the establishment of an armistice in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in 
Palestine and to facilitate the transition frown the present truce to permanent 
peace in Palestine, shall remain in force until a peacefiil settlement between the 
Parties is achieved, except as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article. 
3. The Parties to this Agreement may, by mutual consent, revise this Agreement or 
any of its provisions, or may suspend its application, other than Articles I and EQ, 
at any time. In the absence of mutual agreement and after this Agreement has 
been in effect for one year from the date of its signing, either of the Parties may 
call upon the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convoke a conference of 
representatives of the two Parties for the purpose of reviewing, revising, or 
suspending any of the provisions of this Agreement other than Articles I and HI. 
Participation in such conference shall be obligatory upon the Parties. 
4. If the conference provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article does not result in an 
agreed solution of a point in dispute, either Party may bring the matter before the 
Security Council of the United Nations for the relief sought on the grounds that 
this Agreement has been concluded in pursuance of Security Council action 
toward the end of achieving peace in Palestine. 
5. This Agreement is signed in quintuplicate, of which one copy shall be retained 
by each Party, two copies conmiunicated to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations for transmission to the Security Council and to the United Nations 
Conciliation Commission on Palestine, and one copy to the Acting Mediator on 
Palestine. 
DONE at Ras En Naqoura on the twenty-third of March nineteen forty-nine, in the 
presence of the Personal Deputy of the United Nations Acting Mediator on Palestine 
and the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization. 
Source: http://www.mideastweb.org/isrlebarmistice 1949.htm 
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APPENDIX-5 
TEH LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CHAMOUN TO PRESIDENT 
EISENHOWER, JULY 21,1958 
Dear Mr. President: I wish to express to you on my own personal behalf and of 
Lebanon, and through you to the Government and people of the US, our profound 
gratitude for responding to my call for help, based on a decision by the legitimate 
Government of Lebanon, through the landing of US forces in Lebanon to help us 
defend our independence and integrity in conformity wdth Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. 
I want to assure you, Mr. President, that we are both happy and honored to 
find ourselves side by side wath the great American nation defending not only our 
independence and integrity against direct aggression, but the high principles in which 
the free world believes and by which it lives. 
Faithfully yours, 
Camille Chamoun 
Source: M. S. Agwani, ed.. The Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary Study 
(London: Asia Publishing House, 1965) p.238. 
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APPENDIX-6 
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S REPLY TO PRESIDENT CHAMOUN'S 
LETTER OF 21 JULY 1958,25 JULY 1958 
Dear Mr. President: I wish to thank you for yoiir message of July 21 in which 
you express personally and on behalf of Lebanon gratitude for the OS's affirmative 
response to Lebanon's call for assistance. The purpose of our action was to help your 
country preserve its independence, in accord with the inherent right of nations to 
cooperate for self-defense. Our countries have long enjoyed close and friendly 
relations, and I look forward to further cooperation between and American people and 
the people of Lebanon in furthering the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. 
Sincerely, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower 
Source: M. S. Agwani, ed., The Lebanese Crisis 1958: A Documentary Study (London: Asia 
Publishing House, 1965)p.239. 
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APPENDIX-7 
THE CAIRO AGREEMENT 
NOVEMBER 3,1969 
In 1969, under the authority of the then president Charles Helou, the following 
document was signed by the Head of the Lebanese Delegation General Emile Bustani, 
and the Head of the Palestinian Delegation Yasser Arafat Many felt this document 
was a mistake of such proportions that it lead to the outbreak of war in Lebanon. 
Text 
On Monday, 3rd November 1969, the Lebanese delegation headed by Army 
Commander General Emile al-Bustani, and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
delegation, headed by Mr. Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the organization, met in Cairo in 
the presence of the United Arab Republic Minister of Foreign Affairs Mahmud Riyad, 
and the War Minister, General Muhammad Fawzi. In consonance with the bonds of 
brotherhood and common destiny, relations between Lebanon and the Palestinian 
revolution must always be conducted on the bases of confidence, frankness, and 
positive cooperation for the benefit of Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution and 
within the framework of Lebanon's sovereignty and security. The two delegations 
agreed on the following principles and measures: 
The Palestinian Presence 
It was agreed to reorganize the Palestinian presence in Lebanon on the following 
bases: 
1. The right to work, residence, and movement for Palestinians currently residing in 
Lebanon; 
2. The formation of local committees composed of Palestinians in the camps to care 
for the interests of Palestinians residing in these camps in cooperation with the local 
Lebanese authorities within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty; 
3. The establishment of posts of the Palestinian Armed Struggle [PASC] inside the 
camps for the purpose of cooperation with the local committees to ensure good 
relations with the Lebanese authorities. These posts shall undertake the task of 
regulating and determining the presence of arms in the camps within the framework 
of Lebanese security and the interests of the Palestinian revolution; 
4. Palestinians resident in Lebanon are to be permitted to participate in the Palestinian 
revolution through the Armed Struggle and in accordance with the principles of the 
sovereignty and security of Lebanon. 
Commando Activity 
It was agreed to facilitate commando activity by means of: 
1. Facilitating the passage of commandos and specifying points of passage and 
reconnaissance in the border areas; 
2. Safeguarding the road to the 'Arqub region; 
3. The Armed Struggle shall undertake to control the conduct of all the members of its 
organizations and [to ensure] their non-interference in Lebanese affairs; 
4. Establishing a joint command control of the Armed Struggle and the Lebanese 
Army; 
5. Ending the propaganda campaigns by both sides; 
6. Conducting a census of Armed Struggle personnel in Lebanon by their command. 
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7. Appointing Armed Struggle representatives at Lebanese Army headquarters to 
participate in the resolution of all emergency matters; 
8. Studying the distribution of all suitable points of concentration in border areas 
which will be agreed with the Lebanese Army command; 
9. Regulating the entry, exit, and circulation of Armed Struggle personnel; 
10. Removal of the Jiyrun base. 
11. The Lebanese Army shall facilitate the operation of medical, evacuation, and 
supply centers for commando activity; 
12. Releasing detained personnel and confiscated arms; 
13. It is understood that the Lebanese authorities, both civil and military, shall 
continue to exercise all their prerogatives and responsibilities in all areas of Lebanon 
in all circumstances; 
14. The two delegations affirm that the Palestinian armed struggle is in the interest of 
Lebanon as well as in that of the Palestinian revolution and all Arabs; 
15. This agreement shall remain Top Secret and for the eyes of the commands only. 
Head of Lebanese delegation 
Emile Bustani 
Head of Palestinian delegation 
Yasir Arafat 
Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 21 May 1987 
1. Abrogation of the law issued by the Chamber of Deputies on 14 June 1983, 
authorizing the Government to ratify the agreement signed by the Government of the 
Lebanese Republic and the Government of the State of Israel on 17 May 1983. 
2. The agreement signed on 3 November 1969 between the head of the Lebanese 
delegation General Emile Bustani and the Chairman of the PLO and which is known 
as the "Cairo Agreement" is hereby null and void as if it had never existed. Further, 
all annexes and measures related to the Cairo Agreement are hereby null and void as 
if they had never existed. 
3. This law will become effective upon its publication in the Official Gazette. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1969_cairo_agre 
ement.asp 
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APPENDIX-8 
THE UN SECURITY RESOLUTION COUNCIL 425 
MARCH 19,1978 
The Security Council, 
Taking note of the letters from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon and from 
the Permanent Representative of Israel, 
Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel, 
Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East and its 
consequences to the maintenance of international peace, 
Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the 
Middle East, 
1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries; 
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese 
territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese 
territory; 
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish 
immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for Southern 
Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, 
restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of 
Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the Force 
to be composed of persoimel drawn from Member States; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four 
hoiars on the implementation of the present resolution. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.coni/prominent/historic_documents/1978_resolution 
_425.asp 
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APPENDIX-9 
THE LEBANESE - ISRAELI PEACE TREATY 
MAY 17,1983 
The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of 
Lebanon: 
Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace 
based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights; 
Reaffirming their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations 
and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as 
with all states within secure and recognized boundaries; 
Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them; 
Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their States and to avoid threats and the 
use of force between them; 
Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this 
Agreement; 
Having delegated their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries provided with full 
powers in order to sign in the presence of the representative of the United States of 
America this Agreement; 
Have agreed to the following provisions: 
ARTICLE 1 
1. The Parties agree and undertake to respect the sovereignty political independence 
and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international 
boundary between Israel and Lebanon inviolable. 
2. The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been 
terminated and no longer exists. 
3. Taking into accoimt the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 Israel undertakes to 
withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the Annex of the 
present Agreement. 
ARTICLE 2 
The Parties being guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of 
intemational law undertake to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a 
manner as to promote intemational peace and security and justice. 
ARTICLE 3 
In order to provide maximum security for Israel and Lebanon the Parties agree to 
establish and implement security arrangements including the creation of a Security 
Region as provided for in the Annex of the present Agreement. 
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ARTICLE 4 
1. The territory of each Party will not be used as a base for hostile or terrorist activity 
against the other Party its territory or its people. 
2. Each Party will prevent the existence or organization of irregular forces armed 
bands organizations bases offices or infrastructure the aims and purposes of which 
include incursions or any act of terrorism into the territory of the other Party or any 
other activity aimed at threatening or endangering the security of the other Party and 
safety of its people. To this end all agreements and arrangements enabling the 
presence and functioning on the territory of either Party of elements hostile to the 
other Party are null and void. 
3. Without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defense in accordance with 
international law each Party will refrain: 
a. from organizing instigating assisting or participating in threats or acts of 
belligerency subversion or incitement or any aggression directed against the other 
Party its population or property both within its territory and originating there from or 
in the territory of the other Party. 
b. from using the territory of the other Party for conducting a military attack against 
the territory of a third state. 
c. from intervening in the internal or external affairs of the other Party. 
4. Each Party undertakes to ensure that preventive action and due proceedings will be 
taken against persons or organizations perpetrating acts in violation of this Article. 
ARTICLE 5 
Consistent with the termination of the state of war and within the framework of their 
constitutional provisions the Parties will abstain from any form of hostile propaganda 
against each other. 
ARTICLE 6 
Each Party will prevent entry into deployment in or passage through its territory its air 
space and subject to the right of innocent passage in accordance with international law 
its territorial sea by military forces armament or military equipment of any state 
hostile to the other Party. 
ARTICLE 7 
Except as provided in the present Agreement nothing will preclude the deployment on 
Lebanese territory of international forces requested and accepted by the Government 
of Lebanon to assist in maintauiing its authority. New contributors to such forces shall 
be selected from among states having diplomatic relations with both Parties to the 
present Agreement. 
ARTICLE 8 
1. a. Upon entry into force of the present Agreement a Joint Liaison Committee will 
be established by the Parties in which the United States of America will be a 
participant and will commence its functions. This Committee will be entrusted with 
the supervision of the implementation of all areas covered by the present Agreement. 
In matters involving security arrangements it will deal with unresolved problems 
referred to it by the Security Arrangements Committee established in subparagraph c. 
below. Decisions of this Committee will be taken unanimously. 
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b. The Joint Liaison Committee will address itself on a continuing basis to the 
development of mutual relations between Israel and Lebanon inter alia the regulation 
of the movement of goods products and persons communications etc. 
c. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee there will be a Security 
Arrangements Committee whose composition and functions are defined in the Annex 
of the present Agreement. 
d. Subcommittees of the Joint Liaison Committee may be established as the need 
arises. 
e. The Joint Liaison Committee will meet in Israel and Lebanon alternately. 
f Each Party if it so desires and unless there is an agreed change of status may 
maintain a liaison office on the territory of the other Party in order to carry out the 
above-mentioned functions within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee and 
to assist in the implementation of the present Agreement. 
g. The members of the Joint Liaison Committee from each of the Parties will be 
headed by a senior government official. 
h. All other matters relating to these liaison offices their persormel and the persoimel 
of each Party present in the territory of the other Party in connection with the 
implementation of the present Agreement will be the subject of a protocol to be 
concluded between the Parties in the Joint Liaison Committee. Pending the conclusion 
of this protocol the liaison offices and the above-mentioned persormel will be treated 
in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Convention on Special Missions of 
December 8 1969 including those provisions concerning privileges and immunities. 
The foregoing is without prejudice to the positions of the Parties concerning that 
Convention. 
2. During the six-month period after the withdrawal of all Israeli armed forces from 
Lebanon in accordance with Article 1 of the present Agreement and the simultaneous 
restoration of Lebanese governmental authority along the international boundary 
between Israel and Lebanon and in the light of the termination of the state of war the 
Parties shall initiate within the Joint Liaison Committee bona fide negotiations in 
order to conclude agreements on the movement of goods products and persons and 
their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis. 
ARTICLE 9 
1. Each of the two Parties will take within a time limit of one year as of entry into 
force of the present Agreement all measures necessary for the abrogation of treaties 
laws and regulations deemed in conflict with the present Agreement subject to and in 
conformity with its constitutional procedures. 
2. The Parties undertake not to apply existing obligations enter into any obligations or 
adopt laws or regulations in conflict with the present Agreement. 
ARTICLE 10 
1. The present Agreement shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their 
respective constitutional procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification and shall supersede the previous agreements between Israel 
and Lebanon. 
2. The Aimex the Appendix and the Map attached thereto and the Agreed Minutes to 
the present Agreement shall be considered integral parts thereof 
3. The present Agreement may be modified amended or superseded by mutual 
agreement of the Parties. 
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ARTICLE 11 
1. Disputes between the Parties arising out of the interpretation or application of the 
present Agreement will be settled by negotiation in the Joint Liaison Committee. Any 
dispute of this character not so resolved shall be submitted to conciliation and if 
unresolved thereafter to an agreed procedure for a definitive resolution. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 disputes arising out of the 
interpretation or application of the Annex shall be resolved in the framework of the 
Security Arrangements Committee and if unresolved shall thereafter at the request of 
either Party be referred to the Joint Liaison Committee for resolution through 
negotiation. 
ARTICLE 12 
The present Agreement shall be communicated to the Secretariat of the United 
Nations for registration in conformity with the provisions of Article 102 of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
Done at Kiryat Shmona and Khaldeh this seventeenth day of May 1983 in triplicate in 
four authentic texts in the Hebrew Arabic English and French languages. In case of 
any divergence of interpretation the English and French texts will be equally 
authoritative. 
David Kimche, 
For the Government of the State of Israel 
Antoine Fattal, 
For the Govenmient of the RepubUc of Lebanon 
Witnessed by: 
Morris Draper, 
For the Government of the United States of America 
ANNEX 
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Security Region: 
a. A Security Region in which the Government of Lebanon undertakes to implement 
the security arrangements agreed upon in this Aimex is hereby established. 
b. The Security Region is boimded as delineated on the Map attached to this Aimex in 
the north by a line constituting "Line A" and in the south and east by the Lebanese 
international boundary. 
2. Security Arrangements 
The Lebanese authorities will enforce special security measures aimed at detecting 
and preventing hostile activities as well as the introduction into or movement through 
the Security Region of unauthorized armed men or military equipment. The following 
security arrangements will apply equally throughout the Security Region except as 
noted: 
a. The Lebanese Army Lebanese Police Lebanese Internal Security Forces and the 
Lebanese auxiliary forces (ANSAR) organized under the fiill authority of the 
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Government of Lebanon are the only organized armed forces and elements permitted 
in the Security Region except as designated elsewhere in this Armex. The Security 
Arrangements Committee may approve the stationing in the Security Region of other 
official Lebanese armed elements similar to ANSAR. 
b. Lebanese Police Lebanese hitemal Security Forces and ANSAR may be stationed 
in the Security Region without restrictions as to their numbers. These forces and 
elements will be equipped only with personal and light automatic weapons and for the 
Internal Security Forces armored scout or commando cars as listed in the Appendix. 
c. Two Lebanese Army brigades may be stationed in the Security Region. One will be 
the Lebanese Army Territorial Brigade stationed in the area extending from the 
Israeli-Lebanese boundary to "Line B" delineated on the attached Map. The other will 
be a regular Lebanese Army brigade stationed in the area extending from "Line B" to 
"Line A". These brigades may carry their organic weapons and equipment listed in the 
Appendix. Additional units equipped in accordance with the Appendix may be 
deployed in the Security Region for training purposes including the fraining of 
conscripts or in the case of operational emergency situations following coordination 
in accordance with procedures to be established by the Security Arrangements 
Committee. 
d. The existing local units will be integrated as such into the Lebanese Army in 
conformity with Lebanese Army regulations. The existing local civil guard shall be 
integrated into ANSAR and accorded a proper status under Lebanese law to enable it 
to continue guarding the villages in the Security Region. The process of extending 
Lebanese authority over these units and civil guard under the supervision of the 
Security Arrangements Committee shall start immediately after the entry into force of 
the present Agreement and shall terminate prior to the completion of the Israeli 
withdrawal from Lebanon. 
e. Within the Security Region Lebanese Army units may maintain their organic anti-
aircraft weapons as specified in the Appendix. Outside the Security Region Lebanon 
may deploy personal low and medium altitude air defense missiles. After a period of 
three years from the date of entry into force of the present Agreement the provision 
concerning the area outside the Security Region may be reviewed by the Security 
Arrangements Committee at the request of either Party. 
f. Military electronic equipment in the Security Region will be as specified in the 
Appendix. Deployment of groimd radars within ten kilometers of the Israeli-Lebanese 
boundary should be approved by the Security Arrangements Committee. Groimd 
radars throughout the Security Region will be deployed so that their sector of search 
does not cross the Israeli-Lebanese boundary. This provision does not apply to civil 
aviation or air traffic control radars. 
g. The provision mentioned in paragraph e. applies also to anti-aircraft missiles on 
Lebanese Navy vessels. In the Security Region Lebanon may deploy naval elements 
and establish and maintain naval bases or other shore installations required to 
accomplish the naval mission. The coastal installations in the Security Region will be 
as specified in the Appendix. 
h. In order to avoid accidents due to misidentification the Lebanese military 
authorities will give advance notice of all flights of any kind over the Security Region 
according to procedures to be determined by the Security Arrangements Committee. 
Approval of these flights is not required. 
i. (1) The forces weapons and military equipment which may be stationed stocked 
introduced into or transported through the Security Region are only those mentioned 
in this Annex and its Appendix. 
331 
(2) No infrastructure auxiliary installations or equipment capable of assisting the 
activation of weapons that are not permitted by this Armex or its Appendix shall be 
maintained or established in the Security Region. 
(3) These provisions also apply whenever a clause of this Annex relates to areas 
outside the Security Region. 
3. Security Arrangements Committee 
a. Within the framework of the Joint Liaison Committee a Security Arrangements 
Committee will be established. 
b. The Security Arrangements Committee will be composed of an equal number of 
Israeli and Lebanese representatives headed by senior officers. A representative of the 
United States of America will participate in meetings of the Committee at the request 
of either Party. Decisions of the Security Arrangements Committee will be reached by 
agreement of the Parties. 
c. The Security Arrangements Committee shall supervise the implementation of the 
security arrangements in the present Agreement and this Annex and the timetable and 
modalities as well as all other aspects relating to withdrawals described in the present 
Agreement and this Annex. To this end and by agreement of the Parties it will: 
(1) Supervise the implementation of the undertakings of the Parties under the present 
Agreement and this Annex. 
(2) Establish and operate Joint Supervisory Teams as detailed below. 
(3) Address and seek to resolve any problems arising out of the implementation of the 
security arrangements in the present Agreement and this Annex and discuss any 
violation reported by the Joint Supervisory Teams or any complaint concerning a 
violation submitted by one of the Parties. 
d. The Security Arrangements Committee shall deal with any complaint submitted to 
it not later than 24 hours after submission. 
e. Meetings of the Security Arrangements Committee shall be held at least once every 
two weeks in Israel and in Lebanon alternately. In the event that either Party requests 
a special meeting it will be convened within 2 hours. The first meeting will be held 
within 48 hours after the date of entry into force of the present Agreement. 
f. Joint Supervisory Teams 
(1) The Security Arrangements Committee will establish Joint Supervisory Teams 
(Israel-Lebanon) subordinate to it and composed of an equal number of 
representatives from each Party. 
(2) The teams will conduct regular verification of the implementation of the 
provisions of the security arrangement in the Agreement and this Aimex. The teams 
shall report immediately any confirmed violations to the Security Arrangements 
Committee and ascertain that violations have been rectified. 
(3) The Security Arrangements Committee shall assign a Joint Supervisory Team 
when requested to check border security arrangements on the Israeli side of the 
intemational boundary in accord with Article 4 of the present Agreement. 
(4) The teams will enjoy freedom of movement in the air sea and land as necessary for 
the performance of their tasks within the Security Region. 
(5) The Security Arrangements Committee will determine all administrative and 
technical arrangements concerning the fimctioning of the teams including their 
working procedures their number their manning their armament and their equipment. 
(6) Upon submission of a report to the Security Arrangements Committee or upon 
confirmation of a complaint of either Party by the teams the respective Party shall 
immediately and in any case not later than 24 hours from the report or the 
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confirmation rectify the violation. The Party shall immediately notify the Security 
Arrangements Committee of the rectification. Upon receiving the notification the 
teams will ascertain that the violation has been rectified. 
(7) The Joint Supervisory Teams shall be subject to termination upon 90 days notice 
by either Party given at any time after two years from the date of entry into force of 
the present Agreement. Alternative verification arrangements shall be established in 
advance of such termination through the Joint Liaison Committee. Notwithstanding 
the foregoing the Joint Liaison Committee may determine at any time that there is no 
further need for such arrangements. 
g. The Security Arrangements Committee will ensure that practical and rapid contacts 
between the two Parties are established along the boundary to prevent incidents and 
facilitate coordination between the forces on the terrain. 
4. It is understood that the Government of Lebanon may request appropriate action in 
the United Nations Security Council for one unit of the United Nations Interim Force 
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to be stationed in the Sidon area. The presence of this unit will 
lend support to the Goverrmient of Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces in 
asserting governmental authority and protection in the Palestinian refugee camp areas. 
For a period of 12 months the unit in the Sidon area may send teams to the Palestinian 
refugee camp areas in the vicinity of Sidon and Tyre to survey and observe if 
requested by the Government of Lebanon following notification to the Security 
Anangements Committee. Police and security functions shall remain the sole 
responsibility of the Government of Lebanon which shall ensure that the provisions of 
the present Agreement shall be fully implemented in these areas. 
5. Three months after completion of the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon 
the Security Arrangements Committee will conduct a full-scale review of the 
adequacy of the security arrangements delineated in this Annex in order to improve 
them. 
6. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces: 
a. Within 8 to 12 weeks of the entry into force of the present Agreement all Israeli 
forces will have been withdrawn from Lebanon. This is consistent with the objective 
of Lebanon that all external forces withdraw from Lebanon. 
b. The Israel Defense Forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces vnl\ maintain 
continuous liaison during the withdrawal and will exchange all necessary information 
through the Security Arrangements Conunittee. The Israel Defense Forces and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces will cooperate during the withdrawal in order to facilitate the 
reassertion of the authority of the Government of Lebanon as the Israeli armed forces 
withdraw. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/lebanon_israel/l 
983_may_l 7_agreement.asp 
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APPENDIX-10 
THE TAIF ACCORD 
This accord, which ended the Civil War in Lebanon, was negotiated in 
Taif, Saudi Arabia, in September 1989 and approved by the Lebanese 
parliament on 4 November 1989. 
First, General Principles and Reforms: 
I. General Principles 
A. Lebanon is a sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland 
for all its citizens. 
B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is an active and founding 
member of the Arab League and is committed to the league's charter. It is an 
active and founding member of the United Nations Organization and is 
committed to its charters. Lebanon is a member of the nonaligned movement. 
The state of Lebanon shall embody these principles in all areas and spheres, 
without exception. 
C. Lebanon is a democratic parliamentary republic founded on respect for public 
liberties, especially the freedom of expression and belief, on social justice, and 
on equality in rights and duties among all citizens, without discrimination or 
preference. 
D. The people are the source of authority. They are sovereign and they shall 
exercise their sovereignty through the constitutional institutions. 
E. The economic system is a free system that guarantees individual initiative and 
private ownership. 
F. Culturally, socially, and economically-balanced development is a mainstay of 
the state's unity and of the system's stability. 
G. Efforts (will be made) to achieve comprehensive social justice through fiscal, 
economic, and social reform. 
H. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all the Lebanese. Every Lebanese is 
entitled to live in and enjoy any part of the country under the supremacy of the 
law. The people may not be categorized on the basis of any affiliation 
whatsoever and there shall be no fragmentation, no partition, and no 
repatriation [of Palestinians in Lebanon]. 
I. No authority violating the common co-existance charter shall be legitimate 
II. Political Reforms 
A. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is the legislative authority 
which exercises full control over government policy and activities. 
1. The Chamber spokesman and his deputy shall be elected for the 
duration of the chamber's term. 
2. In the first session, two years after it elects its speaker and deputy 
speaker, the chamber my vote only once to withdraw confidence from 
its speaker or deputy speaker with a 2/3 majority of its members and in 
accordance with a petition submitted by at least 10 deputies. In case 
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confidence is withdrawn, the chamber shall convene immediately to 
fill the vacant post. 
3. No urgent bill presented to the Chamber of Deputies may be issued 
unless it is included in the agenda of a public session and read in such 
a session, and unless the grace period stipulated by the constitution 
passes without a resolution on such a bill with the approval of the 
cabinet. 
4. The electoral district shall be the govemorate. 
5. Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free of sectarian 
restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided according to the 
following bases: 
a. Equally between Christians and Muslims. 
b. Proportionately between the denominations of each sect. 
c. Proportionately between the districts. 
6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be increased 
to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims. As for the 
districts created on the basis of this document and the districts whose 
seats became vacant prior to the proclamation of this document, their 
seats shall be filled only once on an emergency basis through 
appointment by the national accord government that is planned to be 
formed. 
7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputies on a national, not 
sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formed and all the spiritual families 
shall be represented in it. The senate powers shall be confined to 
crucial issues. 
B. President of Republic: The president of republic is the head of the state and a 
symbol of the country's unity. He shall contribute to enhancing the 
constitution and to preserving Lebanon's independence, unity, and territorial 
integrity in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. He is the 
supreme commander of the armed forces which are subject to the power of the 
cabinet. The president shall exercise the following powers: 
1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, but without voting. 
2. Head the Supreme Defense Council. 
3. Issues decrees and demand their publication. He shall also be entitled 
to ask the cabinet to reconsider any resolution it makes within 15 days 
of the date of deposition of the resolution with the presidential office. 
Should the cabinet insist on the adopted resolution, or should the grace 
period pass without issuing and returning the decree, the decree of the 
resolution shall be valid and must be published. 
4. Promulgate laws in accordance with the grace period stipulated by the 
constitution and demand their publication upon ratification by the 
Chamber of Deputies. After notifying the cabinet, the president may 
also request reexamination of the laws within the grace periods 
provided by the constitution, and in accordance with the articles of the 
constitution. In case the laws are not issued or retvimed before the end 
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of the grace periods, they shall be valid by law and they must be 
published. 
5. Refer the bills presented to him by the Chamber of Deputies. 
6. Name the prime minister-designate in consultation with the Chamber 
of Deputies speaker on the basis of binding parliamentary consultation, 
the outcome of which the president shall officially familiarize the 
speaker on. 
7. Issue the decree appointing the prime minister independently. 
8. On agreement with the prime minister, issue the decree forming the 
cabinet. 
9. Issue decrees accepting the resignation of the cabinet or of cabinet 
ministers and decrees relieving them from their duties. 
10. Appoint ambassadors, accept the accreditation of ambassadors, and 
award state medals by decree. 
11. On agreement with the prime minister, negotiate on the conclusion and 
signing of international treaties which shall become valid only upon 
approval by the cabinet. The cabinet shall familiarize the Chamber of 
Deputies with such treaties when the country's interest and state safety 
make such familiarization possible. As for treaties involving conditions 
concerning state finances, trade treaties, and other treaties which may 
not be abrogated annually, they may not be concluded without 
Chamber of Deputies' approval. 
12. When the need arises, address messages to the Chamber of Deputies. 
13. On agreement with the prime minister, summon the Chamber of 
Deputies to hold special sessions by decree. 
14. The president of the republic is entitled to present to the cabinet any 
urgent issue beyond the agenda. 
15. On agreement with the prime minister, call the cabinet to hold a special 
session whenever he deems it necessary. 
16. Grant special pardon by decree. 
17. In the performance of his duty, the president shall not be liable unless 
he violates the constitution or commits high treason. 
C. Prime Minister: The prime minister is the head of the goverrmient. He 
represents it and speaks in its name. He is responsible for implementing the 
general policy drafted by the cabinet. The prime minister shall exercise the 
following powers: 
1. Head the cabinet. 
2. Hold parliamentary consultations to form the cabinet and co-sign with 
the president the decree forming it. The cabinet shall submit its cabinet 
statement to the Chamber of Deputies for a vote of confidence within 
30 days [of its formation]. The cabinet may not exercise its powers 
before gaining the confidence, after its resignation, or when it is 
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considered retired, except within the narrow sense of disposing of 
affairs. 
3. Present the government's general policy to the Chamber of Deputies. 
4. Sign all decrees, except for decrees naming the prime minister and 
decrees accepting cabinet resignation or considering it retired. 
5. Sign the decree calling for a special session and decrees issuing laws 
and requesting the reexamination of laws. 
6. Summon the cabinet to meet, draft its agenda, familiarize the president 
of the republic in advance with the issues included in the agenda and 
with the urgent issues to be discussed, and sign the usual session 
minutes. 
7. Observe the activities of the public departments and institutions, 
coordinate between the ministers, and issue general instructions to 
ensure the smooth progress of work. 
8. Hold working sessions with the state agencies concerned in the 
presence of the minister concerned. 
9. By law, act as the Supreme Defense Council's deputy chairman. 
D. Cabinet: 
The executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet. 
The follovmg are among the powers exercised by it: 
1. Set the general policy of the State in all domains, draws up draft bills 
and decrees, and takes the necessary decisions for its implementation. 
2. Watch over the implementation of laws and regulations and supervise 
the activities of all the state agencies without exception, including the 
civilian, military, and security departments and institutions. 
3. The cabinet is the authority which controls the armed forces. 
4. Appoint, dismiss, and accept the resignation of state employees in 
accordance with the law. 
5. It has the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies at the request of 
the president of the republic if the chamber refiises to meet throughout 
an ordinary or a special session lasting no less than one month, even 
though it is summoned twice consecutively, or if the chamber sends 
back the budget in its entirety with the purpose of paralyzing the 
government. This right may not be exercised again for the same 
reasons which called for dissolving the chamber in the first instance. 
6. When the president of the republic is present, he heads cabinet 
sessions. The cabinet shall meet periodically at special headquarters. 
The legal quorum for a cabinet meetmg is 2/3 the cabinet members. 
The cabinet shall adopt its resolutions by consent. If impossible, then 
by vote. The resolutions shall be adopted by a majority of the members 
present. As for major issues, they require the approval of 2/3 the 
cabinet members. The following shall be considered major issues: The 
state of emergency and it abolition, war and peace, general 
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mobilization, international agreements and treaties, the state's general 
budget, comprehensive and long-term development plans, the 
appointment of top-level civil servants or their equivalent, 
reexamination of the administrative division, dissolving the Chamber 
of Deputies, the election law, the citizenship law, the personal status 
laws, and the dismissal of cabinet ministers. 
E. Minister: The minister's powers shall be reinforced in a manner compatible 
with the government's general policy and with the principle of collective 
responsibility. A minister shall not be relieved from his position unless by 
cabinet decree or unless the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence 
from him individually. 
F. Cabinet Resignation, Considering Cabinet Retired, and Dismissal of Ministers: 
1. The cabinet shall be considered retired in the following cases: 
a. If its chairman resigns. 
b. If it loses more than 1/3 of its members as determined by the 
decree forming it. 
c. If its chairman dies. 
d. At the begiiming of a president's term. 
e. At the begiiming of the Chamber of Deputies' term. 
f. When the Chamber of Deputies withdraws its confidence 
from it on an initiative by the chamber itself and on the basis 
of a vote of confidence. 
2. A minister shall be relieved by a decree signed by the president of the 
republic and the prime minister, with cabinet approval. 
3. When the cabinet resigns or is considered retired, the Chamber of 
Deputies shall, by law, be considered to be convened in a special 
session until a new cabinet is formed. A vote-of-confidence session 
shall follow. 
G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism: Abolishing political sectarianism is a 
fimdamental national objective. To achieve it, it is required that efforts be 
made in accordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputies elected on 
the basis of equal sharing by Christians and Muslims shall adopt the proper 
measures to achieve this objective and to form a national council which is 
headed by the president of the republic and which includes, in addition to the 
prime minister and the Chamber of Deputies speaker, political, intellectual, 
and social notables. The council's task will be to examine and propose the 
means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to present them to the Chamber of 
Deputies and the cabinet, and to observe implementation of the phased plan. 
The following shall be done in the interim period: 
a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on 
capability and specialization in public jobs, the judiciary, the 
military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the 
independent agencies in accordance with the dictates of 
national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent 
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jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians and Muslims 
without allocating any particular job to any sect. 
b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on the identity 
card. 
III. Other Reforms 
A. Administrative Decentralism: 
1. The State of Lebanon shall be a single and united state with a strong 
central authority. 
2. The powers of the governors and district administrative officers shall 
be expanded and all state administrations shall be represented in the 
administrative provinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitate 
serving the citizens and meeting their needs locally. 
3. The administrative division shall be recognized in a manner that 
emphasizes national fusion within the framework of preserving 
common coexistance and unity of the soil, people, and institutions. 
4. Expanded administrative decentralization shall be adopted at the level 
of the smaller administrative units [ district and smaller units ] through 
the election of a council, headed by the district officer, in every 
district, to ensure local participation. 
5. A comprehensive and unified development plan capable of developing 
the provinces economically and socially shall be adopted and the 
resources of the mvmicipalities, unified municipalities, and municipal 
unions shall be reinforced with the necessary financial resources. 
B. Courts: 
[1] To guarantee that all officials and citizens are subject to the supremacy of the 
law and to insure harmony between the action of the legislative and executive 
authorities on the one hand, and the givens of common coexistance and the basic 
rights of the Lebanese as stipulated in the constitution on the other hand: 
1. The higher council which is stipulated by the constitution and whose task it is 
to try presidents and ministers shall be formed. A special law on the rules of 
trial before this council shall be promulgated. 
2. A constitutional council shall be created to interpret the constitution, to 
observe the constitutionality of the laws, and to settle disputes and contests 
emanating from presidential and parliamentary elections. 
3. The following authorities shall be entitled to revise the constitutional council 
in matters pertaining to interpreting the constitution and observing the 
constitutionality of the laws: 
a. The president of the republic. 
b. The Chamber of Deputies speaker. 
c. The prime minister. 
d. A certain percentage of members of the Chamber of Deputies. 
[2] To ensure the principle of harmony between religion and state, the heads of the 
Lebanese sects may revise the constitutional council in matters pertaining to: 
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1. Personal status affairs. 
2. Freedom of religion and the practice of religious rites. 
3. Freedom of religious education. 
[3]. To ensure the judiciary's independence, a certain number of the the Higher 
Judiciary Council shall be elected by the judiciary body. 
D. Parliamentary Election Law: Parliamentary elections shall be held in accordance 
with a new law on the basis of provinces and in the light of rules that guarantee 
common coexistance between the Lebanese, and that ensure the sound and 
efficient political representation of all the people's factions and generations. This 
shall be done after reviewing the administrative division within the context of 
unity of the people, the land, and the institutions. 
E. Creation of a socioeconomic council for development: A socioeconomic council 
shall be created to insure that representatives of the various sectors participate in 
drafting the state's socioeconomic policy and providing advice and proposals. 
F. Education: 
1. Education shall be provided to all and shall be made obligatory for the 
elementary stage at least. 
2. The freedom of education shall be emphasized in accordance with general 
laws and regulations. 
3. Private education shall be protected and state control over private schools 
and textbooks shall be strengthened. 
4. Official, vocational, and technological education shall be reformed, 
strengthened, and developed in a maimer that meets the country's 
development and reconstruction needs. The conditions of the Lebanese 
University shall be reformed and aid shall be provided to the xmiversity, 
especially to its technical colleges. 
5. The curricula shall be reviewed and developed in a manner that strengthens 
national belonging, fiision, spiritual and cultural openness, and that unifies 
textbooks on the subjects of history and national education. 
G. hiformation: All the information media shall be reorganized xmder the canopy of 
the law and within the framework of responsible liberties that serve the cautious 
tendencies and the objective of ending the state of war. 
Second, Spreading the Sovereignty of the State of Lebanon over all Lebanese 
Territories: 
Considering that all Lebanese factions have agreed to the establishment of a strong 
state founded on the basis of national accord, the national accord government shall 
draft a detailed one-year plan whose objective is to spread the sovereignty of the State 
of Lebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with the state's own forces. The 
broad lines of the plan shall be as follows: 
A. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias shall be announced. The 
militias' weapons shall be delivered to the State of Lebanon within a period of 6 
months, begiiming with the approval of the national accord charter. The president 
of the republic shall be elected. A national accord cabinet shall be formed, and the 
political reforms shall be approved constitutionally. 
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B. The internal security forces shall be strengthened through: 
1. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanese without exception, 
beginning the training of volunteers centrally, distributing the volunteers to 
the units in the govemorates, and subjecting them to organized periodic 
training courses. 
2. Strengthening the security agency to insure control over the entry and 
departure of individuals into and out of the country by land, air, and sea. 
C. Strengthening the armed forces: 
1. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to defend the homeland, and if 
necessary, protect public order when the danger exceeds the capability of the 
internal security forces to deal with such a danger on their own. 
2. The armed forces shall be used to support the internal security forces in 
preserving security tmder conditions determined by the cabinet. 
3. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared, and trained in order that they 
may be able to shoulder their national responsibilities in confronting Israeli 
aggression. 
4. When the internal security forces become ready to assume their security 
tasks, the armed forces shall return to their barracks. 
5. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganized to serve military 
objectives exclusively. 
D. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall be solved fundamentally, and the 
right of every Lebanese evicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he 
was evicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee this right and to insure 
the means of reconstruction shall be issued. Considering that the objective of the 
State of Lebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebanese territories through 
its own forces, represented primarily by the internal security forces, and in view of 
the fraternal relations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shall thankfully 
assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanese government to spread the authority of 
the State of Lebanon within a set period of no more than 2 years, beginning with 
ratification of the national accord charter, election of the president of the republic, 
formation of the national accord cabinet, and approval of the political reforms 
constitutionally. At the end of this period, the two governments ~ the Syrian 
Government and the Lebanese National Accord Government ~ shall decide to 
redeploy the Syrian forces in Al-Biq'a area from Dahr al-Baydar to the Hammana-
al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary, at other points to be determined by 
a joint Lebanese-Syrian military committee. An agreement shall also be concluded 
by the two governments to determine the strength and dxiration of the presence of 
Syrian forces in the above-mentioned area and to define these forces' relationship 
with the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist. The Arab Tripartite 
Committee is prepared to assist the two states, if they so wish, to develop this 
agreement. 
Third, Liberating Lebanon from the Israeli Occupation: 
Regaining state authority over the territories extending to the internationally-
recognized Lebanese borders requires the following: 
341 
A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the other UN Security Council 
resolutions calling for fully eliminating the Israeli occupation. 
B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded on 23 March 1949. 
C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate all Lebanese territories fi-om the Israeli 
occupation, to spread state sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy the 
Lebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; and making efforts to 
reinforce the presence of the UN forces in South Lebanon to insure the Israeli 
withdrawal and to provide the opportunity for the return of security and stability 
to the border area. 
Fourth, Lebanese-Syrian Relations: 
Lebanon, with its Arab identity, is tied to all the Arab coimtries by true fraternal 
relations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a special relationship that derives its 
strength from the roots of blood relationships, history, and joint fraternal interests. 
This is the concept on which the two countries' coordination and cooperation is 
founded, and which will be embodied by the agreements between the two countries in 
all areas, in a manner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries' interests within 
the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each of them. Therefore, and 
because strengthening the bases of security creates the climate needed to develop 
these bonds, Lebanon should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria's 
security, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute a source of threat to Lebanon's 
security imder any circumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allow itself to 
become a pathway or a base for any force, state, or organization seeking to undermine 
its security or Syria's security. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security, 
independence, and unity and for harmony among its citizens, should not permit any 
act that poses a threat to Lebanon's security, independence, and sovereignty. 
Source: http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/lebanon/taifhtm 
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APPENDIX-11 
THE LEBANESE - SYRIAN TREATY OF BROTHERHOOD, 
COOPERATION, AND COORDINATION, MAY 20,1991 
The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab RepubUc on the basis of the 
distinguished brotheriy relations between them which serve their strength from the 
roots of kinship history common affiliation common destiny and joint 
strategic interests; out of their belief that the achievement of the broadest 
cooperation and coordination between them will serve their strategic interests and 
provide the means for ensuring their development and progress and for defending 
their pan-Arab and national security be a source of prosperity and stability enable 
them to face all regional and international developments and meet the aspirations 
of peoples of the two countries; and in implementation of the Lebanese national 
accord which was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on 5 November 
1989 have agreed on the following: 
Article 1. The two states will work to achieve the highest level of 
cooperation and coordination in all political economic security 
cultural scientific and other fields in a manner that will realize the interests of the 
two fraternal coimtries within the framework of respect for their individual 
sovereignty and independence and will enable the two countries to use their political 
economic and security resources to provide prosperity and stability ensure their pan-
Arab and national security and expand and strengthen their common interests as an 
affirmation of the brotherly relations and guarantee of their conunon destiny. 
Article 2. The two states will work to achieve cooperation and coordination in the 
economic agricultural industrial and commercial fields as well as in the fields of 
transportation communications customs the establishment of joint profits and 
coordination of development plans. 
Article 3. The coimection between the security of the two countries requires 
that Lebanon not become a threat to Syria's security and vice versa under any 
circumstances. Therefore Lebanon will not allow itself to become a transit point or 
base for any force state or organization that seeks to undermine its security or that of 
Syria. Syria which cherishes Lebanon's security independence and unity and the 
agreement among its people will not allow any action that threatens Lebanon's 
security independence and sovereignty. 
Article 4. After the political reforms are approved in a constitutional manner as 
stipulated in the Lebanese national accord and after the deadlines specified in this 
accord have expired the Syrian and Lebanese Goverrmients will decide on the 
redeployment of the Syrian forces in the al-Biqa' area and the enfrance to western al-
Biqa' in Dahr as-Baydar up to the Haammanah-al-Mudayri-'Any Dara line and if 
necessary in other points to be specified by a joint Lebanese-Syrian military 
committee. The two governments will conclude an agreement specifying the size and 
duration of the Syrian forces' presence in these areas and the relationship of 
these forces with the authorities of the Lebanese state. 
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Article 5. The two states' Arab and international foreign policy shall be based on the 
following principles: 
1. Lebanon and Syria are Arab states which are committed to the Arab League 
Charter the Arab defense pact and joint economic cooperation and all agreements 
ratified within the framework of the Arab League. They are members of the United 
Nations and are committed to its Charter. They are also members of the Non-aligned 
Movement. 
2. The two countries share a common destiny and common interests. 
3. Each country supports the other in issues related to its security and 
national interests in accordance of the contents of this treaty. Therefore the 
governments of the two countries shall coordinate their 
Arab and international policies cooperate to the fullest extent possible in Arab and 
international institutions and organizations and coordinate their stands on regional and 
international issues. 
Article 6. The following bodies shall be formed to achieve the goals of this 
treaty. Other bodies can be established by a decision from the Supreme Council. 
1. The Supreme Council: 
A. The supreme council will consist of the presidents of the two contracting countries 
and a number of other members from both countries. 
B. The supreme council will meet at least once a year and more often when necessary 
at a venue to be agreed upon. 
C. The supreme council charts the general policy for coordination and cooperation 
between the two states in the political economic security military and other fields. It 
also supervises the implementation of this policy and adopts the plans and 
decisions that are made by the executive body the foreign affairs committee the 
economic and social affairs committee the defense and security affairs committee or 
any committee that is established in the future provided that the constitutional 
provisions of the two countries are respected. 
D. The supreme council's decisions are binding and effective within the framework 
of the constitutional laws and rules of the two countries except for those 
decisions which require the approval of the executive or legislative authorities in the 
two countries imder their constitutional provisions. 
E. The supreme council defines the subjects on which the committees concerned have 
the right to make decisions. Once they are issued these 
decisions assume an executive nature within the framework of the constitutional 
laws and rules of the two countries except for those decisions which require 
the approval of the executive or legislative authorities in the two countries under 
their constitutional provisions. 
2. The Executive Body: 
The executive body will consist of the prime ministers of the two countries and a 
number of ministers concerned with the relations between them. This body will 
assume the foliov^ng tasks: 
A. To follow up on the implementation of the decisions and to submit reports to the 
supreme council on the phases of implementation. 
B. To coordinate the reconmiendations and decisions of the specialized committees 
and to submit the proposals to the supreme council. 
C. To hold meetings with the specialized committees whenever the need arises. 
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D. The executive body will meet at least once every six months and more often when 
necessary at a venue to be agreed upon. 
3. The Foreign Affairs Committee: 
A. The foreign affairs committee will consist of the two countries' foreign ministers. 
B. The foreign affairs committee will meet at least once every two months and more 
often when necessary in the two countries' capitals on a rotating basis. 
C. The foreign affairs committee v^ll seek to coordinate the foreign policy of the 
two countries with regard to their relations with all countries. The committee will 
work to coordinate their activities and stands at Arab and international 
organizations. The relevant plans will be drawn up and submitted to the supreme 
coimcil. 
4. The Economic and Social Affairs Committee: 
A. The economic and social affairs committee will consist of the ministers concerned 
in the two countries in economic and social sectors. 
B. The economic and social affairs committee will meet m the two countries' capitals 
on a rotating basis at least once every two months and more often when necessary. 
C. The economic and social affairs committee will be responsible for 
working to attain economic and social coordination between the two coimtries 
and for drawing up the reconmiendations that will lead to such coordination. 
D. The recommendations adopted by the economic and social affairs committee 
will take effect after they have been endorsed by the supreme council in accordance 
with the constitutional provisions of the two countries. 
5. The Defense and Security Affairs Committee: 
A. The defense and security affairs committee will consist of the two countries' 
ministers of defense and interior. 
B. The defense and security affairs committee will be responsible for studying 
the adequate measures needed to safeguard the two countries' security and for 
suggesting joint measures to confront any aggression or 
threat endangering their national security or any imrest that may disturb their 
internal security. 
C. All plans reconmiendations and measures prepared by the defense and security 
affairs committee will be submitted to the supreme council for endorsement 
after taking into consideration the constitutional rules of the two countries. 
6. The General Secretariat: 
A. A general secretariat will be created to follow up on the implementation of 
the provisions of this treaty. 
B. The general secretariat will be headed by a secretary general who will be 
appointed by the supreme council. 
C. The headquarters specialization basis and budget of the general secretariat will 
be determined by the supreme council. 
Closing Provisions: 
A. Special agreements shall be concluded between the two countries in the 
fields covered by this treaty such as the economic security defense and other 
fields in accordance with the constitutional rules in each of the two countries and 
shall complement this treaty. 
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B. This treaty shall take effect after being ratified by the authorities of the two 
countries in accordance with their constitutional provisions. 
C. Each of the two countries will abrogate any law or regulation which is not in line 
with this treaty. Such abrogation will be done in a way that does not violate any 
constitutional provision in either country. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1991_lebanon_s 
yria_cooperation_treaty. asp 
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APPENDIX-12 
LEBANON - SYRIA DEFENSE AND SECURITY AGREEMENT 
SEPTEMBER 1,1991 
Based on the Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty between the 
Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic signed in Damascus on May 20, 
1991 and ratified by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on May 27, 1991 in Beirut, 
including its third, fifth, and sixth Articles, particularly Clause 5 of the sixth Articles, 
agreement has been reached on the following: 
1. Structure 
A defense affairs committee consisting of the two countries' defense and interior 
ministers is to be formed. This committee will meet every three months, altemating 
between the capital cities of Beirut and Damascus or in any other location agreed 
upon, and will also meet whenever it is deemed necessary. The committee may seek 
assistance from any of the chiefs of the two countries' security authorities or from the 
chiefs of other branches of the two ministries. The army will meet every month, 
altemating between the capital cities and will meet whenever the need arises at an 
agreed upon location to implement the defense and security committees' programs and 
supervise their details. 
2. Missions 
The defense and security affairs committee is charged with studying ways to 
safeguard the two states' security and with proposing joint plans to confront any 
aggression or threat against their national security and any disturbance that may upset 
either country's internal security. In implementing the contents of Article III of the 
Brotherhood, Cooperation, and Coordination Treaty, the following must be realized: 
In an effort to reaffirm the two states' pledge and ensure that Lebanon does not 
become a source of threats against Syria's security and vice versa, the military and 
security authorities in the two countries must implement the following: 
A. Ban all military, security, political, and media activity that might harm the other 
country. 
B. Refuse to give refuge to, facilitate the passage of, or provide protection to persons 
and organizations that work against the other state's security. If such persons or 
organizations take refuge in either of the two states, that state must arrest them and 
hand them over to the other side at the latter's request. 
C. To enable the military and security services in each of the two states to carry out 
their duty of implementing the aforementioned Clauses A and B, these services must 
meet regularly in each of the two countries to exchange information involving all 
issues of strategic, national, and internal security, including those related to drugs, 
major financial crimes, terrorism, and espionage. The military and security services 
will coordinate their work to follow up and resolve these issues within each country as 
well as abroad, and will cooperate with international institutions as necessary. All 
legal and procedural steps must be taken to facilitate the joint action of the two states' 
authorities as part of the agreement to expedite the adoption of legal prosecution and 
ways to solve these problems. 
D. The two countries' defense ministries and their relevant departments will meet 
every three months, altemating between the capital cities, and as necessary, to 
exchange information on everything that concerns the two countries' security and all 
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hostile activities in an effort to reach a mutual understanding on the dangers and their 
dimensions, and, consequently, to draw up integrated plans at various levels to 
confront these dangers. In this regard, the two Defense Ministries will establish joint 
organs to follow up and supervise strategic coordination. 
E. The two countries' Ministries of Defense and Interior will increase the exchange of 
officers and troops through training courses at various levels, including the exchange 
of military instructors in the military colleges, in order to achieve a high standard in 
military coordination and adequate familiarity to confront common threats. 
F. The ministerial conmiittee for defense and security affairs will draw up the 
necessary plans to promote exchange and development in each country's civil defense 
field. 
3. Final Provisions 
In addition to its tasks, the defense and security committee will do the following: 
-Follow up the implementation of all the provisions of the agreement and give the 
necessary instructions to ensure its progress. 
--Propose to the Higher Council the bases, principles, and regulations that are bound 
to ensure fiiU and effective implementation of the agreement. 
Source:http://www.lebanonwire.com/prominent/historic_documents/1991_lebanon_s 
yria_defense_treaty.asp 
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APPENDIX-13 
UN SECURITY RESOLUTION COUNCIL 1559 
United Nations S/RES/1559 (2004) adopted by the Security Council at its 5028'*' 
meeting, on 2 September 2004 
The Security Council, 
Recalling ail its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978) 
and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, resolution 520 (1982) of 17 September 1982, and 
resolution 1553 (2004) of 29 July 2004 as well as the statements of its President on 
the situation in Lebanon, in particular the statement of 18 June 2000 
(S/PRST/2000/21), 
Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders. 
Noting the determination of Lebanon to ensure the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese 
forces from Lebanon, 
Gravely concerned at the continued presence of armed militias in Lebanon, which 
prevent the Lebanese Government from exercising its fiiU sovereignty over all 
Lebanese territory. 
Reaffirming the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of 
Lebanon over all Lebanese territory. 
Mindful of the upcoming Lebanese presidential elections and underlining the 
importance of free and fair elections according to Lebanese constitutional rules 
devised without foreign interference or influence, 
1. Reaffirms its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
unity, and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive 
authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanon; 
2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon; 
3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias; 
4. Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all 
Lebanese territory; 
5. Declares its support for a free and fair electoral process in Lebanon's 
upcoming presidential election conducted according to Lebanese 
constitutional rules devised without foreign interference or influence; 
6. Calls upon all parties concerned to cooperate fully and urgently with the 
Security Council for the fiiU implementation of this and all relevant 
resolutions concerning the restoration of the territorial integrity, full 
sovereignty, and political independence of Lebanon; 
7. Requests that the Secretary-General report to the Security Coimcil within 
thirty days on the implementation by the parties of this resolution and decides 
to remain actively seized of the matter. 
Source: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UhfDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf7OpenElement 
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APPENDIX-14 
UN SECURITY RESOLUTION COUNCIL 1595 
United Nations S/RES/1595 (2005) adopted by the Security Council at its 5160* 
meeting, on 7 April 2005 
The Security Council, 
Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity 
and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the 
Government of Lebanon, 
Endorsing the Secretary-General's opinion, as expressed in his letter of 24 March 
2005 to the President of the Security Council, that Lebanon is passing through a 
difficult and sensitive period, that all concerned should imperatively behave with the 
utmost restraint and that the future of Lebanon should be decided strictly through 
peaceful means, 
Reaffirming its unequivocal condemnation of the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing 
in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
others, and caused injury to dozens of people, and condemning the subsequent attacks 
in Lebanon, 
Having examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon inquiring into the 
circumstances, causes and consequences of this terrorist act (S/2005/203), transmitted 
to the Security Council by the Secretary-General following the declaration of the 
President of the Security Council of 15 February 2005 (S/PRST/2005/4), 
Noting with concern the fact-finding mission's conclusion that the Lebanese 
investigation process suffers from serious flaws and has neither the capacity nor the 
commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible conclusion, 
Noting also in this context its opinion that an international independent investigation 
with executive authority and self-sufficient resources in all relevant fields of expertise 
would be necessary to elucidate all aspects of this heinous crime, 
Mindful of the unanimous demand of the Lebanese people that those responsible be 
identified and held accountable, and willing to assist Lebanon in the search for the 
truth. 
Welcoming the Lebanese Government's approval of the decision to be taken by the 
Security Council concerning the establishment of an international independent 
investigation Commission, and welcoming also its readiness to cooperate fully with 
such a Commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and of its legal 
system, as expressed in the letter of 29 March 2005 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of 
Lebanon to the United Nations to the Secretary-General (S/2005/208), 
1. Decides, consistent with the above-mentioned letter from the Charge d'affaires 
a.i. of Lebanon, to establish an international independent investigation 
350 
Commission ("the Commission") based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese 
authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, including to 
help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices; 
2. Reiterates its call on the Lebanese government to bring to justice the 
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the 14 February 2005 terrorist 
bombing, and calls upon the Lebanese government to ensure that the findings 
and conclusions of the Commission's investigation are taken into account 
fully; 
3. Decides that, to ensure the Commission's effectiveness in the discharge of its 
duties, the Commission shall: 
- Enjoy the full cooperation of the Lebanese authorities, including full 
access to all documentary, testimonial and physical information and 
evidence in their possession that the Commission deems relevant to the 
inquiry; 
- Have the authority to collect any additional information and evidence, 
both documentary and physical, pertaining to this terrorist act, as well 
as to interview all officials and other persons in Lebanon, that the 
Commission deems relevant to the inquiry; 
- Enjoy fi^edom of movement throughout the Lebanese territory, 
including access to all sites and facilities that the Commission deems 
relevant to the inquiry; 
- Be provided with the facilities necessary to perform its functions, and 
be granted, as well as its premises, staff and equipment, the privileges 
and immxmities to which they are entitled under the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations; 
4. Requests the Secretary-General to consult urgently with the Lebanese 
Government with a view to facilitate the establishment and operation of the 
Commission pursuant to its mandate and terms of reference as mentioned in 
paragraphs 2 and 3 above, and requests also that he report to the Council 
accordingly and notify it of the date the Commission begins its full operations; 
5. Requests further the Secretary-General, notwithstanding paragraph 4 above, to 
undertake without delay tiie steps, measures and arrangements necessary for 
the speedy establishment and full functioning of the Commission, including 
recruiting impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise; 
6. Directs the Commission to determine procedures for carrying out its 
investigation, taking into accoimt the Lebanese law and judicial procedures; 
7. Calls on all States and all parties to cooperate fully with the Commission, and 
in particular to provide it with any relevant information they may possess 
pertaining to the above-mentioned terrorist act; 
8. Requests the Commission to complete its work within three months of the date 
on which it commenced its fiiU operations, as notified by the Secretary 
General, and authorizes the Secretary-General to extend the Commission's 
operation for a further period not exceeding three months, if he deems it 
necessary to enable the Commission to complete its investigation, and requests 
that he inform the Security Council accordingly; 
9. Requests the Conrniission to report to the Council on the conclusions of its 
investigation and requests the Secretary-General to update orally the Security 
Council on the progress of the Commission every two months during the 
operations of the Commission or more fi-equently as needed. 
Source: http://daccessdds.un.org/(ioc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/299/98/PDF/N0529998.pdf?OpeiiElement 
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APPENDIX-15 
UN SECURITY RESOLUTION COUNCIL 1636 
United Nations S/RES/1636 (2005) adopted by the Security Council at its 5297* 
meeting, on 31 October 2005 
The Security Council, 
Reaffirming all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1595 
(2005) of 7 April 2005, 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and 1566 (2004) of 8 
October 2004, 
Reiterating its call for the strict respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of 
the Government of Lebanon, 
Reaffirming that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of 
the most serious threats to peace and security. 
Having examined carefully the report of the international independent 
investigation Commission (S/2005/662) ("the Commission") concerning its 
investigation into the 14 February 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that 
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury 
to dozens of people, 
Commending the Commission for the outstanding professional work it has 
accomplished under difficult circumstances in assisting the Lebanese authorities in 
their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, and taking note of the 
Commission's conclusion that the investigation is not yet complete. 
Commending States which have provided assistance to the Commission in the 
discharge of its duties, 
Commending also the Lebanese authorities for the full cooperation they have 
provided to the Commission in the discharge of its duties, in accordance with 
paragraph 3 of resolution 1595 (2005), 
Recalling that pursuant to its relevant resolutions, all States are required to 
afford one anotiier the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
investigations or criminal proceedings relating to terrorist acts, and recalUng in 
particular that it had requested in its resolution 1595 (2005) all States and all parties to 
cooperate fully v^ dth the Commission, 
Taking note of the Commission's findings that although the inquiry has 
already made considerable progress and achieved significant results, it is of the 
utmost importance to continue the trail both within and outside Lebanon in order to 
elucidate fully all aspects of this terrorist act, and in particular to identify and hold 
accountable all those who bear responsibility in its planning, sponsoring, organization 
and perpetration. 
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Mindful of the demand of the Lebanese people that all those responsible for 
the terrorist bombing that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
others be identified and held accoimtable, 
Acknowledging in this coimection the letter of the Prime Minister of Lebanon 
to the Secretary-General of 13 October 2005 (S/2005/651) requesting that the 
mandate of the Commission be extended to enable the Commission to continue to 
assist the competent Lebanese authorities in any further investigation of the various 
dimensions of the terrorist crime, 
Acknowledging also the concurrent recommendation of the Commission that 
continued international assistance is needed to help the Lebanese authorities get right 
to the bottom of this terrorist act, and that a sustained effort on the part of the 
international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform together 
with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential. 
Willing to continue to assist Lebanon in the search for the truth and in holding 
those responsible for this terrorist act accountable for their crime. 
Calling upon all States to extend to the Lebanese authorities and to the 
Commission the assistance they may need and request in connection with the inquiry, 
and in particular to provide them with all relevant information they may possess 
pertaining to this terrorist attack. 
Reaffirming its profound corrmiitment to the national unity and stability of 
Lebanon, emphasizing that the fixture of Lebanon should be decided through peacefiil 
means by the Lebanese themselves, fi-ee of intimidation and foreign interference, and 
warning in this regard that attempts to undermine the stability of 
Lebanon will not be tolerated. 
Taking note of the Conmiission's conclusions that, given the infiltration of 
Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services 
working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a 
complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge, and 
that there is probable cause to believe that the decision to assassinate former Prime 
Minister Rafiq Hariri could not have been taken without the approval of top ranked 
Syrian security officials, 
Mindful of the Commission's conclusion that while the Syrian authorities, 
after initial hesitation, have cooperated to a limited degree with the Commission, 
several Syrian officials have tried to mislead the investigation by giving false or 
inaccurate statements. 
Convinced that it is unacceptable in principle that anyone anywhere should 
escape accountability for an act of terrorism for any reason, including because of his 
own obstruction of the investigation or failure to cooperate in good faith, 
Determining that this terrorist act and its implications constitute a threat to 
intemational peace and security. 
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Emphasizing the importance of peace and stability in the region, and the need 
for peaceful solutions, 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Welcomes the report of the Commission; 
2. Takes note with extreme concern of the Commission's conclusion that, there is 
converging evidence pointing at the involvement of both Lebanese and Syrian 
officials in this terrorist act, and that it is difficult to envisage a scenario 
whereby such complex assassination could have been carried out without their 
knowledge; 
3. Decides as a step to assist in the investigation of this crime and without 
prejudice to the ultimate judicial determination of the guilt or innocence of any 
individual; 
(a) that all individuals designated by the Commission or the Government 
of Lebanon as suspected of involvement in the planning, sponsoring, 
organizing or perpetrating of this terrorist act, upon notification of such 
designation to and agreement of the Committee established in 
subparagraph (b) below, shall be subject to the following measures: 
- All States shall take the measures necessary to prevent entry 
into or transit through their territories of such individuals, 
provided that nothing in this paragraph shall obligate a state 
to refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals, or, if 
such individuals are found within their territory, shall ensure 
in accordance with applicable law that they are available for 
interview by the Commission if it so requests; 
- All States shall: fi-eeze all fimds, financial assets and 
economic resources that are on their territories that are owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such individuals, or 
that are held by entities owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such individuals or by persons acting on their 
behalf or at their direction; ensure that no funds, financial 
assets or economic resources are made available by their 
nationals or by any persons within their territories to or for 
the benefit of such individuals or entities; and cooperate fully 
in accordance with applicable law with any international 
investigations related to the assets or financial transactions of 
such individuals, entities or persons acting on their behalf, 
including through sharing of financial information; 
(b) to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of 
procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the 
members of the Council to undertake the tasks described in the annex 
to this resolution; 
(c) that the Committee and any measures still in force imder subparagraph 
(a) will terminate when the Committee reports to the Security Council 
that all investigative and judicial proceedings relating to this terrorist 
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attack have been completed, unless otherwise decided by the Security 
Council; 
4. Determines that the involvement of any State in this terrorist act would 
constitute a serious violation by that State of its obligations to work to prevent 
and refrain from supporting terrorism, in accordance in particular with 
resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004) and that it would amount also to a 
serious violation of its obligation to respect the sovereignty and political 
independence of Lebanon; 
5. Takes note with extreme concern also of the Commission's conclusion that, 
while the Syrian authorities have cooperated in form but not in substance with 
the Commission, several Syrian officials tried to mislead the Commission by 
giving false or inaccurate information, and determines that Syria's continued 
lack of cooperation to the inquiry would constitute a serious violation of its 
obligations under relevant resolutions, including 1373 (2001), 1566 (2004) 
and 1595 (2005); 
6. Takes note of the recent statement by Syria regarding its intention now to 
cooperate with the Commission and expects the Syrian Government to 
implement in fiiU the commitments it is now making; 
= 11 = 
7. Acknowledges that continued assistance from the Commission to Lebanon, as 
requested by its Government in its letter to the Secretary-General of 13 
October 2005 and recommended by the Commission in its report, remains 
necessary to elucidate ftilly all aspects of this heinous crime, thus enabling that 
all those involved in the planning, sponsoring, organizing and perpetrating of 
this terrorist act, as well as their accomplices, be identified and brought to 
justice; 
8. Welcomes in this regard the decision of the Secretary-General to extend the 
mandate of the Commission until 15 December 2005, as authorized by the 
Security Council in its resolution 1595 (2005), and decides that it will extend 
the mandate further if recommended by the Commission and requested by the 
Lebanese 
1. Government; 
9. Commends the Lebanese authorities for the courageous decisions they have 
already taken in relation to the inquiry, including upon recommendation of the 
Commission, in particular the arrest and indictment of former Lebanese 
security officials suspected of involvement in this terrorist act, and encourages 
the Lebanese authorities to persist in their efforts v^th the same determination 
in order to get right to the bottom of this crime; 
= 111 = 
10. Endorses the Commission's conclusion that it is incumbent upon the Syrian 
authorities to clarify a considerable part of the questions which remain 
unresolved; 
11. Decides in this context that: 
(a) Syria must detain those Syrian officials or individuals whom the 
Commission considers as suspected of involvement in the planning. 
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sponsoring, organizing or perpetrating of this terrorist act, and make 
them fully available to the Commission; 
(b) the Commission shall have vis-a-vis Syria the same rights and 
authorities as mentioned in paragraph 3 of resolution 1595 (2005), and 
Syria must cooperate with the Commission fully and unconditionally 
on that basis; 
(c) the Commission shall have the authority to determine the location and 
modalities for interview of Syrian officials and individuals it deems 
relevant to the inquiry; 
12. Insists that Syria not interfere in Lebanese domestic affairs, either directly or 
indirectly, refrain from any attempt aimed at destabilizing Lebanon, and 
respect scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political 
independence of this country; 
= IV = 
\3. Requests the Commission to report to the Council on the progress of the 
inquiry by 15 December 2005, including on the cooperation received by the 
Commission from the Syrian authorities, or anytime before that date if the 
Commission deems that such cooperation does not meet the requirements of 
this resolution, so that the Council, if necessary, could consider further action; 
14. Expresses its readiness to consider any additional request for assistance from 
the Lebanese Govenunent to ensure that all those responsible for this crime 
are held accountable; 
15. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
Annex 
The following are the functions of the Committee established pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of this resolution: 
1. To register as subject to the measures in paragraph 3 (a) in this resolution 
an individual designated by the Commission or the Government of 
Lebanon, provided that within two working days of receipt of such 
designation no member of the Committee objects, in which case the 
Committee shall meet within fifteen days to determine the applicability of 
the measures in paragraph 3 (a). 
2. To approve exceptions to the measures established in paragraph 3 (a) on a 
case-by-case basis: 
(i) with respect to the travel restrictions, where the Committee 
determines that such travel is justified on the ground of 
humanitarian need, including religious obligation, or where the 
Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise 
further the objectives of this resolution; 
(ii) with respect to the freezing of fimds and other economic 
resources, where the Committee determines that such 
exceptions are necessary for basic expenses, including 
payments for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and 
medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public 
utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable 
professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses 
356 
associated with the provision of legal services, or fees or 
service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen 
funds or other financial assets or economic resources; 
To register the removal of an individual from the scope of the measures in 
paragraph 3 (a) upon notification from the Commission or the Government 
of Lebanon that the individual is no longer suspected of involvement in 
this terrorist act, provided that within two working days of receipt of such 
designation no member of the Committee objects, in which case the 
Committee shall meet within fifteen days to determine the removal of an 
individual from the scope of the measures in paragraph 3 (a). 
To inform all Member States as to which individuals are subject to the 
measures in paragraph 3 (a). 
Source: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/579/61/PDF/N0557961 .pdf?OpenElement 
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APPENDIX-16 
UN SECURITY RESOLUTION COUNCIL 1701 
United Nations SC/8808 adopted by the Security Council at its 5511*** meeting 
(Night), on 11 August 2006, Security Council calls for end to hostilities between 
Hezbollah, Israel, unanimously adopting resolution 1701 (2006). Permanent Ceasefire 
to Be Based on Creation of Buffer Zone Free of Armed Personnel Other than UN, 
Lebanese Forces 
Resolution 
The foil text of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) reads as follows: 
"TTze Security Council, 
^'Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 
(1978), 426 (1978), 520 (1982), 1559 (2004), 1655 (2006) 1680 (2006) and 1697 
(2006), as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon, in 
particular the statements of 18 June 2000 (S/PRST/2000/21), of 19 October 2004 
(S/PRST/2004/36), of 4 May 2005 (S/PRST/2005/17), of 23 January 2006 
(S/PRST/2006/3) and of 30 July 2006 (S/PRST/2006/35), 
^'Expressing its utmost concern at the continuing escalation of hostilities in 
Lebanon and in Israel since Hezbollah's attack on Israel on 12 July 2006, which has 
already caused hundreds of deaths and injuries on both sides, extensive damage to 
civilian infi-astructure and hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, 
''Emphasizing the need for an end of violence, but at the same time 
emphasizing the need to address urgently the causes that have given rise to the current 
crisis, including by the unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers, 
"Mindful of the sensitivity of the issue of prisoners and encouraging the 
efforts aimed at urgently settling the issue of the Lebanese prisoners detained in 
Israel, 
"Welcoming the efforts of the Lebanese Prime Minister and the commitment 
of the Government of Lebanon, in its seven-point plan, to extend its authority over its 
territory, through its own legitimate armed forces, such that there will be no weapons 
without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of 
the Government of Lebanon, welcoming also its commitment to a United Nations 
force that is supplemented and enhanced in numbers, equipment, mandate and scope 
of operation, and bearing in mind its request in this plan for an immediate withdrawal 
of the Israeli forces fi-om southern Lebanon, 
"Determined to act for this withdrawal to happen at the earliest, 
"Taking due note of the proposals made in the seven-point plan regarding the 
Shebaa farms area. 
358 
'Welcoming the unanimous decision by the Government of Lebanon on 
7 August 2006 to deploy a Lebanese aimed force of 15,000 troops in South Lebanon 
as the Israeli army withdraws behind the Blue Line and to request the assistance of 
additional forces from UNIFtt. as needed, to facilitate the entry of the Lebanese 
armed forces into the region and to restate its intention to strengthen the Lebanese 
armed forces with material as needed to enable it to perform its duties, 
''Aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-
term solution to the conflict, 
"Determining that the situation in Lebanon constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security, 
1. Calls for a fiiU cessation of hostilities based upon, in particular, the immediate 
cessation by Hezbollah of all attacks and the immediate cessation by Israel of all 
offensive military operations; 
2. Upon full cessation of hostilities, calls upon the Government of Lebanon and 
UNIFIL as authorized by paragraph 11 to deploy their forces together 
throughout the South and calls upon the Government of Israel, as that 
deployment begins, to withdraw all of its forces from southern Lebanon in 
parallel; 
3. Emphasizes the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of 
Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of 
resolution 1559 (2004) and resolution 1680 (2006), and of the relevant 
provisions of the Taif Accords, for it to exercise its full sovereignty, so that 
there will be no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon 
and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon; 
4. Reiterates its strong support for full respect for the Blue Line; 
5. Also reiterates its strong support, as recalled in all its previous relevant 
resolutions, for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence 
of Lebanon within its internationally recognized borders, as contemplated by the 
Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949; 
6. Calls on the international community to take immediate steps to extend its 
financial and humanitarian assistance to the Lebanese people, including through 
facilitating the safe return of displaced persons and, imder the authority of the 
Government of Lebanon, reopening airports and harbours, consistent with 
pan^aphs 14 and 15, and calls on it also to consider further assistance in the 
future to contribute to the reconstruction and development of Lebanon; 
7. Affirms that all parties are responsible for ensuring that no action is taken 
contrary to paragraph 1 that might adversely affect the search for a long-term 
solution, humanitarian access to civilian populations, including safe passage for 
himianitarian convoys, or the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons, and 
calls on all parties to comply with this responsibility and to cooperate with the 
Security Council; 
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8. Calls for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term 
solution based on the following principles and elements: 
- full respect for the Blue Line by both parties; 
- security arrangements to prevent the resumption of hostilities, including the 
establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any 
armed persoimel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of 
Lebanon and of UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11, deployed in this area; 
- full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of 
resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all 
armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision 
of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than 
that of the Lebanese State; 
- no foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its Government; 
- no sales or supply of arms and related materiel to Lebanon except as 
authorized by its Govenmient; 
- provision to the United Nations of all remaining maps of land mines in 
Lebanon in Israel's possession; 
9. Invites the Secretary-General to support efforts to secure as soon as possible 
agreements in principle from the Government of Lebanon and the Government 
of Israel to the principles and elements for a long-term solution as set forth in 
paragraph 8, and expresses its intention to be actively involved; 
10. Requests the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international 
actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions 
of the Taif Accords, and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including 
disarmament, and for delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, 
especially in those areas where the border is disputed or imcertain, including by 
dealing with the Shebaa farms area, and to present to the Security Coimcil those 
proposals within thirty days; 
11. Decides, in order to supplement and enhance the force in numbers, equipment, 
mandate and scope of operations, to authorize an increase in the force strength 
of UNIFIL to a maximum of 15,000 troops, and that the force shall, in addition 
to carrying out its mandate imder resolutions 425 and 426 (1978): 
(a) Monitor the cessation of hostilities; 
(b) Accompany and support the Lebanese armed forces as they deploy 
throughout the South, including along the Blue Line, as Israel withdraws 
its armed forces from Lebanon as provided in paragraph 2; 
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(c) Coordinate its activities related to paragraph 11 (b) with the Government 
of Lebanon and the Government of Israel; 
(d) Extend its assistance to help ensure humanitarian access to civilian 
populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced persons; 
(e) Assist the Lebanese armed forces in taking steps towards the establishment 
of the area as referred to in paragraph 8; 
(f) Assist the Government of Lebanon, at its request, to implement paragraph 
14; 
12. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an 
international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, 
authorizes UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its 
forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations 
is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful 
means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security 
Coimcil, and to protect United Nations persoimel, facilities, installations and 
equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations 
personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of 
the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence; 
13. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to put in place measures to ensure 
UNIFIL is able to carry out the functions envisaged in this resolution, urges 
Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNIFIL and to 
respond positively to requests for assistance from the Force, and expresses its 
strong appreciation to those who have contributed to UNIFIL in the past; 
14. Calls upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry 
points to prevent the entry in Lebanon without its consent of arms or related 
materiel and requests UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11 to assist the 
Government of Lebanon at its request; 
15. Decides further that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent, by 
their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft: 
(a) The sale or supply to any entity or individual in Lebanon of arms and related 
materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, 
whether or not originating in their territories; and 
(b) The provision to any entity or individual in Lebanon of any technical training or 
assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items 
listed in subparagraph (a) above; except that these prohibitions shall not apply to 
arms, related material, fraining or assistance authorized by the Government of 
Lebanon or by UNIFIL as authorized in paragraph 11; 
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16. Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2007, and expresses 
its intention to consider in a later resolution further enhancements to the 
mandate and other steps to contribute to the implementation of a permanent 
ceasefire and a long-term solution; 
17. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one week on the 
implementation of this resolution and subsequently on a regular basis; 
18. Stresses the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including 
its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973 
and 1515 (2003) of 18 November 2003; 
19. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 
Source: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8808.doc.htm 
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Glossary 
Al-Mithaq al-Watani The National Pact 
Al-Watani The National 
Ayatoilah A Shiite Muslim religious title meaning 'sign of God,' and 
referring to a clergyman who has reached the third level of 
Shiite higher education, is recognized as a mujtahid, and is 
over 40. The word is particularly associated today with the 
Islamic Republic of han. 
Balad Thu Wajh Arabi A country with an "Arab face" 
Caliph 
Emir 
Ijma 
Imam 
Millet 
Successor of the Prophet; temporal leader of the umma in 
the Sunni doctrine or a Muslim ruler 
Ruler, prince, governor of province 
A certain unanimity 
(1) A reUgious leader and teacher of a Suimi Muslim 
community, who leads worship in the Mosque. (2) A 
charismatic leader among Shiite Muslims, who believe that 
in every generation there is an imam who is an infallible 
source of spiritual and secular guidance. The line of imams 
ended in the 9^ century, and since then the ayatoUahs serve 
as the collective caretakers of the office until the return of 
the expected imam. 
Intifada 
Jabal (jebel) 
Jihad 
Majlis 
Majlis al-Shura 
Millah 
The uprising 
Hill, mountain 
Sacred struggle 
Council 
Consultative Cc 
A religion, ere li i , c ed, faith, sect or spiritual community, as 
opposed to din, religion, which denotes religion in 
particular and Islam specifically. Millah is often used in the 
compound "the religion of Abraham" (millat Ibrahim). 
Under the Ottomans, self-administered non-Muslim 
religious community (e.g., Jews, Christians), a logical 
383 
Mithaq 
Mohafazah 
Mudiriyyat 
Mufti 
Muhafazah 
Mujahidin 
Muqawama 
Muslim 
Mutassarrif 
Mutassanifiyya 
Pasha 
Qadi (pi. qudah) 
Qaimaqamate 
Qur'an 
Sherif(pl.Shurafa) 
extension of the early Muslim concept of "people of the 
book." 
Pact 
District 
Administrations 
A religious official of the Sunni rite with the authority to 
issue authoritative opinions in matter of Islamic Law 
Govemorate, district 
Warriors in the cause of religion (Jihad) 
Resistance 
An adherent of Islam, "one who submits" -to the will of 
God 
Governor 
Govemorate 
A Turkish military and civil title of high rank. It is still use 
in Arab countries to designate a civil authority such as a 
regional ruler or major. 
A judge, appointed by a ruler or a govenmient on the basis 
of his superior knowledge of Islamic law. 
The two-govemorate system 
Record of the revelation Muslims believe were sent to 
mankind through the messenger of God, Prophet 
Muhammad 
"Noble" (Sharif is also used). The descendents of the 
Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and AH son of Abi 
Talib. The Prophet had other daughters, but upon the 
marriage of Fatimah the Prophet called a special blessing. 
Each Sherif draws his line of descent from one of the two 
grandsons of the Prophet, Hasan and Hussein. Today, there 
are many thousands of Shurafa in Islamic communities. 
They are treated with respect and addressed in traditional 
societies by a particular title: Sidi, Sayyad, Mawlay etc. In 
some countries special registers exist to inscribe those who 
are entitled to be called Shurafa. Two ruling families today 
are Shurafian, those of Morocco and Jordan. 
384 
Sheikh (Shaykh) 
Shiite, Shi'a 
Sultan 
Sunna 
Sunni (Sunnite) 
Taqiyya 
Ulama 
Umma 
Wadi 
Wahhabism 
Waqf(pl.Awqaf) 
Yishuv 
Yom Kippur 
Za'im (pi. is zu'ama') 
This term can apply to a tribal leader, a religious teacher, a 
ruler, or head of institution 
From Arabic for "partisan" of Ali, Muhammad's kinsman 
and son-in-law. Shiites believe Ali should have succeeded 
to leadership of the ummah upon Muhammad's death and 
that Ali and his several successors (Shiite imams) are the 
only true heads of the ummah. 
A secular ruler of the Islamic community 
The tradition of the Prophet's behaviour and practice 
Muslim who accepts the legitimacy of Muhammad's 
successors. So-called after "sunnah," the admonitions and 
examples of Muhammad regarding proper Muslim belief 
and conduct. 
The practice of dissimulation about one's beliefs to protect 
oneself fix)m harassment or persecution. 
The learned men of the religious law of Islam, Muslim 
scholar, jurist 
The Islamic community 
A desert ravine or steep-sided gorge formed during flash 
floods, but generally containing water only during rainy 
seasons 
The puritanical movement led by Muhammad ibn Abdul 
Wahhab in 18'*' century in the Arabia 
Religious endowments 
(Hebrew: Settlement) the term Yishuv means the Jewish 
community in Palestine, starting with the first aliya in 1882 
and ending with the founding of Israel in May 1948. Used 
in contrast to the term Diaspora, the Yishuv was viewed as 
the vanguard of world Jewry, laying the groimdwork for the 
Jewish state in Palestine. 
The Jewish holy day 
The political boss 
